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ABSTRACT 
The rubber export tax system in West Malaysia consists of 
the following elements: 
1) the Schedule I export tax, which varies with the 
price level of RSb 1 rubber 
2) the Schedule III research cess, which is a fixed 
amount of 1 cent per pound of rubber exported 
3) the Schedule IV replanting cess, which is a constant 
amount of cents per pound of rubber exported. 
The explicit objectives of the Schedule I export tax are to 
raise revenue for the Government and to act as a countercyclical tool 
during periods of price fluctuations. The other two cesses are earmarked 
taxes. The research cess is collected for the purpose of funding 
research in the rubber industry. The replanting cess is collected for 
the purpose of subsidizing replanting amongst the rubber producers. To 
accomplish this a replanting grant is given to the rubber producers. 
The problem to be investigated in this thesis centres on the 
relationship between the imposition of the export taxes and the 
provision of the replanting grant on the one hand and rubber investment 
and production on the other. Owing to differences in the administration 
of the export taxes, particulc^rly the replanting cess, for the estate 
and smallholding sectors and because of their different economic 
background, the effects on the two groups of producers are quite 
different. 
The details of the above issues are explained in Chapter 1, 
which outlines the objectives and methodology of the thesis. It also 
explains the marjier in whxch detailed new data on the rubber production 
Vll 
and marketing system and on the decision making of estates and smallholdings 
was collected by an extensive sample survey during 9 months fieldwork 
in West Malaysia. These new data foinn the basis for a large part of the 
analysis in the thesis. 
In Chapter 2, the development of the rubber industry and its 
role in the Malaysian economy are discussed. Differences in the 
organizational structure and resource use between smallholdings and 
estates are highlighted. 
In Chapter the major theoretical conclusions on export 
taxes in international trade and public finance studies are reviewed. 
The development of the rubber export taxation system is then traced. 
An attempt is also made to reinterpret the Nurkse effect of the use of 
export taxes. 
Chapter k examines the process of price fonnation in the 
rubber sector. The major variables affecting the prices received by 
smallholders and estates are examined by a simple model. In this Chapter, 
there is also an attempt to estimate the effect of a change in the 
rubber export taxes on the domestic prices received by the rubber 
producers. 
Chapter 5 discusses the concept and measurement of progressivity 
of the rubber export taxes. It also analyses the burden of the taLxes 
and its impact on the profitability of rubber production. 
A simple Nerlovian supply response model is constructed for 
smallholdings and estates in Chapter 6. The aim is to establish 
evidence on the influence of the export taxes and replanting grant on 
short run production and long run investment in the rubber industry. 
In Chapter 7, survey data and information are used to verify 
the conclusions of Chapter 6. The decision making process and the 
viii 
variables considered significant by rubber producers in their production 
and investment policy are analyzed. 
The long term planning decision in replanting a stand of 
rubber trees is examined in Chapter 8, The Farria model is applied and 
the effect of the replanting grant on optimal replacement ages is 
analyzed. 
In Chapter 9, the problems involved in restructuring the 
rubber export tax system are explained. A few hypothetical cases are 
used to illustrate the issue. It also provides a summary of the main 
conclusions of this study. 
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Replanting Gra/it +^'+1 
8.P0G Eirtate: Amoxtizod Net Returns for Replacement Clone 
RRIM 600 at 'lO Cents Per Pound, 7 Per Cent, 
Replantinp- Grant 'J't^ O.OO Per Acre 
8.20!I Estate: Amortized Net Returns for Replacement Clone 
RRIM 600 at hn Cents Per Pound, 10 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant fJ'fHO.OO Per Acre +^'+3 
8.201 Estate: Amortized Net Returns for Replacement Clone 
R}iIM 600 at Co Cents Per Pound, 7 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant 00 Per Acre khh 
8."'0J Estcite: Amortized Net Returns for Replacement Clone 
RRIM 600 at 80 Cents Per Pound, 7 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant ff'tW.OO Per Acre hh^ 
F.PCK Estate: Amortized Net Retni-ns for Rei)lacement Clone 
,;RIM 600 at 80 Cent;; Per Pound, 10 Per Cer^ t 
Replanting Grant Per Acre kh6 
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8.20L Estate: Amortized Net lieturns for l^oplacement Clone 
'.mv 600 at '+n Cents Per Pound, ? Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant U O O O . O O Per Acre 
8.20M Estate: Amortized Not Returns for Replacement Clone 
RRTM 600 at >'+0 Cents Per Pound, 10 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grai.t 'ilOOO.OO Per Acre 
8.20N I'Vit'ih,^ : /\mo>-ti"':J Net Returns for Replacement Clone 
HKIK 600 at 60 Cents Per Pound, 7 ler Cent, 
Replanting Grant ii-lOOO.OO Per Acre 
8.200 Estate: /.mortir.ed liet Return fnr Replacement Clone 
RRIM 600 at 60 Cents Per Pound, 10 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant U O O O . O O Per Acre ^50 
8.20P Estate: Amortized Net Retr,rn.<^ for Replacement Clone 
RRIK 600 at 80 Cents Per Pound, 7 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant ",^1000.00 Per Acre 'f^l 
8.20C^ Estate: Amorti::ed Net Returns for Replacement Clone 
RRIM 600 i^t 80 Cents Per Pound, 10 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant JlOOO.OO Per Acre 
8.20R Estate: Amortized Net Returns for Replacement Clone 
RRIM Coo at 'fO Cents Per Pound, 7 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant $1500.00 Per Acre 
8.20.1 ]^state: Amortized Net Returns for Replacement Clone 
RRIM 600 at ^^ 0 Cents Per Pound, 10 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant 31500.00 Per Acre 
8.20T Estate: Amortized Net Returns for Replace! ent Clone 
RRIM 600 at 60 Cents Per Pound, 7 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grruit H 5 0 0 . 0 0 Per Acre ^55 
8.20U Estate: Amorti::ed Net Returns for Replacement Clone 
RRIM 600 at 60 Cents Per Pound, 10 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant ":;i500.00 Per Acre '+56 
8.20V Estate: Amortized N(»t Returns for Replacenient Clone 
RRIM 600 at 80 Cents Per Pound, 7 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant •,U500.00 Per Acre '+57 
8.20W Estate: Amortized Net Returns for Replacement Clone 
RRIM 600 at 80 Cents Per Pound, 10 Per Cent, 
Replajiting Grant U 5 0 0 . 0 0 per Acre '+58 
8.21A Smallholding: Amortized Net Returns for Replacement Clone 
RRIM 600 at ^0 Cents Per Pound, 7 Per Cent, 
No Replanting Grant ^+59 
8.21B Smallholding: Amortized Net Returns for Replacement Clone 
RiJM 600 at 40 Cents Per Pound, 10 Per Cent, 
No Replanting Grant k60 
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8.21c Smallholding: Amortized Net Returns for Replacement 
Clone Hi^ TM 6OO at 60 Cento Per Poiuid, ? Per Cent, 
No Replanting Grant. 
8.21D Smallholding: Amortized Ket Returns for Replacement 
Clone RRTH 6OO at 60 Cents Per Pound, 10 Per Cent, 
KG Replanting Grant 
8,21E Smallholding; Amortized Net Returns for Replacement 
Clone RRIK 6OO at 80 Cents Per Pound, 7 Per Cent, 
No Replanting Grant ^63 
8.21F Smallholding: Amortized Net Returns for Replacement 
Clone RRIM 6OO at BO Cents Per Pound, 10 Per Cent, 
No Replanting Grant 
8,21G Snallholdin-: Amortised Net Returns for Replacement 
Clone RRIM 6OO at kO Cents Per Pound, 7 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grrmt $?50.00 Per Acre 
8.2111 Smallholding: Amortized Net Returns for Replacement 
Clone RRIM 6OO at 'rO Cents Per Pound, 10 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant ::750.00 Per Acre ^66 
8.211 Snallholdini;: Amortised Met Returns for Heplacer::Ont 
Clone RRIM 6OQ at 60 Cents Per Found, 7 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant '^750.00 Per Acre '<67 
8.21J Smallholding: Amortised Met Returns for Replacement 
Clone RRIM 6OO at 60 Cents Per Po^md, 10 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant S750.00 Per Acre 
8.21K Smallholding: Amortized Net Returns for Replacement 
Clone RRIM 6OO at 80 Cento Per Found, 7 Per Cent, 
Repl^mting Grant S750.00 Per Acre -+69 
8,21L Smallholding: Amortized Net Returns for Replacement 
Clone RRIM 6OO at 80 Cents Per Found, 10 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant 3750.00 Per Acre '-^ 70 
8.21M Smallholding: Amortised ilet Returns for Replacement 
Clone RRTM 6OO at 'iO Cents Per Pounds 7 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant "1000.00 Per Acre 471 
8.21N Smallholding: Amortized Ilct Returns for Replacement 
Clone R-RIM. 6OO at hO Cents Per Pound, 10 Per Cent, 
Replacement Grant tSlOOO.OO Per Acre 
8.210 Smallholding: Amortized Net Retiu-ns for Replacement 
Clone RRIM 6OO at 60 Cents Per Pound, 7 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant ^^aOOO.OO Per Acre '•(73 
8.21? Smallholding: Amortized Net Returrc for Replacement 
Clone RRIM 6OO at CO Cents Per Pound, 10 Per Cent, 




8,21Q Smallholding;: /unortized Net Returns for Replacement 
Clone RRIM f^OO at 80 Cents Per Pound, 7 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant ttlOOO.OO Per Acre ^75 
8.21R Smallholding: Anortized Net Returns for Replacement 
Clone RRIM 600 at 80 Cents Per Pound, 10 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant "^1000.00 Per Acre ^76 
8.213 Snallholding: Amox-ti:icd NuL Returns for Replacement 
Clone RRIM 600 at +^0 Cents Per Pound, 7 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant U 5 0 0 . 0 0 Per Acre ^77 
8.21T Smallholdi nf;: Amor tized Net Returns for Replacement 
Clone RRIM 600 at '+0 Cuate Per Pound, 10 Per Gent, 
Replanting Grant BI5OO.OO Per Acre ^+78 
8.21U Smallholding: Amoi-tized TJet Returns for Replacement 
Clone RRIK 6OO at 60 Cents Per Pound, 7 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant 51500.00 Per Acre i+79 
8.21V Smallholding: Amortized Net Returns for Replacement 
Clone RRIM 6OO at ''.O Cents Per Pound, 10 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant 1{1500.00 Per Acre kSO 
8.211V Smallholding: Amortized Net Returns for Replacement 
Clone RRIM 6OO at 80 Cents Per Pound, 7 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant t{1500.00 Per Acre 48l 
8,21X Smallholding: Amortized Net Returns for Replacement 
Clone RRIM 600 at 80 Cents Per Pound, 10 Per Cent, 
Replanting Grant 151500.00 Per Acre ^82 
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CHAPTEE 1 
In this introductory chaptei-, we shall first outline the 
general problem and scope of the thesis. Then the sajnple and the 
survey are discussed. 
1.1. THE PR0BL]!l4 
The term export taxation refers to the various methods used 
by a government or its agencies to withhold a portion of the export 
proceeds from the domestic suppliers. These have variously included 
the imposition of export duties, the use of marketing boards, and 
the establishment of a multiple exchange rate system.^ 
In this study, the term export taxation as applied to the 
Malaysian rubber industry is given a wider connotation. It is defined 
as a two part system. One part involves a three tier payment of export 
duty (Schedule I), research cess (Schedule III), ajid replanting cess 
(Schedule IV), by all exporters to the government for all rubber 
exported from the country. To facilitate discussion later on, the term 
export taxes is used to denote these various payments by rubber 
producers.^ The replanting grant constitutes the other component of 
the rubber export taxation system. It is in effect a negative tax or 
a subsidy paid by the government to rubber producers for the purpose 
of rubber replanting and new planting. 
The rubber export taxation system is described in detail in 
chapter Therefore, only a brief description of its operation is 
given here to help explain the problem of the thesis. 
^ In this study marketing boards and multiple exchange rates are ignored. 
^ When a particular export tax is referred to it will be specified. 
For details of rates and their historical changes see Appendix 3«1. 
Export taxes are collected by the government from rubber 
exporters at the point of export. The export duty (Schedule I) to be 
paid for each pound of rubber exported is computed on the basis of the 
level of RS3 1 (ribbed smoked sheet grade 1) f.o.b. world prices. 
That is, a sliding scale is used. Historically, the export duty on 
rubber has been the major source of revenue to the government. From 
the Korean War boom period, it has also assumed the role of a 
countercyclical device to insulate the economy from the volatile impact 
of rubber price fluctuations. 
The research cess (Schedule III) is an earmarked tax collected 
specifically for the purpose of financing research to help improve the 
rubber industry. The existing rate is 1 cent per pound of rubber 
exported irrespective of the level of rubbei' prices. 
Like the research cess, the replanting cess (Schedule IV) is 
also an earmarked tax. It is collected for the purpose of financing 
replanting and new planting in the smallholding sector. Though both 
estates and smallholders have to pay the replanting cess, in effect only 
the smallholders contribute the cess. This is because the replanting 
cess is returned to estates every three months after verification of each 
estate's production data and therefore the amount to be returned. To 
adiriinister this, Fund A for tlie estates and Fund B for smallholdings 
were established. The rate of the cess in 1975 is 'f.5 cents per pound 
of rubber exported. 
To rejuvenate the rubber industry, various replanting schemes 
have been started by the government. Of direct int'-Test to us is the 
replanting subsidy given to rubber producers to stimulate their 
replc'inting. The amount provided to estates was S^OO per acre. 
Smallholders have been given ii'750 per acre.^ 
^ See Chapter 3 for details. 
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Since the imposition of export taxes on rubber started in 1907, 
many chemges have been made to the structure of the tajt schedules. 
Changes have also been made to the amount of direct assistance provided 
to rubber producers. As mentioned earlier, these historical changes and 
their details are examined in Chapter 3 and will not be pursued fiorther 
in this section. 
At the macro and micro level investment in rubber planting and 
rubber production in the long and short run is influenced by numerous 
diverse factors of varying importance. The relationship between some 
of the most significant variables and investment in rubber planting and 
production is summarized in a schematic form in Figure 1.1. It must 
be pointed out that the relationship is a dynamic one and involves the 
interaction of economic and non economic variables. The schema shows 
only a simplified version of the actual situation. 
The problem to be studied centres on the relationship between 
the imposition of export taxes and the provision of the replanting grant 
on the one hand and rubber investment and production on the other. 
Though the explicit objectives of the imposition of the export 
duty are to raise revenue and to stabilize the economy, and that of the 
research and replanting cesses are to improve the rubber industry, their 
existence has certain economic effects on rubber production. The 
requirement to pay export taxes may be considered as an outside inter-
ference in the economic activities of rubber producers. Reactions to 
this are reflected in a change in their economic behaviour and 
decisions on economic plans directly or indirectly affected by the export 
taxes. 
Thus, the conclusion from a priori reasoning is that the export 
taxes would, by reducing the profit level and therefore the potential 
FIGURE 1 . 1 . REJ..ATIONSHIP l^ L'TiVE'JN 1-ilJBBEK PRODUCTION 
AND OTHLR MAJOl-i VARIABIJi^S 
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amount of investible funds, have an adverse impact on the long run 
investment in rubber planting and short run production of rubber. 
Counteracting this disincentive effect of the export taxes is the 
stimulus of the replanting grant to rubber investment. 
Because of differences in resource base, perception of future 
economic events, and the influence of economic and non economic factors 
on decision making, individual estate and smallholding rubber producers 
are expected to react differently under the rubber export taxation 
system. 
These micro-economic reactions will in turn have their impact 
at the macro level on rubber production, employment, revenue, and 
income of the government. 
1.2. 0&TECTIVE.S 
The maior intention of the thesis is therefore to investigate 
some of these major effects of the rubber export taxation system on the 
rubber industry in general and on the comparative position of the 
estate and smallholding sectors in particular. 
To fulfil this, the first objective of the study is to trace 
the relationship between the world price and the dealer's price given 
to rubber producers and the position of the export taxes in this nexus. 
After the formal and effective incidence of the export taxes is 
determined, the second objective is to measure and compare the burden 
of the export taxes on estates and smallholders, A tem.poral and inter-
sectoral comparison is made to establish the relative burden of the 
two groups of producers. 
The third objective then is to analyze the effect of the export 
taxes and replanting grant on long run investment in rubber planting 
and rubber Tsroduction in the short run. 
To confirm the results of the quantitative study in the third 
objective and to gain a better insight into the decision making process, 
the fourth objective is to have a comparative study of the organizational 
structure of the estate firm and smallholding firm-household complex 
and the variables influencing ttaeir decision making in long run 
investm.ent and short run production. 
In determining the best time to replace rubber trees, rubber 
producers face a different, and quite difficult type of decision making 
as compared to other routine aspects of management. Here the decision 
making is complicated by the influence of agronom.ic and economic factors 
like the yield distribution, expected prices, and the replanting grant. 
The fifth objective is thus to suggest the application of a replacement 
model to the rubber industry and, in particular to investigate the impact 
of the replanting grant on the optimal replacem.ent of a stand of rubber 
trees in the estate and smalUiolding case. 
Lastly, to illustrate the difficulties of restructijiring the 
export tax system a few hypothetical cases are examined. 
As the impact of the rubber export taxation system has widespread 
repercussions and rsjnifications both v;ithin the rubber industry and in 
the whole economy, the study would become unm.anageable if every aspect 
of this is to be traced out. Besides, the data constraint would 
frustrate such an attempt. The scope of the thesis is thus confined to 
the above objectives. 
1.3. GENERAL APPROACH 
- The approach used in the study is essentially the partial .analysis 
one which is concerned with a definite sector, the rubber industry, of 
the total Malaysian economy. The focus of the analysis is the estate 
firm, the smallholding firm-household complex, and the rubber dealer. 
The general methodological approach is to use a combination of 
deductive reasoning, empirical-statistical techniques, and observation 
and survey information to analyze a problem or problems. 
The principal tools used include simple econometric methods, 
statistical techniques like the chi-square test, budgeting, and discount 
cash flow technique. One innovative feature of this thesis is to use 
survey research to verify the results of various econometric models. 
The main contribution from survey- information is that it can supplement 
the underst?iinding of an empirical result by high lighting the 
institutional background and non economic variables of the problem. A 
survey of rubber producers and rubber dealers was thus conducted. 
l.^U SAMPLE 
Given the above, a method of selecting the sample had to be 
decided so that the desired information and d<ata could be collected with 
the time and resources available. 
One possibility was to choose rubber producers at random 
throughout the country. This was rejected as impracticable as the amount 
of travelling involved in conducting the fieldwork would have been 
prohibitive. Besides, in the case of smallholdings there was no suitable 
"frame" of reference. Their actual population size and their location 
were not known. It would be very time consuming to attempt to locate 
the sm.allholders who were scattered over a wide area if the whole country 
was surveyed. Fvirthermore, the author did not have the resources to 
conduct such a large scale survey. 
Because of the above reasons it was decided to confine the survey 
to the state of Selangor. From the view point of logistics it was more 
convenient to carry out the study in this state as most of the sources of 
information were located in the Federal Capital, Kuala Lum.pur. For 
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instance, the Rubber Research Institute, the State x^eplanting Office, 
Department of Statistics, the Rubber Industry Smallholder Development 
Authority, Agency Houses, and raost main offices of rubber companies and 
rubber dealers are found in Kuala Lumpur. There v^ as one additional 
advantage in choosing the state of Selangor. Some studies have ali'eady 
been made on the rubber industry in this state. These would therefore 
provide useful background information on the characteristics and 
institutions of the rubber industry. Morever, they are useful for 
comparative purposes. 
We shal.l now discuss the stiinple on rubber smallholdings, 
estates, and rubber dealers in that order. 
One estimate of the number of rubber smallholders in the country 
is half a million people.^ Of this, an estimated 25,000 are located in 
Selangor.^ RISDA estimated that by the end of 1973 there were about 
156,000 acres of smallholdings in Selangor. The National Crop Survey of 
1967/68, however, gave <an estimated figure of 188,000 acres. Up to 
date information on the distribution of smallholdings by size and ethnic 
group are not available. The only major source of information, though 
dated, was from the Department of Statistics in 1952. This is presented 
in Table 1.1. 
Given the limited resources of the author, the large estimated 
population size, the heterogenous character of the population and the 
t. 
For instance, P.K.Voon, Chinese Rubber Sm.allholding Industry in 
Selangor, (M.A.Thesis, University of Malaya, I967) and S.C.Lira, A 
Study of the Marketing of Smallholders' Rubber at the First Trade 
Level in Selangor, (Vi.A.Thesis, University of Malaya, 1968)1 
c 
Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority. This excludes 
Land Schemes. 
^ Ikii-
n Department of Statistics. 
scattered location of the population it would not be feasible to have 
a large stratified random sample survey of the smallholders. A purposive 
sample was therefore more practicable. The sample was confined to 
individual smallholders who did not belong to any government land schemes. 
Smallholdings in land schemes were organised, and some even administered, 
by govermrient agencies cind officials. Consequently, the economic 
behaviour of the smallholders would be quite different. We are more 
interested in the case of the ordinary individual smallholder with regard 
to his decision making and the impact of the expoi-t taxes on his response 
behaviour. Secondly, only the owners of the smallholdings would be 
interviewed. This is because they were the decision makers on long run 
investment decisions and on the short run management problems. 
Interviewing a tenant, for instance, would not be useful in term.s of 
obtaining the above information as he did not decide on such issues. 
A total of 100 smallholders was decided on. No sophisticated 
formula was used to determine this size. Practical considerations, like 
the survey time and help available, were uppermost in m.ind. It was 
s 
thought this could be surveyed within the survey period of eight months 
and is of a sufficient size to give us a representative background. A 
simple stratification on the basis of ethnic grouping by size was used. 
TABLE 1.1. OVVNERSHIP PATTERN OF RUBBER SMALMOLDINGS 
IN SELANGOR, 1952 
1 ? 1 i " ^ „ -, i Percentage j Below 25 I 25 - 100 Total ! ^^ i 




Malay ! 4l,80'+ 
Chinese | '+^ ,072 












Source: Rubber Statistical Handbook, 1952. 
8 From May to January, 1973-
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There was an important rationale for this. Research works of 
Swift, Bevan, and Barlovr have shown that there are significant 
differences in the economic behaviour of smallholders of different 
ethnic origin. The Selangor State Replanting Officer and other RISDA 
officials also confirmed this from their field exneriences during their 
contacts with smallholders. If this is so then a stratification on the 
basis of ethnic groups would help to reveal comparative differences in 
economic behavioui- of smallholders of different ethnic origin in the 
analysis. The total sample of smal^tholders was therefore split between 
the two dominant ethnic groups, Malays and Chinese. 50 Malay and 50 
Chinese smallholders were selected. No Indian smallholders were selected 
as they were not very significant in number. This corresponds quite well 
to the distribution of smallholders by ethnic groups in Selangor 
(Table 1.1.). 
Table 1.2 shows the distribution of the sample of smallholders 
surveyed according to acreage size and ethnic grouping. 
1 J. . » SAMPLE OF SMALLHOLDERS BY SIZE AND ETHNIC GROUP 
1 
Below 10 Acres | 
• • 


















I 1 5 0 1 
50 100 
i , 
It can be noticed that in the case of the Malay ethnic group 
80 per cent of the smallholders were below 10 acres. In the case of 
the Chinese, 80 per cent were above 10 acres. This "weight" was 
deliberately assigned to the sample as the distribution at the country 
9 c Swift, M. Malay Peasant Society in Jelebu, London School of 
Economics, Monographs on Social Anthropology, No.29, 1965; 
Bevan, J.V/.L. A Report on the Marketing of Smallholders' Rubber 
with Special Reference to the First Level Buyer, (Rubber Archives, 
R.R.I.M., Doc.7, 1956); Barlow, personal communication. 
level corresponds roughly to this. Thus about 8? per cent of Kalay 
smallholders are below 10 acres in size while most of the Chinese 
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smallholders are over 10 acres.''" In fact the average size of holdings, 
as presented in Table 1.3 shows that the Chinese smallholding is twice 
the size of the Kalay one both in Selangor and for the whole of West 
Malaysia. Our survey data suggest that the average size of Malay 
smallholding may be about 3.5 acres and that of the Chinese 9.5 acres 
in Selangor. 
TABLE 1.3. AVHIMGE .SIZIC OF SMALLHOLDING;^ IN CELANGOR 
BY ETHNIC GROUP:;, 1965 
Ethnic Average Size of Holding 





V/est Malaysia 1 
(Acres) | 
i j 
1 Chinese j 10.1 10.5 
Kalay i 1 ^.9 
f 5 
1 i+.l 
Others 9.9 3 n.a. 1 
j Overall Average ! 5.9 1 n.a. f i vi 
Source: Report on a Survey of Smallholders' Replanting to which 
Full Replanting Grants have been Paid, Document 12, 
Research Archives, R.R.I.M., 1959, p.l-
There are tv/o major sources of information on smallholders, 
the District Office and the State Replanting Office in Selangor. Each 
District Office has some official records of land use in the district 
it administers. The uasic information would include the address, lot 
number, registered ownership, and ethnic group of the owner(s) of a 
plot of lajid. The type of crop cultivated was also indicated. One 
troublesome feature of the information in the District Offices was that 
they were not properly filed and catalogued. It was very time 
consuming to check thi-ough all the files in all the District Offices and 
then rearrange them as a basis for sampling. 
10 Rubber Industry Small^iolders Development Authority (hereafter 
referred to as RISDA./ 
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Another major source of information was the State Replanting 
Office in Selangor. The State Replanting Office filed information on 
smallholders and smallholdings who had applied for replanting. The 
files contained information on the address of the owner, his ethnic 
origin, the lot number of the holding, acreage size, the proportion of 
mature and immature areas, type of planting material, and the date of 
past replanting. It was felt that this was a better source of 
information on individual om.allholdings and was therefore used in obtaining 
the sample of smallholders. In fact, the Deputy Directors of the 
Smallholders Section of the Rubber Industry Smallholders Development 
Authority and the Selangor otate Chief Replanting Officer advised that 
this was probably the "best" so'jrce of information on smallholdings. 
The principal sources of information on estates"^ "^  were: the 
Rubber Statistics Handbook, the Straits Times Directory, and the 
Directory of Rubber Estates in West Malaysia. The Handbook provided only 
the bare background data, viz, the number of estates in Selangor» No 
other details were given. The Straits Times Directory gave more useful 
information like the name of the company, its address, the ownership and 
acreage of the estate. The Directory of Rubber Estates, which was 
compiled by the Botany Division of the Rubber Research Institute, gave -
in addition to the above information - details on land use in each estate. 
The Directory of Rubber Estates listed 255 estates in Selangor 
in 1972. The distribution by type of ownership is given in Table l A . 
A simple stratified sample, with a sample size of 20 per cent, was taken 
(see Table 1.^). The distribution of the s<ample by. size group is 
presented in Table 7.1 in chapter ?. 
1 2 Two sources of information on rubber dealers'" ' were used: 
^^ See Chapter 2 for details on estate sector. 
^ See Chapter 2 for more details on rubber dealers. 
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the licensing authority"^ and the Department of Statistics. The total 
number of dealers in Selangcr which were licensed to purchase, treat, 
and store rubber was listed by the Department of Statistics to be 229 
in 1972. The classification by trade level is shown in Table 1.5. A 
stratified random sample of 1 per cent of the population was taken. 
TABLE oTRATIl'Tii; SAMPLE OY ESTATZL^ IN SELANG02, 1 9 7 2 





(20 Per Cent) 
Public Limited Company | 80 
Private Limited Company 1 7 1 
Partnership i 82 ! 
Sole Proprietorship and Others*^^^ ?2 
i 
! 




Total i 2 5 5 
! 5 0 ; 
(a) Including k estates operated by the National Land Finance 
Cooperative. 
Source: Department of Statistics. 
TABI^ 1.5. STRATIFIED RANDOM SAMPLE OF RUE3SB DEALERS 






(10 Per Cent) 
j First Level Dealer i ; ( i 
Middle Level Dealer 65 1 
J 
Exporter Level 10 : 1 ! 
Total 2 2 9 ; i ^^ 
1 
Sources: 1) Rubber Dealers' Association, Selangor. 
2) Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur. 
1.5. COLLECTION OF DATA 
This section gives a brief account of the way the survey was 
conducted and how the data were collected. The case of the sm.allholders, 
estates and rubber dealers is explained in that order. 
13 Malaysian Rubber Exchange and Licensing Board (MRELB). 
The survey was carried out during the period April-November 1973. 
During the survey the author had the assistance of a graduate student 
in Economics. The Selangor State Chief Replanting Officer was 
extremely helpful and provided the author with an official letter, which 
explained the nature of the survey, and the help of the Assistant 
Replanting Officers. 
After the sample was selected a schedule of the rubber 
producers and rubber dealers to be interviewed was worked out. This 
schedule had to be occasionally revised because of the inevitable changes 
made in the original time-table due to cancellation or postponement of 
appointments. 
The knowledge of the Assistant Replanting Officer of the local 
area expedited the locating of the smallholders and facilitated the 
survey. In fact, a lot of time was saved because of their help. Though 
the addresses of the smallholders were listed in the files of the State 
Replanting Office it was still difficult to look for them during the 
survey. First, the address of a particular smallholder and his actual 
residence need not coincide. The official address given to the State 
Replanting Office could be a care-of or postal address, usually near or 
along the main road, and his actual residential place could be a few 
miles off the main road. Secondly, even if the address was correct it 
could still be a frustrating experience and time cons^oming effort trying 
to locate him unless one was familiar with the local environment. From 
this viewpoint the assistance of the ARO's was extremely useful. In 
most cases, they knew the smallholders at the personal level. This not 
only helped in locating the smallholders but also in establishing support 
between them and the author. 
1/4 
This student had just completed his M.Ec. thesis on some accounting 
aspects of the estate sector in the rubber industry. He was also 
extremely fluent in Bahasa Malaysia and several Chinese dialects. 
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The best time for the interview v/ac from 11.30 a.m. onwards 
when the smallholder had already completed his tapping of the rubber 
trees, the collection and processing of the latex, and other 
miscellaneous work. As far as possible, the interview was conducted in 
his house. This was to ensure that there was privacy for the interview 
and that the price data could be copied out from the Cultivation Book 
with little interruption from anyone. 
The interview was conducted either in Bahasa Malaysia^"^ or in 
one of the Chinese dialects. This depended on the ethnic origin of the 
smallholder. Extraction of information from the smallholder involved 
a) the filling in of the questionnaire, and 
b) the copying of the dealer's price series. 
As far as possible both were done at the same time so that little time 
would be wasted. It took about minutes to complete the questionnaire 
and about two to three hours to copy out the price data. The total 
time taken varied with each smallholder and with the length of the time 
series on dealer's price. If the interview and the copying of the data 
were done simultaneously it would take on the average about three hours 
to survey one sm.allholder. Depending on the location (geographical 
accessibility) and the total time taken for each smallholder, an average 
of two smallholders could be surveyed in one day. 
If the original sample of 100 smallholders, 15 had to be 
replaced because 10 could not be located and 5 were uncooperative. 
These latter were all Chinese smallholders. In general, it was much 
easier to obtain the cooperation of the Malay smallhold.ers. The Chinese 
ones were usually more suspicious of the intent of the survey. 
In comparison to smallholders it was much easier to survey the 
estates. Each of the estates in the sample was contacted by phone. The 
Bahasa Malaysia is the national language of the country. 
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natui'e of the survey was then explained. It was easier to obtain 
permission by phoning than by writing to the company. Besides getting a 
prompt reply, some persuasion could be used during the conversation to 
overcome the doubt and suspicion of the company's authority. As far as 
possible the owner(s) or one of the directors would be contacted for the 
interview. However, in those cases where none of them were around the 
manager would be interviewed. Altogether there were 9 such cases. 
These estates were in effect run by the managers. Consequently their 
views sjid that of the owners were not expected to differ greatly. When 
managers were interviewed this w^ ui invariably at the estate office. This 
was normally done after 1] a.m. when all the work in the estate was 
com.pleted. '.'.'hen owners or directors were interviewed this could be at 
the estate office or in the main headquarters which would normally be in 
Kuala Lumpur. In such cases the time of the interview was fixed according 
to the convenience of the interviewee. Even then visits to the estate 
might be necessary if the various records containing information on the 
estate were kept at the estate office. The interview was usually conducted 
in English. It took on the average 2 to Z,k days to complete one estate. 
The questionnaires could be completed in about minutes. Ho?/ever, 
it would take at least a day to go through the files and records of an 
estate to obtain the relevant information. 
5 estates (private limited companies) in the original sample 
were replaced because the Directors refused to divulge any information.^^ 
As in the case of the estates, whenever possible the rubber 
dealers were contacted by phono and an appointment would be made at a 
convenient time. In most cases, the interview was done in the late 
afternoon at their offices as the rubber dealers vrould be busy with their 
^^ In the case of the other estates which cooperated the author had to 
promise them that the information they gave was strictly confidential 
and that no names were to be mentioned in the thesis. 
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transactions in the morning and early afternoon. The interview was 
conducted either in English or in Hokkien,"' a Chinese dialect. In the 
case of those first level dealers who could not be contacted hy phone 
the author would visit their offices to get their approval and an 
appointment would be made for the survey interview a few days later. 
1.6. TYPES OF INFORMATION 
In order to study the objectives of the thesis both institutional 
inforniation and empirical data were required. These were derived from 
two sources. The primary source was the survey on rubber producers and 
rubber dealers, and the secondary source was the published and unpublished 
information of government and quasi government institutions. 
The survey made use of a set of questionnaires. For both 
smallholders and estates the questionnaires (Appendices 1.1 and 1.2) were 
framed to elicit the following information: 
1) general background of the rubber producer and hJ.s 
rubber holding or company; 
2) the marketing policy of the producer; 
3) the replanting policy and general response behaviour 
of the producer with respect to the export taxes; 
k) time series on prices received and output sold. 
In the case of the estates, which had much better data, three 
additional schedules were used to obtain information on replanting 
expenditure (Appendix 1.3), costs of production (Appendix 1.4), and yield 
statistics (Appendix 1.5). 
The general procedure during the survey was to fill in the 
questionnaires with the relevant answers. Any other information which 
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" This is because most of the Chinese rubber dealers belonged to the 
Hokkien clan. 
T 0 
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could be of use in our studi/, provided by the interviewees was recorded 
in a note book. Time t:eries data, however, were copied out from their 
souT'ces onto a ledger-type book. The two major time series were on 
dealer's price given to rubber producers and the rubber sales of the 
producers. The purpose in collecting these two series was to trace the 
relationship between world price and that received by rubber producers 
and to find out the response behaviour of rubber producers with respect 
to both prices and the export taxes. 
The only source of information of smallholders' sales of rubber 
and prices received wsis the Rubber Cultivation Book which, under Scheme M 
of the Rubber Supervision Licensing Legislation, required that licensed 
dealers in rubber to enter details of sales and prices given to 
smallholders. All smallholders must have this Book before they could 
sell rubber. The full title was Certificate of Registration of Rubber 
Cultivation. The Book contained the name, address, acreage and lot 
number of the smallholder. There were appropriate columns within the 
pages for the entry of rubber sales and prices accepted. The sales were 
recorded in local units, i.e., in pikuls and katis, and the dealers' 
prices were in Malaysian 'ringgits' and cents. The recording was done 
by the rubber dealer. The Book was not necessarily kept by the smallholder. 
Out of convenience he might leave it with the dealer. In our sample,20 
smallholders let the dealer keep the Book. All were Malay smallholders. 
When such a practice was undertaken it usually meant that the smallholders 
would continue to sell to the particular dealer for some tiniG* UGS v/as 
still the common grade sold by smallholders. RoS was more frequently 
sold by the relatively larger smallholders. The frequency of sale varied 
between k to 8 times a month. Depending on the smallholder, this meant 
that there were k to S dealer' s prices (v/ith tiieir corresponding quantity 
of rubber sold) per month. A total of 48 to ^G dealer's prices per year 
for each smallholder might be available. 
19 
\iVhen the Book was with the smallholder it v;as then a simple matter 
of copying out the data. If it was with the dealer then we had to seek 
the dealer for permission to check through the Book. The smallholder 
was normally brought along to get back his Book for us. Without him, 
the dealer would be reluctant to cooperate. 
The quality of the data in tu^rms of length and completeness of 
the time series was uneven. Of the total cross-sectional data so far 
obtained (see Table 1,6) only 60 Gmallhclders had dealer's prices 
recorded back from December 1973 to January I969. These were the larger 
smallholders, above 10 acrer. Details of the distribution of the dealer's 
price by length of time i,; shown in Table 1.6. Smallholders kept minimal 
written records, if ciny, of the economic and marketing aspects of their 
rubber production. Besides the problem of general illiteracy (most of 
them can actually read some Jawi or Chinese) it was the lack of 
determination to v/rite down relevant particulars, and the attitude that 
this was more ol a botheration than a help, which explained the general 
lack of data and in particul.^.r accounted for the short time series of 
most dealers' prices. This alt30 explained the incompleteness of certain 
time series. Though dealers were legally obliged to record the 
transactions in the Book they did not always do this dutifully. Most 
did so only when the smallholders asked them to or when the latter fussed 
over the issue. However, few smallholders really bothered. Thus both 
thp dealei-s and the smallholders did not consider the proper recording 
of the dealers' prices (and the corresponding sales) with any practical 
significance: the former were seldom disturbed by government officers over 
this and the latter cannot appreciate the usefulness of such recordi.ngs. 
Perhaps it needs a slightly higher degree of 'accounting and economic 
sophistication' to perceive that such records could be of some use for 
cross-references and for other planning purposes. 
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TABLE 1.6. NUMBER OF SMALLHOLDJ.H.S AND ETAT'-vS HAVING PP.ICE 
m D S/lLSS OBSERVATIONS BETWEEN JAI'-IU.-iW 1969 /vND 
DECEI^ .BER 1973 
January 1969 September 1971 
to to 
December 1973 July 1973 





The main source of dealers' prices for estates was foiond in the 
various sales invoices which recorded the date, weight of the sales, the 
grade of rubber sold, fmd the prices given by the dealer. One of these 
invoices was kept by the estate manager .and another copy was kept with 
the headquarters. The nur.ber of such invoices depended on the frequency 
of sales by the estate. These invoices were normally filed. However, 
depending on the efficiency of the Chief Clerk, they were not necessarily 
filed according to chronological order. When this happened quite a lot 
of time was wasted looking through the files first before the data were 
copied out on to a book. Dealers' prices on RS3 1, 2, 3 and scrap 
rubber were copied out. 
There was no doubt that the time series of dealers' prices of 
the estates were of a much better quality than those of the smallholders. 
They were very complete, i.e., every tr.ansaction, and thus the invoice 
for this, was recorded and filed. Though estates did not necessarily 
stick to one dealer there was no necessity for the author to obtain the 
information from the dealer. The reason was that, as earlier mentioned, 
every invoice was kept by the estate. 
One disappointing note was that not all the estates kept such 
records longer than I968. This was the earliest year the author came 
across. Only 5 estates had such a long time series. The explanation of 
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most Chief Clerks and the Estate Managers was that most of these records 
had already been throvm away or could not be found. The author tried 
in vain to obtain data for the earlier period from the Agency House of 
the estate. The Agency Houses were extremely uncooperative with regard 
to the release of any data. In fact, they would be quite displeased if 
they knew the estate manager showed me such information. Most Agency 
Houses did not bother themselves to find out if they had such earlier 
information and they usually gave a simple no. A few tried to help but 
could not because bhey just could not find the old ledgers and reports. 
It would be possible to trace back some of these earlier data if the 
dealer who bought from the estate was known, instate managers, however, 
could not inform me of this. Neither could the staff of the Agency 
House. (Maybe they refused to do so.). 
One other source on dealers' prices was found in the Progress 
Report of the estate. This was found in the 'Despatches' section. The 
date, invoice number, grades of rubber, weights, and proceeds were 
given. This source of information was used to counter-check what might 
be missing within the files of the sales invoices^ (Sometimes a slip of 
an invoice might be inadvertently kept in another file.). Going through 
the invoices definitely involved more time than checking through the 
'Despatches' section. But the data were better in the sense that the 
dealers' prices were given as so many cents or ringgits. The 'Despatches' 
section only listed down the total proceeds of the transaction. The 
dealers' prices had therefore to be worked out. 
We shall comment on some of the problems encountered during the 
interview of rubber producers. The following seem to be quite common 
problems encountered during the interview: 
1) Digression on the part of the smallholder; 
2) Miscomprehension of certain questions; 
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3) Exaggeration, whether overestimation or underestimation, 
in answering certain questions; 
Ignorance over certain issues and therefore unable to 
reply certain questions; 
5) Deliberate refusal to reply certain questions. 
Though it took on the average about minutes to answer the 
questionnaire many smallholders took a longer time. One of the cauces 
of this was the constant digression on the part of the smallholders into 
irrelevant issues, e.g., their family and financial problems, and 
political issues. Thus in the Mukim of Kajang a by-election was held 
during the time of the survey. This became a very current topic among 
the local residents. The four smallholders interviewed there incessantly 
brought in political discussions. In this particular instance it was 
quite futile to restrain them as the by-election and local politics were 
•uppermost in their rainds. A lot of tolerance had therefore to be shown. 
In other cases of digressions it was quite easy to guide the smallholders 
back to the issues in the questionnaire. We often reminded them that we 
had little time but much work and that it was best to finish the 
questionnaire first before we discussed other things. 
Many smallholders could not provide a correct answer to the size 
and details of their I'ubber holding. They normally referred to the plot 
of land they worked on as their holding and did not include other pieces 
of land they rented out or worked by other relatives or family members. 
A chjck on the accuracy of the answer was done by finding out the quit 
rent he paid, by looking at the land grant, or by refering back to the 
record on the smallholder in the State Replanting Office. 
They also could not provide an accurate reply to the question on 
replanting expenditure. First, they do not keep accounts of their various 
replanting items and the corresponding expendj.ture on them. Secondly, 
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they cannot reccill the Ifibour time spent in working the field to be 
replanted. Those who could provide any information on this item gave 
an aggregate figure. The smallholders' average answer was over a 
thousand dollars per acre. It was suspected that they overestimated 
the cost. This could be due to faulty recall or it might be a 
deliberate overstatement in order to highlight their replanting 
difficiilties. 
There was a marked tendency towards bias in the reply on income. 
Most smallholders tended to understate their monthly income. This may 
be due to deliberate misrepresentation or due to misinterpretation of 
v/hat income was. Most Chinese smallholders seem to understate their 
monthly income. This was easily discovered by checking the sales and 
dealers' prices received. Many Malay smallholders, on the other hand, 
interpreted income as cash in hand, i.e., whatever remained of the sale 
proceeds after payment for debts and other expenditures. Again, this 
could be adjusted by checking the sale figures and the dealer's price. 
In the survey of estates fewer problems were encountered. The 
interview had few digressions. Most estate owners or managers preferred 
to finish off the interview as soon as possible as they desired to be 
left alone to do their office work. Most digressions, when they did 
occur, were on issues related to the topic rubber. However, this proved 
to be a boon as they provide useful background information on the rubber 
industry. Quite often such digressions assumed the form of answers to 
questions to be asked later on. When this happened the particular 
question would be immediately filled with these answers. But this was 
done only when these were pertinent and exact answers to the questions. 
This saved a little time as those questions could be skipped. 
Unlike the smallholders, estate directors and managers pondered 
very carefully before they answered a question and often checked through 
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some records first to verify certain answers. Usually they referred to 
the Progress TJeport. Sometimes quite a lot of time was wasted as the 
manager would be asking the "^hief Clerk to bring the various reports 
he wanted just to check on a simple fact. 
There was no such thing as ignorance over matters regarding the 
estate on the part of estate managers as they knew their work thoroughly. 
This contrasted with the smallholders who were quite ignorant over certain 
issues. However, quite a number of estate directors and managers did 
take some time in answering the question on the shifting of the export 
tax. 
Compared to smallholders the element of bias present appeared to 
be small. Estate managers faced no problem of memory or recall as they 
could refer to their written records when they were unsure of any fact. 
Certain questions, which required detailed copying out of d^ta 
(viz, number of immature and mature acres) were not asked during the 
interview as they could be found in the Progress Report. The Progress 
Report was a monthly account of every aspect of production, expenditure, 
acreage use, field activities, sales and proceeds of the estate. There 
were 12 such Reports in a year. It must be pointed out that though all 
estates did have records of invoices of their sale transactions only the 
large estates kept Progress Reports. 'Large'here generally means those 
above 1000 acres. This should not be regarded as a fixed demarcation as 
many estates of a smaller size, e.g., between 700 and 1000 acres also 
kept a Progress Report. On the other ]rie.nd there were two Chinese estates 
of between 2000 to 3000 acres which did not keep a Progress Report at all. 
These two estates were acquired from previous European owners and the 
managers explained that since they were the owners they would know 
everything in the estate and they did not wish to be burdened with all 
the details of the Progreoa Report. 
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Smaller eatateo which did not keep a detailed Progress Report, 
however, did have a sort of an account for each month. Obviously this 
showed fewer details than the Progress Report. 
1 . 7 . RUBBjJR d e a l e r s 
Rubber dealers play an important part in the determination of 
the prices given to rubber smallholders. Their role in this respect was 
not so important in the case of estates as the marketing system was a 
relatively more perfect one. It is useful, in order to study the 
objective of this thesis, to find out how tiiey determine prices and what 
other factors they give weight to. To find out such problems the 
questionnaire (Appendix 1.6) was designed to obtain information on the 
following: 
1) factors affecting prices given to smallholders; 
2) factors determining the grading and weighing of 
smallholder rubber; 
3) time series on prices given to smallholders. 
It was thought that (3) could provide more data if they could 
be collected from the dealers besides getting them direct from smallholders 
and estates. Rubber dealers were most mwilling to cooperate on this 
issue though they would not mind answering the questionnaire. As explained 
in the Smallholder Section above, the rubber dealer had to comply when the 
smallholder is brought along to get back his Cultivation Book (when the 
smallholder left it with the dealer). Sometimes the presence of the ARO 
also helped. But generally they were uhcooperative on this. So far only 
10 series could be obtained. They covered the period 1970-1973. What 
was said under the Smallholder Section regarding the quality of the data 
also applies. 
1.8. syCONbrtRY DATA 
The following secondary data were collected from government 
departments, quasi government institutions, rmd vtu-ious publications:-
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1) Replanting expenditure. The replfmting cost per acre for 
smallholders (required to answer Objective 5) iias been 
obtained from RISDA. The total replanting cost, which 
could not be obtained directly from the Bmallholders 
themselves, given by RISDA v/as actually an estimate 
figure. Besides showing the distribution of the items 
and expenditvire incurred for the year, the total cost was 
also shov/n in this form for every year starting from year 
1 to year 6. 
2) Yield data. Time series on the yield distribution of 
various clones and seedlings were obtained from the 
various departments of the Rubber Research Institute. 
These were estimates derived from Management studies and 
various soil and nutrient surveys done by the Rubber 
Research Institute. They were supposed to be confidential 
data. The data were on ordinary seedlings, RRIM 600, and 
PB 86. These are the common materials planted by estates 
and smallholdings. 
l8 
3) Production and prices. Data on output of estates and 
smallholdings were obtained from the Rubber Statistical 
Handbook. 
k) Replanted acreage. The major sources were the Rubber 
Statistical Handbook and the various reports of the Rubber 
Industry (Replanting) Board, Fund 'B'. This also provided 
information on the amount of replanting grant given to 
rubber producers by the Replanting Board each year. 
Besides getting information from these sources, the author also 
discussed various aspects of the thesis with many government officials 
and local experts on the rubber industry. 
1.9. TIMETABLE OF WORK 
Table 1.7 shows the distribution of the workload during the 
survey period between April to December 1973 by the number of months spent, 
1 fi See Appendix 1.7 for comments on these statistics. 
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The relatively longer period spent on estates, as mentioned earlier, 
was due to the larger amount of written records and files which had to 
be examined to obtain the desired information. The rest of the table 
is quite self explanatory. 
TABLE 1.7. TIMETABLE OF FIELDWORK (MAY 1975 - JANUARY 197^) 
No. of 
Months Area of Work 
May 
June - August 
September - December 




Discussion with government 
officers, Pilot Survey. 
Survey of Smallholders (lOO) 
Survey of Estates (50) 
Survey of Dealers, (23) 
Collection of Secondary Data 
and Collation of Data 
(a) 
(a) Figures in parentheses refer to the number siirveyed. 
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ciiapt:]r 2 
THE RUBB.^ INDUSTRY IN Wl'^ ST MALAYSIA 
2.1. HISTORIC/lL Dl!]VZLOPMENT 
Hevea brasiliensis, the rubber tree,^ is not a native plant of 
Malaysia. It was first introduced into West Malaysia (including 
Singapore then) in 1877, via Kew Gardens in London, from a collection 
of seedlings originally taken out from Brazil.^ 
Though the Malaysian climate was suitable for growing rubber 
trees, it took another twenty years before they were grown on a 
commerical basis. In 1897, there were only 350 acres of rubber trees 
in the whole country. By 1909, the total acreage increased to 
290,000.^ During the 1900*8, the failure of the coffee industry, due 
to its inability to compete with the Brazilian one and the set back 
caused by a blight epidemic, turned the interest of Malaysian growers 
to rubber. Two other major developments also contributed to the growth 
of the rubber industry. The first "/3S the tapping system introduced by 
Ridley. The second was the development of the automobile industry which 
boosted the demand for natural rubber. These last two factors overcome 
the initial inertia which v;as due to the uncertainty and ignorance in 
venturing into rubber planting. 
The early period of the rubber industry was dominated by 
^ See Appendix 2.1 for details on tho botanical and techracal aspects 
of the rubber tree and rubber production. 
^ For details on the historical development, refer C.Y.Lim, Economic 
Development of West Malaya. (Oxford University Press, 1968). 
^ KcHale, T.R., 'Rubber Smallholdings in Malaya: Their Changing Nature, 
Role and Prospects.' Malayan Economic Reviev^ ,^ Vol.10, No.2, I965, pp. 
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plantations. Lured by the attractive profit and backed by financial 
capital in the Eui-opean markets, new companies v/ere floated in Europe 
to participate in the new business. There was no doubt too that the 
existence of political stability and administrative orderliness under 
the British rule was a significant precondition to the early success in 
attracting the necessary capital and enterprise from abroad. 
The number of smallholdings increased in number slowly from 
1920 onwards. The initial 'animportance of the smallholding sector was 
due to several factors. First, the government did not encourage the 
smallholders to plant rubber. In fact, major steps were taken by the 
government only during the 1950's to help the smallholders. Secondly, 
the initial ignoremce of the technological and agronomic aspects of rubber 
planting v/as a great impediment to the uninformed peasants. It took 
sometime before the basic knowledge of tapping and processing was 
disseminated to potential smallholders scattered around the country. 
Thirdly, the undeveloped marketing system was another business obstacle. 
It was obvious that people vrould only grow rubber if they could sell their 
products through and to someone. The establistunent of a marketing network 
and the assurance of buyers were necessary incentives for prospective 
planters. Lastly, rubber grovers must learn to get used to the long 
gestation period of six to seven years before the rubber trees could be 
tapped. This was, and ;.^ till is, a serious obstucle facing small growers 
with limited income and capital. 
However, when the above adverse factors were finally overcome 
the small gi'owers responded significdutly to the high prices and high 
level of profit of the rubber industry. There are certain characteristics 
of rubber growing v/hich the smallholders find favourable. One of them 
is the compatibility of the working regime in rubber production with the 
background of the smallholders. Except for the initial arduous task of 
planting, rubber production requires relj^tively simple teclmical skill and 
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management. The maintenance, tapping, and processing t-isks are quite 
simple and routine in nature. 
Anotlier desirable chai'acteristic is the continual flow of income 
during the productive life of the rubber trees. This flow of income is 
non-seasonal and thus fits the smallholders' financial requirements very 
well. To the smallholders, the rubber trees are a form of latent capital 
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asset during the mature period. In periods of high prices, they are a 
source of vdndfall profits. In periods of low prices, they are still a 
guaranteed source of income though the level is lov/er. 
Over the years, the rubber industry has experienced a period 
of steady growth, particularly in production and acreage. (Fig. 2.1). 
It can be seen that from 1920 onwards, the total acreage under rubber has 
increased. Between 1938 and I96O, the growth was moderate. Since 1962, 
the total planted acreage increased more rapidly. 
The growth pattern of the smallholding and estate sector has 
been different. Initially, the estates had a larger proportion of the 
total planted acreage. During the 1960's, estate acreage declined. This 
was caused by the fragmentation of estates and their conversion into 
smallholdings.^ Furthermore, the total acreage of smallholdings was also 
increased by the development oT land schemes by the government 
Since the 1950'r the output of the rubber industry has increased. 
The major contributin;; fiictor has been the avnilability of better planting 
materialso The estates, though declining in acreage vis a vis smallholdings, 
^ McHale, T.R., 'Kubber Smallholdings in Kalaya: Their Changing Nature, 
Role and Prospects.' Malayan Sconomic Review. Vol.10, No.2, 1965t 
pp. 35-^8. 
^ Aziz, U., Subdivision of Estates in Malaya 1951-1960. (University of 
Malaya, 1962). 
^ S.C.Lim, Land Development Schemes in V/est Malaysia. A Study of Costs 
and Benefits. (Ph.D. Thesis, A.N.U. 1972). 
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have been mainly re-sponsible for the increase in productivity and yield 
in the rubber industry. 
Table 2.1 shows the improvement in yield between 1920's and 
1970's. During the 1920's, when unselected planting materials 
predominated, the average yield was +^99 pounds per acre. In the 1970's, 
with better planting materials and good husbandry, the yield is expected 
to reach as high as 2990 pounds per acre. 
TABLE 2.1. AVERAGE YIELD OF SELECTED PLANTING MATERIALS 
DEVELOPED BETWEEN 1920's AND 1970's 
Period Planting Material Yield in Pound Per Acre Per Year 
1920's Unselected 499 
1930's P.B. 8 4 868 
j 1 9 ' + 0 ' s - 5 0 ' 8 P.B. 86 998 
1950'6 RRIM 5 0 1 1 3 0 0 
1 9 6 0 ' S RRIM 600 2093 
1970's RRIM 703 2992 
Source: Rubber Research Institute, Malaysia. 
Table 2.2 explains the relative importance of the estate and 
smallholding sector with regard to the proportion of high yielding 
materials used and the average annual yield for certain years since 1950• 
It will be noticed that the average yield of estates has been consistently 
highe-^. This can be explained by the higher proportion of high yielding 
materials used in estates. 
The development of the rubber industry has been remarkable 
despite several setbacks in the past. For instance, between 1922 and 
7 
1928, the Stevenson Scheme was imposed to restrict production and tho 
alienation of land for rubber planting. During the Great Depression, the 




International Rubber Restriction Scheme also prohibited nev/ planting and 
restricted export by a quota system. Normal production was again disrupted 
during World War II and the Emergency period. Since the 1950's, the 
natural rubber industry has also to face strong competition from the 
synthetic rubber industry. Because synthetic rubber has a petro-chemical 
base, the present energy crisis and high oil prices have affected the cost 
of production of synthetic rubber. This could have reduced the competitive 
pressure of synthetic rubber on natural rubber. However, this is counter-
balanced up the rise in the cost of natxiral production due to the rise in 
the prices of various inputs like fertilizer. Furthermore, the recession 
in developed countries due to the energy crisis has also affected the 
demand for and prices of natuial rubber. Consequently, the competition 
between the two types of rubber has not changed very much to the favour 
of one of them. 
TABLE 2.2. PROPORTION OF HIGH YIELDING MATERIALS AND AVERAGE 
ANNUAL YIELD PER ACRE ON ESTATES AND SMALLHOLDINGS 
BETWEEN 1950 - 1972 
Year 
Proportion of High Yielding 
Materials (Per Cent) 
Yield in Povmd Per 
Acre Per Year 
1 Estates Smallholdings Estates Smallholdings 
1950 10 1 509 415 
1933 24 8 491 386 
i960 '+8 29 677 390 
1963 68 831 527 
1970 
1 i 
89 63 1065 680 
( 1 ) Areas replanted and newplanted. 
Source: Rubber Statistics Handbook, 
g 
Ibid, particularly Parts 2 .^nd 3- For a discussion on the contemporary 
problems of international commodity agreements, refer Lee, K.H., 
raul Chan, Nava N., 'The Buffer Stock - Price Compensation Scheme with 
Special Reference to Natural Rubber,' background pappr for UT'ICTAD IV. 
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On top of all these problems, the natural rubber industry 
has to face the uncertainty of price fluctuations, the United States' 
stockpile policy and the repercussions of world politics. 
In spite of all these problems, the rubber industry in Malaysia 
has so far proved itself to be resilient and viable. 
2.2. IMPOHT.\MCE OF THE RUBBER INDUSTxRY 
Like many other developing countries, Malaysia is heavily 
dependent on the agricultural industry. In 1972, the agricultural sector 
contributed 21 per cent to the gross domestic product of the country. In 
comparison, manufacturing and mining contributed only 16 and 5 per cent 
respectively for the same period. 
'.Vithin the agricultural sector, perennial crops dominate. 80 
per cent of the total cultivated land is in fact under perennial crops. 
Of this amount, 69 per cent is rubber land. 
Table 2.3 shows the acreage of cultivated land under rubber. 
In i960, 69 per cent of the total cultivated agricultural land was under 
rubber. Though the proportion has declined somewhat rubber is still the 
most important agricultural crop. 
The contribution of rubber export revenue to the total value 
of national exports has been consistently over JO per cent. This 
percentage contribution has, however, declined in recent years because of 
low rubber prices and because of the increasing importance of other export 
products. 
Besides its direct contribution, the rubber industry has also 
strong indirect influences on the rest of the economy. For instance, 
economic activities built around the rubber industry also generate 
g employment, income, and revenue to the government. 
9 For a detailed analysis refer Khoo, S.J. Malayan Exports: Instability and 
Prospects (Ph.D.Thesis, Cornell, 196?) and Tan, A.H.II. Natural Rubber; 
Problem., and Techniques of Stftbilization. (M.A.Thesis, Un'^v^rsitv of 
Malaya, 196^?;. 
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TABLE TOTAL CrLTIVAT;JD Ur!D-« 
IN WEoT MALAYSIA (I96O - 1970) 
('000 ACRES) 




i960 56^ +6 3°S9 69 
1961 y/ii'3 3972 69 
1962 6131 4130 68 
1963 6281 4251 68 
196^ + 6350 k^Ok 68 
1965 651:; 67 
1966 6583 '+3B4 67 
1967 6693 '+3S0 65 
1968 6841 4291 63 
1969 6963 426^ + 61 
1970 7159 +^275 60 
Source: Department of Statistics. 
Its relative importance in the economy has its unfortunate 
aspects. Thus, if the rubber industry is adversely affected by price 
fluctuations or falling exbernal demand this has damaging repercussions 
on the rest of the economy via the multiplier e f f e c t s . A s a long run 
solution to this problem, the only measures seem to be diversification 
in agriculture and industrialization. 
2.3. STRUCTURE OF THE RUBBER INDUSTRY 
The rubber industry is dichotomized into the estate and small 
holding sector. This distinction is based on the size of acreage under 
rubber. An estate is a holding of 100 acres and above. As a corrollary, 
a smallholding is one below 100 acres. A holding is here defined to be 
a unit of ownership. 
10 Tan, op.cit, 
TABLE 2.'+o SllAi^ J^ Oi' RUBELR EXPO^.T Jii.VxJ^ 'UE in TOT..I 
NATIONAL EXPORTS 
(MILLION OF i?) 
Year Total National iixports 
Rubber Export 
Revenue 
Rubber Export Revenue 
As Per Cent of Total 
National Exports 
1963 270^ +.6 137^ + 51 
196 2781 1303 
1965 3103 1368 
1966 3120 1396 
1967 1919 1216 k2 
1968 3217 1301 '+1 
1969 '1076 19'H3 
1970 J+192 1663 ho 
1971 3917 l'+17 36 
1972 it030 1298 31 
Source: Department of Statistics. 
This division on the basis of 100 acres is an arbitrary one. 
It is not a functional definition in terms of, say, resource use like the 
proportion of wage labour employed or the size of the capital invested. 
Because of the distinction on the basis of the number of acres 
anomalous situations occur. For instance, some large smallholdings 
around 90 acres may operate like an estate of 100 acres. While a small 
estate is similar in many respects to a large smallholding, it is very 
different from a large estate of say, 5,000 acres in terms of resource 
use mid investment policy. 
However, it must be admitted that from the view point of 
administrative convenience, this traditional definition has to be 
accepted. any other definition on the basi::> of size of acreage v/ould 
encounter the problems we have mentioned. Besides, it would be difficult 
to use a Cimctional definition which incorporates all sorts of 
characteristics. This would create too many aub-grouns and sub-divisions. 
Hecognizinj iiuch conceptual problems, tlie tradition/,il definition is. 
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ther.-'forp, adopted. The major adv-inLage i,-. that exinting data, which 
have been collected on the baoiu of this definition, can be used in 
this study. Another advantage is that we can use and compare the 
results of other studies, which have invariably used this definition, 
with the conclusions of this thesis. It must be remembered that within 
the estate or :5mallholdin,'- sectoi' there is no complete homogeneity. It 
is to be expected that differencesin organization, I'eplanting policy, 
and other such aspects do exist. 
There is one issue which must be clarified with regard to the 
smallholding sector. A distinction must be made between a smallholding 
as a unit of ownership and as a unit of operation.'"" One who has a legal 
claim to the holding is an owner and one who works on the holding is 
termed an operator. Because of the possibility of division of ownership 
and operation, the owner and operator need not be the same person. If 
the ov;ner also operates his own land, he is called an owner-operator. 
When he rents or leases out the whole or part of his holding, he becomes 
a full or part landlord. A tenant by definition is an operator, but is 
not an owner of the rented plot. The above distinction between an operator 
and aai owner applies to the various sharing systems too. For instance, a 
tenant instead of paying a fixed rent per month may instead agree to 
share the output according to a certain ratio. Here the tenant is just 
an operator. 
It is usual tliat the decisions on long term investment like 
replanting and those involving large expenditure are the domain of the 
owner. It is quite ©bvious that the owner would not like to leave this 
entrepreneurial function to the operator. In any case, the tenant 
operator would only be too glad that he is not required to assume such 
financial burden. On other decision areas like whether the rubber should 
be smoked or not, the operator has sole authority. 
^^ Aziz, op.cit. 
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Very often, the agreement which is usually verbal, is not kept. 
For instance, the operator may adopt an intensity tapping system which is 
usually disapproved of by the owner. This is because this method of 
tapping actually amounts to capital consumption (i.e. consumption of the 
bark which increpses use cost) in order to maximize short run out. It 
is invariably the tenant operator who brenclies the atreement. Owners 
normally prefer not to be troubled by changing tenants as this involves 
not only inconvenience but also loss of output duilng the period of looking 
for new tenants. For this reason, it is quite common to find that owners 
who desire a more lastini-^  relationship, are more willing to lease out a 
plot to their own relatives rather than to strringers. Of course, it is 
not always true that rel-itives would always abide to the terms of the 
agreement. But relatives may bo more amenable than strangers. 
2 A. IvVrATE ^i:.CTOR 
In 1968, the estate acreage was 1.68 million acres out of a 
total of million. This was roughly 39.^ + per cent. Since the end of 
the 1950's, there has been a decline in the total acreage of the estate 
sector (Figure 2 . 2 ) . There were two reasons for this. First, there 
has been some replacement of existing' rubber land witli oil palm planting. 
Secondly, the fragmeiitation of estates during the 1960's also contributed 
to their decline.^^ 
The distribution of estates by various si:-:e groups is shown in 
T;.blu The largest number of estates is in the 100--'+99 size group. 
66 per cent is in this group. The largest planted acreage is, however, 
in the 1000-1999 and 5000 plus groupings. 
It c^m be seen that there is an inverse relationship between 
size group and number of estates. If a division is made between estates 
o f 999 acres and below on the one hand and 1000 acres and above on the 
12 T. ai, op. ci t. 
38 
FIGURE 2.1 PLANTED AREA, PRODUCTION AND PRICES IN 
THE RUBBER INDUSTRY, 'VEST MALAYSIA, 
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other, we will notice that 78 per cent oT the total number of estates is 
in the former group and 7'f per cent of the planted acreage is within the 
1000 acres and above group. 
T A B L E 2 . 5 . D I S T R I B U T I O N O F IIK^TNTEO B Y A G R E A G I I I N 









100 - 13fil 266.'4 192 
5 0 0 - 999 262 189.2 722 
1 0 0 0 - 1 9 9 9 3^+7.5 
2 0 0 0 - 2 9 9 9 96 23^.5 2^ 4^ 13 
5 0 0 0 - 6 6 259.9 3938 
5000 and above 57 378.3 6637 
Total 2 1 0 6 
Source: Rubber Statistice Handbook, 1970, 
Department of Statistics, Malaysia. 
There are two other points to note. The first is that the 
smaller estates are predominantly Malaysian owned while the larger estates 
are owned by uon Malaysians. The second point is that the smaller 
Malay-sian owned estates are mostly partnerships and individual 
proprietorships. In the case of foreign controlled estates, the legal 
organizational structure is mostly private and public companies. The 
common feature is that as the size of the estate increases, the 
partnership and individual proprietorship form of ownership becomes less 
important. The probable reason is that only the public and private type 
of ownership is better suited to finance and to manage large estates. 
In terms of number, Malaysians own the most estates. In terms 
of planted acreage, foreigners' control is still more important. The 
British alone control kj, per cent of the total planted a r e a . A further 
16 per cent is distributed aiDong several other foreign groups. (Table 2.6) 
TABLE 2 . 6 NUMBER OF ESTATE AT 31ST DECEMBER, BY CITIZENSHIP, 
OWSERSHIP AUD PLASTED ACREAGE SIZE GROUP IS WEST HAUYSIA 


























0 - 499 10 185 689 279 1163 16 38 99 72 225 26 223 780 351 1388 
500 - 999 12 81 50 29 172 44 26 6 9 85 56 107 56 38 257 
1000 - 1999 11 72 12 14 109 92 35 3 3 133 103 107 15 17 242 
2000 - 2999 8 13 2 5 28 48 11 - - 59 56 24 2 5 87 
3000 - 4999 4 14 - 3 21 42 11 - - 53 46 25 - 3 74 
5000 - Over 1 5 2 - 8 34 8 - - 42 35 13 2 - 50 
Total 46 370 755 330 1501 276 129 108 S4 597 322 499 863 414 
(a) Includes individual proprietors, ovnership by government and cc-operatives. 
£ource: Rubber Statistics Eandbook, 196^. Department of Statistics, Malaysia. 
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British 72r>.2 312 2327 
Malaysian 68^ 4.0 IkGh k67 
Singaporean l'+8.6 9 173 859 
ether European 56.2 3 19 2956 
American 27.2 2 6 4620 
Others 33.2 2 132 250 
Total 1675.8 100 2106 796 
Source: Rubber Statistic Handbook, Department of 
Statistics, Malaya. 
The organizational structure of the large European estates is 
quite elaborate. Very often they are assisted and advised by auxiliary 
organizations like agency houses. The Malaysian owned estates have a 
simpler structure. Smaller estates do not normally use the services of 
agency houses. 
Figure 2.2 presents one typical pattern of control and management 
in a large estate with its headquarters, say, in London.^^ At the top 
of the pyramidal structure are the directors who are accountable to the 
shareholders. The directors would formulate policy for investment, like 
replanting. Usually they are assisted by a secretarial firm. The 
implementation of the directors' policy decisions at the ground level in 
Malaysia include the agency houses and the manager of the estate. 
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The functions of the agency houses include the administrative, 
accounting, and advisory aspects of rubber planting. Representatives 
from the agency houses like tlie visiting agent or planting adviser help to 
13 Modelled on estate:? .-surveyed. 
Puthucheary, J.K., Ovmership and Control in the Malayan Economy. 
(Economy, Eastern University Press, Singa5)ore, I96O). 
FIGURE 2.2 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF AN ESTATE COMPANY 
Directors of Company f- Secretarial Firm 
Agency House 
Visiting Agents 
and Planting Advisers 
























Note: A Two way arrow indicates 
authorization from higher level 
with feedback of information from 
below or another level. 
implement decisions made after consultation with the estate manager. 
The agency houses are paid fees for their services. These are calculated 
on the basis of the total acreage or on the total volume of production. 
The duties of the estate manager include the daily routine of 
administration of both staff and. production, implementation of decisions 
made at liighcr levels, and also feeding back information to headquarters 
the progress of work done. Assisting the manager is the assistant manager. 
The number of assistants varies from none to one or two. This depends on 
the size of the estate. Small estates do not have assistant managers. 
Under this executive level are the vrious types of workers and 
supervisor^ who have their respective areas of work and responsibility. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates a good case of the ncalar principle in 
business management. That is, authority and responnibility flow in a 
direct line vertically from the highest level of the organization to the 
lowest level. This establishes the hierarchical level of the estate 
organization. There is a vertical division of authority and responsibility 
and the assignment of Vcu'ious duties along the scalar chain. The span of 
control, or span of supervision, widens downwards along the chain. The 
traditional system of orgonizatioii in an estate is still one of superior-
suboi'dinate relationships. 
This pattern of organizational structure is broadly the same 
for most rubbei"' companies which use the services of management agencies 
or agency houses. Differences ajnong estates at the executive level 
probably lie in the responsibility and authority which are allotted to 
each manager. That is, some estate managers are given more power in 
their decision making over a wider area while some continue to be mere 
administrators or policy measures which they have little share in 
formulating. 
Rubber production is essentially labour intensive. The two 
major labour systems estates use are checkroll and contract labour. 
The former, usually resident workers like tappers, are paid monthly wages 
while contract labour, normally non-resident, sure paid piece rate. One 
advantage in using contract labour is the absence of expenditure on 
fringe benefits. However, from the viewpoint of training, work continuity, 
and assurance of labour supply, checkroll labour are preferred by estates. 
Two major groups of wage systems are used in the rubber industry. 
The first one is the Malayan Agricultural Producers' Association -
National Union of Plantation V/orkers' Wage Agreement, i.e., the MAPA 
wage system.^^ The other is the group of heterogenous wage system used 
by estates not tied to the MAPA wage agreement. Estates which are members 
of MAPA adhere to the MAPA wage system. Altogether kk6 members are using 
this system. In terms of rubber land, this covers half a million planted 
acres. 
The present MAPA agreement on wages is a modified one of those 
which were used in the past. The agreement specifies the rate of payment 
which is computed on the basis of certain variables like RSS 1 price, 
yield of the task, the task size, and type of planting materials. A basic 
wage of $3.20 is paid to each tapper per working or tapping day. An 
incentive payment is also given. This is related to the RSS 1 price for 
the day and also to the latex yield. Depending on the RSS 1 price level, 
a price bonus is also paid. In addition, there is also an allowance paid 
for the scrap collected by the tapper. Resident workers, as mentioned 
earlier, of such estates are also provided with fringe benefits like 
housing, employees' provident fund, and other social amenities besides 
holidayso In 1973, these fringe benefits came to 83 cents a day for each 
resident worker. 
^^ For details, refer to Appendix 8.13. 
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Hon HAPy\ estates use a variety of wage systems. Gone are 
modified versions of the fiAFA agreement. Tlie better known one based on 
the MAPn system is the Lee Plantation Tapping V.'age System. In p r i n c i p l e , 
this i s quite similar to the HAPA one. The difference l i e s in the basic 
poundaj-^e and latex incentives which are used. The l.ee systom has an 
addition.il incentive built i n . Thi ,j i s an extrci ullownnce for tappers 
brinfj;ini'; in more than pounds of latex d . r . c . 
I n other non M'.PA estates , i t i s quite coiniron to ur,e a time rate 
ware r.y.•.t'MT'. In the V/est Coast of West f 'alayoia, the common rate in 
i s per toppin//; d'ly plur; a pnymont for scrap r-ubber -it the rate of 
cents p(!j- pound. 
In the smaller Chinese owned estates a simple formula to calculate 
the wa(;;e rate i s used. For instance , the wage rate may be determined on 
the basis of one-fifLh or one-third of the prevailing 1 price for the 
day. C'-.lcula tions on the basic;, of y i e l d , type of planting materials may 
also be used . For instance , in old rubber areas a j)aym( iit of 23 cents 
per pound i s givei-i for latex ( d . r . c . ) coll'^'cted and a rate of 6 cents ner 
pound i s paid to scrap collccted . Fo''" younger trees, a basic rate of 
20 cents jjer poujid i;- pa.id and 7 cen' ; ; are given for each pound of scrap 
rubber . In general , th-.- non K/iPA ..y,.;+.ems have wage r.ate which are lower 
than the ori'v; givv-n by IIk' F;\]\i estates , Th<' fj-inge be-nefits are also 
smaller . 
TIPv SraL],iK PuII^lG .;.,CTOR 
A smallholding Ivi;- been d(;ri.r;rd tr. be a unit o ovan^rship with 
an aggregate area of lest Mian 100 acces . Un<ler t M s d e f i n i t i o n , there 
are various, types of smalllioldings. 
T)ie f irst (-roup are the individual smrillhol din 's which are owned 
hv an indivirhial or by a family. This group foiaiis th'> largest number, 
about 71 : r con L, of t.h t o L l nuriibcu- of srn.-llhold i ( ? .h].. 2 . M ) , 
'f6 
Since I96O, there are about 0.3 milliuii acres which have become 
smallholdings as a result of the fragmentation of estates. The rest of 
the smallholdings belong to the various types of land schemes developed 
by the governmento Except for tho unsubsidized land schemes, the other 
schemes have been given various foi-mr of financial assistance from the 
State or Federal govei-nments. 
TABIE 2.8. VARIOUS TYPES OF SMAI.LHOLDINGS IN V/K.T MALAYSIA, I966 











Subdivided 10.0 62 
Fringe Schemes i;'3.o 92 
I'T.UA Schemes 116.3 7.5 100 
Unsubsidized Schemes 113.0 6.0 92 
State Schemes ^7.0 6.0 73 
Other Schemes 18.6 3.5 5'+ 
Total 2521.5 6.6 55 
Source: Colin Barlow and Chan O.K. "Towards on Optimum Size of 
Rubber Holding", (Natural Rubber Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 1968.) 
The major source of information on the individual smallholdings 
is still the Census of Agriculture, I96O. The information, though 
comfjrehensive and detailed, must be treated witli caution. This is 
because of the various omission and the use of definitions which led to a 
certain number of smallholdings being classified as estates.^^ 
The average size of a smallholding was given as 5-2 acres by the 
Ceiisun. Small f,amj. Le .surveys of individual smallholdings have reported 
^^ Greenw'-od, J.M.I''., 'Kubber Smallholdings in the Federation of Malaya'. 
Journal of Tropical Geography, V0I.I8, August I96U, pp.8l-100. 
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average sizes varying between 2.:} to a c r e s . O u r survey gives aii 
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average size of '1.5 acres. Though the actual average size is still not 
determined, it is generally recognized that most of the smallholdings are 
below 10 acres in size. (Table 2.9). 
TABLi^ 2 . 9 . AViulUiGL SIZE OF 3MALLPICLD1NGJ 
Location of Sample Year of Average 
Sajnple Size Survey Size 
Census Country 173,000 i960 5.2 
Brown V/, Johore 13 3 i960 3.2 
Bevan 3clangor 160 1962 3.9 
Ho I'! .Semb'i I'-ui 6P7 1967 2.3 
Ri^M Selangor 1,071 1963 6.2 
Survey Selangor 100 1973 ^i.3 
Source: See Footnote 15. 
The distribution of smallholdings by size of acreage is uneven. 
(Table 2.10). About per cent of the total number of smallholdings are 
below j5 acres. These constitute 13 per cent of the total area under 
individual smallholdings. At the other end of the dispersion, there are 
13 per cent over 10 acres which constitute hi per cent of the total area. 
There are no det d i e d data on the distribution of smallholdings 
by ethnic groupings. It is, however, believed th:it holdings belonging 
to Malays are tlie smallest among all the smallholdings. One estimate 
showed that per cent of Malay holdings ai'e below 3 acrcs and (^6 per cent 
17 Brown, D.V,'., A Keconnais^xnce Study of Farming Org.otiizations in Coastal 
Area of iVest Johore. (University of Singapore, i960). Bevan, J.W.L., 
A Report on the Mcirketing of Smallholders "Rubber with Special 
Reference to the First Level Buyer. (Doc.7, Research Archives, RRIM, 
195(1) . H o , R., Farmers of Central Malaya, (Department of Geogrtiphy, 
A.N.II.); RRIM Sui-vey of Smallholders 1963; survey data. Census 
of Agriculture (I96O. Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operative, 
Kuala Lurnpur). 
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}ee discussion on sample in Chapter 1. 
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from 3 to 10 acres in size. Gentvrnlly, the lia-j^ er smallholdings belong 
to the Chinese. O'or survey data suggest th-it in r.elangor the average 
size of Malay smallholdings is 3.0 acres. In contrast, the average si/.e 
of Chinese smallholdings is 9 • M C r c s . 
T^. ] 2.10. ;; jj^  SM.UiJT:.Lj:'"n . 3Y OF 
Plant('d Area (Acres) 
Belov, 3 3 - 5 5 - 10 10 Over All Classes 
Number^^^ ifl 23 23 13 100 
, (2) Aroa 13 16 'H 100 
(1) In Percentage. 
(2) In Percentage. 
Source: Census of Agriculture 19<"'0, (Kiniati-y of agriculture and 
Co-operatives, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.) 
The official data on distribution of smallholding ownership by 
ethnic groups dated back to 195^3. This is the only information available. 
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The Depai'tnent of Statistics estimated that of the 1.7 million acres 
under rubber smallholdings, 'lO per cent v;ere owned by the Chinese, and 
1}? per cent by the Malays. The remaining 13 per cent were shared by the 
Indians, Aurasians and Indonesians. 
There is no doubt tluit over the years since the above estimate 
was made there has been transfer of land between the various ethnic 
groups. There are no official data to indicate the extent and magnitude 
of this transfer. One might hazard the guess that the Chinese, because 
of their strong desire to possess land and because of their relatively 
strong financial position, might have expanded both the number and acreage 
of their holdings vis-a-vis the other ethmic groups. Because of the slow 
development of new land and the government policy of favouring Malays, 
buying existing rubber holdings is one major way to accjuire rubber land 
^^ Personal Communication by an officer of the Department. 
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available to the Chinese. 
Most of the amallholdings are under a permanent title grant. 
About 15 per cent are held under temporary occupation licence, and are 
given no right to permanency of occupation. The rest are squatters who 
have planted rubber and other crops without official permission. In 
1973, it was estimated that this p;roup formed less than one per cent of 
the total number of smallholdings.^*^ For those who are allowed to occupy 
the land, they are required to pay an annual quit rent varying between 
5 to 10 dollarj; depending on the State. 
In contrast to the mono-cultujr-al pattern of agricultural 
production of estates, most smallholdings' production is characterized 
by a large degree of mixed farming with rubber as the dominant crop. 
The Census of Agriculture data (Table 2.11) indicated that more than half 
of the smallholdings belov; 3 acres were involved in the production of 
some minor crops besides rubber. Most of these crops are produced for 
food and on-farm consumption. It is rare that large scale cultivation 
for commercial sale of such crops is practised. During the survey, all, 
except 9 larger smallholdings belonging to Chinese owners, reported that 
some other tyjje of crops were aloO grown. 
TA3L;:; 2.11 PHOPORTIO?! OIP IJUBruiil^  SHALLHOLDINGo IN 
'.r^ oT MALAYSIA IIAVII'IG OTikLH (I960) 
Planted Acres Rubber Only 'with Other Crops 
Below 3 '+8 32 
3 - 3 32 
3 - 1 0 71 29 
Source: I96O Census of Agriculture, (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia). 
Unlike estates which are organised and ruxi on a complex 
20 Land District Office, Kuala Lumpur. 
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hierax'chiccj.1 system, sinallholdin,j;s Lave a simple a n i G t r a t i v e , 
production iuid mai-keting system. In most cases, the orgcinisational 
unit is the family which provides both the entrepreneurial skills and 
the manual labour. The use of f:amily labo'ai> is st.ill the most important 
method of iiroduction, thou^Ji other forriis of labour use are also practised. 
(Table .-.l.'). 
TAuJ.r. 2.12. US:i; 01' TYPES Of LABOUii 
(Pc,K CilNT) 
Type of Farm Labour 
Below 
3 Acres 
3 - 5 
Acres 
5 - 10 
Acres 




Family Only 78 69 58 36 65 
IVith Pawah O C-. h 8 15 6 
Pawali Only 20 26 32 +^0 27 
Cash Only 0 1 2 8 2 
Contract Only 0 0 0 1 0 
All Classes 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: As in Table 2.11. 
It will be observed from Table 2.12 that there is a clear 
relationship between the size of the smallholding and the type of labour 
used. The smaller the size of the holding, the more important is the use 
of ftmiily labour. Nevertheless, even when the holding is over 10 acres, 
one third of the labour force came from family labour. 
'When the holding is small, for instance, between 1 to 10 acres, 
the use of some form of sharing system is also common though they become 
predominant only when the holding is over 10 acres. 
On the average, 2? per cent of individual smallholdings use 
some form of sharing system or pawah. One popular form is bagi dua. In 
this system, the gross revenue from the total crop is divided equally 
between thr- owner and the operator. In practice, equal division is rare. 
Usually, a ratio of 60:'4-0 in favour of the owner is used. In addition, 
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the operator or tenant is allowed to take the ticrap. About 29 per cent 
of smallholding's in Selangor use the modified bagi dua arrangement. 
One disadvantage of this sharing arrangement is the poor 
husbixndry v/hich results from the disinterested attitude of the tenant. 
This becomes more acute where absentee landlordism is pre.iont since in 
such a situation tlie frequency of supervision is reduced. 
In the case of the contracting tapping system, i^y.ad of 
money is paid, normally, tlie rate varies inversely with the yield find 
rubber pj'ices. 
Malay smallholdings quite often practise a variation of the 
above, called the pajak system. In this system, a monthly rent or a 
fixed sura is paid over a period or in one lump sum. This system allows 
the tenant a free hand with the tapping of the trees. The inevitable 
consequence of this system is the severe exploitation of the trees by 
the tenant in order to maximize output in the short run. For this reason, 
most of the holdings which are leased out under this system are usually 
old trees wliich may be replfinted soon. 
The use of wage labour is not common for smallholdings, '.'/hen 
it is practised, it is usually in the larger smTllholdings where family 
labour is inadequate. A flat rate per holoing per tapping day is given. 
The -vage is invariably lower than estate wage and ranges from 53*50 to 
7,3^00 per Hay depending on the yield of the holding. 
A perennial problem affecting the landlord-tenant relationship 
is the possibility of violation of the agreement. It is rare that a 
written contract is used between the owner and the tenant. Verbal 
agreement, which is based on mutual trust, is the general rule. 
Consequently, it is not uncommon to find tloat the verbal 
agreement is breached by one of the parties. In a study of Jelebu, 
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Swift " found thnt it was usuallv tlie tennnt v:ho Violated the agreement. 
He would do it 'vhen he found it unprofitable to continue the relationship 
or becau3e he could get alternative emoloyment elsev/here. To a large 
de(^roe, the mobility of labour is an important f-ctor. This in turn 
depends on tho alternative opportunities, available. 
There is another problem which confronts smallholdings, 
particularly the Malay ones. This is the problem of inheritance. The 
fact that most smi^llholders a r f n m i l y farns malce the inheritance issue 
an inevitable one. 
Life amonp: the falay producers is dominated by traditional 
customs or adat and the precepts of Islam. Both of these have 
unfor t unritely contributed to the distinte|^r;ition of Malay owned small-
holdings. The Islamic law of inheritance prescribes that each male 
inheritor should receive one share of the property from the deceased 
and that a female inheritor should be given one half share. Each such 
successive division has thus inevitably led to a smaller share of the 
original plot of land. 
In practice, the actual physical division and subdivision of 
the plot of land may not be carried out for the simple reason that the 
divided lots are ridiculously small and are, therefore, not suitable for 
economic cultivation or other uses. For this reason, the management of 
the holding may be assigned to one or more of the joint owners. Such 
multiple ownership possess a challenge to decision making when the time 
for replanting arrives. Disagreement over such large capital expenditures 
has been a major cause of delay, postponement or even abandonment of 
replanting. 
^^ Suift, M.C., Malay Peasant Society in Jelebu. (The Athlone Press, 
N.Y., 1965). 
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Laws have been proniulf^ iited by the governinciit ai£;airist such 
exceuaive diviGion of Land by the Kalays. Thus it is illegal to subdivide 
land of one acre and below in rubber holdings. But this meacure is 
insufficient. Fii-st, the law only ap])lies to rubber holdings of one 
acre and less. This means that other holdings larger than one acre 
are still allowed Lo be subdivideu, Secondly, the law cannot prevent 
multiple owners of land below 1 acre from having disagreement on the 
maintenance aiid replnjjting of the r>ibbor holding. From the viewpoint of 
higher preductivity and replantin(j, tl.e unfavourable aspects of the local 
customs must be elimiiiated by chaiiglng the local institutions. 
Tlie pi'oblem of .inheritance among tho Chinese smallholders does 
not pose a seriou:., threat to replanting. This is mainly due to the 
absence of traditional customs like the Islivnic law of inlieritance which 
encourages division of the rubbc.i' holding. This has lielped somewhat to 
avei't the difficulties faced by Kalay smallholders. The traditional 
practice of passing the property to the eldest son is still a strong part 
of tlie Chinese social code. Even when tliis does not happen, there are 
other factors which deter the Chinese from disintegrating their land 
ownershipo The most important fiictor is their strong desire to preserve 
their Iand-]:iolding in a political environment whicli is not very favourable 
to their acquisition of land. i'urthermore, the strong tradition of the 
Chinese to maintain the assets as a family property to continue the 
liiif- ige of the fjunily also contributes to the reluctance to break a 
family plot of land. 
This interpretation should not be taken to be universally true. 
In general, tlie cultural differences between the Chinese and Malays do 
explain their various attitudes towards the problem of land inheritcOice, 
wliich in turn has influence on future replanting of the rubber plot. 
2 . 6 . A[!D SM^vLLHOLDIIIGS 
i'rotn the above discussion of the two sectors, we can notice 
strong evidence of dualism existing between estates and smallholdings. 
Dualism is here defined to be a situation in which there exists two 
groups of productive units each of v.'hich allocates the factors of 
production diffei-exilly and whicii m/iniiostB diffcx'ent saving/investment 
beliaviour. 
The first difference we liave pointed out is the institutional 
distinction on tlie basis oi .-ize of acreaij;e and the organizational structure. 
Three quarters of both output ;uid /ic '^e'ttje f ills into the extreme categories 
of uudei- acres (for smallholdi.Kfj;5;) arid ovir^ r 1 ,000 acres (for estates). 
In terins of organizational r,ti-ucturo, smallholdijigs ai-e essentially units 
of family farin complex using mainly family labour. In estates, the 
adoption of an elaborci.te liierarchy using vjage laboui' is the rule. 
x''-LCtor allocation are also different. Sector-wise data on 
acreage, employment, and output indicate differences in allocative 
beh: vioui-. This is clearly r.b.o^ .n in Table P.IJ. 
LAND AND LA?,0U1^ PRODU VIT? AMb LAND IIITIIioITY 







0 . 50 0 . 2 2 
Acreage/Labour Force 
(Acres/Worker) 
6.6't 5 . 70 
oource; Gi-nsu/i of Agr-iculture, l^OO 
I'Jubber Statistical Handbook, 1971. 
From an examination o^ tb.is table, it is readily noparent that 
the techniques or conditions of production differ subnt<.intially between 
estates an(3 smallholdings. The land-labour ratio in the estate sector is 
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r^lirhtly than T': times tlvit in tho sm,.llhol.UnL: sector. In fact, 
the land-labour r itio in the siriallholding sector is smaller than that 
indicated in the table if allowance io given to the use of fiiriily labour 
which was not ajjparei.tly included in the I96O Census. Only the owners of 
holdings were estim':'.ted. It can als;j he noticed thrit the output per 
worker i r, about tine.; that in t!.,. Gmallhyldin^' sector. This has been 
due to three fnctors. First, estates have a higher proportion of high 
yielding material (T-.blo 2.2). Secondly, the higher proportion of younger 
trees in estate.; also contribute to their higher output. Thirdly, there 
is a higher degree of specialisati(;n in the use of labour in estates. 
The estates thus have an output-land ratio twice that of smallholdings. 
) 
(Table 2.13), From the aljove arguraerits it is quite clear that smallholders 
have a lower marginal productivity level than the estates. 
One may also note tho difference in capital intensity of the 
two sectors. This was clearly pointed out by Bauer^^ and was confirmed 
by observations during the survey. Though there are no estimates of the 
ratio between capital intensity between the two sectors, it can be 
easily perceived that the difference is very substantial. The striking 
feature of an estate is its large investment in fixed capital. This 
investment is in management facilities, processing and transport 
facilities, and social overheads such as schools, hospitals, and roads. 
These are absent in smallholdings. 
On this issue of capital intensity, it is of interest to note 
that in fragmented estates converted to smallholdings substantial 
proportions of the fixed capitnl on the ex-estates were allowed to 
deteriorate.'"'^ For example, 28 per cent of the factories and 50 per cent 
22 ,, Jauer, op.cit. 
23 , . Aziz, op.ext. 
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of the j3rr!o]:i'hou;ie.7. were not in use, 'uid o^r cent 'if the roads were 
noL rn,-rint.-;ined. Probably the reason/: were the simple orc'-ini:;;ational 
structui-e oT smrillhoxclings ajid tlieir low inc. i.ie <//hich made the/n unable 
to cope with the maintenance and renewal of such fixed assets. 
Tlie fxaancial capital markets facin^i the estates and smallholders 
cii'o different. ijuropoan owned estates have access to international 
markets as ivell to the domestic cnritul mai-ket. Malayaian owned 
estates are mostly dependent on the uome.itic capital market. The picture 
of estate companii:;S i;^  one similai- to modern capitalist industries all 
over the world. In contrast, smallholders are faced with a restricted 
number of financial soui'ces. The principal source is still the rural 
money-lender. In general, the cost of such capital financing tends to 
be high due to high risk, the small scale of lending operations, and the 
presence of monopolistic elements. 
Difference in the methods and institutions of capital financing 
suggests that the cost of capital to smallholders is higher than to 
estates. This is also supported by the evidence that estates Iriave been 
able to finance replanting investment from internal sources whereas 
smallholders were unable to do so at a significant level till the government 
started t>ie replanting grant programme. 
Tliis is reflected in the rate of replanting of the two sectors 
in the earlier period before the government subsidy was in operation. 
(Table From 19^ +7 to 195?» tlie amiual rate of replanting of 
smallholdings was below 1 per cent of mature acreage. I'br the small period, 
the rate of replanting of estates averaged 2.3 per cent. In fact, between 
19'+7 to 1952, estate replanting exceeded that of smallholding by a factor 
of 13. 
.Vhile estates in genei-al find it relatively easier to replant, 
as they ti-^ ve sufficient internal funds, the smr.llhaiders face several 
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TA3LL 2^.1't. TLT/vL RiiPLAriT.'lU AR.^A AND 1-H'JP0RTI>^N Oi' 












As Per C e n t Q ^ 
of Mature 
Area 
±9>\G 6.7 Ojf n.a. n.a. 
19'47 2'f.8 1.3 'f.'f 0.28 
in'+a 2 . 5 2.0 0.12 
19't9 52.8 '' Q 2J: 0.15 
1950 Vi.O 2.5 3.5 0.22 
1951 58.-^ 3.8 
1952 51.6 '.C 0.26 
195? 29.8 1.7 29.5 1 .87 
195'+ 59.1 2.3 22.6 i.'a 
1955 57.6 25.3 1 .56 
1956 78.'+ '1.8 ^+6.5 2.8'f 
1957 76.3 if 9.8 3.00 
1958 6'4.8 59.7 3.50 
1959 68.2 69.1 3.90 
i960 75.2 5.3 69.5 3.80 
1961 70.5 5.1 57.3 2.89 
1962 6?.o U.6 69.2 3.21 
1963 58.7 Hz.'i 3.71 
196^1 58.9 'f.3 79.7 
1965 53.2 'f.O 91.'+ 
1966 50.0 3.7 73.0 2.97 
1967 27.9 2.1 79.7 3.07 
1968 13.1 1.0 39.1 1 . 5 2 
1969 23.9 1.8 37. 1. 'fO 
1970 3'4.8 2.6 53.2 2.03 
1971 29.9 2.3 57.5 2 . 1 9 
Average 39.72 2.66 'fU.52 2.1^+ 
(1) EGtimated ValuoR. 
n.a. - Data not available. 
Soiirce: RubV^er StatisticG Handbook, Various IsGuei 
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difficult Lee. Th.-re are two rn; joi' j-cajuii; foj- Lheli- reluctiuice, or 
rather inability, to replaxit. The first i-j the lack of Ccipit/il needed 
for the heavy replanting expenoeo. Tlie lack of sufficient Ccipital also 
means that they would find it difficult to bridge the loss of income 
during- the t^er.tation peri or!. The r.econd reasoa is a technical one. 
l^aucr ha:> ];0inte;l ovt t^at it v.'O'ild not b.' very sacce.sijful to replant 
only one oj;- two acres at a tit:,e as the young trees would not be able to 
comp^ite With th>. .Muaxjundinij matiu-e troer; fo-" sunli^'ht and nutrition. 
Indeed, the Comi.:itt6'e on Subdivision of i^lstates jjointed out that only 
holdings of 10 acres and above would find it easy to replant. A larger 
than 10 acre holding, especially if the ti'ees are of different vintage, 
could be phased cut for replanting. 
Convinced of the need to assist the rubber industry, particularly 
the smallholding sector, the government in started the replanting 
programme which gave financial assistance to those who v/anted to replant. 
Since 1952, tlie government has launched four replanting schemes 
for smallholders.^^ In Scheme No.l (1952), an assistance of ;v'+00 per 
O C P G VJclS 
giv^n in six instalments. This vjas actually on interim Scheme 
set up in pi'eparation for Scheme h'o.2 which vj. is to administer Schedule IV 
cccs collected from smallholders and put into Fund E. 
Scheme No.2 increased the rr.'planting grant to ^SOO per acre as 
the government realised the ^+00 subsidy was insufficient. The Scheme 
provided for the re])lanting of not less than one acre or more than one 
Bauer, op.cit. 
^^ Report of the Committee on Subdivision of Estates. (Government 
Printing Press Malaya, 19^3). 
26 
For details, refer to Rubber Industry (Replanting) Bocard F\md B. 
R.,-port on Operations for the Year 1971. 
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third of the holding of a smallholder. Besides rubber, the Scheme 
approved of replanting with other crops like fruit trees, coffee, and 
p i n e a p p l e . The target of the Scheme was to replant 500,000 acres of 
smallholding rubber by the end of 1959. H o w e v e r , only 66.2 per cent 
of this quota was reached. 
During the operation of Scheme No.2, the government allocated 
an additional $112 million to the smallholding sector. This operated 
within the established administration of Scheme No.2. The replanting 
grant was increased from 11.500 to U600 per acre. 
Scheme No.3 (i960) amalgamated the Administration of Fund B 
and the Government Replanting Scheme (19'35) which had a 5tll2 million 
s u b s i d y . Scheme No.3 increased the replanting grant to 3750 payable in 
7 instalments. Holdings below one acre were allowed to replant provided 
agronomic practices reached the required standard. 
Scheme No.'t was started in 1967. The aim was to replant 
^5,000 acres per annum till 1970. 80 per cent of the target was reached 
by 1 9 7 0 . 
Between 1953 and 1 9 7 0 , 32,000 acres of smallholding rubber were 
replanted without the aid of the grant. T h e s e , probably, are those which 
could afford replanting on their o w n . 
The Government Replanting Scheme of 1955 also provided assistance 
to e s t a t e s . O f the total subsidy of $280 million, Sl68 million was given 
to estates. This was channelled into the Rubber Industry (Replanting) 
Scheme for Estates N o . l . t^ach estate was permitted a replanting quota 
of 21 per cent of their total a c r e a g e . The target was to replant 
thousand acres by 1962. When the Scheme ended in 1962, the replanted 
acreage was ^+75,000 a c r e s . 
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In the government allocated an additional •;!;il6,000,000 
to help estate replanting. For each estate, the quota was set at 15 
per cent of the total planted acreage. When ended in 196?, 96 per cent 
of the target of 290,000 acres '.vas reached. 
Both the Schemes for estates provided grants of $ ^ 0 per acre 
payaVjlo in five instalments. 
In 1975, the Malaysian Governir^ ont is considering an increase in 
27 
the replanting grant for smallholdings. Informed sources mentioned 
that this may come to as much as ?fl,000 per acre. The same sources also 
mentioned that estates would also he given the same grant. pO 
2.7. UOLDIMGG ON LAND SCIIIiMES 
These holdings belonj^ ' to one of the several types of land 
schemes organised by the State or Federal governments. There are two 
categories: those which are subsidized and those which are not. The 
former includes the Federal Land Development Authority Schemes, block new-
planting schemes, fringe schemes, and some other minor ones. 
The FLDA schemes are the most ambitious and largest in total 
area. These are actually newplanting schemes in which jungle clearing, 
planting, immature maintenance, housing, processing of rubber, and 
general management are completely financed by the Federal Land Development 
Authority. The schemes are organised on a hierarchy of managers, 
assistiuits and supervisors. They tend to regulate the working regime of 
the tapper-owners. 
The average size of the FLDA holding is between 7 to 10 acres. 
pn 
Personal Communication with RIJDA Officials. 
pO 
Lim, op.cit. For details on various land schemes. 
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Though the initial work of clearing the jungle and other costs were 
financed by the government, the owner of the holding is expected to 
repay FLDA the principal plus an interest rate of 5 per cent. The 
repayment is expected to be completed in years' time. The holding 
is not under a freehold title but is leased for 99 years. 
There is no doubt that smallholdings in FLDA schemes produce a 
better grade of rubber than most other individual smallholdings. All 
FLDA schemes use the best planting materials which have an average yield 
of 1700 pounds per acre. Besides, the mcuiagemont of such schemes provide 
for supervision and advice which help the smallholders to improve their 
rubber production and mcxrketing. However, it must be noted that such 
FLDi. schemes involve a substantial amount of infi'astructure and heavy 
ini tial expenditui-e. 
Compared to FLDA schemes, which can be as large as 600,000 
acres, the other subsidized schemes are smaller. These vary from 120 to 
700 acres. 
One type of these is the fringe alienation scheme. These were 
started not so much to help the landless but to supplement the income of 
those who have already got smallholdings nearby. They are therefore 
usually situated on the fringe of existing cultivated areas varying in 
distance from 1 to 5 miles. In such schemes, government participantion 
was limited to clearing the jungle, planting and initial maintenance for 
a few months. Other than this, each smallholder was responsible for the 
holding after the initial development. He maintained it during the 
immaturity period without further supervision from the governmento Because 
of the little supervision given by the government, the stand^irds of 
maintenance of such schemes are poorer th^n those in I'T.DA schemes. This 
is al:^ o due to the fact that smallholders have to tr ivel some distance 
from their existing holdings to the fringe schemes. In addition, most 
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srnallholdnrij ])refcr to ir.oro time on holdinp;^ which .'aix- ricar tc their 
family dv-'ellings. 
The average size of the fringe hoi 3in,r; ic ^K? acret-. and the 
averagi.^  yield iw about I3OO pounds per annum. In 1970, there were 
13^3,850 acrec; of frinf^ e schemes. 
It is only in the unsubsidized schemcvs that the Chinese 
smallholders are dominant in number. Two-thirds were Chine;-e in 
This contrasts with the other schemes which are predominantly Malay 
owned. In such schemes, the only contribution from the government was 
the alienation fees. The smallholders had to rely on their own resources 
to develop the land. The average size of the unsubsidized holding is 
6 acres. The proportion of high yielding materials used is smaller than 
the other two schemes. 
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OIIAtT^R 3 
EXPORT TAXATION: A SURVEY OF LITERITURE 
AND THE RUBBER ECPORT TAXATION SYSTEM 
Two main areas are covered in this chapter: the first surveys 
some of the conclusiouii of theoretical and empirical works on export 
taxes; the second traces the development of the rubber export taxation 
system in Malaysia. The purpose of this chapter is to serve as background 
for analysis of various issues in subsequent chapters. Some general 
conclusions are, therefore, drawn in tliis chapter without detailed 
substantiation. They will be elaljorated later in their proper context. 
3.1v ai^ IiiJ^ AL BACKGROUUD 
Export duties had been widely used m l-iurope till the early 
twentieth century. The use of export duties had a mercantilist background. 
In fact, mercantilist governments in Europe made use of them to conserve 
resources at home for domestic utilization.^ At one time, circa I66O, 
Englcind iinposed export duties on 212 items.The main objective was to 
check the excessive outflow of certain raw materials. 
Iftien trade became more liberalized, the use of export taxes was 
discarded by the European countries. Besides, with rapid development in 
their economies, a larger number of other tuX bases became available. The 
former' reliance on export taxes, tlierefore, disappeared. In contemporary 
time, few industrialized countries use export taxes.^ In the United 
tates, the imposition of export duties is in fact prohibited by the ot<-
^ /or historical details, see League of Nations, Economic and Financial 
Section, International Economic Conference, Export Duties (Geneva, 1972) 
and L.R. Edminister, 'Export Duties', in /incyclopaedin of the Social 
Sciences (New York, 1931), Vol.VI, pp.21-;'3. 
Ibid. 
^ i'br inst.mce, Austx;ilin ha. an exjjort l>-;vy i";n beef and C nada has an 
export, t/i>; (.n oil export. 
eh 
consti tiition. 
By contrast, the i-se of export taxes quite a common 
feature of the fiscal systum of raany developing countries. There are 
several reat5ons for the popularity of export taxea in such countries. 
In tlie historical devolopment of tl^ eoe countries, the export sector has 
been the central nucleus of the market economy. In the development of 
their fiscal system, it was, therefore, quite a natural step to impose 
duties on the export of the few pritrary product^j from this sector. It 
was really a quoi-^ tion of simple exj^ediency from the political, 
administrative and revenue viewpoint. 
Export taxes are favom^ably regarded from the political viewpoint 
by the governments of developing countries. Unlike income taxes, export 
taxes are impersonal in nature. They are not so obvious in their incidence. 
For this reason, the population would not 'revolt' against their imposition, 
Besides, it is believed by the populace that the burden is on foreign 
owners in the taxed sector. Their imposition is thus readily approved of 
by the local citizens. However, if the producers in the taxed sector 
have powerful political influence, then the above argument loses its 
validity. In fact, this was what happened to some of the attempts by 
the Colonial Government to raise the export tax rates on the rubber 
industry. The politically powerful estate producers were in a position 
to occasionally frustrate some of these proposals of the government. 
Export taxes have the administrative simplicity which is most 
compatible with the local institutions and environment of developing 
coiintries. The tax, which is collected at points of ex];ort, is easy to 
assess and collect. It does not require complex machinery to collect 
the tax or great expertise to examine the records of tax payers. 
65 
Consequently, the cost of collection is low/^ Furthermore, where there 
is a large number of small producers scattei-ed within the country, as in 
the case of the numerous smallholders in Malaysia, the most feasible way 
to tax them is to impose export duties. 
For developing countries with few sources of tax revenue, the 
revenue productiveness of export taxes is moot significant. It is 
estimated that about thirty developing countries currently use export 
taxes as a significant source of revenue.^ For twelve of them, the 
contribution of export taxes amount to as much as 10 per cent or more of 
the total tax revenue.^ 
Since the export taxes are tied in one way or another to the 
volume and price of such e>r{->orts, there is a high degree of instability 
in the volume of export tax revenue caused by fluctuations in the prices 
of primary exports. For instance, during the Korean boom in the 1950's, 
export tax revenues of most developing countries rose rapidly. But 
during the post Korean recession, they declined sharply. This instability 
of export tax revenue is a major problem in treasury management for the 
governments of developing countries. 
During the Korean boom period, the role of export taxes as a 
countercyclical instrument to stablize the domestic economy gained 
n 
prominence. The governments of developing countries introduced new 
export duties or raised the rates of existing ones in order to dampen 
^ The cobt of collection in Malaysia is 5.0?:^  of revenue collected from 
export taxes. 
r; 
H.Good, et al, "Role of Export Taxes in Developing Countries," 
International Monetary Fund Gtaff Paper. 
^ Ibid, pAGO. 
K.J.Rothwell, "Taxeb on Export;j in Underdeveloped Countries," 
Public Finance. Vol.lS, I965, pp.310-525. 
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the impact of inflaLionai'y pressure ij,cn.er,'itu(i b^' the rise in prices of 
primary exports. Usually, the chanj-ie in the export tax structure involved 
a bhift from specific to ad valorem rates or to a sliding scale geared 
to the world price of the taxed commodities. Depending on the structure 
of the export tax, the general trend in i-:ost countries using export taxes 
has been towai-ds he:ivier export duties in order to cope with inflationary 
pressure generated by price rises. 
The use of expoi't t;o:es for stabilization purposes is only 
effectual provided the government does not spend excessively during the 
boom time. Ag-iin, if the export tnxes can be sliifted abroad easily 
during boom time, tlien the full puwer of export taxes in stabilizing 
domestic income will be diluted. 
There are other minor objectives of using export taxes. For 
instance, they are sometimes used to eliminate forcing control of the 
export trade, to exploit foreign markets because of their inelastic 
dem;ind, and to check the outflow of certain raw materials. 
These objectives are not all compatible with one another. For 
instance, if the objective is to discourage the outflow of resources, 
then this will affect the revenue objective of export taxes. 
For most developing countries, the major objective of export 
g 
taxes is still the revenue one. 
3.2. THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS 
Let us first look at some of the major theoretical conclusions 
on export taxes in literature on international trade theory. 
Ilabeler'^ was one of the earliest to mention the effect of the 
p 
.j.B.Ayal. The Impact of Export Taxes on the Domestic Economy. (Centre 
for Intern itional Affairs, Hav/ird University, 196",, Kimeographed). 
Ilarbelor, The Theory of International Tr.-nie, (London 1936), p.22?. 
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imposition of export duty in international trade. 'Using a partial 
equilibrium approach, he concluded that the quantity or terms of trade 
effects are the same vvhether the exporting country imposes an export 
duty or the importing country (l) imposes an import duty. 
Actually, various chaiiges can occur deijendinc on the supply and 
demand elasticities of the two countries. Thus, if the importing country 
has inelastic supply and inelastic deritoid and the exporting country has 
elastic supply and elastic demand, then any rise in the price of the 
export cornnodity due. to the export tax will be shifted to the importing 
country. Kowevor, if tlir- exporting country is an atomistic supplier, 
then it has to bear the tax. 
One inadequacy of Karbeler's analysis is that he did not make 
a distinction between the short run and long run situation. In the long 
run situation, the elasticity of demand is larger because of the 
availability of other sources of supply and the possibility of substitutes. 
This would then change the terms of trade of the trading countries. The 
country imposing the tax would then not be able to determine the terms of 
trade to its favour. 
In addition, to be applicable to the problems of developing 
countries^ Harbeler's classical assumptions must be modified to accommodate 
the peculiar institutional structure of (developing countries. 
The second approach^*^ to the study of export taxes in 
international trade theory made use of the Karshallian offer curves. 
Invoicing the classical assumptions of perfect competition, no capital 
flow and ho transport costs, and using the simplifying two by two model 
io See A.Marshall, Money, (Credit Zc Comnicrcej, (London, 1923) pp.l80-l82, 
Appendix J5 A Lej'ner, 'The 3ymnetry between Import and Export Taxes' 
Economica, Vol.3, 1936, pp.306-313; A Pigou, A"Study in Public P^inance, 
TLondon, 1927), pp. 193-216. 
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(th:rt is, two goods and two counLries), t>ie conclusion ir. reached that 
import and export taxes are symmetrical. The only effect is that the 
price for traders in one country is made different by the amount of the 
tax from that of traders in another country. The final equilibrium 
depends on the manner in which the government spencls the tax revenue. 
1 1 According to i.erne] /'- the terms of trade v;ould be f,;.voia-able to the 
country for whose goods the demand of the government is higher. Secondly, 
the country is bettor off than under no fo; oign trade taxes if the 
proportion of the tax spent on its goods i.3 greater than the elasticity 
of the foreign offer curve over the r-elev-nt i.-angc. 
'uhen it is pointed out in international trade literature that 
export and import taxes are syminetrical, there are actually two symmetries 
involved. In the Karshal-Lerner-Pigou model, the Scime equilibrium results 
wheth<-)r the government of a country uses equal ad valorem import or export 
12 
duties. ^ In the second case, an export duty in one country is identical 
with an import duty in another country, if the revenue is handed over 
to the second country by the first, that is, the export taxing country.^^ 
The third approach is the optimum tariff anrlysis. The whole 
^^ Lerner, Ibid., pp.310-'-ll. 
1 ? A. Lerner, Economics of Control, (New York, 19'f'+) pp. 382-383. 
^^ J.Meade, A Geometry of International Trade, (London 1952) p.48. 
Ih 
There is a large number of articles on this issue. See, for instance, 
T.D. Jcitovsky, 'A Reconsideration of the Theory of Tariffs', in 
Readings in the Theory of International Trade (Phila, 19^9), K.Kaldor, 
'A Note on Tariffs and the Terms of Trade', Economica, Vol,VII, 19^0; 
I.Little, 'Vielfare and Tariffs', Review of Economic Stud-ies, SVl(2) 
I9/K8-49; J.de V.Graff, 'On Optimum Tariff Structui-e', siirae Review, 
XVII (1); H.Johnson, 'Optimum Welfare and Maximujn Revenue Tariffs', 
Scime Review XXX (L) , also his article, 'Optimum Tariffs and 
Retaliation', same Review, X]:i (2); il.G., Johnson, 'Tariffs and 
Economic Development: oome Theoretical Issues', Journal of Development 
Studies, 1(1) 1964; G.,V.Edwards, 'Optimum Tariff Theory and the Wool 
Industry', The Treasury, Canberra. 
69 
c 
idea behind Ibis i^ j thrvt a countx^ j' c:a, itripj-ove i LG v.olfare by manipulating 
itis tariffs to improve its terms of trade» '.Vhen this succeeds, then the 
tarifr situation would be preferred to the free tri^ de one for this country, 
15 
Thus Scitovsky concludes that the highest point of welfare is reached 
if the barter terms of trade of the country, under the influence of its 
tariffs, re;.>che;i th • ].oint of tcmgency between the foreign offer curve 
and one of the country's community indifference curves. 
Great refinements'^ ' have been laade in this area of study. The 
conclusioji with regard to the export tax is that it con be shifted 
forv/ard, the amount of shift depending on the relevcOit supply and demand 
elasticities. 
The usefulness of the optimum tariff analysis is that it points 
out the possibility of improving the terms of trade of the country 
imposing the export tax. 
In terms of practical applications, however, there are 
conceptual and measurement difficulties. In the real world situation, 
many sets of pptimum tariff structures are possible. There is no one 
unique solution, but there exists a large number of them. Each of these 
corresponds to a particular distribution of income within the tax 
17 
imposing country. Little also points out that the gains from imposing 
the optimum tariff are not easy to measure. This is due to the 
difficulty in comparing the constantly changing points of equilibrium 
arising from reactions to the imposition of the tariffs. 
In practice, the imposing of tariffs by developing countries is 
^^ Scitovsky, Ibid. 
^^ See the bibliography in S.K.Nath, A Reappraisal of Welfare Economics 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969; p.202. 
Little, 'Tariffs and .'/elfare' , op.cit. 
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not for the purpose o-f improving; their terms of trade. Invariably, the 
motive has been to maximize revenue. It must also be recoguised that the 
gaintj from applying so-called optiraiixii t/irirfs to improve their tKx-i.Lj of 
trade may be short lived if other countries ret.ort to retaliatory 
measures. . 
It will be noticcd that the analynic of international trade 
theory with respect to the problem of export taxes has been a-^ ainly 
concerned with their effects or the tei-ras of trade of the countries 
involved. Nothing is mentioned of the distributive effects of the tax 
18 
within the imposing country. This aapect of the prcblem is important 
especially when in most cases the tax cannot be shifted abroad because 
of elastic demand and inelastic supply. In such a situation, the tax is 
shifted backvvard and may be shared among the vai-ious economic units 
involved in the production and marketing of the taxed commodity. 
To get an idea of this aspect of the problem, we shall look at 
some of the conclusions of literature in public finance. Since export 
taxes really belong to the clans of excise taxes, some major conclusions 
19 on the latter are reviev/ed first. 
A system of excise taxes nay be aimed at commodities which have 
their final impact on consumers or the producers. Export taxes are that 
group which belong to the latter case. Except for the case where the 
demand is inelastic, the tax burden will not be solely on consigners and 
is usually shared between consi.im,ers and factors of production, 
Stopler and Gamuelson, 'Protection and Real '.Vages', Review of Economic 
Studies. 19^ tl, pp.58-73. 
C.S.Shoup, Public Finance. ((Veidenfeld and Nicholson, I969). 
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Unirij^  a general equilibrium approach, the conclusion is reached 
20 
by Rolph" that when a completely f^eneral and uniform set of excise 
taxes is imposed, the incomes of resource owners are decreased 
proportionately. In the case of a single excise tax, if the demand 
facing the taxed industry is elastic, this will lower rewards of factors 
used in producing the taxed commodity. •Resources will migrate out of 
this industry into others where the returns may be higher. However, if 
the demand facing the taxed industry is inelastic then expenf^iture on the 
taxed commodity rises and spending on other goods is reduced. Factor 
incomes in these other industries correspondingly decline. 
The conclusion o J' liolph that the excise tax falls on factor 
incomes is reached by way of certain special assumptions, viz., perfectly 
inelastic factor supplies, perfect competition in factor and commodity 
markets, price flexibility, a given quantity of money, and the use of 
the tax receijit in such a way that total money demand is not affected. 
In a celebrated study on the incidence of excise taxes, Due^^ 
generalized the above restrictive conditions and concludes that the 
immediate responses to the excise tax depend on a host of variables, 
viz., the consumer preference schedules (which determine demand 
ela.sticity) , the production functions (which determine cost reactions 
of the firm), the indu;itx"y cost conditions, and on thu competitive 
situation of the industry (which controls entry and tlie elasticity of 
the s.Ales curve). 
20 
S.K'olph, 'A Proposed Rovisiotj of Excise Theory', Journal of Political 
ICconomy, 19^32, pp.102-117; i:;.Rolp]i, 'h Theory of ><xcise Subsidies', 
American Economic Hevievj, 19!>2, pp.515-527: K.Iiusgrave, 'General 
Equilibrium Aspects of Incidence Theory' , American Sconomic Review, 1953' 
21 J.Due, 'General Theory of Sales Tax incidence', .^ .uarterly Journal of 
Economics, 1953• 
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Tn the long run situation, factor price adjustments viill take 
place. The final equilibrium depends on the effect of the tax, how the 
tax receipt is used, and the elasticities of the supply and demand of 
factors of production. 
Unlike Rolph's conclusion that the excise tax will fall only 
on factors, Due's analysis shows that the tax burden may be shared by 
both consumers and factors of production. 
22 
Some gent^ i'al conclusions on the incidence of excise taxes 
have background relevance for analyzing the case of export taxes. 
Under competition, the .ihare of the burden of the excise tax 
depends on the elasticity of supply and elasticity of demand of the 
seller and buyer. The ratio of the elasticity of supply to the elasticity 
of demand determines the eimount of burden of the excise tax to be divided. 
If the supply is perfectly elastic, then a tiix on the seller 
leads to a rise in the price by the full amount of the tax. This occurs 
irrespective of the elasticity of odd demand. Here, the burden is on the 
buyer. 
If the demand is perfectly elastic, then the burden of the ta x 
is on the seller. This is so irrespective of the elasticity of supply. 
As a corollary of the above, if supply is perfectly inelastic, 
then the burden of tlie excise tax is on the seller. The demand affects 
iieibher the price nor the amount transacted. 
If demand is perfectly inelastic, then tlie entire burden is on 
the buyer. The price and amount transacted are not affected by supply. 
The elasticity of supply is determined by the degree of 
22 r., ohoup, o^. . CI t . 
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specificity and mobility of the factors of production used in the taxed 
industry. The more specialized the resources, the smaller is the 
possibility of substitution between uses of such factors. This makes 
the resources very immobile. A good example is certain types of land 
v/hich are only suitable for specific crops. 
The elasticity of demand is determined by factors like the 
availability of alternative supplies ajid the existence of substitutes. 
When both of these are absent, the elasticity of demand is very 
inelastic. The tax v;ill then fall on the buyers. 
3.3. IKCIDZINCS OF THE EXPOl^T TAX 
From the above einalysis in the theory of international trade 
and public fin<\nce studies, oone general conclusions can be M.ravm v/ith 
regard to the incidence of the imposition of export taxes.'" 
On the sliifting of export taxes, the general ansvyers provided 
by economic theory rely heavily on the relative price elasticities of 
supply and demand of the taxed com-nodity, and on the mobility of the 
factors used in the production and marketing of the commodity. 
In general, where supply is elastic and demand is inelastic, it 
is possible to shift the export tax on to foreign consumers. However, 
if the supply is inelastic and the demand is elastic, then the burden of 
the export tax is on the i)roducers of the tax imposing country. 
For most primary products under export taxes, the world prices 
are determined by world demand and supply forces. The demand facing any 
single producer is usually a very elastic one in normal circumstances. 
This elasticity is directly due to the availability of alternative 
sources of supply and for some commodities the possibility of substitution 
by synthetics. 
^^ Good, op.cit. 
Consequently, the imposition of an export t.ix, or the raising 
of the ratee of an existing one, on an exported cominodity by a single 
producer would have no impact on the world price of that item. It has 
an influence only if the tax imposing country is a monopolist or when 
all producer • c-n coordinate to restrict supply. Oiven the absence of 
both, the export t-.x burden will f-tll. on the producer^ of the tax 
imposing country. 
The small possibility of forward shifting of the export tax 
due to elastic demruid is also diminisliod by the very low elasticity of 
of most of tht\se primary exports. 
In most Ciises, t}i<; rt!sources used in tlie production of primary 
prod\tcts are ei thoi- .-.peci fic or iin.Tiobd le or have become so when they 
are committed during the initial period of investment. Technological 
and agronomic factors have contributed to this immobility. Take the case 
of a tree crop like rubber. Once a piece of land is planted with rubber 
trees, it will be confined to rubber production for a considerable length 
of time because of the long life-span of rubber trees. Alternative uses of 
this piece of land are only possible at the end of the life span of the 
rubber trees or when rubber production is abandoned. Other factors like 
labour could move out of rubber production. The possibility of this 
depends on alternative employment available. In the absence of such 
possibilities, the long gestation period of rubber planting, and the 
limits to v.'hich the trees could be exploited for more latex at any given 
moment of time, the supply of rubber output is therefore very inelastic 
in the siiort run. 
Other non economic factors also contribute to the inelasticity 
of supply. For instance, some farmers may stick to a ccrtain type of 
crop production because it has become a way of life to them or they may 
produce only a certain amount as long as their target income is reached. 
75 
The above factors oper'.it'"' in varyin/3 degrees for different crops 
and in different cultural and economic envii'onment.s. 
Over the long run, the possibility of adjustments is greater 
since the v<-.;riout> constraints become less restrictive. The long run 
supply curve io, therefore, more elastic tli:i.n tlie short run one. 
Thus, given the elastic demand ;xnd inelastic supply of most of 
luese products the possibility of forr/r^ r^d shifting of the export tax, 
at le£;st in the short riUi jjcriud, to foi-eign consumtrs is not likely. 
Governments imposing oxpurl. taxes mast, therefore, regard the burden of 
such taxes as falling on thi)ir ovm producers. 
The disti'ibutiou of the burden of the expoi't taxes witiiin the 
country among those involV(^a xu tlie production and marketing of the 
product is determined by the relative demand and supply curves of the 
various economic units involved and also b;y th'; institutional framework 
they operate in. 
Most of the analysis on the international shifting of the export 
tax can be applied to the internal incidence of the tax within a country, 
ijome modifications and qualifications have to be added for the latter 
case because of the existence of imperfect institutional and marketing 
structures facing some producers. Plowever, the general conclusion still 
holds with regard to the sharing of the tax burden. The ones in the 
weakest bargaining position will receive the greater share, if not all, 
of the tax burden. 
In the general case, there ore at least three groups of people 
involved: the exporters, middlemen, and the producers. In some cases, 
The case of the rubber producers is analyzed in Chapter k. 
The actual number of levels depends on the marketing institutions 
of different countries. 
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the fir^jt two groupti may be tlie c a m j people. There are a l G O situations 
where the producera are able to bypact; the traditional marketijig chain 
and expoi-t the goods themeelvea. For instance, some of the larger estates 
in Malaysia export their rubber dix-ect to foreign consumers. To do this, 
tliey are aG!i.j.jted by agcncy liouues wldch have import-export interests 
besides performing other functions. 
In the exporter-producer case, the share of the export tax 
bur^den is between him and the foreign consumers. The earlier analysis 
on the possibility of forward shifting of the expoi't tax at the 
international level will apply. 
In the othei' 3itu:ition where producers have to sell through the 
middlemen and expoi'ter.'i, the su-in-ig of the export tax burden depends 
on the relative elasticities of supply and demand of i.hese economic units. 
The elasticities ai-e determined by the competitive conditions of trading, 
the mobility of resources used in the production anil laarketing of the 
commodity, ajid tlie presence of institutional factors like government 
regulations. 
AL tlie point of export, exporters pay the export tax. This is 
the formnl Jncidence. Ilowevei-, the effective incidence may not be on 
them. This dojiends on their demand cOisticity for thf jjroducts of the 
tr.ider.'. ia l-lie middle level of the marketini: cli. d n . I f the ela;.3ticity of 
dem: iicl i -. larg.jr tl . :i the ela;^ticity of supp ly of the middlemen, then 
oxporlf'r-s could shift the tax bac' to them. However, i f the middlemen 
have plastic supply and the exportci's h.ivo inclastic demand, then the 
shifti.i)^^ of tlie tax is made d i f f icult . 
It is (piite usual to find tlie number of exjiortt rs much smaller 
than t}ie number of other traders the lower I'^v d of the marketing 
chain. One may dfduce from this, arid from tlie presence of other 
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innti1-\itional r igiditicG , tluit foa- -my partical-,r m::ddloman the 
elasticity oT his sup^ - l^y will be smaller tlian tlu;- elasticity of the 
demand curve fjicing him. The r,upply curvets of tiie middle tr-iiders will 
be more inelastic , the larger is their number and the smaller is the 
numlirr of av.^il-^iMe exporters as outlets. A priori reasoning would 
i.idicate th' t expor t-I's ar-e in a much bett(?r position to shift the 
export tax backward to the middle traders, given that they cannot shift 
the tax abroad. 
In practice, this is what actually happens. The price which 
the exporters use to compute the offer price to middle traders is not 
the world price . I t is the one with the relevant araount of the export 
tax already deducted. This means the export tax is immediately shifted 
26 
backwai'd to those below the exporter in the marketing chain. 
Between the middle traders and the producers, the supply 
elasticity of the latter is larger than the demand elasticity of the 
former for the taxed commodity. This is due to the fact that the 
number of middle traders in any given area is smaller than the number of 
producers. Consequently, the ntimber of otitlets for producers is small 
and the choice of middlemen restricted. VJe have also shown that 
producers of primary exports are in most cases very inelastic in their 
supply. Given the above, and the existence of other institutional 
r ig id i t ies , the backward sliifting of the export tax to producers is 
facil itated . 
Thiis the price used by thu middle trn.iers to calculate their 
offer price to producf;rs is no L the world price net of the exporters' 
and tneir own marketing margin but also net of the export tax. The tax 
is thus shifted all tho way back to the producers. 
This i 11 ustrntion i^ based Oii tlie experience of the rubber case 
an^ilyzed in Chapter 
78 
The shifting of the expor'L tax backward v;il.l be either smaller 
or not possible if the relative elaiiticities of the supply and demand 
curves of the various c^ 'O'-ips in the production and marketing of the 
taxed commodity are ju.,t the opposite of what we have discussed above. 
The internal shifting process therefore dej;endG on (l) the 
ratio of tiie supply elasticity of the middle traders to the demand 
elasticity of the exporters; (2) the ratio of the supply elasticity of 
the producers to the demand elaoticity of tnc middle traders. 
The above siiifting process is called external backward 
27 
shifting. The process of shifting the export tax via price changes 
all the way back from the exporter level to the producer may not end 
there. There is the possibility that the producer can shift the tax to 
his factors of production. V/hen this takes place, this is called 
internal backward shifting. 
The extent to which producers can shift the tax back to wage 
labour depends on the available alternative employment for labour and 
the availability of land for them. It also depends on whether the wage 
rate is institutionally determined. If the first two opportunities for 
labour are absent, then producers can shift part of the export tax to 
them by lowering their wage rates. On the other hand, if wage rate is 
regulated by the government or by trade unions, then the shifting of the 
tax to wage labour is not possible. 
In the case of fcunily laboui-, the tax is shared among the 
family members if all of them are involved in the family business. 
In the case of the f'ictor land, the owners will bear the export 
tax if there are no other uses of the land or if tht yield from 
alternative utilization is lovif. 
H.C .rjecktenwald, Tax Incidence .ind Income Redi;y}.ri1)ution. (Wayne 
GLate University Tress, D'^troit, 1971) pp.J'2-36. 
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Owners of liquid capi^ •! are similarly affected. If returno 
from alt'-rnativG une;j of capit.'l funds are lower th,in in the taxed 
industry then the ownorG co.ririol evade the cxporb tax by shifting C'-\pital 
oiace the incoitive to do .-so ia 1. ilov/evor, if the alt'..>ra •tiv(? 
return:; are ainil-.a or nor- then thi;rc will b.^  an oulflo^; of c-.pi tal 
out of thf; t;ixiMl inductry to unt^ixoT onca, or those with lo\-er taxes'. 
In thia fsection, a surnmory of the results of empirical workc 
on the shiftin.rr of export tisxer? in given, 
/Jvidence on the ponaibility of shifting the burden of export 
taxes to foreifx) consumero is scarce. In a study on this iasue, 
?P> 
Staley'"" h:),s found that tlb.'re was some shifting of export taxes abroad 
in the case of tea and jute exports from Ceylon, India and Pakistan. 
This occurred during the boom period of the 1950's. The evidence is 
not V::i-y strong. For in boom periods, world prices would rise regardless 
of taxation. This is because of the powerful pull exerted by external 
demand combined with inelastic supply of the various agricultural exports. 
However, if the indication of full forv,':rd shifting in Staley's study 
war, correct, it would mean thnt the primiiry producing countries had 
gained an incre-tse in real income taxing the foreign consumers. 
This could only bo g short run gain since, as was pointed out 
earlier, tlit possibility of forv.-ard shiftinr- re-^ u^ires very stringent 
conditions for it to be successful. V.'hen shifting is possible, it 
most likely takes place during short tc^n boom period, for instance, 
during the Korean war time. 
pQ 
C.E.Staley, 'Export Taxes in Ceylcn, 19'+8-52' Public Finance, 
Vol.XIV, 1959, I^ P-
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tlie strong external demand is sustained and the supply 
is restricted for a long period, forward shiftinc^ of the export taxes 
can only be a temporary plienomenon. This v/as clearly shown by the 
experience of international control in the rubber induijtry. The 
pq 
Stevenson Scheme/" which was implemented to regulate the export of 
natural ruhh.n- from British administered ar^^as, created price effects 
similar to those due to the imposition of an export tax. During the 
short period of the sclieme, forcjipn buyers had to pay higher prices. 
Cut tiiis lasted only a short while as foreign consumers found new 
sources of su|..ply from non Briti-'Vi administered countries. This led to 
the collapse of rubber prices cmd Lhe eventual abandonment of the scheme. 
forward sliiftin;-; of export taxes is, therefor-e, an exception. 
The ge..eral rule is ttiat the economic units involved in the production 
of the exported commodity witliin tlie tax imposing country have to bear 
the burden. 
The evidence of the distribution of the burden of export 
taxes within a country is one of varied experience, "^ his has to be 
expected. J'or the sharing of the burden among tlie different economic 
units involved depends on numerous factors like the nature of the 
commodity, the structure of the industry, and other economic and non 
economic variables surrounding the traders and producers of the taxed 
commodity. Because of such differences in the economic ;ixid non 
ecoiicji.;ic environment between different countries, it is difficult to 
make a valid comparison of the empirical results. oeaidLS, the period 
of tne v;irious st\idies being not t}ic. s..i.mc, also distorts the 
conc]usion. However, it is sLill useful Lo luiujv their conclusions. 
'/ov a detailed study, see P.i. i,iaut;r. The ihjbber Industry, 
(Longmans, 
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The study on the coffee tax in Guatemala by Olscn^'^ concludes 
that the burden is not shifted forward because the country is an 
atomistic producer and as such, cannot influence world piice by its 
taxation policy. The tax is a heavy one in relation to the profit margin. 
However, the exporters do not bear the effective bm-den as it is shifted 
backward to the producers. The producers have to bear the tax because 
there is no possibility of their shifting it to the wa^e labour. There 
are two reasons for this: first, the w/age level of the labour is already 
low; secondly, the labourers can switch to the cultivation of their ov/n 
land. 
However, the study on the coffee export tax in SI Salvador by 
V/allich and Adler"^^ gives a different analysis. Their conclusion is that 
the burden of the coffee export tax is shifted back to labour. The major 
argument is that labour in that country has no alternative eraployrnent 
available. In addition, the coffee industry has been dominating the wage 
structure of the economy for a long time and has become the leading sector 
in wage deterraination. Froomkin and Lidstone,' '" however, thirJc otherwise. 
In fact they point out that labour has to be paid higher wages in the 
coffee industry in order to get the crops harvested. As long as coffee 
prices are high, the producers have to bear the burden of the coffee 
export tax. 
% 
This apparent conflict c:ui be easily resolved if one recognises 
the existence of a dual v/age structure in the economy. Depending on the 
A.Olson, e t . a l . , Public Finance ^ d Sconor.ic Development in Guatemtila. 
(Stanford University Press, 195-), pp.lOC-102. 
H.V/allich and J.Adler, Public Fimmce in A Developing Country, 
(Harvai-d, 195'0) pp. 
^^ Froomkin and Lidstone, 'Tax Problems of Export Economies', National 
Tax Journal, 1955, pp. 2e-'f-273. 
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relative wai3e rate between the coffee inclut^ try ar.d the other sectors, 
labour supply will flow accordingly in response to the wage incentives. 
This assumes that they can move freely. If they can, IVallich et.el. 
are correct. If they cannot, then Olson is correct. 
Two general studies on the use of export taxes and marketing 
boards, one by I3SD on Mexico and Nicaragua and the other by Bauer 
and laish,'' conclude that the producers are tlie ones who bear the export 
tax bvu-den. 
In his study on the operatioji of the rice export tax in 
Thailand, Aval'''' concludes that everyone involved in the production and 
nm'keting process pays a share of the export tax. His main evidence is 
that the elasticity of supply at every stage of the marketing chain is 
snaller thLan the elc.sticity of demr':nd at every corresponding level. In 
a quantitative study on the same issue, Renaud"'''^  points out that it is 
the rice producers v/ho actually bear the burden of the tax. The 
difference in conclusion may be due to the different periods which these 
authors have used for their study. Henaud's conclusion seems to rest on 
stronger ground since ho could provide some quantitative estimates of 
the problem whereas Ayal relies on a priori reasoning to reach his 
conclusions. This, of course, assumes that the former's estimates are 
sufficiently accurate to justify his con^ -ilusions. 
^^ IBRD, Economic Development of Mexico (Saltimore, 1953), p.10?; 
Economic Development of Micr-ragua, (Baltimore, 1953), 
^^ P.T.Bauer and F.'.^ '.Paish, 'The Reduction of Fluctuations in the 
Incomes of Primary Producers Further Considered', Economic Journal, 
Vol. LXIV, 193^ +, 711-712. 
Ayal, op.cit. 
^^ B.Renaud, et.el., The Effect of the i^ ice jH-iport Tax on the Domestic 
Rice Price Level in Thailand, Ilulayan Economic Review, 1971, 
pp. 8^-103. 
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On the shifting of the rubber expert taxes in the Malaysian 
case there is Cf^neral agreement that the bearer of the burden is the 
producer. Such conclusions have been reached by Bauer, Lim, Tan, Edwards 
37 
and Stern using a macro approach in their analysis. Their other 
general conclusion is that the tax cannot be shifted forward to foreign 
consumers. 
The exact determination of the export tax incidence is a 
difficult exercise. Many of the issues are dependent on institutional 
details which influence the economic relationships of the participants 
in the production and marketing of the taxed commodities. In addition, 
most studies are plagued by data problem and conceptual difficulties. 
Despite these difficulties some statements on the probable incidence of 
export taxes can still be made by studying the institutional factors and 
whatever quantitative data available. Pending further confirmation from 
more research on the topic, we should regard the conclusions of previous 
studies as tentative and as indications of probable effects only. 
There is one other aspect of the incidence of export taxes. 
This is on the effects of export taxes on production and investment in 
the taxed industry. The question is whether the imposition of export 
taxes have an adverse influence on production and investment in the 
short and long run situation. 
The first point to note is that there have been no studies which 
are directly concerned with the specific issue of the effects of the tax 
^^ Bauer, T^ubber Industry, op.cit. ; C.Y.Lim, ICxport Taxation in Post 
War I.alaya, (M.A. Thesis, University of Malaya IQ'^ .l;) A.Tan, The 
Incidence of Export Taxes on Small Producers, Malc-iyan /Economic 
rieview, Vol.XII, No.l, 196?, pp. 90-9?^; C.T.Edwards, Public Finance; 
in Malaya and Singapore, (A.Il.U. Press, 1970); R.!:.Stern, 'The 
Expoi-t Tax on Malayan Fiubber: Problems and Policy:, National Tax 
Journc.1, VoloXVI, No.l, conclusions in Chapter •'i of 
thesis. 
8^ 4 
on investment an^ ^ production. I-lost of the enipirical works have been 
iOcur-Ged on the price elasticity of supply of primary exports.' From 
the conclusions of supply response studies, some authors ^ have drawn 
inferences on the likely effects of the imposition of export taxes on 
production ;uid. investment. 
I'Voni the i_^ reat volume of literature on supply response studies, 
two di:-imetrically opposite conclusions, with respect to the effects of 
export taxes, are found: those who have founu that supply is insensitive 
to price changes conclude th it because of this the export taxes have, 
therefore, also no .influence on productj.on, In fact, it is art^ 'ued 
that outpul rai^Vit even be stimulated because of the export taxes because 
producers desire to maintain their profit and income level. The other 
conclusion is that since supply is sensitive to price changes, output 
-'hi must therefore bs responsive to export tax changes. 
L'n this issue, one must make a distinction l^etween the short 
run and long run situation, lilmpirical evidence has shown that for most 
•I? 
crops the short run supply elasticity is very small. The reason is 
that tlie regular output of most producers is in fact the maximum one. 
There is little scope for increase beyond the technological maximum in 
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The voluitie of literature on tliis topic is vi;i-y large. I'or a review 
and bibliogrciphy, re fur B.Oury, 'A r^?view of Past efforts at 
Deriving Agricultural oupply Models for Developing Countries,' 
Working Paper N0.I8, IBRD, I968. 
Gee Oood, op.cit. 
For irisl.ance, sec; F.Chan, 'A i rcliminary .'"tudy of Supply Response of 
t-'alayan Rul^ber ilstates Between 19''i3-19r>J' , Malayan Jconomic Ileview, 
Vol.7, No.,^, 196?, pp. 77-9^+; c .P.lVhrLrton, ' 1' o n o c u 11 m- a 1 P e r e rmi al 
Pxjjorr Domina.nce: The Inelasticity of Goutheast Asi;.in Agricultural 
Trade, Clameographed} . 
uood, op.cit. , p.'+o^. 
i;.J .Bateman, 'oupply Halations for P-.rennial Crop^ in the Less 
Developei5 Areas', in C . R .V/h?ir ton (ed.) Cubsis b^ -nce Agricultiu-e S-. 
iLConomic Developinent, (Adline : ublishing Co.l9'''9}, 
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the short rxin period in resxionse to a price rice. .lien the price f--l?i.s 
there is, hov^ever, little incentive to decrease output as most producers 
would not v/ish to lovver further their income level. In any cace, they 
v;ould only do GO if the variable cost of production is not covered. At 
the lov/er price range, the rate o^ export taxation io in noct car-.os lev/ 
and takes a M y only a omall proportion of the receiv':blo pricc. Tor 
this reason, output is not reduced. 
In the long rvin case, ernpirical evidence shows that the elasticity 
of supply would be greater than in the short rvm. There are more 
possibilities of adjustments and changes, Depencli.ng on the structure of 
the export tax, in the long run situation there may be incentives to move 
out of the taxed industry. The indication from a priori reasoning is 
that if the export tax has absorbed a large proportion of the potential 
amount of investible funds, long run investment would be adversely 
affected in this industry. However, the flow of capital and other 
reso'iirces into other investment depends on the opportunities present and 
also on their relative ret-ii-ns. If both of these are not very attractive, 
then resources inay not move out of the t^xed industry. Besides, 
consideration should also be given to technological changes and to any 
government subsidies for the taxed industry which are incentives to 
retain existing resoiirces from moving out^into other investments. 
Tlie effect of the export tax in the long run is a reduction in 
profit and investible funds, which in turn adversely affects reinvestment 
in the taxed industry. But the net effects of the export tax and the 
influence of other factors like government subsidy and investment 
opportunities, could affect the industry in different directions. T>ie 
L-2. 
Wharton, op.cit. 
See Chapter ^ of thesis. 
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case '.vould be diffei-cnt for difforent industries and comnodities. No 
definitive statements could be made on the net effects until more 
knowledge of tlie export structure and institutional background of 
the industry is available. 
Til;; Ku:-;- A I^ XPOUT T.-XATIC, 5Y;;T.1! 
T}io earliest evidence of l.he ui.e of export taxation in West 
I Malaysia was the per capita tax of five rikndollars on each adult slave 
exported from the styte of Hnlacco, then under D\itch administration, in 
the seventeenth century. By 19'+1, there were seventy items under export 
taxation in the -''cderated and Unfederated Malay States. . 
In its early history of economic development, trade taxes 
dominated the tax structure of the '//est Malaysian economy. The heavy 
reliance on sucli taxes was inevitable. This was because the economy was 
underdeveloped ?nd was not completely monetized. Consequently, the 
available range of tax sources was very limi ted. I-^ any of those which 
were potentially available were not accessible because of the high 
collection cost and the ease of t.'.;x evasion. The dependeiice and 
development of trade taxes like export taxes v/as thus very closely 
associated with the evolution of the economic structure of the economy. 
3uch trade taxes, particularly export taxes, are easy to administer and 
difficult to evade. More importantly, they have proved to be good 
sources of tax revenue. In the case of tzie rubber' industry, the use of 
ex^ .oi't taxes seem to be the most feasible way to tax the large number 
of scattered siiiallholuers within the country. 
Uijice th'i inti'oduction of an export tax on rubbci" in 1907, it 
has coxitinued to play an important r-ole in tlie structure of government 
j^evenuo. Tliere were two reasons for this. The fir;-.L w-s the growing 
'C Lim, op.cit. , for detailed study on the Id ; Lory of oxpor-t taxes 
in I: ilaysia. 
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importance of the rubber indueti-y, v.'hich enliajiced the role of the 
rubber export taxes in the economy. The second viais the comparatively 
less important contribution of the other sectors to the economy and the 
consequently smaller role played by their taxes. This was the case 
throughout much of the history of the Malaysian rubber industry. The 
presexit positJon, is however, somewhat different as the relative 
position of each sector has changed in importance. 
Table 3*1 shows the relative contribution of the major taxes 
between 19^+7 and 197'k The first point to note is the dominance of the 
trade taxes. The second poxnt is that, next to import taxes, export 
taxes have been the most important source of revenue till I96I when 
income taxes started to play a more significant role. 
Table 3.2 shows the relative position of various export duties 
between 19^+7 and 197^^ One may note the important part played by the 
rubber export duty. In comparison with the tin export tax, until 196^ 
the rubber export tax lias generally been the most important. In 1959, 
for instance, rubber export duty alone contributed Si per cent to the 
total export tax revenue of the country. Since 196'i-, because of 
declining rubbei- prices, the rubber export tax has been less important 
until 197J' when, because of rising prices, the contribution of the 
rubber export tax hi^ s again exceeded that fj'om tin. 
ClhUlGLL] i;; TWA RUBBER EXJ Oi-iT T..X CTHUCTLiRL^'^ 
The development of the rubber export taxation system is the 
result of i-esponses to tlie needs of the government and the rubber 
itjdus try. 
'iC 
An ajTi.-,lysis of the progressivity tnd btirden of the structui'e is 
done in Chapter 9. 
TABLE 3„1 WEST MALAYSIA: TAX REVENUE DISTRIBUTION 
19^7-197^ 
(AS PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL TAX REVENUE) 
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19^ +7 — 28, k 52.7 18.9 
19^8 1 .0 3k.2 58.1 6.7 
19^ +9 15.3 28.6 50.4 5.7 
1950 12.5 39.9 43.2 4.4 
1951 18.8 kk.O 33.8 3.4 
1952 34.1 28.5 34.2 3.2 
1953 30.7 21.8 42.6 4.9 
195^ 26.6 22.5 46.7 4o2 
1955 17.2 36.2 42.8 3.8 
1956 20.5 30.2 45.7 3.6 
1957 19A 27.1 49.9 3O6 
1958 20.2 21 .5 54.4 3.9 
1959 17.3 31 .5 47.7 3.5 
i960 2 1 . 1 29. k 46.2 3.3 
1961 26.5 22.0 47.9 3.6 
1962 27.0 20.1 49.1 2.8 
1963 26A 20.1 46.2 7.3 
1964 2k.7 20. 41.5 13.4 
1965 2k.k 21.0 39.7 14.9 
1966 26.3 17.7 36.7 19o3 
1967 28.2 Ik.k 39.9 17o5 
1968 28.8 13.2 40.9 17 . 1 
1969 23.6 17.2 26.2 33.0 
1970 26.3 14.2 16.2 33.2 
1971 33.0 1 1 .0 42.7 13.3 
1972 31.0 10.0 40.0 19o0 
1973 27.0 14.0 37.8 21.2 
1974 26.0 22.0 33.7 18.3 
Sources: 1) Federal Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure. 
2) Economic Report 1973-197^, The Treasury, Malaysia. 
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TABLE 3.2 DISTRIBUTION OF EXPORT DUTIES: 19^7-197^ 
AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORT DUTIES 
Year Rubber (Schedule l) Tin Export Other Export Export Duty Duty Duties 
]9'+7 66.6 28.8 k.G 
19^8 ^9.9 kk.S 5.3 
19^9 39.3 53.8 6.9 
1950 60.7 35.^ 3.9 
1951 71.9 25.6 2.5 
1952 59.6 37.^ 3.0 
1953 ^5.7 5.5 
195^ i+6.8 ^7.7 
1955 7^.0 23.7 2.3 
1956 68.^ 28.6 2.9 
1957 66.7 30.0 3.3 
1958 71.6 23.7 
1959 81.3 15.7 3.0 
1960 75.5 21.1 3.5 
1961 61.5 3'+.l 
1962 52.5 37.7 9.8 
1963 ^5.5 39.2 15.3 
196^ 36.1 50.2 13.7 
1965 3^.0 51.5 1^1.5 
1966 31.8 5'+.7 13.5 
1967 23.5 59.7 16.8 
1968 25.9 55.^ 18.7 
1969 ^2.0 14.3 
1970 31.0 50.'+ 18.6 
1971 2h.O 55.0 23.0 
1972 21 .1 5^.7 2h.2 
1973 53.3 29.7 17.0 
197^ + 28.3 27.6 
Source: 1) Federal Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure. 
2) Economic Report 1973-197^, The Treasury, Malaysia, 
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From its first imposition the major function of the rubber 
export tax has been to obtain revenue to defray the expenditure of the 
government. 
However, during the Korean boom period, the government, 
having insufficient fiscal and monetary weapons, added another function 
to the rubber export tax and cunvert(;d it into a countercyclical tool. 
This v;as d^ne by increasing the marginal export tax rates. 
To ensure the \;-xabi].ity of the rubl-er industry, the government 
has also imposed tv;o other duties called rul:.ber research cess and 
repliuiting cess. The research ces^, for the purpose of funding research 
expenditure, w;u:; actual]y imposed as early as 19'+6. The replanting cess, 
for the purpo::c of fin;xnciug r..j:vl:uiting, war, inticducud in 195-• 
The main features of tho I??:' riiub-r export tax st?-!cture 
consist of thj follov.'ing: 
1) the rubber export tn.x c .lied -Schedule 1 which is 
per cent ad valorem when the price of" P.SG 1 is 
at 60 cents mid below for eacli pound of rubber 
exported. The tax is gradu;itod. progressively when 
rubber prices are over 60 cents per pound. A 
surcharge of 2 cents is also imposed when the price 
is over 60 cents per pound; 
?) the rubber research cess or "Schedule 3 ivhich is 1 
cent per pound of rubber exported irrespective of the 
price level; 
3) the rubber replantinr cess of cent^ per pound of 
rubber exporti.'d irrespective of the price level. 
This cess is called Schedule and applies to only 
smallholders. 
The development of each of the above Schedules will now be 
briefly examined in turn. 
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Trli: E7.P0^T TAXCSCIuCDIlLE I) ^ • ( 
Schedule 1 is the rubber <-:xport tax which provides the general 
revenue of the government and at the same time acts as the counter-
cyclical device for the stabilization of domestic income in period of 
high rubber prices. 
Since the imposition of Schedule 1 many proposals for changes 
and actual change.-; have been made to the structure of this tax. In 
several instances, the proposal::: of the foveriiment for changes in the 
Schedule 1 tax structure were frustrated l)y the powerful owners of 
rubb.er estates who v/ielded gx'cat politic'il influence during that time. 
This experience somewhat invali-inted Jacksoii's argument that for many 
developing countries it was quite easy to impose export taxes, or raise 
hi 
their rates, as the producers are in a weak political position. This 
was not so ritla estates. His point, however, hn;3 more validity for the 
smallholding case, at least in the past, since smallholders were in a 
weak political position. 
IVhen Vv'orld IVar II ended, a uniform system of rubber export tax 
was established in the whole country. Since World VJar II, eight changes 
have been made to the structure of Schedule 1, Four were made before 
the Korean war and four after. 
The first four changes were made because of the necessity to 
raise revenue for the rehabilitation programmes to be implemented to revive 
the economy after the devastation by the Japanese occupation. 
The government felt that the rubber industry, which recovered 
very quickly from the aftermaths of the war, could bear additional 
taxation for subsidizing the rest of the economy. The Schedule 1 rates 
werp therefore raised upwards. (Appendix 3.1). However, this effort of 
hi F.II .Jackson, 'Political Aspects of Export Taxation', Public Finance, 
NO.^H, 1957, p.291. 
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the government was not effectual as the tax rates viere not raised 
sufficiently high. The margintd tax rates did not rise as fast as the 
rise in rubber prices. 
The first two changes made in the Schedule 1 structure were 
actually a retrogressive step from the 5 per cent ad valorem used in 
19^ +5. This was because they were proportional taxes. The first change 
was used between 19'^ 5 (March) to l^h6 (October) and the tax was a 
proportional one of h cents per pound irrespective of the price level. 
The second change was a reduction from this rate of cents to 2.5 cents 
per pound applicable aL all price levels. 
Idealizing the impotency of thr- fir^t t.vo changes for the purpose 
of raising revenue,the goverriiaont reestablished the 5 per cent ad valorem 
tax. This rata was definitely less regressive than the first two fixed 
rates. For instance, at the very low price of 20 cents per pound, the 
'f ceiits tax amounted to 20 per cent of the price, the 2.'} cents tax was 
12.5 per cent, and the 5 per cent ad valorem tax remains at 5 per cent. 
At a very high price of 250 cents per pound, the respective percentages 
for the tlu-ee tax rates came to 1.6, 1.0 and 5.0. 
V/hich of the three tax rates would obtain more revenue depended 
on the price level. Given the export volume of rubber, the cent tax 
would bring in more revenue than the other tv/o rates if the price was 
below 80 cents per pound. Below 50 cents, the 2.5 cent tax would reap 
more revenue than the 5 per cent ad valorem tax. At higher prices, the 
5 per cent ad valorem tax vjould obtain more revenue. 
The above point was clo<irly shown during the boom in the 1950's. 
The total export tax revenue increased because of the operation of the 
5 pei- cent ad valorem tax though the export volume of rubber did not 
increase much compared to the previous years. If the other two rates 
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vvex'e used, the oinoiaxit of revenue obtained \;.juld be lower. 
During the Korean boom the goverru:;ent ivas not prepared for the 
sudden tjurj^ e in domestic purchasin;;'; power generated by the riue in 
comrnodity pricei:.. The existinj^' fiscal and monetary tools were ineffective, 
v.'hen the government revi;..ed the rubber expoi-t tax -schedule 1 rates 
upwards, it was too lute to control the; inflation. I^evertheless, because 
of the higher marginal rates of the new Schedule 1 structure (Appendix 
3-1), and because of the high price of rubber, the tax revenue rose to 
:;2l't,000,000 though the export volume of rubber actually fell (Table 3.3). 
This new structure for Schedule 1 was actually a modified version 
of the one the government had originally proposed. The original one had 
higher marginal rates, but the estates protested against it claiming 
that they could not bear the heavier burden. Consequently, it was 
disc, rded. 
In May the Mudie Mission was set up to examine the 
conditions of the rubber industry and to review the structure of the 
rubber export tax. 
With respect to Schedule 1, the Mission recommended that at 
60 cents and below the rubber export tax Schedule 1 should be abolished. 
The rationale behind this was tliat some est.'.tes, particularly those with 
low yielding materials, would find tl.e burden too heavy and would not be 
able to plough back profit for replanting. 
It also recommended that at the price range between GO and 80 
cent:, the tax rate .should be lowered. But marginal rate should be 
inci ;eJ wlien the price war ov-r 80 c.-nL... 
Report of the T'i: -ion of L'noniry into the Rubb-r In''u;jtry of 
Kal^vya, novernment Iress, Kuala Lumpur, 193^ 1-. 
T A B L E 3 O 3 R E L A T I O N S H I P B E T W E E N R S S I P R I C E , E X P O R T 
V O L U M E AND E X P O R T T A X R E V E N U E 
Y E A R 
R S S ] P R I C E 
C E N T S 1 ] B . 
N E T E X P O R T S 
' 0 0 0 T O N S 
E X N O R T T A X 
R E V E N U E 
S M I L L I O N 
E X P O R T T A X 
R A T E S 
( S C H E D U L E L ) 
C E N T S 1 L B . 
1 9 ^ 7 3 7 . 3 1 6 5 7 . 1 3 1 . 9 1 . 8 7 
1 9 ^ 8 6 8 6 . 5 3 3 . 1 2 . 1 1 
1 9 ^ 9 3 8 . 1 9 6 7 7 . 7 2 8 . 1 2 . 0 1 
1 9 3 0 1 0 8 . 1 8 6 9 3 . 4 8 . 3 5 . 4 1 
1 9 5 1 1 6 9 . 5 5 5 9 ? . 2 2 1 4 . 1 1 9 . 9 8 
1 9 5 ? 9 6 . 3 6 5 8 0 . 6 1 1 0 . 8 8 . 6 4 
1 9 5 3 6 7 . ' + ^ 5 7 3 . 2 5 4 . 7 4 . 1 5 
1 9 5 ^ 6 7 . 3 0 5 7 4 . 9 5 2 . 6 4 . 1 4 
1 9 5 3 1 1 ^ , 1 6 6 2 6 „ 2 1 7 4 . 1 1 4 . 0 5 
1 9 . % 9 6 . 7 6 6 0 5 . 7 1 4 4 . 0 1 1 . 3 6 
1 9 5 7 8 8 . 7 5 6 1 7 . 2 1 2 0 . 3 8 . 8 6 
1 9 5 8 8 0 . 2 1 6 3 4 . 1 9 0 . 6 6 A 3 
1 9 5 9 1 0 1 . 5 6 7 2 9 . 6 1 8 4 . 4 1 2 . 5 2 
I 9 6 0 1 0 8 . 0 8 6 9 6 . 1 1 9 6 . 1 1 3 . 2 7 
1 9 6 1 8 3 . 5 ^ 7 2 5 . 6 1 1 8 . 1 7 o 0 7 
1 9 6 2 7 8 . 2 0 7 2 3 . 7 9 3 . 0 5 . 7 9 
1 9 6 3 7 2 . 4 2 7 8 8 . 3 8 2 . 7 4 . 7 4 
1 9 6 ^ + 6 8 . 1 / + 8 0 7 . 2 6 9 . 1 3 . 9 2 
1 9 6 5 7 0 . 0 2 8 4 0 . 8 7 8 . 0 4 . 2 6 
1 9 6 6 6 5 . 3 8 8 9 3 . 1 6 8 . 1 3 . 4 O 
1 9 6 7 5 ^ 1 . 0 8 9 7 4 . 6 4 5 O O 2 . 1 5 
1 9 6 8 5 3 . 1 2 1 , 1 0 4 . 8 4 7 . 3 2 . 1 2 
1 9 6 9 6 9 . 8 2 1 , 2 6 4 . 9 5 6 . 8 4 . 2 6 
3 9 7 0 5 6 . 4 2 ] , 2 7 1 . 3 6 9 . 6 2 . 3 3 
1 9 7 1 ^ 1 6 . 1 0 ] , 3 2 1 O O 5 5 . 0 1 . 8 4 
1 9 7 2 4 2 . 4 2 N . A . 4 9 . 0 1 . 6 9 
1 9 7 3 7 0 . 9 4 N . A . N . A . 6 . 2 6 
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The government, having exurained tho Mudie proposal, adopted a 
new tax structure but with emphasis changed. The tax was not abolished 
when the price was at 60 cents and below. It was reduced to k per cent 
ad valorem. Between 60 gind 80 cents, the tax was reduced but not by as 
much as the Mudie suggestion. At prices over 80 cents, the raartinal 
rates were increased but by not as much as the Mudie advice. 
The government could not abolish the tax when the price was at 
60 cents and below as it was heavily dependent on Schedule 1 as a major 
source of revenue. Secondly, it was felt that the tax concession at the 
price range of 60 to 80 cents would not necessarily stimulate replanting 
by rubber producers. For tVas it was best to assist rubber producers 
directly by giving them financial assistance. 
The structure of Schedule 1 remains to the present time with 
only slight changes. In I96I, the marginal rates of the tax were 
increased when the price was 80 cents upwards. The other change was the 
imposition of a surcharge of 2 cents per pound when the rubber price 
exceeds 60 cents. This was introduced in February 1970» 
Since the use of the 2.3 cents flat rate in 19^ +6, the general 
trend in the modification of the Schedule 1 tax has been towards higher 
marginal rates especially at the high price level. The major aim has 
still been to absorb more revenue from the rubber industry, though the 
anti-inflationary objective is still an integral part of Schedule 1. 
Figures 3.1 and 3*2 summarize the changes which have taicen place 
in Schedule 1 since the post war period. 
The yield of the rubber export tax Schedule 1 depends on the 
tax base and the tax rates for the different price levels. One measure 
of the response of the yield is the elasticity of revenue yield changes 
to export value changes. The formula is 
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E = f / f ... O . l ) 
where E is the elasticity of response of tax yield to export value 
of rubber 
T is the tax yield of Schedule 1 
Y is the export value of rubber 
dT is the change in the tax yield of Schedule 1 
dY is the change in the export value of rubber 
If E ^ 1, this implies elastic, unitary elasticity, and 
inelastic response of tax yield to changes in the value of rubber export. 
The computed estimates for the period 19^7 to 1970 is given in Table 3.^. 
It will be noticed that only in three years (19^+8, 1968 and I969) was the 
elasticity less than 1, The average elasticity for the whole period 
is 2.5. 
3.8. THE RUBBER EXPORT TAX AND STABLIZATION 
kQ 
Various studies have concluded that the fluctuations of the 
gross national product of the Malaysian economy are principally caused 
by the changes in the export proceeds, which in turn are influenced by 
the violent changes in the price levels of the primary exports. 
We have earlier pointed out that one of the chief anti-
inflationary tools of the Malaysian government has been the rubber 
export tax. This part of the rubber export tax was called anti-
inflationary cess Schedule 11 and was imposed from 1951 (June) to I96I 
(January) (Appendix 3.1). From I96I, Schedule 11 has been incorporated 
into Schedule 1 and therefore forms an integral part of the structure 
of Schedule 1. 
During the period of enforcement. Schedule 11 was not an 
effective anti-inflationary device for two reasons: first, the marginal 
ko 




COMPARISON OF EXPORT DUTY RATES ON RUBBER 
EXPORTS TOR PRICES BETWEEN 20 AND 80 CENTS 
PER POUND 
-L 
20 50 W 50 f^ 
Price of Rubber in Cents Per Potind. 
70 80 
* Coincides with Jan 1961 - Feb 1970. 
FIGURE 3.2 
98 
I P O ^ 
110 -
100 _ 
COMPARISON OF EXPORT DUTY RATES ON RUBBER 
EXPORTS FOR PRICES BETWEEN 80 AND CENTS 
PER POUND 
// 
/.• Jfm 1961 
/y" Feb 1970 
oince ! : 
Feb 1970/.' 
/ f Mudie 
Mission 
Propfosal 
Price of Rubber in Cents Per Pound. 
99 
TABLE J,A. ELASTICITY OF SCHEDULE I YIELD 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
19^ 7 31.9 551.6 • _ _ 
19^ 33.1 1.2 650.6 99.0 0.036 0.152 0.257 
19^ 9 28.1 - 5.0 568.8 - 81.8 0.178 0.144 1.236 
1950 89.3 61.2 1678.3 1109.5 0.685 0.661 1.038 
1951 ZLk.l 124.8 2226.9 548.6 0.583 0.246 2.370 
1952 110.8 - 103.3 12^ +1.1 - 985.8 0.932 0.794 1.173 
1953 5'+.7 - 56.1 869.9 - 371.2 1.026 0.427 2.403 
195't 52.6 - 2.1 859.5 - 10.4 0.039 0.012 3.250 
1955 17'+. 1 121.5 1524.7 665.2 0.698 0.436 1.601 
1956 l^ '+.O - 30.1 1309.3 - 215.4 0.209 0.165 1.267 
1957 120.3 - 13.7 1247.0 - 62.3 0.114 0.049 2.327 
1958 90.6 - 29.7 1123.4 - 123.6 0.328 0.110 2.982 
1959 18'+.'+ 93.8 1624.6 501.2 0.509 0.309 1.647 
i960 196.1 11.7 1690.6 66.0 0.059 0.039 1.513 
1961 118.1 - 78.0 1347.1 - 343.5 0.660 0.255 2.588 
1962 93.0 - 25.1 1272.8 - 74.3 0.269 0.058 4.638 
1963 82.7 - 10.3 1300,4 27.6 0.125 0.021 5.952 
196i+ 69.1 - 13.6 1250.3 - 50.1 0.197 0.040 4.925 
1965 78.0 8.9 1307.1 56.8 0.114 0.043 2.651 
1966 68.1 - 9.9 1338.5 31.4 0.145 0.023 6.304 
1967 ^5.0 - 23.1 1216.0 - 122.5 0.513 0.100 5.13 
1968 ^7.3 2.3 1300.9 84.9 0.049 0.065 0.754 
1969 56.8 9.5 1940.1 639.2 0.167 0.329 0.508 
1970 69.6 12.8 1663.3 - 276.8 0.184 0.166 1.108 
ii 
1) Columns (1) to (4) in Million Malaysian Dollars. 
2) T = Export Tax Proper (Schedule 1) in Million 
dT o Change in T 
Y = Value of rubber exports in Million S 
dY = Change in Y 
E = Elasticity of rubber export tax. 
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rates were not uuffxcieiitly high.The tax v.'ould come into operation only 
when price waG 100 cents and above. This meant tkit the inflationary 
presf5ure generated when the price was slightly below this level would 
not be taken care of. Secondly, the way the cest; wau adminiGtered 
nullified iLt! anti-inflationary objective. For all producers, at any 
point in time v^ hen the price wa.-j 100 cents and above they liad to pay the 
ochedule 11 cess, h'owever, in the case of estates, if the price fell 
below 100 cents froi.i thi^ point of time for eight successive weeks, tlie 
original amount of the collected cess would be returned to them. In the 
case of the smallholders, Schedule 11 was channelled to Fund B for 
funding replanting. 
Theoretically and in practice, if the price dropped to 99 
cents per pound the goveriu.iont was obliged to refund the cess to the 
estates. Since the refund could be made when tJie price was on the upswing-
again this would in fact contribute to the destabilization rather than 
the stabilization of the economy. The problem would not be serious if 
the estates did not spend the refunded money. But there W;TS no guareaitee 
tVifjt they would not. Of the Iv^f'-i- million collected from the estates since 
the cess was imposed till 191391 million was returned to them. 
Because of the absence of dc^ t ', it was not kno vn hov7 much of tliis was 
spent and when it wu; done. 
Realising t;ie .''utilil.^ / iif Ihe Schedule 11 scheme tlie government 
finally combined it wi ixi Schedule ].. The present Scliedule 1 is actually 
not very much liiglier than the combined rates of Schedule 1 and Schedule 
II used before I96I. For instance, at th. price of 200 cents per pound, 
the pre I96I tax ai.ioimted to J^fj pr,r cent of the price rnd the present one 
is per cent. However, tlic major (•"'i f ferenre is tlia t the cess is not 
refunded but goes inlo the general rcvenut-. of thf> government. 
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rriT . 
•ujere 13 no c-i^ -toriii concorsus among economists that variable 
export tajces arc tl.-.; beat tool to Biuhliz^i the domestic economy.^^ 
^urkae^ in particular liad argued u-aini.t the use of export taxes on 
the ground that foreign exchange earnixi^s would bo reduced. He also 
pointed out th:i5: producerj would be protoctco frcii the full inpact 
cf the changes in pricc-.- .^ Consequently, their trend of production would 
actually contribute to the cyclical swing of prices. 
The argument o n be critis-'-d on sever <1 grounds. First, it is 
not clear whether th'-,"long run or short run situation is involved. In 
the long run, ;-hifts iu the supply curves would be more appropriate than 
the use of a single si:pply cui-vo. "ccondl-, the elasticity of denaad 
cannot bo ignored since it gloo ir finer ceo export earninsis of the 
product, 
In the ease of rubber, it is possible that the loss in foreign 
exchange in the sliort run is rraite negligible because of the relative 
CO 
inelastic supply and demand cva-ves of the pi-oduct 
In general, the t-'.K revenue of a country is usually directed 
to a cor.r.on pool for .jllocc'tion to various expenditure cireas. In this 
case there is no diri;ct connection between the source of the tax revenue 
and ths purpose of the final expenditure. 
In contrast earmarked taxes are different. These are special 
' See the various contributions to this issue in Kyklos, Vol.XI (1958) 
and (1959) . 
^^ ^.Ivurkse, 'Trade Fluetuations and Buffer Policies of Low Income 
Countries' , Kyklos, Vol.XI (19^8) , pp. l'+l-15'i; C.Y.Lim, op.cit. 
For - study on problei.is of stabilisation and related issues in 
I-:al;.ysia see A.II.H.Tan, Na.tural Rubber: Problems and Techniques 
of Stabilization Cl'.A.Thesis, University of Singapore, I 965 ) . 
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tixes which arc- impoGed for specific expenditure purponee. Usually 
the oarmnrked taxes are net apart from the general revenue. There are 
four categories of such earmarked taxes classified by tax base and 
end-use. There are those which are 
1) a specified tax base and a particular- end use 
2) a specified tax base and a broad end use 
3) an unspecified tax base and a particular end use 
k) an unspecified tax base and a broad end use. 
The export tax Schedule 1 is an example of (2). The research 
cess Schedule 111 and the replanting cess Schedule IV are exanples of 
(1). 
The rubber research cess Schedule 111 was introduced in 19^ 1-6 
for the specific objective of financing resecirch in the rubber industry. 
It is a proportional tax since it is a fixed amount, irrespective of the 
price level of rubber, for each pound of rubber exported. 
Since its imposition there have been only minor changes in its 
rates. From 0.25 cents per pound in 19^6 the rate was finally raised 
several times to reach the present one of 1 cent per pound. (Table 3.5)• 
Because it is a proportional tax it is regressive in nature. 
For instance, v/hen the price dropped to cents per pound at one point 
in 1972, the cess came to 2,88 per cent of the price. However, if the 
price of rubber is say 120 cents per pound the cess is only O.83 per 
cent of the price. 
Though the tax is based on the benefit principle there is no 
doubt that the di;jtribution of its benefits is not even. Estates, at 
least in the past, have been rcceivin[: more benefits from the product of 
research on rubber than the smallholders havo. This is clearly reflected 
in th'-' larger proportion of high yielding materials, and therefore higher 
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y i e l d , o f ruboer e s t a t e s in cont.x-"ast to the lev/ yieldin,_, mater ia l s o f 
suialllaoldinga. 
TABLE 3 . 5 . RESSARCH CJSS (SCHEDULE I I I ) !I07:i.Bi.H 19^7-197^ 
Research 
C 6 SS 
( S c h . I I l ) 
Cents 1 Lb. 
35 
P r i c e o f Rubber Per Found 
60 80 100 
Schedule ( i l l ) as Percentage 




Jim •19'i'9 0 .25 0 ,71 0 .63 0.'+2 0 .31 0 .25 0 .21 
Oct 19^9 
Hay 1950 O.hO 0 .71 1 .00 0 .67 0 .30 0»'Vo 0 .33 
June 
Dec 1950 0 .50 1 .1^ 1 .25 C.83 0 .63 0 ,30 0.k2 
Jan 
Dec 19!}1 0 .35 0 ,8S 0 .33 C.30 
Jan 1952 
Kay 1955 1 .00 1 .00 C.67 0 ,50 QjiO 0 .33 
June 1953 
Dec I95B 0 , 5 0 1.1^+ 0 .83 0 .63 0 .50 
0. h2 
Jan 
Dec 1959 0.73 1 .8c 1 .23 0 .9^ 0 .73 C.63 
Since 
Jan 1968 1 .00 2,88 2 .30 ±. .J t i. . C-V 
1 .00 0 ,83 
Iio'vvever, because the cetis is c o l l e c t e d on the be s i s o f the 
amoiiiit o f rubber eXj..ortea there i s a c e r t a i n element o f equity present . 
That i s , thoae vv'.io c e l l more w i l l pay more, Schedule I I I c e s s . But the 
equity i s not a p e r f e c t one in that thooc v/ho export mere volume aay 
have more acrc-agos and not because thny have higher y i e l d i n g m a t e r i a l s , 
a product o f reoearch f inanced by the re,3e;.rch cesJ . 
Bes ides , the c ess i ^ ulr.o r e r r e s . u v e in that f o r the same 
volurne o f rubber exported those who produce a lower jivido and t h e r e f o r e 
r e c e i v e a lov/or ^ r l c e h: ve to bear the scune burden as those who produce 
10^ 
a higher (^ rade, and therefore get a higher price. 
Given the above defects, one can still speak in favour of the 
research cess. Its imposition has been a wise one in that its i^esearch 
expenditure has contributed to the viability of the rubber industry. 
The problem is now one of more even distribution of the benefits. 
3.10. THE RUBBEi? 2SFLANT11IG CiiSS^^ (SCH::DULE IV) 
After V/orld V.'ar II, the government became concerned v/ith the 
condition of the rubber industry, particularly the smallholding sector. 
Many of the rubber trees planted in the 1900's were by then old and 
low in yield. 
In 19^ +3 the Rubber .Smallholdings Enquiry Comnittee was therefore 
set up. It was coimriissioned to investigate the condition of smallholding 
rubber production and their replanting problems. The purpose v/as also 
to find out what assistance could be given to thera. The conclusion of the 
Committee pointed out that ujiless adequate replanting was carried out the 
smallholding sector would not survive because of the obsolescence of the 
trees. It also advised that an 'inducement money' of per acre v/as 
to be given to help) them to replant. The government accepted the findings 
but did not implement the proposal. 
In 1951 the replanting cess Schedule 11 was introduced for the 
dual purpose of combating inflation and for building up a reserve fund 
for replanting. It w,--,:: bat'od on a sliding scalo and v.'ould operate only 
v;hea the price of rubber v/as above 60 cent;-.. 'Appendix 3«l)-
In 1953 this cr.-'-c war. ro^ .^lac-O. by the anti inflation:uy cenc 
Cch -dule 11. Thir: .vuuT.I oporntc only when the price urr, 100 cents and 
The replnr.ting r.f^cn "chedulo 11 \r r, not n very r.-;ti.sfactory way 
of st'irting a replanting fund. Thi;-^  '.vis bccauce the amount of the cess 
See also Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
19'= 
collected dopcnded vor/ :r,\ich on t}^ ' price I'^ ivcl foi- e.'ch (];ivcn vola'nf^  of 
export. For instance, in 1951 the anount collected v/ar. ''50 million. In 
195^ +, it v/as only million. The reason for the difference was mainly 
due to the price difference. It was 169 cents in 1951 and 6? cents in 
195^. 
In 1955 the smallholder replantin;;" cess Gchedule 17 v/as 
introduced. Tlie covernmont had i^ 'anted t.j '^ "tend this cess to both 
estates and smallholdings. Bccause of the strong protest from estates, 
the govermrent ^ave way and tho cess applies only to smallholders. 
The Schedule IV cess is a fixed amount of '4.9 cents for each 
poijind of rubber exported. When it was first imposed, the cess v/ould 
operate only when the price of rubber was 60 cents and above. Since 
1955, the cess is operative at all price levels. 
To administer Schedule IV and the replanting cess Schedule 11, 
Fund A for the estates and Fund B for the smallholders v/ere established. 
This v;as done from the viewpoint of administrative expediency. Data on 
smallholders' output are not available. The only v;ay to determine their 
output is to deduct estate production from the total export (excluding 
re-export) to derive smallholders' output. Using this ratio of estate 
and smallholders production, the replanting cess collected from Schedule 
TV and 11 were allocated to the respective Funds. 
Fund A Schedule IV ir, returned to estates every three months 
after each of the estate's production data are verified. V/hen the 
replanting cess Gchedule 11 was still in op.••ration, this cess was also 
returned to estates but only against approved expenditure on replanting. 
Fund B Schedule IV and the replanting cess Schedule 11 while 
it was still in operation, were not directly returned to smallholders. 
However, when a smallholder decides to replant and if all the necessary 
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conditions are satisfied then a direct grant is given him from Fund Be 
This replautinj^ grant was originally fixed at S'+OO per acre. In 195^+, 
it was raised to 15^00, Since then the grant has been fixed at 3750 per 
acre. 
It is generally recognized th^ it tlic Schedule IV cess is an 
additional burdeii on a smallholder as long as he lias not made use of the 
replanting (rrant. For a high yielding producer, the amount that he gets 
back from the replanting grant may be less than the amount he has paid 
to Schedule IV over the years. If the above holds, then Schedule IV is 
not very different from the rubber export tax Schedule 1 in that both 
become a tax burden to smallholders. However, for a low yielding 
producer the position is reversed as the grant will be larger than what 
ho has paid out to Schedule IV. 
The Mudie Kission recommended tiiat tlie replanting cejs Schedule 
II should be abolished and that Schedule IV should be extended to 
OS tales for rcfilanting purpose. The government abolished Schedule II 
but did not apply Schedule IV to estates due to their strong opposition. 
To help the rubber industry the government decided to give a 
grant of 1i?80 million. This grant was given at a certain 'cost' to the 
rubber producers. Tliis came in the form of a rise in the Schedule I 
export tax rates v/hen the price of rubber was above 80 cents per pound. 
If the price remfiined below 80 cents the grant would have come mainly 
from general revenue since the Schedule I tax rates were reduced for 
prices below BO cexits. However, if the price had remained consistently 
above 80 cento, it would mean that the rubber producers were paying a 
greater share of the subsidy because of the higher marginal rates of 
Schedule I. In fact, since the decision to provide the grant was made 
till now, the government has already recouped the ;J280 million subsidy 
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from tlie rubbei- producerc. 
The w2S0 raillion cubcidy was to be 3x1 .^red betv/eeu ectdec 
aaid smallholdings accordin- to the productiori ratio of CO:'fO. That ic , 
estates were given 3l68 million and smallholders were given .'.11^ rdllicn. 
I f the goverunierit had used acreage a;;, the basis of calculation, then 
GEallholders would receive A'll r.illion. aj their acreage was about 
per cent that of estate acreage. 
In a therefore, this v;ai not a very ' feir ' diGtributior:. 
I f the objective v/aa to help replazitiug on a per acre bacio then the 
subsidy should be divided on the basir. of acroago rat}:-r-r than on 
production. Since the total production of ecte.tes hao been higher than 
\ 
that of Gniallholdingc, using production, as t!;c basis of the subsidy 
division meant that more of the subsiey went to the estate sector; But 
it is the smallholdJ.ng sector which requires most of the financial aid 
i'ro:n tlie government. 
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CHAFPER k 
RELATIONSHIP BETV/EEN THE DOMESTIC RUBBER PRICE AND 
EXPORT TAXES 
INTRODUCTION 
The main objective in this chapter is to examine some of the 
major factors which influence the domestic price paid by dealers to 
rubber producers. Another issue to be examined is the magnitude of the 
increase in the domestic price that may accrue to rubber producers as 
a result of a reduction or the elimination of the rubber export tax. 
Some studies on the pricing and marketing aspects of rubber 
have been done on smallholders' rubber. Particular mention must be made 
of the works of Bevan, Salim, Lim and Cheam.^ The omphaeie of these works 
has been on the institutional framework of smallholders' marketing and 
the various variables which exert an influence on the prices received by 
these producers. Their main method of study is descriptive analysis 
using collected information from survey and secondary sources. 
However, none of these studies have set out to analyse the 
consequences of the export tax variable by examining the relationship 
2 
between the pricixig and taxing aspects oi the problem. This is rather 
surprising since majiy policy pronouncements on the rubber industry have 
been made.^ 
^ Bevan, J.v;.L., A Report on the Marketin.i;^  of Smallholders' Rubber with 
Special Reference to the First Buyer Level (K.L., Rivl, 1956); S.C.Lim, 
A Study of the Marketing of Sma.llhclders' Rubber at the First Level in 
Selangor, (M.A. Thesis, University of Malaya, 196^); S.T.Cheam, 
A Study of the Marketing of Smallholders' Lov/er Grade Rubber. (M.A. The sis, 
University of Malaya, 1970); Salim, A. The Market for Small Rubber Farm 
in Malaya, (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 196?). 
^ c.f. C.Y.Lim, The Export Tax System in Malaya, (M.A. Thesis, University 
of Malaya, I960); H.H.Tan, "The Smallnolders' Export Tax Incidence," 
Malayan Economic Review, I967. 
^ For some macro studies see works citea in footnote 2 Hbove. 
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Using a quantitative approach the pricing problem is re-
examined in this chapter. The export tax variable is integrated into 
the analysis by quantifying the relationship between the dealer's 
price on the one hand and other determining variables on the other. 
This is accomplished by simple econometric techniques. Recognizing 
that such quantitative estimates are by themselves inadequate and 
restricted in many ways, they are supplemented in the analysis by 
survey information on the institutional structure and process of price 
formation. 
MARKETING STRUCTURE 
Though Malaysia is an important producer of rubber it is not 
an important consumer of the raw product. Local consumption of rubber 
is negligible. The major reason for this is the relatively low level 
of industrialization in the country. A second reason is that the 
producers, particularly the smallholders, can not consume or use this 
product in any way. Essentially it is a raw material for manufacturing 
purposes. Rubber is not a food crop like paddy which can be part 
consumed on the farm and the surplus sold in the market. These two 
reasons explain the insignificant domestic absorption of the Malaysian 
rubber output. Rubber produceis must export and 3ell abroad to the 
foreign buyers ^ho can utilize it in their manufacturing. 
A typical system comm.inly used by sri.allholders in their rubber 
marketing is depicted in Figure k.l, Tne present system for smallholder 
rubber in Vii'est Malaysia developed out of historical necessity. It has 
since been mainly influenced by developments within the rubber industry 
and the complexities of smallholder operations. The mjirketing system 
is characterized by a multi-tierred framework and a multiplicity of 
operators. Marketing activities at the primary, secondary and tertiary 
levels by the dealers, remillers, packers and exporters closely interact 
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and form a highly integrated system. Through the provision of a wide 
range of services such ae credit, warehousing, transportation, 
processing and grading, the marketing eysLera has performed its task of 
effecting movement of rubber from scattered sources to the foreign 
consumers. We shall examir.e in some detail the smallholder marketing 
system first before we explain the estate system. 
Classifying them by trading functions, there are basically 
three intermediary economic units between the rubber producer and the 
consumer: the first or primary level dealer, the intermediate or 
secondary level dealer, and at the tertiary level the packer and exporter. 
Though each provides different services they are not mutually exclusive. 
In fact, some of them may function at more than one level in the 
marketing chain. 
The smallholder's first point of contact with the marketing 
side of his production is the first level dealer- The first level 
dealer is found predominantly in the village or kampong close to the 
smallholders. It is quite uncommon for him to be located at large urban 
centres. As the term implies, the first le^ rel dealer or buyer 
essentially purchases from smallholders. He does not buy from other 
dealers and o-^ xasi onally buys from some small estates. His mam trading 
activity is with the smallholders. 
Within these groups of dealerr there are three broad categories. 
The first is the independent buyer. He uses his own capital and decides 
on his own the buying and selling policy to be used. The second is the 
integrated buyer. Like the first category he is independent in his 
buying policy. However, he is not so independent when it comes to 
selling. For instance, because of contractual agreement with another 
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latter. The third is the agent buyer. Nominally he may be doing his 
own bueiness ir rubber. De facto, he is a buying agent for a larger 
dealer. The buying and selling policy in this case is controlled by 
the larger dealer who pays the former a commission. 
Besides these three categories there is a sub-group of 
unlicensed dealers. The unlicensed dealer is really a tout. He moves 
around the villages and country-side in search of rubber. This itinerant 
buyer and his buying activity is an illegality in respect of the law 
regulating the internal trade of ri-bber in the country. 
The Rubber Supervision Enactment stipulates that all those 
who deal in rubber in one way or another must be licensed. In each 
district in each statv,' a rubber ]icen6ing board is in charge of the 
licensing and trading activity of rubber dealers. One of the 
stipulations is that only licensed dealers are allowed to buy, store 
or treat rubber. Any other person or firm not so licensed is subject 
to prosecution. In practice this may be flouted as the enforcement of 
the law is not very strict. 
One major function of the first level dealer is to provide 
assembly points for the collection of smallholders' rubber. This role 
of the first level dealer is important. Without him, the smallholders 
would find it difficult to sell their small quantity of rubber each 
time to the intermediate buyers who only deal in large quantity. 
Another function of the first level dealer is the dissemination of price 
information. This importa^it function makes it possible for smallholders 
to know the condition of the rubber market. This, however, does not 
ensure that smallholders will be given higher prices. In addition, the 
first level dealer performs the tasks of grading, weighing and smoking 
l± 
Rubber Supervision Enactment, No.10 of 19^7. F.M.S., Gazetted 
Notification No.^288/^8. 
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rubber. One byproduct of his trading activity is the provision of 
loans and credit to smallholders who need thera. If he is also a grocery 
ehop-owner he also provides goods on credit. 
The intermediate level dealer is found between the first level 
dealer and the packer/exporter. He is the major outlet for the first 
dealer as the latter is the prime outlet for the smallholders. He is 
also the main source of rubber to the packer/exporter. There is a close 
analogy between the smallholder/first level dealer relationship and the 
first dealer/intermediate dealer relationship. Just as the smallholders 
would find it difficult to sell each small lot of rubber directly to the 
intermediate buyers or to consumers abroad, the first dealer would also 
find it difficult to sell directly to packer/exporters or foreign 
consumers. For the latter deal only in large bulk. It is difficult for 
small first level dealers to accumulate stocks for this purpose, for it 
is both inconvenient and financially beyond them. The intermediate 
dealer thus performs the functions of collecting from smaller dealers 
the small scattered amounts of rubber. The intermediate dealer may grade 
or re-grade the rubber if necessary and also does smoking if required. 
The intermediate dealer is generally located in the larger urban centres. 
Besides buying from the first level dealers he also buys from estate 
producers. There is little direct transg.ction between him and the 
smallholders. 
Except for latex and scrap rubber, all other types of rubber 
are smoked, and eiaoked rubber has to be graded and packed for export at 
some stage in the marketing chain. This is mainly the job of the 
packer/exporter. Usually the functions of packing and exporting are 
performed by one firm. Being at the end of the internal marketing chain 
he is also the connecting link with overseas consumers. He is also at 
the beginning of the pricing process for the internal marketing system. 
ll'^  
The packer/exporter is located at or near the major ports in the 
country. 
One of the several types of rubber output is scrap and cuplump 
rubber. This is the lowest grade rubber produced in West Malaysia and 
is un-processed in this stage. It is the job of the remiller to convert 
this raw material into various types of crepe rubber like 2X Thin Brown 
Crepe, Flat Bark Crepe and Thin Brown Crepe. As shown in Figure k,l 
this scrap rubber follows a slightly different patn through th<j 
marketing system. 
Mention must be made of the role of public agencies in the 
marketing system for rubber^ particularly smallholder rubber. The 
unorganized and uiisonhisticated manner in which smallholders market 
their rubber exposes them to trading malpractices. It is to remedy 
these drawbacks and to strengthen the smallholders' bargaining position 
that various public agencies have been started. 
The principal public agencies which play an important role in 
the marketing of smallholder rubber are the Malaysian Rubber 
Development Corporation (MARDEC) which concentrates on the processing 
and marketing of rubber mainly from individual smallholders; the 
Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) which organizes the marketing 
of rubber for smallholders in such land schemes; ajid the Rubber Industry 
Smallholders Development Authority (RISDA) which market the rubber of 
individual smallholders who use the group processing centres. These 
three agencies work in a coordinated manner. Thus, because MARDEC is 
involved in both processing and marketing it also provides an outlet 
for FELDA's latex and RISDA's sheet rubber through its factories which 
are strategically located. 
Smallholders who use this marketing system of public agencies 
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Ar(? paid a price for their products based on the daily official price 
isBued by the Malaysian Rubber Exchange and Licensing Board. This 
price is net of the relevant export tax and various cesses, and also 
the processing and overhead costs. Generally, this price is expected 
to be slightly better than that offered by the traditional traders 
since the sole aim of these public agencies is to upgrade the income 
of the smallholders. Consequently, some degree of competition is 
introduced into the traditional marketing aysterr. by the existence of 
such agencies. 
How-sver, their impact in the national marketing network is 
still not very significant. Thie is confirmed in Table ^.1 below. It 
can be observed that the traditional marketing sector of private 
dealers, remillers, and exporters still control as much as per cent 
of the smallholder rubber in 197^. MARDKC'e share is only a modest 7 
per cent. The other two agencies, RISDA and FELDA, are respectively 
responsible for 6.3 and 2.8 per cent of the marketed smallholder rubber. 
It is envisaged that by the end cf the Third Malaysia Plan (I980) the 
share of MARDEC, FELDA, and RISDA in the marketing of smallholder rubber 
would rise to 30» 11» and 3*3 per cent respectively. VVhether these 
targets could be realized depend obviously on the efficiency of these 
agencies. At the moment, despite their government backing, they are not 
in a position to compete effectively with the traditional dealers. One 
explanation for this is that these agencies sire burdened with bureaucratic 
red tape and corruption.^ There is no doubt that if such activities are 
allowed to continue the expected targets could not be achieved. 
^ As publicly mentioned by the Minister of Primary Products in the 
various issues of the Straits Times during October 1975. 
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TA3LK 4.1. ESTIMATED SHARi^ OF PUBLIC AGENCIES IN THE 
PRODUCTION/PROCESijING/MARKETING OF 













FELDA 50,100 6.3 
RISDA 22,000 2.8 
PRIVATE 661,200 83.9 





Figure k.2 shows the marketing system of the estate producers. 
It will be noticed that the role of the first level buyer is not 
important. Few estates sell to first level buyers. Most deal directly 
with the other dealers. Some larger estates even bypass the intermediate 
buyers and sell directly to exporters or even to consumers abroad. Most 
of the direct and indirect functions, like provision of loans, of the 
dealers in the case of the smallholders' marketing system are absent in 
the estate marketing system. 
Figure 4.2 needs some elaboration since it does not reveal in 
full the marketing details of the estate section. There are in fact 
^^ive possible channels of flow of estate rubber through the market to 
the consumer. They are: 
1) as untreated field rubbers which are sold locally to 
external processing factories, direct or through 
dealer agents 
2) ae sem'.-processed and processed rubbers which are 
sold locally to dealers, processors smd packers for 
further processing, sorting, grading, packing and 
final export 
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FIGim k.Z, THE TPJ\DITIONAL MASKiSTING SYSTEM OF ESTATES 
Eb t a t e s' St\bb er 





, Foreign ConsymerB 
Major ohrvrs using this route. 
Minor amount vising this route, 
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3) B.s p.rf?pare-d rubbers which i>Te export-packed and 
\v>dch are sold hj the estates themselves locally, 
with or without broker intermediary, to dealers 
and consijmffirs 
4-) as prepared rubbers which are export-packed and which 
are sold by the estates themselves overseas, with or 
T/ithout broker intermediary, to dealers and 
coTiGumers 
5) as prepared rubbers I'/hich are export-packed and which 
are sold in London by London Head Offices of estates, 
with or vri-thout London Selling Agents and London 
Brokers, to dealertS and consunerB, 
The above channels of supply may have the additional 
intei*position of a Ma3.ay®ian~basod Agency House intermeddary acting 
for the estate producer, or a manufacturer's buying agent intermediary 
acting for the consureer. This applies particularly to the larger 
estates \?hich use the servrlces of Agency Houses. 
THE PRICING PROGSCS 
The price which is paid by the first let-el dealer to the rubber 
producers is reached in the following manner. Each diay the rubber 
dealer contacts a feiv of the intermediate dealers to obtain a quotation 
of the price for the various grades of rubber. The norma?, communication 
method is by telephoning the intermediate buyer. Thi.s may be dona more 
than once a day. When there is no quote, for instance d^ Jiring the ear3.y 
part of the morning, the previous day's piico maj'' be used. Thi.s is done 
at a risk since the price vdll change up or down during the day. From 
the quoted price, in local monetsj-y units and ^^ eights, the dealer 
the necessary deductions to cover his marketing cost and profit margin. 
^ Obtained by discussion with dealers during survey. 
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Thrn tbJ.R ±s us^d as the basis for the determination of th<? price to be 
paid for a giv^n grade of rubber. The actual decision process to arrive 
at the final price to be paid to the smallholder or estate is also 
influenced by nTimerous other variables which will be discussed later. 
The intermediate buyer who provides the price quotation to the 
first dealer is in his turn dependent on the exporter for a price quote. 
K-5 makes similar deductions to cover his marketing cost and profit 
margin. Then this is used as the basis for price quotations to other 
dealers. 
The i?orld price is determined by supply and demand factors 
which in turn are influenced by other variables like world politics, 
stockpi?.ing policy of the United States, competition from synthetic 
producers, the buying policy of large consuiners, and the ?.ike. This is 
the price from which the exporter gets his basis to arrive at the price 
given "^o the intermediaries below him in the marketing chain. 
Besides the deductions made for m.arketing cost and marketing 
profit the exporter also deducts the export tajx and vaj'ious cesses he 
has paid to the customs on the date of shipment of the rubber. Through 
the price transmission process the final payer of the export tax ajid 
cesses is the rubber produ.cer. It is more in the nature of administrative 
convenience that the exporter pays the export tax and cesses first. 
In general, the pricing process for both estates and smallholders 
can be summa.rized thus: 
1) world price minus export tax and cesses equa3.s exporter's 
price 
n 
2) esrnorter's price minus marketing margir/ of exporter 
equals intermediate dealer's price 
7 Including transport cost, 
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3) intermedj.ate dealer's price minus his marketing margin 
equals first dealer's price 
k) first dealer's price minus his rnsj-keting margin equals 
price received by rubber producers. 
For any given x?orld price, the price received by the producer 
is thus influenced by the export tax and the marketing margin of the 
dealers. The amoujit of the export tax is determined by the world price 
according to the taoc schedules. The marketing margin is dependent on 
not only the marketing, cost but also on the marketing practices of the 
dealers and the rubber producers. vlOiat determines the msjrketing margin 
will determi^ie the price received by the rubber producers. This is 
because one is the obverse of the other. Ceteris paribus, they ^ary 
inversely with each other. 
As usually understood, f.arm gate price is the price received 
by the producer on his farra. For rubber this means the price given by 
the rubber dealer to the sm.allholder or estate producer. However, thi.s 
is actually a misnomer in the rubber case. There is^ strictly speaking, 
no official record of the farm gate price in rubber marketing. The term 
dealer's price is therefore used. To understan.d this requires a brief 
explan.ation of the laws governing the internal m>arketing of rubber 
within the country. 
The various stipu2^.tions in the Rubber Supervision Enactment 
were mainly to protect the interests of the estate producers. The 
estates had alleged that some of the rubber sold to r^ abber dealers had 
been purloined from, the estates. To stop the thefts they urged the 
government to legislate all rubber trsjasactions on a licensed basis. 
Thus all who deal in rubber are licensed. Furthermore, rubber dealers 
are not allowed to buy rubber outside their prem.ises. The trading houj's 
sure restricted to between 6.30 a.m. ajid 6.30 p.m.. at the dealers' 
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premises. This piece of legislation outlaws dealers from ?_ooking for 
business amongnt rubber producers. Legally speaking therefore the 
dealer is precluded from buying at the faxm gate. 
In practice, it is known that dea].ers, particularly the 
smaller ones, do violate the regulations. The extent of the breach is, 
however, not knovm. It is suspected that it is more common in the 
tran.sation of smallholder rubber than in the case of estates. During 
the survey the dealers were questioned on this issue. None TOuld admit 
any breach of this rubber regulo.tion - which is hardly surprising. 
However, litcle effort seems to be made to enforce these rubber 
regulations strictly, 
A MODEL OF PRICF DETSEMINA-NTS 
In this section, a simple model of price determinants is 
constructed. The analytic technique used in the study may be described 
as the general regression model using dumm.y variables in the regression 
equiition. The uj3e of dummy variables in regression analysis provides 
a method of quantifying othenrdse non-quantifiable variab?.'^ s and also' 
affords a way of measuring their net effects» The technique requires 
assigning a dumjny variable to certain variables* For instance if the 
variable belongs to a certain category it is given 1, and 0 otherwise. • 
Dum,my x^ 'ariables say be used as dependent or independent 
variables in a regression model when the data, are logically divisible 
into mutually exclusive classes or groups. 
As an illiistration the hypothesis to be tested m.ay be 
DP = f (G) where DP is the dealer's price and G represents one of the 
following grades of rubber: USS 1, P.SS 3, USS. If g^^ , g^, g^ represent 
these grades in the order nam.ed, the model becomes 
DP - a + b^g^ -!- b^g^ 
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The g's in the model take the value 1 or 0 depending on -s-hether the 
observation is in that category. 
The methoJ. of least squares carjiot be ijsed unless certain 
constraints are imposed. This is because of the existence of linear 
dependence in the dummy variable model among the g's. Three 
constraints could be used:'"^  
1) eett.ing the constant terra to zero 
2) setting one of the coefficients in a factor group 
to zero 
5) setting the eum or the 7'eighted sum of the b 
coefficients of a group to aero. 
In this .study the first constraint is used. 
The main hypothesis of the study may be stated algebraical.lj 
as follows; 
DP = G. S . + D, -f F^  -h I 1 .1 k 1 m n o 15 
where: 
DP = price offered by dealer 8.nd r •eci eived by producer 
G. = grade of rubber X 2, 3, 
S . ( V = size of holding J = 
2. 
distance from dealer k n T 2. 
v =5 frequency of sales 1 = 2, 3. 
T 
"'m 
=! •^r-i ce information m =: 1 2. 
S n = re].ationship with dealer 
rt = •! J. « 2. 
M 
0 
= number of dealers sold to O •1 2, 3. 
E P 
3t ethnJ,c ownership P 1 2. 
u =r »»rror ter^ 
^ Kmenta, J., Slements_ of _Ecqnqm_eti2^ 8j,_ (MacMillan Co., London, 197?) 
BP. +^09 to ^30, and pp. ^Jl to ^50. 
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Equation states that the dea.ler's price is influenced by 
the dependent variables listed. These are qualitative variables 7/.hich 
are believed on a pricri ground to be important determinants of 
dealers' prices. Other major determinants like world price, export 
tax, marketing cost, business volume of the dealer will be brought into 
the discussion at a later stage. 
A brief explanation of each term v^ ill be done here, DP, the 
dealer's price, is the quantitative dependent variab3.e. The data cover 
the period May to July 1973. 300 observations on the prices were 
collected during the survey fur this period for smallholders and 150 for 
estates. Other details on the qualitative variables were collected using 
various questionnaires (see Appendices 1.1 and 1.2.). The grade variable 
refers to RSS 1, 2, 3 and USS. The size of holding is divided into two 
groups, viz, below 10 acres and above 10 acres for smallholders; and 
below 1000 acres and over 1000 acres for estates. Distance is divided 
into two groups: less than 2 miles from, the dealer and more than this 
distance. The frequencj'' of sales refers to the number of times marketing 
is done per month by the producer. Relationship with dealers refers to 
whether loans or credit has been taken by the smallholders from the 
dealers. This variable is used only for smallholders since estates do 
not obtain such benefits from dealers. They get their finance and 
cred:.t elsewhere. The number of dealers refers to the nujnber of dealers 
the producers transact with. 
Results 
Price vas regressed on all che listed variables separately for 
the smallholders' and the estates' d^ta. The least squares estim.ates 
and other statistical, properties of the equation are given in Table 
P is measured in cents per pound. The coefficients measure the amount of 
devi^ation of each variable. The coefficient of determination, Pl^, is 76 
per ccnt for smallholders and 58 for estates. 
Price and_Grade 
The statistical results in Table 4.2 confirm the inverse 
relationship between tne price and grade of rubber. Producers of 
better grades of rubber managed to fetch a higher price for their 
output. For instance, it c.an be seen that HSS 1 rubber could get a 
price which ^as h/gher than th-- average by '+,3 cents per pound. 
Lower grade rubber, on the other hand, fetched prices which were below 
the average figure. Thus, lISS sell.ers were given 6.7 cents below the 
average price. The coefficients for the grade variable are all 
significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level of significance. 
Price and Size of Hoiaang 
Smaller producers as defined by the size of their acreage 
seemed to get lower prices. Hov,?ever, we must not be misled into thinking 
that size per se was the cause of the low dealers' prices offered to 
small rubber producers. It is the associated factors like the poorer 
quality of the rubber and the weaker bargaining position of these 
producers because of their small sales volume, and such like factors, 
'shich caused the lower prices. Size did not appesj* significant to the 
estate sample. In the case of smallholdings, the coefficient for those 
below 10 acres v/as significant and indicated that they obtained a price 
which was 2.3 cents below the average price. 
Price and Distajic^ 
None of the coefficiento were significant for this variable. 
Distance did not appear to be a significant variable in determinj.ng 
dealers' prices. There are two possible explanations for this. First, 
it is the economic distance p^ hich really matters. That is, given the 
geographical distance could the producers cover it in an efficient v^ ay 
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and do they have the transportation facilities to do so. Economic 
9 
distance was a more serious constraint to smallholder producers than 
to estate producers. Durinj]; the survey it was found that p^r cent 
of the smallholders still rely on bicycles to transport their rubber 
to the dealers. 29 per cent used motorbikes and 10 per cent used 
motor vehicles. The remaining ? per cent reported that their rubber was 
sold to itinerant buyers. From this information it could be deduced 
that smallholders were rather restricted iu their choice of dealers, 
expecially if they were scattered, because of the lack of efficient 
transportation facilities. One corollary cf this is the consequent 
weakened bargaining power of the cmallholders vis a vis that of dealers. 
The estates are in a different position. During the sujrvey it was found 
that all the estates owned at least one lorry which could be ujsed to 
transport the rubber. This gave them a larger degree of freedom 
compared to smallholders. Secondly, no transport cost was deducted from 
the dealer's price since the sellers provided their own transport. For 
instance, when an estate delivered rubber to the buyer's godown the 
former undertook the loading, transport, and unloading of the product.^'^ 
Price and Sales Frequency 
In the case of the smallholders, those who sold three or 
more times per month had a slightly lower average price: (0,59 cents 
per poujid lower) than the others who sold at less frequent intervals. 
This was t)robably due to downgrading when sales were made frequently in 
Economic distance is determined not only by geographical distance 
but also by availability of and accessibility to transport. 
See Jajnes Ong, "The Marketing of Natural Rubber in the Estate Sector", 
MSELB International M^arketing Conference, K.L., 1975., 
TABI^ i; 4.2 SSTIHATES OP THE DUKCT VARMLS MODEL OF PRICE DSTEIiMrHANTS 
Group 7ariBbl9 
Grade 
Size of Holding 
Distaaca froTs Dealer 
Frequency of Sales Per f'onth 
Price Infonsation 
Relationship uith Dealer 
Huaber of Dealers Sold to 
Ethnic Oimershlp 
Speoi f ic YaiHLable 
Grade 1 
3 ®2 ~ 2.1000 
US 3 ~ 6 , 7 2 1 0 








2 Miles \ ,0711 
2 Miles - .0271 
1 Month J.617 
2 Month .1131 





Present R - 2.1671 
Absent 1.002 












C e u f f i o i g a t 
.76 
t S t a t i s M a 
( ~ 10,2316)' 
( - 7.652 )" 
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( 1.021 ) 
( .2671) 
( .7616) 










^ Sisrdf ioant at 5 per cent l e v e l . 
ON 
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small lots. higher frequency of sale of the smallholders was due 
to the need for income, which was requj.red to pay for the d^ily 
expenditure. This point will be fuj-ther elaborated later. In contrast, 
the estates which sold less frequently and which ^ere well informed of 
the prices did not suffer any such loss. 
Price and Price Information 
The result shows that those who were ignorant of the price 
situation obtained lower average prices. Smallholders who did not try 
to find out the pre\^ailing price could be more easily cheated than those 
who were more knowledgeable. Thus the foraer got 1.2671 cents less than 
the average price. The estates being better informed, faced a more 
competitive market and could thus obtain better prices. 
Price and_Relationshipwith pealers• 
Smallholders who were indebted in one way or another, viz., 
loajiB or credit, got 2.1671 cents per pound less than the average. Those 
who were not got 1 cent above the average. Perhaps the latter were not 
bound by the relationship as the former ii?ere and could sell to dealers 
offering better prices. This issue is elaborated later. During the 
survey it was found that the relationship between estates and dealers 
was one of equal footing. The former were not bound in any vs.y to dealers 
by way of loans or such like services. In fact, dealers were foujiad to 
be quj.te obligatory in giving the "best" price to estates ae the large 
business of any particular estate was something to be valued in the long 
run. A rash move by a dealer to "exploit" any estate would mean the loss 
of a profitable customer. 
Price and Number of Dealers 
It appears that smallholders v?ho sold to more than one dealer 
obtained a higher price than those who sold to only one dealer. This 
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fact seemed to substantiate the section analysed imme?diately abcfe. 
Thus those who sold to three or more than three dealers obtained 0.8? 
cents more than the average and those who sold to only 1 got .06l2 cents 
less than the average. The coefficients are signi^ficant. For the 
estate case they are net significantly different from zero though est-ites 
selling to more than 3 dealers or to 3 got 1.3 cents more than the 
others. In contrast to smal3-holders, estates could obtain access to 
as many dealers as they wished and they were tberefcre in a better 
position to obtain the best competitive price for their rubber. 
Price and Ethnic Ovynership 
For sm.allholders it is clear that Malays got a lower price 
(-3»67 cents per poujid) and Chinese got cents per pound above 
average. The reason is that generally Malays produced lower grade 
rubber whilst the Chinese produced better ones. Similarly, European 
estates fetched a better price, 2.6 cents above average. But the 
coefficients for the estate situation are not significantly different 
from, zero, 
'4.5. MARKETING PRACTICES AlU) PRICING 
It has already been established that grade of rubber has been 
the most important determinant in pricing rubber. A better grade of 
rubber is sold at a premiiMi in the world m.arket. Some average price 
d-ifferentials for various grades of rubber are given in Table A-.3. 
It was mentioned in Chapter 2 that whereas estates produce 
better grade rubber like RSS 1 an.d 2, the majority of emalJJiolders 
output is still of grade ESS 3 below. The quality of sm.allholders' 
products is uneven. This has created a situation whereby the dealer's 
price can be reduced deliberately by the dealer's pricing policy. 
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:ABLE K.3. AVERAGE PEICS DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN V.LRIOUS 
GRADES OF RUBBER FOR THE PERIOD I960 - 1973 
Difference Between 
RSS 1 and RSS 2 
Prices (Cents) ; 
Difference Between 1 Difference Between | 
RSS 1 sjid P.SS 3 1 RSS 1 and USS | 
1 Prices (Cents) i Prices (Cents) | 
.72 2.10 6.51 
1 6 
Source: Rubber Statistical Bulletin. 
Before pricing the rubber of the smallholders' sheet rubber 
the dealer takes into considerations factors like its grade, weight, 
and. for unsmoked sheets moisture content. No scientific method is 
used by dealers in determining the quality of sheet rubber. Visual 
inspection is still the most comrncn .method. Table shows some of 
the ways commonly used in assessing the quality of sheet rubber purchased 
from smallholders. Slightly more than half the dealers assessed the 
quality of sheet rubber by checking the batch as a whole. Few examined 
every sheet. It would be too laborious a task unless only a few sheets 
are sold at any one tirae. From a practical viewpoint, it is hardly 
feasible to examine every sheet especially if the amount transacted is 
a large one. It is time consuming and laborious. 
TABLE kA. NUMBER OF DEALERS USING VARIOUS METHODS 
TO ASSESS GRADE OF SMALLHOLDER RSS AND USS 
! '"•; 
1 Number 
1) Examine every sheet 
2 ) Examine a few sheets 
3) Examine batch as a whole 
k) Rely on past knowledge of products 
of smallholders 
n ; 0 
13 
i 6 i 
Total 1 2 8 j 
Source: Survey. 
But whj.chever method is used the smallholders are still in a 
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oi-sadvantageous position. Unless a mistake is made no dealers would 
give a grade ixighsr than necessary. Frequently the grade is 
deliberately downgraded. This serves t?/o purposes. The first is a 
safeguard against wrong assessment. When this happens he suffers a 
loss when the rubber is re-scld to another dealer as the latter is quite 
likely to grade the rubber accurately. This is thus an insurance 
against ritsk. Secondly, downgrading the smallholders' rubber increases 
his marketing margin sine® he can re-sell it as a better grade. This 
is a sort of 'hidden^ price erosion. Table shows th^t most sheet 
rubber was classified as a grade 3, and more tlrnn three-quarter of 
unsmoked rubber was classified as grades 3 and k. Lim has confirmed 
that a large proportion of this downgraded rubber was re-sold as higher 
grade rubber. 
TABLE PROPOSTION OF SMALIilOLDSR RSS AND USS 
ASSESSED BY DEjILERS AS PES CENT 
1 ! ! r 
USS 2 I USS 3/USS 4 
"1 •U... i.. I 1 ! f 
10 i ^^ ft S 






Another way to erode the price paid to smallholders is to 
make a gain during the weighing of the rubber. Table k.6 shows that 
60 per cent of dealers rouinded the weight to the nearest half kati. 
Dealers did not round up to the smallholders' favour. They rounded 
dovm to benefit themselves. Smallholders v;ho sell in small quantity 
each time will thus lose more by this practice. The loss will be 
greater the more frequent they sell in small am.ount each time. 
11 I Lim, op.cit., Chapter '+. 
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TABLE k,6 NUMBER OF SMALLHOLD^IR DEALEPS REPORTING 
ROUNDING OF WEIGHTS TO NEAIREST 
Tahil Half Kati One Kati Total No 
2 7 
Source: Survey. 
The sale of un.Bmok<?d sheet rubber has a third disadvantage 
facing the smallholders. In assessing the quality of msmoked sheets 
the moisture content has to be gauged, Agssn, no scientific method 
is used. It is based on thicJ<ness of the unsrr.oked sheets and the 
length of time after the processing of the rubber. A rule of thuTib 
policy, very arbitrary in nature, is used. Dealers reported that 
generally they would deduct about 10 per cent for moisture if the 
sheets were thin and one or two weeks old and as much as to 50 per 
cent for thick sheets which were sold immediately after processing. 
Estates are in a different position. The grade of rubber 
produced is nonr.ally P^ SS 1, Dealers, from their past dealings with 
estates, know the standard Qua.lity of estate rubber. Besides, the fact 
that estates have their own assessment m.ade of the rubber for checking 
against that of dealers' grading and weighing make exploitation 
d-ifficult. For any given grade this ensures that a better price is 
given to any estate producer. 
Another variable which needs a little e?.aboration is the 
smallholders' relationship 'rrith the dealers. Dealers do not only buy 
rubber from smallholders. Many of them also provide loans, credj.t, and 
services like processing and smoking facilities. Lim's conclusion is 
that marketing deductions were not made because smallholders borrow from 
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the dealers."^ Probably the reason for this ir that dealers use this 
as a means to secure the patronage of the smallholders. Besides, 
deductions need not be made from the dealer's price to increase the 
marketing margin. 'Hidden' price erosion in the form of downgrading 
ajid suchlike practices can be carried out once the customer-buyer relation-
ship is firmly established. 
During the survey it -vas found that most sm^allholders preferred 
to sell to only 1 oi 2 dealers (Table 4.7). The comjnon answer given to 
this was that they found the dealers reliable and 'a good friend'. A 
'good price' was also mentioned as one of the reasons but not as 
frequently as the first two. Probably reliable and friendly dealers 
give 'good prices' and this factor is subsumed vinder the other two reasons. 
On the other hand this preference for a reliable and friendly dealer may 
be a genuine one. It is a very rational behaviour. From the 'good' 
relationship a smallholder can obtain access to loans and credit ^hich 
are not easily available to a 'small' man in a kampong. This preference 
to deal with a reliable and friendly dealer is double-edged. It can be 
a source of benefits to smallholders in terms of loans, etc. It can 
also be used against hj.m if the dealer 'exploits' the relationship by 
hidden price erosion. 
TABLE 4.7. MU>SER OF SMALLHOLDERS SELLING TO 
One Dealer 46 
One or two dealers 30 
More than two dealers 24 
100 
Source: Survey. 
If the latter occurs and if the smallholder knows and still 
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continues the relationship it is because he values it more than the 
slight loss in piice. One possible interpretation is given in Figure .^3< 
Assume two dealers A and B. Assume that dealer A's price is higher than 
dealer B's price by the amount shown, given the world price. Also 
assume that the smallholder involved can sell to either A or B a.nd he 
knows the price differential. If the smallholder is still willing to 
accept the lower price from dealer B and suffers a slight loss it is 
because he considers the imputed value o£ the benefits deriving, from his 
relationship with B more than compensates or is equal to the loss he 
suffers frora the smaller price given. Hoi^ever, this equilibrium relation-
ship will be disturbed if the Bmallholder feels the loss is greater than 
the benefits. He will then ask for a better price or try another dealer. 
Both, however, presume that the smallholder could do so, i.e. that he 
has a strong bargaining position and that he has access to other dealers. 
For most, both may be absent. 
The dealer's price received by the estates sjad smallholders 
thus depends not only on the v^ orld price and the export tax but also on 
institutional variables and marketing practices of the dealers and 
rubber producers. 
^.6. ASYMKETRY TEST OF MARKETING MARGIN 
Since the marketing margin is the obverse of the dealer's 
price, a test of the movement of one is also an indirect test of the 
other. In this section the hypothesis that a change in marketing margin 
in response to a unit increase in the world price is different in 
absolute amount from the change in response to a unit decrease of the 
same explanatory variable is tested for the smallholders and estates. 
13 
The asymmetric response model is of the following form: 
Kmenta, op.cit., pp. ^21 to k22. 
FIGURE A CASE OF PRICE COMPENSATION 
Deeder's Price 
(Cents Per Pound) 
Dealer B'e Price 
Hypothesized difference 
in price between Dealer A 
and Dealer B approximately 
equals to benefits 
received by smallholders. 
(Cents Per Pound) 
World Price 
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M^ = a + b WP^ ^ 4- cWP^ ^^ t ® 
where M^ is the .aarketing margin, Vn'P is the ?/orld price of a certadn 
grade of rubber, a.nd Z is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 when 
V/P^Z. and is equal to 0 otherwise. 
The marketing margin is the aggregate of the marketing margin 
of each of the levels in the marketing chain. By definition, it is 
derived thus: M = V/P - Export Tax - Cesses - Dealer's Price. 
No data wa8 collected on marketing margin for each level of the 
marketing chain. It is extremely uifiicult to collect data on marketing 
margin which can be considered reliable and representative. This is 
because the prices given by dealers to producers for their rubber products 
at any one level neeu not refer to the products of the same quality group 
at different stages of the marketing chain. It is not a practical 
possibility to obtain the m.argin by tracing a certain grade of rubber, 
which is being transformed at each stage of the marketing process, through 
the marketing chain. There is no doubt that i f such details are available 
lU 
the analysis can be done in greater depth. For the purpose of finding 
the asymmetric response the aggregate marketing margin has therefore 
to be used, but it would serve our purpose of high-lighting the issue. 
The results are given in Table The period of .analysis 
starts from January I969 to December 1975. Cross-sectional time series 
d^ta are pooled for the regression estimates. The test of the asymmetric 
1^ + 
However, using our definition of marketing margin BJX attempt was made 
to deri\''e an approximate meaeure for the period January I969 -
September 1973 using survey data. The regression equations and results 
are: Estate Marketing Margin = - 3-17 + 0 ,12 V/P, 
(3 .16 ) (2 ,97)p 
D .W . : 2 ,17 P = .78 
Smallholder Marketing = 3-17 + 0 ,15 ''VP 
Maagin (2 .01 ) (2 .52) ^ 
D .W , : 1.78 R = .70 
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response is equivalent to testing whether the coefficient c is 
equsd to zero. In the estate case c is not zero but very close to it. 
The t statistic at the 5 per cent level of significance is within the 
acceptance region. It is quite reasonable to conclude that the 
marketing margin for estate deaJ-ers is quite symmetrical in its response 
to price changes. On the other hand, the c coefficient is larger than 
zero for the smallholders' case. It is also not significant at the 
5 per cent level. The null hypothesis of no asymmetry has to be 
rejected. That is, the marketing margin responds differently to a rise 
and a fall in the world price. 
TABLE 4.8. ASYMMETRY TEST ESTIMATES 
Dealer's 
Price 
Re ^ession Coefficients of 
















(1) ^ estates 
(2) 60 smallholders. 
Source: Survey Data. 
Period covers January I969 - December 1973* 
This is illustrated by a hypothetical case in Figure 
The assumed long rvin function between the marketing margin and the world 
price for smallholders is indicated by line through the origin. Assume 
world price rises from P^ to The margin rises by M^ to M^. Now 
assume the situation is a price fall from P^ to P^. The fall in the 
dealers' margin is sticky downward. It falls from M^ to M2, which is 
smaller than M^ M^. In the short run, if symmetry in response exists 
the fall and rise in the margin would be similair in magnitude with the 
corresponding price changes. 
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M = f (WP) 
World Price 
Note: During a price rise the marketing margin increases fromM, toM,«-
However, during a price decline, the marketing margin falls 
from M, to M-, i.e., it slides on the dotted curve instead of 
returning (See text.) 
k,7, PRICE RIGIDITIES 
Having explained that the marketing practices of dealers 
exert a depressive influence on dealers' prices of smallholders but not 
for estates, and having proved that the marketing margin did change 
differently in response to world prices rise and fall for smallholders 
and estates, it would be enlightening to investigate the changes in the 
dealers' prices of the two sectors in different periods of price changes, 
This could be useful to verify further the less than competitive 
situation of smallholders' marketing vis-a-vis that of estates. 
Besides other factors, the world price is the basic unit from 
which the dealer's price is derived. No dealer would be willing to pay 
more than the price ruling at a point in time. Since the world price is 
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the guiding price for dealers and exporters^ it can be said that the 
relationship between this and the dealer's price is a very strong one.^^ 
In a perfectly competitive situation, the marketing margin in absolute 
terms is a constant. Given this, it means that the dealer's price has 
a unique one-to-one relationship with the world price. The line of best 
fit will pass through the origin, that is, the constant a is zero. The 
coefficient of determination is also equal to 1. This ahows that 
changes in dealer's price are explained tctally by changes in world 
prices. Deviations from this perfectly coupetitive situation indicate 
some degree of imrierfections in the market. 
The relationship between the dealer's price and the world price 
variable is expressed by the linear equation: 
DP = a + b WP + e ... (^.3) 
Three periods are chosen for the study: 
1) a rising trend, 
2) a steady price period, 
3) a falling trend. 
P-ising Trend 
The period covers September 1972 to July 1973 . The first point 
to note is that the a coefficient given in Table 4.9 is significantly 
different from zero, b is in every case less than 1 . The b coefficient 
ranges from . 5917 to o92l6 . The lowest coefficient is found in the case 
of smallholders producing unsmoked sheets. The results indicate that a 
one cent change in the world price leads to a change in the dealer's 
price ranging from . 5917 to . 9 2 1 6 . Estates have a b coefficient closer 
^^ We must add that there may be a time-lag involved in this 
relationship. This of course varies with each situation and for 
each dealer and exporter. But the basic mechsjiism would not be 
very different. 
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to 1. All are significantly different Trom 1 at the 5 P'^ r cent level. 
The coefficient of determination, P.^ , is high in all cases. 
Between 76 per cent to 70 per cent of the variations in the dealer's 
price is explained by changes in the world price. The conclusion is 
that during the rising trend only in the estates case do dealers' 
prices move close to that of the world prices. 
TABLE RBGPESSION ESTIMATES OF DEALER'S PRICES 
ON WORLD PRICE 
4— 
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Steady Trend 
The steady price period covers the period from February 3.96^  
to July 1966. The a coefficients are all significantly different from 
zero at the 5 per cent significance level. The b coefficients for the 
smallholders are signiiicpjitly different from 1, but not in the case of 
the estates' b coefficient. The b values range from .5002 for unsmoked 
sheets to .786I for RSS 1. That is, a one cent change in the world 
price leads to a change ranging from .5002 to .786I cents per pound. 
The coefficients of determination in this period are generally 
lower than the rising price period. 
The results again indicate thai the market is imperfect, but 
less so for th^ estates. 
Falling Trend 
The period of analysis starts from August I969 to September 
1972. As in the other two periods the a coefficients are significantly 
different from zero. The b coefficients are significantly lower than 1. 
For a one cent change in world price the dealer's price changes from 
.8921 to .578I0 Again, the b coefficient for estates is larger than 
2 
that of the smallholders. The R 's range from 75 to 78 per cent. 
The results in this period also reject the existence of a 
perfectly competitive market, especially in the smallholders' case, 
4.8. MARKETING COSTS 
No detailed data on marketing costs at each marketing level 
could be collected due to practical difficulties and the absence of 
information. Some idea on the deductions made for the major cost 
elements had, however, been collected during the survey. Data for 5 
dealers are given in Table 4.10. For smoked sheets the major cost 
element is handling cost. This includes expendi.ture spent on purchasing, 
sorting and assembling sheet rubber. The next important cost item is 
transport cost. Both items are really dependent on the volume of 
Ikl 
business done. The other cost components inc^ uude rent, licence fee, and 
other administrative costs. In the case of lansraoked sheets, handling 
cost and smoking are the dominant cost elements. Again, both are 
dependent on the volume of business. In the short run, it is quite 
reasonable to say that the marketing cost would be a constant given the 
volume of business regularly traded. This may be said of the cost at 
the other level of marketing. 
TABLE 'l.lO. BREAKTOWN OF 5 DI^ALERS' MAPJ<ETING COSTS 
OF SMOKED AND UNSMOKED SHEETS, 1972 
Cost Item Smoked. Sheet » Unsraoked Sheet Per Cent ) Per Cent 
Handling I ^8.2 ^ 27.3 
Smoking | - j 25.0 
Transport | 20.0 < 8.3 
Rent ' 10.0 I 3.1 I 
Licence i S 1.3 
Total Cost s 82.8 ^ 65.0 
(1 ) ! « 
Surplus''-^ [ 17.2 f 
(l) Approximate return to dealers' labour, management 
and investment. 
Source: Survey. The information is given in percentage form and 
should be regarded as average approximates. Details of 
cost items were not given by dealers. 
Any variation in the marketing margin therefore, especially 
in the short run, comes from other sources. We have already pointed out 
that the v,arious marketing practices of the dealers really account for 
the variation in marketing maj-gin. Another point to make is that the 
marketing margin at the first trade level is probably the most variable. 
This is because the trading done at the other levels is done in a less 
imperfect situation. At these higher levels of marketing the dealers 
and exporters are well informed of the price situation and every aspect 
of rubber trading. Consequently a more competitive price for any grade 
is generally paid. 
ioiwr TAX AND DEALER'S PRICE 
In the earlier part of this chapter we have shown that the 
export tax has a depressive influence on the dealer's price for any given 
world price. Details on the structure of the export tax system have 
already been given in chapter 2 and are therefore not repeated here. 
However, one point needs to be mentioned again. Though an important 
producer of rubber in the world market, Malaysia is still a price-taker. 
Any increase in the export tax can not be &h.ifted abroad. Nor is any 
reduction in rhe tax shifted abroad in the form of lower prices. As 
pointed out in chapter 3 this is strictly an internal problem. Any 
change in the export tax has its consequence only on the internal price 
transmission process. 
Since the Schedule I tax is a direct function of the world price, 
given the tax schedules, any rise in the latter leads to a rise in the 
former. The payer of the tax is the exporter of rubber. However, since 
he can recoup it from the smal].holders or estate producers the effective 
burden is actually on these two groups. For a given rise in the tax it 
will be just deducted back from the world price to arrive at the basis 
for determining the other domestic prices. We have shown that when the 
world price rises the marketing margin, particularly that of smallholders' 
dealers, also rises. The rise in the marketing margin is a direct 
absorption of part of the rise in the world price. The rise in the export 
tax concomitant to the rise in world price is just passed back. 
Given the imperfections in the internal marketing system the 
question arises as to whether the full part of the export tax will be 
returned if there is a reduction of the tax either by the Government or 
during a price fall (with the tax rates also falling). The amount of 
the export tax which is returned to rubber producers when the tax is 
reducod by a certain percentage will be termed tax benefit here. The 
question to be is thus v/hether the tax benefit goes to the 
middlemen or to the rubber producers. What is the direction and the 
magnitude of the dealer's prices due to this tax reduction? 
To investigate this the first step is to determine the change 
in the dealer's price due to a reduction in the export tax. This 
yields the coefficient showing th^ - change. The second step is to compute 
the elasticity coefficient of pri.ce change to a tax change.^^ 
The relationship between th^ dealer's price on the one hand 
and the world price and export tax on the other is expressed by the 
following linear equation: 
DP = a + b ,VP + c T + n ... (k.k) 
v/here 
DP is the dealer's price for a certain grade 
WP is the world price for a certain grade 
T is the export tax corresponding to a given 'WP 
u is the error term 
From equation the e].asticity of response coefficient of 
dealer's price to export tax changes can be derived. The elasticity 
coefficient, E, is c T/DP. c is derived by partially differentiating 
equation with respect to T. Since the equation is expressed in 
linear form E is com.puted at the mean. That is, T and DP are the means 
for the period under study. It is to be expected that the sign of the 
coefficient of T will be negative. Since the export tax is one of the 
factors which depre«5seB the dealer's price, a change in the tax will 
result in a change in the dealer's price in the opposite direction. The 
^^ See B.Renand and P.Suphaphiphat, "The Effect of the Rice Export Tax 
on the Domestic Rice Prive i/evel in Thailand", Malayan Economic 
Review, V. XVI, No.l, 1971. 
sign of the coefficient of WP is expected to be positive. This is 
because the dealer's price is a direct fxinction of the world price. 
Empirical Results 
The empirical estimates of the model are given in Table 4.11. 
The coefficieiitb are significant at the 5 cent level on the basis 
of the test. The coefficient of determination is high in each case. 
The signs of the various coefficients are as expected. 
TABLE 4.11. REGREiiSION ESTIMATilS OF i:E;\LER'S PRIGS 
TO WORLD PRICE AI4D EXPORT TAX 
FP a R 
RSS 1 ( 1 ) 1 - 8 . 2 0 2 7 i 1 . 0 3 6 8 i - . 9 9 8 1 ! 9 9 
Estate I ) 
i 
( - 1 0 . 8 1 2 2 ) i 
J 
( 6 2 . 4 0 3 5 ) 1 ( - 1 3 . 2 1 5 7 ) 1 
r ^ 
RSS 3 ( 2 ) 1 - 7 . 9 1 0 1 . 7 1 2 1 : - . 6 5 2 1 9 6 
Smallholder 1 } ( - 8 . 9 2 6 1 ) 1 ( • ' 4 0 . 6 8 1 0 ) i ( - 9 . 6 6 7 1 ) 1 
u s s ( 3 ) 1 - 1 4 . 1 0 3 0 1 
. 6 2 6 1 ' - . 4 7 8 1 • 9 0 
t 
( - 8 . 6 6 7 1 ) 1 ( - 2 0 . 2 1 6 1 ) 1 ( - 6 . 7 2 3 1 ) i 
(1) 40 estates 
(2) 25 smallholdings 
(3) '+5 smallholdings 
Source: Survey Data covering period from September 1971 to July 1975. 
The elasticity of response coefficients are computed at the 
means and are given in Table 4.12. It will be noted that as the 
quality of the grade declines the elasticity coefficient becomes 
smaller. In all three cases, the coefficients are less than 1. The 
sensitivity of the domestic price to world price is also computed and 
shown in colujnn 1 of Table 4.12. The elasticity coefficient also shows 
a similar decline with the decline in the grade of rubber. 
Let us assume that there is a reduction in the export tax by 
1 per cent. If this takes place, what ie the magnitude of the tax 
benefit going back to the rubber producers? The method to derive this 
is very simple. First, use the elasticity response coefficient, E, and 
1^5 
multiply it by th<» average world price of a pa^-ticular grade, smd then 
divide the result by the average export tax for the period. That is, 
E.WP/T (].00) = percentage of tax benefit returned to producer. For the 
three grades of rubber the results are given in Table 4.13. RSS 1 
producers receive back an amoant twice that of unsmoked sheet producex-s 
and slightly lese than two times that of HSS 3 pi'oducers. Estates 
receive back 99 P'^ r cent of a 1 per cent reduction in the export tax. 
In the case of smallholders, the percentage rajiges from 66 to per 
cent. The returns of the tax benefit .are inversely related to the quality 
of the grade of rubber. 
TABLE h.l2. ELASTICITY RESPONSE COEFl'TCIENTS 
"I Percentage Change of I 
? DP to that of I 
Percentage Chsjnge of 
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There are two possible explanations for the lower tax 
benefit flowing back to the smallholders compared to that received by 
the estate producers. The first one is the imperfect market which 
faces the iroallholders in their sales of rubber. The existence of 
imperfections in the marketing system allows the absorption of part of 
the tax benefit. 
The second explanation is that smallholders suffer from what 
±e termed here 'tax ignorance'. Smallholders are aware of the replanting 
cess which they have to pay. This is a constant amount of +^.5 cents 
which is easy to remember. Besides, there is widespread knowledge of 
the existence and amount of this tax. But the same cannot be said of the 
Schedule I export tax. Many smallholders vaguely know they pay some 
amount of export tax. But the actual amount and the basis of its 
derivation are not loiown to the smallholders. They do not have with 
then the tax schedules which help to calculate the various tax rates. 
Furthermore, though price information is obtainable via the newspapers 
and radio the price news do not explain the amount of tax deduction. 
For this reason the smallholders have come to accept on faith the 
sjnount of tax deduction made by the exporter and dealer. This makes it 
easy for dealers to absorb a certain proportion of the tax benefit. 
In contrast estate producers are well informed of the tax 
rates and the changes made everyday. In fact, every estate has in its 
possession the government gazetted tax schedule for a particular week 
for quick reference. Thi3 ms^ kes it difficult for dealers to absorb any 
portion of the tsuc benefit. It is quite easy to cheat smallholders of 
1 or 2 cents arising from the tax benefit since the pricing is compounded 
with so many arbitrary factors when the grade and weight of an amount of 
rubber is determined. This is less easily done in the case of the 
estates. 
4.10. CONCLUSIONS 
Though the model used in the analysis of the tax benefit 
sharing is a very simple one, it has proved to be quite useful in 
pointing out some of the implications of the export tax in its relation-
ship with the dealer's price, ior policy purposes one usefulness of the 
type of analytical approach just discussed can be shown here. Let us 
Ik7 
assume that the government has established a minimum price prograjnme 
for smallholders. Assume that the minimuin price to be supported i s 
55 cents per pound, and the average world price for RSS J> ±8 hO cents 
per pound. Because of the availability of the response coefficients 
the desired exnort tax reduction can be computed for supporting the 
minimum price . I t i s done in this way. F irst , get the difference 
between the world price and the minimum price to be supported. Second.i.y, 
divide this by the tax benefit computed on the basis of the knowledge 
of the response coefficients and average v.orld price. That is 
(55 - 'K ) ) / 3 . 6123 . The denominator is taken from Table 4 . 12 for RSS 3 . 
The desired tax cut in the export tax is 4 . 1 55 P«r cent for maintaining 
the minimum price of 55 cents per pound. This assumes that certain 
existing institutional factors and tie marketing margin are constant. 
I f they change, different calculations h^ve to be done. In passing, 
it may be mentioned that the tax cut is smaller i f the marketing margin 
is reduced by reducing the share of the dealers' portion in the tax 
benefit due to a tax cut. 
The predictive power of the model is limited by the reliability 
an.d details of the data. I t is obvious that i f both are available a 
more refined and accurate analysis can be done. 
The difficulty in using the above analysis as part of policy 
formulation is the availability of a wide range of elasticity 
coefficients which will be available under different assumptions and data 
accessibility . The final choice has of course to be representative of 
the general case. 
Admitting that d i f f icult ies and restrictions are present, some 
knowledge of the taxing and pricing problem in quantitative form is 
definitely useful in planning reforms of the export tax and marketing 
system. One cannot be indifferent to tajc shifting problems, complicating 
though they are in their computation. A first approximation, as 
attempted here, to the general solution of the export tax problem must 
be made before any export tax reforms are to be carried out. 
1^ +9 
CHAPTER 5 
PROGRESSIVITY AND BURD3^ OF 
THE RUBBER EXPORT TAXES 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Several ifisues are examined in this chapter. The first is 
the concept and measurement of progressivity of the rubber export 
tax schedules. The second is the concept and meaeureirent of the burden 
of the rubber export taxes. A related topic to the second issue is 
the direct money burden of the rubber export taxes on the profitability 
of rubber production. 
To facilitate the study of this chapter a few details on the 
rubber export taxes, which have been analyzed in chapter 3i will be 
repeated here. The triple tiered export tsix system includes the 
Schedule I tax which is an ad valorem cess and varies with the price of 
RSS 1. The objective of Schedule I is to raise revenue and to act as a 
countercyclical device during periods of high rubber prices so that 
potential inflationary pressure on the domestic economy is checked. The 
second component is the Schedule III research cess. This is collected 
for funding research in the rubber industry. The last component of the 
rubber export tax system is the Schedule IV replanting cess. This is 
collected from smallholders for financing their replanting. Both 
Schedules III and IV are collected for each pound of rubber exported and 
are not based on the rubber price level. 
While it is known that Schedule I rises with the corresponding 
rise in RSS 1 prices, it is not obvious by what degree the progressivity 
of this tax has changed. As yet, no estimates have been made on this 
aspect of the rubber export tax. This section is an attempt to explore 
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the topic and to evaluate the chang'« in the progressivity of the various 
structures of Schedule I since 19'+5« 
5.2. DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS 
Before we propose various measurements of progressivity a few 
concepts have to be clarified. The terras which need explaining are 
progression, proportionality, and regression. 
The existence of progression, proportionality, and regression 
is defined in the following manner."^ A tax system is progressive if 
the average rate of tax (that is, ta:: liabiliry as a percentage of the 
tax base) rises wh-sn the scale of the tax bas^ ^ rises. It is proportional 
if the average rate of tax does not change with the change in the scale 
of the tax base. Lastly, it is regressive if the average rate falls 
when the scale of the tax base rises. 
Putting it in another way, the tax system is progressive if the 
marginal rate exceeds the average rate, proportional if the two rates 
are equal, and regressive if the average rate exceeds the marginal rate. 
Let the rubber export tax Schedule I, T, be expressed as a 
function of the RSS 1 price, P, v/hich is the tax base. That is, T = 
f (P). Then the average rate of tax is f (P) / P and increases, remains 
constant, or decreases as 
C_L(PL) ... (5.1) 
dP ( p ) 
( f (p) ) _ ( P - f (P) ) o.. (5.2) 
dP ( P ) ~ p2 
^ M.M.Jain, "Tax Progressivity of Income Tax: 1955 to I967-68/' Indian 
Jo'ornal of Econom:.cs, 1969» pp.l87-196; R.A.Musgrave, "Income Tax 
Progressivity: 1929-19^8," JPE 19^, pp.'+98-510; M.Kubo, "Income Tax 
Progression in Britain," Public Finance, 1955, pp.235-258; and 
S.H.Chou, Capital Levy, (New York, 19^5); A.C.Pigou, Public Finance, 
(London, 192^71 R.E.Slitor, "The Measurement of Progressivity and 
Built-in-Flexibility," 19^S p.309. 
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1 (f^(P) - f (P) ) p ( p ) " ' 
~ in ~ k ) ... (5.if) 
where 
M = r-(p) 
A = (f (?) ) / P 
The average rate of tax, f (?) / P increases, remains constant, 
cr decreases as (M - A) ^^ 
5.3. MEASURES OF PROGRESSIVTTY 
The concepts explained aV)ove can only provide some evidence of 
the various degrees of progressivlty of the rubber export tax Schedule I. 
They do not give the exact degree of progression of the tax system. 
To determine the exact degree of progression two measures are 
proposed; the average rate progression and the marginal rate progression. 
Each of these measures is developed in the next section and is then 
applied to the Schedule 1 rubber export tax. 
AVI®AGE RATE PROGRESSION (ARP) 
The average or effective rate is the tax liability as a percentage 
of the tax base, which is here defined to be the RSS 1 price. ARP is 
measured by the rate of change in the averap;e rate of the rubber export 
tax Schedule 1 as the price of RSS 1 rises. The measure is expressed as 
T T 
P2 " ••• (5.5) 
P - P 2 1 
where T^ and T^ are the rubber export tax Schedule 1 
liabilities at RSS 1 prices P^ and P^ respectively. 
Average rate progression is equal to zero if the tax is 
2 
See Musgrave, Ibid and Kubo, Ibid. 
152 
proportional, positive if the tax is progressive, and negative if the 
tax is regressive, 
MARGINAL RATE PROGRESSION (MRP) 
This second raeasxire shows the rate of change in the marginal 
rate of Schedule 1 tax as the RSS 1 price changes. It can be expressed 
as 
- ^0 
" p p ... (5»6) 
2 " 1 
The export tax Schedule 1 structure ic progressive if the 
coefficient is positive, proportional when the coefficient is 0, and 
regressive when the coefficient is less than 1. 
5.^. APPLICATION AND RESULTS 
Details of the structure of the Schedule 1 tax have been 
explained in Chapter 3 and the changes over the years since 19^5 are 
given in Appendix 3»1. The tax liability is the Schedule 1 rate and the 
tax base is the RSS 1 price. 
An examination of the Schedule 1 tax structure over the years 
shows that the marginal rates of change are more significant between 
price brackets of 20 cents, or larger, than between price brackets of 
say 5 or 10 cents. Since the objective is to measure tax progressivity 
it would be better to use a wider price bracket than a smaller one. 
Using a larger price bracket would reveal changes in tax progressivity 
than when a small price bracket is used. 
The analysis covers the period from December 19^5 to December 
1975. Altogether there have been ten different structures. Eight of 
these were actually used. Two systems were proposed, the government 
proposal in 1950 and the Mudie suggestion in 1955i but were not 
imxjl • Ml 
The analysis is cam-^d oul. from two angl' r,. The first is an 
inter-^fi>iporal "tudy of the cli.-.nit^er. in the rubber export tax Schedule 1 
projressivi. ly v;it::in a price br.- cket. The er-cond ir an intertemporal 
ctud^ of the changes in Sci-^ d^ule 1 progresaivity b.'tween price brackets. 
The follqwing point should be noted. If the average rate of 
Schedule 1 tax is raised c:.- lowered at .a11 price point.'j by the same 
nuir.b'-r of pei-centat^e po-lnts^ the degree of pro£;resnivity of the new 
structure would, remain the sa.'rie an the old at e^ch respective price 
bracket. The rea'?c>n t"or th'- coast;-.iit prOt^rej';ivity is that the increase 
or dccrea.se of the average rate of tax by the same amount would only 
shift the curve in a parvJlel v/ay. 
For instiuice, let (f (P) ) / P be the first average rate of 
tax. If k, the number of percentage points, is addf^d then the function 
becomes f (P) / P + k. For example, k can be the research cess of a 
confstant cum of 1 cent per- pound. 
The nevj degree of progressivity is then 
^ ( r (P) , ) ( f ) 
T - p — ^ = ^ T — p — r ••• 
which i.s actually the o]d degree of progressivity, The curve has 
only .siiifted, in this case, to the right. 
The uarne explanation can be used for the KRF case. 
However, if k is not a constant factor then the new function 
has T new degree of progressivity which may be larger or smaller depending 
on whether k is positive or negative. 
In this case, the new function is expressed as 
. kP ... 
whtr" k can h>- j)0( itiv^ or negatJ.vr- dep<'ndi ng on t^ hc carf». 
15^ 
The of prop:resBi\'ity is th<»n 
^ f . icp > J . K ... (5.9) dP ( P ) ( P 
What it m^ians is that the new function has its progressivity 
increased by k percentage points, t'or instance, let us assume the 
government wants to raise more revenue by increasing the existing 
Schedule 1 rates. Assume it does this by increasing the rate of tax 
by 5 p*?!" cent at nric-n Lei low uO certts and 10 per cent at prices above 
60 cents. The new function has a nev; degree of progressivity which is 
increased by k per cent (where k is different for the tv;o groups of 
prices). Sin'^e k is not a constant increase for all prices the curve 
has shifted forward, but it is not a parallel shift. 
A similar explanation applies for the MRP case. 
The above illustration shows changes in average rate progression 
which may be analyzed in terras of incremental average rates. These are 
obtained by deducting the rates applicable in earlier years from those 
which are imposed in later years. This would reveal the changes due to 
k. 
The computed values for the ARP case are given in Table 5.1. 
In column 1, the ARP was z-'ro for the period December 19^5 to 
March 19^ +6. This was due to the use of a proportional tax rate for this 
period. 
The change to a fixed rate of tax at all price levels, at 4.5 
cents per pound for the period April 19'^ ^ to November 1 9 ^ and 2.5 cents 
per pound for the period December 19^ +6 to February 19'+7, was the major 
reason for the regressiveness given in Columns 2 and 3- The regressiveness 
declined with the rise in the prices in these two periods. 
The reversion to an ad valorem of 5 per cent tax during March 
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19^7 to December I95O explained the proportionality of the AKP in Colamn 
This proportionality was maintained in the scheme proposed by 
the government in I950 for prices at 60 cents and below. However, the 
use of a higher marginal rate of Schedule 1 tax after 60 cents explained 
the progressiveness of the ARP in Column 5. This was the first 
progressive tax structure suggested for the rubber industry. 
However, this was not implemented. A modified form of this was 
used for the period January 1951 to May 1955. It maintained the same 5 
per cent ad valorem rate at prices of 6C cents and below and adopted a 
slightly lower marginal rate structure for prices above 60 cents. This 
was the first progressive Schedule 1 structure imposed on the rubber 
industry. 
Since this period, all the other Schedule 1 structure had been 
progressive. In passing one may note that the Mudie Mission advised that 
the Schedule 1 tax be abolished for prices below 60 cents. 
The various changes in k are shown in Table 5.2. The incremental 
average rates (Column l) declined in the April 19^ +6 - November 19^7 period. 
The explanation of this was that in the preceding period a proportional 
tax was used (Column 1 of Table 5.1) whereas in the next period a 
regressive tax structure was imposed, k was therefore negative and the 
curve shifted backward but the slopes were unchanged. 
Schedule 1 rates in December 19^ - Februs.ry 19^ +7 were regressive, 
but less so than the immediate period. This explained the forward shift 
of the incremental rates in this period (Colurr.n 5.5, Table 5.2). 
Because the degree of progressivity due to the change in k was not 
constant for all prices the curve did not have a parallel shift forward. 
The reversion to the 5 per cent ad valorem structure in March 
19^7 - December 1950 explained the parallel shift forward of the incremental 











































( 1 0 ) 
20 
ko 0OOO8 ^ .0050 - 0OO31 0 0 0 
-
0 0 0 
60 0 ~ ,00167 - .00104 0 0 0 0 0 0 
80 0 « .00083 - .00052 0 , 0 0 1 8 7 .00131 oOO'oS . 0 0 1 8 3 .00183 .00183 
100 0 - .OCO65 - «00031 0 . 0 0 1 6 3 .00076 ,00^ +13 , 0 0 2 3 6 .00329 000304 
120 0 - . 0 0 6 6 6 - .00021 0 , 0 0 1 5 0 .00055 , 0 0 2 7 5 ,00006 ,00204 . 0 0 1 8 8 
0 - c00015 0 .001'12 .00038 . 0 0 1 9 6 . 0 0 0 7 1 ,00217 .00205 
160 0 - .00018 - «00011 0 .00138 c00028 ,001^ +7 ,00116 ,00225 .00217 
i 8 o 0 ™ .0001^ + - ,00009 0 .00135 .00022 . 0 0 1 1 5 ,00146 .00231 ,00224 
200 0 - c00011 - .00007 0 ,0013'+ , 0 0 0 1 8 .00092 , 0 0 1 6 7 .00235 .00229 
220 0 « .00009 - ,00006 0 .00132 ,0001'+ 000075 , 0 0 1 8 2 . 0 0 2 3 8 ,00233 
2'+0 0 - .00008 - ,00005 0 .00131 ,00012 ,00063 ,00248 .00239 .00235 
(1) Including Export Tax Schedule I and Other Cesses. 
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rates from the previous period (Column 3, Tab?ie 5.?). 
The attempt by the government to raise more revenue by proposing 
a rise in all the rates of Schedule for all prices at 60 cents and above 
really meant that k had increased by the difference between the previous 
5 per cent ad valorem rates and the new one of ( P - ^ ) ( P 60 ), 
where P is RSS 1 price, (See Appendix 3.1). 
Too 
The actual system imposed was, however, slightly lower in the 
marginal rates at 60 cents and above. Compared to the government 
proposal, the change in incremental rates due to k showed a fall in 
progressivity (Column 5, Table 5.2). But compared to the 5 per cent 
ad valorem structure, the new progressivity represented a parallel shift 
forward of all the rates for prices from 60 cents upward. 
Though the Mudie Mission proposed that Schedule 1 be abolished 
for prices at 60 cents and below, the rates for prices above 60 cents 
were advised to be increased. Because of the higher rates proposed 
(Appendix 3-1)• the incremental changes in the average rates showed a 
positive increase over the rates used in all the past periods. 
In June 1955 to December I960, the rates imposed were lower than 
the ones suggested by the Mudie Mission for prices at l60 cents and below, 
For prices above this range, the rates were raised. This explained the 
increase in progressivity as shown by the incremental average rates in 
Table 5.2 (Column 7) from l60 cents upward. 
Compared to the structure imposed in January 1951 to May 1955» 
the rates used since this period had been larger. In fact, from January 
1951 onwards the rates had become more progressive though the 1970/1975 
system is slightly less progressive than the one used between January 
1961 to February 1970. 
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1?0 - ,00666 - . 0 0 0 2 1 .00108 - .00095 .00220 - .'X)269 .00198 - .00016 
- .0002^^ ,0009 - , 0 0 0 1 5 ,00112 - .00104 .00158 - ,00125 .00146 - .00012 
160 - o00018 .0007 - . 0 0 0 1 1 .00116 - .00110 .00119 - .000^1 .00109 - .o>ooo8 
i 8 o - .00014 , 0005 -^.00009 .00118 - .00113 ,00093 000031 .00085 - .00007 
200 - .0^011 ,ooo4 - .00007 .00120 - .00116 .00074 . .00075 .00068 - .00C<>6 
220 - oCOOOQ -.00006 0OOI22 - oOC>li8 ,00061 .00107 .00056 - .00005 
- 000008 .000? - .00005 ,0012^ - .00119 .00051 ,00185 -0OOCO9 - oCCOC-4 
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had been genera.lly rising as k was raised variously, depending on the 
structure of the period, for each price level. The other point to note 
is that since the government proposed structure in 1950 until the 
present system, a proportional ta^ rate has been used for prices at 
60 cents and below. The third point- to note is tha.t since May 1955, 
the Schediile 1 structure has become raore progressive with each rise in 
the price bracket. 
This change between price brackets is better revealed by the 
marginal rate of progression measure. In Table 5.3, the MRP measure 
8ho?/ed a proportional structure for Schedule 1 for the period from 
December I9U5 to December 1950. This was due mainly to the uise of rates 
which did not change with change in price levels, that is, the marginal 
rates were constant. 
Since January 1951, the MRP sho',?ed a progressive structiare as 
the marginal rates of Schedule 1 were rising with rising price levels. 
The 1950 government proposal had constant marginal tax rates 
for prices from 100 cents upwards. (Table 5.3). This explained the 
constant progression for prices at and above this price level. Compc?.red 
to the previous period, the proposed rates represented aji increase in 
progressivity at all price levels from. 30 cents and above. 
However, the incremental rates of January 1951 ~ May 1955 
showed a decline in progressivity. From cents upwards, the marginal 
rate curve actually shifted downward. The main reason for this was that 
the marginal rate of tax was a constant at this price range. 
The Mudie Mission suggestion did not stress on rising marginal 
rates of Schedule 1 though the average rate was increased. Thus, the 
marginal rate progression m'»asure shows no change in progressivity for 
prices at 120 cents and above. Because the immediate previous period to 
l6o 
the Mudie suggestion also had constant marginal rates for prices from 
160 cents upward, the incremental changes in progressivity was therefore 
nil in the Mudie period (Table 'y.k,). 
The degree of progressivity for the remaining periods since 
1955 June .has been quite similar especially for prices from. l40 cents 
upwards. Because of the same marginal rates being used, the incremental 
changes during the last t¥/o periods showed no change in progressivity. 
Comparing changes in progressivity between price-brackets, it 
will be noticed that snost of the increase in progressivity occurred only 
since June 19?5« Second2.y, the increase in progressivity was between 
the price range of 80 to 120 cents. 
Both measures of progressivity indicate that the export tax 
schedules between 19^5 and the present time have become more progressive. 
However, they have only given a general idea of the export tax burden on 
the rubber industry as a whole in terms of price absorption by the export 
taxes. Nothing is said about the distribution of the burden between the 
estate and smallholding sectors. Some aspects of this will now be 
discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
5.5. RUBBER EXPORT TAX BURDEN 
A great deal of attention in taxation literature has been 
focussed on the concept and measurement of tax burden.^ Unfortunately, 
" For instance, the works of: E.D.Fagan, "Recent and Contemporary Theories 
of Progressive Taxation," J ^ , V.^^, N o . 1 9 ^ 8 , pp.^57-^98; Y.J.Blum, 
et al, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, (Chicago university 
Press) 1953; H.Dalton, Principles of Public Finance, (Eoutledge and 
Kegan Paul Ltd., 19^9), p.16^7 J.Stamp, Wealth and Taxable Capacity, 
(P.S.King and Son Ltd., London, 1922); S.Kuzxiets, "National Income and 
Taxable Capacity," V./XXII, Ko.l, 19^2; G.F.Shirras, "Methods of 
Estimating the Burden of Taxation," Journal of Royal Statistical 
Society, V.CVI, 19'+3, pp.21^2^9; A.S.Donnohoe, "Measuring State Tax 
BurdeiC" J ^ , V.LV, No".3, 19'+7, K,J„Frank, "Measuring 
State Burdens," National Tax Journal, Y.XVII, No.3 196^, pp.3C'3-308; 
V.P.Ghandi, Tax Burden on Indian Agricult'ure, (Havard Law School, I966.) 
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120 - 0 0 0 .0025 0 .00025 - .00908 0O0815 0 
1^ +0 - 0 0 0 .0025 « .00237 .00013 .00^ 17 0O003 0 
160 - 0 0 0 .0025 - .0025 0 0OO5 0 0 
l8o - 0 0 0 .0025 - .0025 0 .005 0 0 
200 - 0 0 0 .0025 - .0025 0 0OO5 0 0 
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the amount of effort expended on tiiis problem has not resolved the 
controversy among economists. As yet there is no general agreement on 
what is the most acceptable rneaeure of the burden of a tax. The 
particular case of the export tax burden has been a neglected area in 
taxation studies. An attempt is made in this section to fill in some 
of the gaps by analyzing the rubber export ta:^  burden in the Malaysian 
rubber industry. 
5.6. MEASURES OF TAX BURDEI^ ' 
Generally, tax burden is defined and measured by econom-ists as 
the ratio of taxes to taxable capacity. It is a simple measure. But 
the simplicity has its •c'eaknese. 
At its best this is orJ.y a theoretical measure. For all 
practical purposes, taxable capacity is beyond measurement. Some 
k 
economists like Stamp have defined taxable capacity to be equivalent to 
economic capacity. Economic capacity in turn is defined to be monetary 
income net of subsistence requirements. 
In some ways this is not a completely satisfactory measure. 
For, there still remains the many difficulties in measuring subsistence 
requirements. While it is understood that subsistence requirements are 
dependent on biological, economic, and sociological needs it is also 
acknowledged that in practice they are difficult to be determined 
accurately and to be evaluated economically. Because of the inability 
to overcome all these measurement problems, econom.ists have resorted to 
equating taxable capacity with money income.^ Tax burden is then measured 
Ibid, Stamp. 
^ See for instance H.C.Simons, Personal Incom.e Taxation: The Definition 
of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy (Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 193SD 
I6k 
as the ratio of taxes to income. 
In the evaluation of the tax biarden of the rubber export taxes 
on estates and emsllholdings, two measures S-re proposed. 
The first measure, which may be regarded as an approximation 
estimate, is expreesed as 
B = T/P ... (5.10) 
where 3 is the rubber export tax burden 
T is the rubber export tax liability 
P is the price of rubber 
T and P are defined differently for the estates and smallholdings. 
In the case of the estate sector, T includes the rubber export 
tax Schedule 1 and the research cess Schedule III. The inclusion of the 
research cess in the estimation of the rubber export tax burden is 
justified by the fact that not all rubber producers benefit equally from 
the expenditure of the research cess. It does not matter whether this 
uneven distribution of the benefit from the expenditure of the research 
cess is due to the fault of the rubber producers in not making use of 
it or to the poor extension services of the various institutions involved. 
The point is, for those producers who have benefitted little or not 
at all from the research cess, its payment is an additional b'Jirden to 
them. 
This contention is particularly valid for the smallholdings. 
There is sufficient evidence to indicate that smallholdings have not 
benefitted as the estates have from the research cess.^ One strong 
evidence of this is the higher proportion of lov/ yielding materials 
planted by smallholders. In contrast, estates have a higher proportion 
of high yielding materials, a product of research funded by the research 
^ Personal communication with PISDA Officials. 
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cess. Other indications are thft poorer cultural practices and the poorer 
grade of rubber produced by smallholders. 
It may be argued that these consequences are as much due to the 
smallholders' entrepreneurial decisions or technical ignorance as to the 
inefficient extension services of the government. Whatever is the actual 
reason, the result is that for such producers the research cess is an 
additional burden. 
For the smallholding sector, T also includes the replsjiting 
cess Schedule IV. This cess is unconditionally retiwned to estates every 
three months on the basis of their production data. But it is not given 
back: to smallholders directly. It is deposited with Fund B which is 
used to subsidize smallholdings in their replanting. 
7 
As Edwards and Lim have pointed out, for those srasillholders 
who have not used the replanting grant for one reason or another the 
Schedule IV cess is effectively an additional tax. It must be pointed 
out that even when smallholders are qualified to receive the subsidy, 
not all of them are given the grant to replant all the total acreage in 
their holdings. For instance, it is only since Scheme 3 (I96O) that 
holdings of less than an acre are eligible for the grant provided the 
standard of husbandry is met. Under Scheme (started in I967) , holdings 
over 5 acres are allowed one third of their total acreage to be replanted 
with a subsidy. 
Under certain conditions, even for those smallholders who have 
received the subsidy of S750 acre for their replanting the Schedule 
IV may be a partial tax if the amount of cess the smallholder has paid 
to the government is smaller than the grant which is given back to him, 
C.T.Edwards, Public Finajices in Malaya and Singapore, Chapter 8, 
(Australian National University Press, 197^) and Lim Chong Yah, "The 
Rubber Replanting Tnxes," Malayan Economic Review, Vol.VI, No.2, 
pp. 
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For instance, assura*' a smallholder replants after tapping his tre^s for 
25 years. During this period he has paid a total amount of cess equa.l 
to 25 X 4,5 X output. Thus, if hie output is 666 pounds a year, the 
total cess he has paid for a 25 year period at cents per pound is 
S75O. This is the breakeven point. Above this output, the subsidy of 
1^ 750 pel acre is smaller than the total cess the smallholder has paid 
out. 
There is thus no necessary relationship between the amount a 
smallholder may contribrte in replanting cess and the amount he may 
receive in the form of a replanting grant. 
P is the f.o.b. world price for RSS 1 when the tax burden is 
estimated for estates. This is because RSS 1 is the grade commonly 
produced by most estates. For smallholdings, P stands for KSS 3 pi'ice. 
The reason is that the average grade of smallholding rubber is of grade 3 
and below. 
The use of price per pound as the tax base given the tax burden 
on a per pound basis. That is» it measures the burden of the export taxes 
on each pound of rubber exported. This shows the burden of the export 
taxes on each pound of rubber exported by estates and smallholders which 
may or may not be equal. The measure can be easily converted to raeaeure 
the burden of the export taxes on a gross income or net income on a per 
acre basis. The result of the estimate would be the same. For instance, 
on a per pound basis the measure is 
B^ = (T/P) V^ ... (5.11) 
where V^  is one pound of rubber exported. On a per acre basis it is 
B2 = (T/P) V^ (5.12) 
where V^ is the output produced per acre and exported. 
g 
Obviously, = _2 
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A few simplifying aasuinptions are used in the first measiar® 
of the export tax burden. 
First, it assumes that the burden of the export taxes is on the 
producers. In Chapter k this was shown to be true. It was argued that 
the shifting of the burden of the export taxes is difficult for 
smallholders and is possible to a small degree for some estates under 
very restrictive conditions. 
Secondly, the subsistence requirements are ignored. Economists 
who have tried to derive a more accurate estimate of tax burden have 
often used an arbitrary measure of subsistence requirements in their 
formulae. Heroic assumptions have to be made regarding the distribution 
of income, biological and sociological needs and such like factors. 
Since the assumptions need not be accurate and since the data on such 
variables are inadequate, it is difficult to say whether the inclusion 
of subsistence requirem.ents would improve the estimate of the tax biirden. 
Because of the absence of adequate information and data on subsistence 
needs they are therefore not included in the various formulae in 
estimating the burden of the export taxes. 
Thirdly, we are only concerned with the burden of the rubber 
export taxes. Other taxes, for instance the land tax and profit tax, 
are ignored. 
Fourthly, only the direct money burden is evaluated. 
It will be noticed that the first approximation estimate of 
the rubber export tax burden is a very simple measure which has not 
considered marketing margin and cost of production. 
The second approximation estimate makes allowance for marketing 
margin ajid cost of production. Thus 
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where MM is the marketing margin 
and C is the cost of producing, a pound of rubber. 
The details on marketing margin and cost of production are 
elaborated later in the data section. The reasons for their inclusion 
are explained in the section analyzing the results of this Tieasui'e. 
5.7. INTi::RSECTOR.\L BURDEN OF THE RUBBER EXPORT TAXES 
Each of the above two measures gives an estimate of the rubber 
export tax burden on each sector. To compare the relative burden of 
the estate and smallholding sector, we need a measure of intersectoral 
8 burden. 
This is expressed as 
T 'T' 
^^ ... (5.14) 
where the subscripts E and S stand for the estate and smallholding 
sector respectively, 
(5.1^) can be rewritten as 
/ 1 ... (5.15) 
If the ratio is smaller than 1, it means that the rubber export tax 
burden is in favoxir of the estate sector. If the ratio is larger than 1, 
the burden is lighter on the smallholding sector. If the ratio is 
enual to 1. then the burden between the two sectors is identical, 
J. » 
5.8, DATA 
Data on the rubber export tax Schedule 1 are identical to those 
used in the measurement of the progressivity of the various Schedule 1 
structures done earlier. In addition to Schedule 1, the research cess 
Schedule III and the replanting cess Schedule IV are also incorporated 
g 
See Ghani, Ibid Chapter 2. 
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in the measures of tax burden. The exact ajnouat to be paid for each 
price level is calculated for each year since 19^5* Appendix gives 
the changes in tax liabilities for Schedule 1, and the amount to be 
paid for Schedules III and IV eince 19^ +5. 
Five sets of prices are used for evaluating changes in the 
rubber export tax burden. For estates the RSS 1 prices are kO^ 60, 80, 
100, and 120 cents. For smallholdings the RSS 3 prices are 37» 57, 77» 
97* and 117 cents. The assumption is that the price differential 
between the two grades is approximately 3 cents. This in fact has been 
the average difference for SSS 1 and RSS 3 prices since 19^5. The range 
of prices which is used is sufficiently wide to cover all variations in 
annual prices for RSS 1 and RSS 3 which actually occurred. There was 
only one year, 19^7 with an annual price of 37 cents for RSS 1, which 
fell outside our assuined range of prices. Furthermore, the assumed 
range is also large enough to indicate changes in the rubber export 
tax burden. 
In the second approximation estimates , the marketing margin 
is a variable in the denominator of the tax burden formula. The 
marketing margin is deducted from the world price to give the actual 
price received by the rubber producers. The marketing margin for each 
sector is estimated from the following equations which were derived in 
Chapter k: 
Estate MM = - 3.17 + 0.12 V/P^  ... (5.l6) 
Smallholder MM = - 3-17 + 0.15 V^P^  ••• (5.17) 
where WP and WP are the world price for RSS 1 and RSS 3 respectively. 
MM is the marketing margin. 
The revenue cost functions for estates are explained in 
Appendix 5.1. From these functions, the following cost of production per 
3.70 
pound of rubber is obtained. They are 39.53, ^ 1-0.37, 
cents per pound for the respective RSS 1 price of +^0, 60, 
100 and 120 cents respectively. It will be noted that the cost of 
production per pound \'aries with the price of rubber. The relationship 
is due to the fact that the wage of tapping and collecting labour is 
9 indexed to changes in ftSS 1 prices according to the MAPA agreement. 
For smallholdings, an a^ 'erage cost of 30.7 cents per pound is used. This 
10 
is the estimate of a RRI survey on smallholdings. During our survey 
some evidence on the cost of production in the scallholding sector was 
obtained from 23 eraal^ .holders^ ^ with an average yield of 5^0 pounds per 
acre. The average cost of production reported range from 25 to 52 cents 
per pound. There is no detailed breakdown of the items included in the 
figures given diu^ ing the survey. As such it is difficult to rely on 
them. The RRI figure of 30.7 cents was for a mean yield of 750 pounds 
per acre. Unlike estate cost of production, which varies with RSS 1 
prices for a given yield per acre, smallholding cost is a constant with 
respect to price changes. 
5.9. RESULTS OF FIRST APPR0XIW.TI0N ESTIMATE 
The computed estimates of the rubber export tax burden using 
the first approximation estimate are presented in Tables 5*5» 5-6, and 
5.7. At the bottom of each table, as index of the tax burden changes 
over the years for each price level is also shown. 
Between December 19^ +5 and December 1950, the direct money 
burden on estates (Table 5.5) was inversely related to the price level 
of rubber. That is, the lower the price the heavier the rubber export tax 
o 
Refer Appendix 2.1 for details. 
From Smallholder Advisory Section, R.R.I. 
^^ Data from the other 27 smallholders were not available. 
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burden. This was mainly caused by the use of a Schedule 1 tax structure 
which was regressive in nature. Since January 1951» the progressive 
structure of Schedule 1 has led to an increase in the rubber export tax 
burden with a rise in rubber prices. 
The change in the rubber export tax burden is clearly shown in 
the index of changes in Table 5.'3. Using December 19^ +5 - March 1 9 ^ as 
the base period, it can be seen that the tax burden has been steadily 
increased. For instance, the exit-tdng system has a burden twice that of 
the base year for the price of ^ cents and 6.^ times for the price of 
120 cents. 
The changes in tax burden for the smallholdings follow a similar 
pattern of the estates. The major difference is that the burden has 
been increased much more since January 1951 foi' smallholdings. For 
instance, the present system has a tax burden which is 5.5 times that of 
the base period for the price of +^0 cents and 7.6 times at the price of 
120 cents. Table 5.6. 
The common feature between the two sectors is that for all the 
years, except for the base period, the burden of the rubber export taxes 
has been heavier at the price of ^0 cents and below than at 60 cents. 
This has been due to the use of the same tax rate for this range of 
prices. Looking back at Table 5.1, it can be seen that the marginal rate 
of tax for these prices has been zero. 
Vifhich of the two sectors has the heavier rubber export tax 
burden? The answer is given in Table 5.7. These estimates are derived 
from the measure o^ intersectoral tax burden in expression (5.15). 
Between December 19^5 to the end of 1950 (including the 
government proposed scheme of 1950), the relative burden of the estates 
and smallholders has been almost equal. The estimated results show the 
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183 158 186 
17^ 156 175 
169 271 251 
166 371 29^ 
l6k k63 326 
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(1) Derived froffi First Approximation Estates. 









































































































































































































38/i+O 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.33 — 0.39 0.33 0.35 
58/60 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 Ook2 - 0A7 0 . ^ 0.42 
78/80 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.58 0.88 0.66 0.59 0.67 
98/100 0.98 C.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.67 0.3k 0.78 0 .75 0.78 
118/120 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.73 0.96 0.81 0 . 7 1 0.83 
INDEX OF CHANGES 
38/iiO 100 100 100 100 100 35 - k l 35 37 
58/60 100 100 100 100 100 ^3 - kS hi ^3 
78/80 100 100 99 100 99 59 90 67 60 68 
98/100 100 100 100 100 100 68 96 80 77 80 
118/120 100 100 101 100 100 74 98 83 72 85 
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ratios ov«r the period to be close to 1, v/hich means an equaJL inter-
sectoral tax harden. The small difference in the intersectoral tax 
burden can be explained by the different size of the P, the denominator 
in expression (5.10). 
However, since 1951 the intersectoral tax burden has changed 
to the favour of the estate sector. The explanation for this is found 
in the Schedule IV replanting cess introduced during this period. It is 
the payment of this cess by smallholders whirh has increased the relative 
disparity of the intersectoral tax burden. As was explained earlier, 
this cess effectively increases the rubber export tax burden of small-
holders. Since estate's are refunded the cess, they are only affected by 
the research cess Schedule III and the rubber export tax Schedule 1, both 
of which also apply to smallholdings. 
5.10. Rt]SULTS OF SECOND AI^PROXIMATION ESTIMATE 
In the first approximation estate of the rubber export tax 
burden, only P, the world price of rubber, was used as a measure of 
taxable capacity. This simple ratio does not provide a complete picture 
of the tax burden. It is true that the differential between RSS 1 and 
RS3 5 gives an indication of the unequal position of the estates and 
smallholdings. But it does not give sufficient attention to the ability 
to pay the export taxes on the part of the rubber producers. 
The inclusion of cost of production gives more information on 
the economic capacity of the rubber producers to pay the export taxes. 
It is admitted that the exact economic capacity of these producers is 
still not determined since other variables like wealth are left out for 
lack of data. Given this, the inclusion of cost of production at least 
gives an approximation to the actual economic capacity of the rubber 
producers. It focusses on the unequal economic background of these tax 
payers. 
176 
In the context of this, one may note the non discriminatory 
nature of the rubber export tax system. For a given price level, the 
same tax rate applies to all rubber producers irrespective of their 
economic background. The rubber export tax structure does not make 
allowance for differences in cost of production and the net profit 
positions of different producers. The effective tax burden is therefore 
not the same for all rubber producers. Thus, ceteris paribus, a low 
cost producer would have a lighter tax burden than a high cost producer. 
This is quite in contrast to the personal income tax which, despite its 
imperfections, is progressive in the sense that those who are more 
capable of paying the tax are required to pay more than those who are in 
less fortunate circumstances. However, the rubber export tax system does 
not operate on the basis of such principles. Furthermore, unlike the 
personal income tax the rubber export tax system does not have an exemption 
limit for those least capable of paying the taxes. 
Using the criteria of traditional taxation theory, this non 
discriminatory aspect of the rubber export taxes is in fact a violation 
of the neutrality principle.^^ Consequently, the penalty of the rubber 
export taxes is on the inefficient whilst the more efficient producers get 
away with a lighter burden. Perhaps, it may be aruged, that this non 
discriminatory feature of the rubber export taxes would create an incentive 
for rubber producers to become more efficient by lowering the production 
cost and by producing better grade of rubber. It has, however, never 
been the explicit intention of the government to use the rubber export 
taxes to achieve this purpose. It will be remembered that the collection 
of Schedule 1 is for general revenue. The objectives of Schedule III and 
IV are to defray the expenditure of research and replanting of small-
holdings. If the non discriminatory nature of the rubber export taxes 
12 See Ghani, op.cit. Chapter 2 and footnotes therein. 
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has created a more efficient rubber industry it is incidental. 
Considering the numerous economic and non economic problems facing the 
rubber producers, especially the smallholders, this is definitely not 
the best way to improve the rubber industry. A direct approach like the 
government replanting schemes is needed. 
P , the world price, i s not the actual amount received by the 
rubber producers. V(/hat they actually get is the world price after the 
marketing margin, and rubber export taxes are deducted. It is therefore 
more appropriate to use thin dealer's price for the estimation of the tax 
burden. The justification for this is similar to the case of the 
inclusion of the cost of production variable. It gives a better 
approximation to the economic capacity of rubber producers to pay the 
rubber export taxes and a more accurate measure of the bxirden of the taxes. 
The computed estimates of the rubber export tax burden using 
the second approximation estimate are given in Tables ^ .S and 5»9 for the 
estate sector. The change in the tax burden due to the inclusion of the 
cost of production and marketing margin is shown by the ratio of the 
second approximation estimates to the first approximation estimates. 
(Table 5 . 9 ) . I f the ratio is larger, equal, or smaller than 1 then it 
means that the burden has increased, remains unchanged, or decreased 
respectively. 
Table 5 . 9 reveals that the burden has increased for every period 
for all price levels. The increase in the burden is particularly 'heavy' 
at the lower prices. This indirectly points out that the higher cost 
producers would bear a higher burden than the more efficient ones 
especially at the lower price range. 
What has been said also applies to the case of the smallholding 
sector. This i s , the burden is increased when their ability to pay is 
TABLE 5.8 SECOND APPROXIMATION ESTIMATE OF PfiOGRESSIVITY OF 












































ko .9^89 2.9190 2.0070 1.739^ l,82i+8 l,766if 1.6241 1,7153 1,8978 
60 .1008 .2068 ,lk22 .17^9 .1809 .1769 - .1564 .1629 .1758 
80 .0736 .1132 .0778 .1239 .2122 .iSkk .2192 .1910 .1946 .2583 
100 .0631 .0777 .053^ .lOi+5 .1858 .3447 .2525 .2913 .3350 
120 .0610 .0626 .0if30 .0999 .2894 .1989 .3669 .2445 .3559 .3911 
ko 100 308 212 183 192 186 171 181 200 
60 100 205 M 17^ 179 175 - 155 162 174 
80 100 15^ 106 168 288 251 298 260 264 351 
100 100 123 85 166 385 23k 546 400 462 531 
120 100 103 70 164 k7k 326 601 401 583 641 
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29.19 29.10 29.17 29.18 35.57 29,2k 29.21 29.17 29.19 
60 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.56 3.11 - 3.10 3.10 3.11 
80 2.26 2.26 2.26 2.26 2.kl 2.26 2.51 2.26 2.26 2.19 
100 1.9k 1.9^ 1.9^ 1.9^ 2.01 1.9^ 2.27 1,9k 1.9^ 1.9^ + 
120 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.90 1.87 1.63 1.87 2.15 1.88 
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weakened by the deduction of the marketing margin and cost of production 
from the world price. (Tables 5.10 and 5.11). 
Let us now compare the intersectoral tax burden. (Table 5.12). 
The following points may be noted. First, the intersectoral tax burden 
between 19^5 to the government proposed scheme of 1950 (including the 
Mudie suggestion) was clearly in favour of the smallholding sector. 
Secondly, at the low price of kO cents the intersectoral tax burden is 
also in favour of the smallholding sector for all periods. Thirdly, from 
1951 the intersectoral burden changed in favour of the estate sector. 
Fourthly, the relative tax burden in the second approximation meastire 
compared to the first approximation estimate shows that the burden of the 
estate sector vis-a-vis that of smallholdings has increased. (Table 5.7 
and 5.12). 
The above features can be explained thus. First, between 19^ +5 
and the 1950 proposal, the total tax payment of the estate and smallholding 
sector was the same. However, the estate cost of production rises with 
the rise in prices of rubber via wage increase. In comparison, the 
smallholding cost of production does not vary greatly, if at all, with 
the change in the price of rubber. Even if allowance is given for increase 
in the wage bill of those smallholdings which employ wage labour and even 
if we assume that the imputed wage of family labour is allowed to rise, 
the increase will not be as high as that of estate labour. For this 
reason, the estates' P is made smaller relative to that of the smallholdings' 
one despite the higher deduction made for marketing margin for the latter 
in expression (5.18). Consequently, the estimates' burden has been 
increased relative to that of the smallholdings' one. This is just the 
reverse position when cost of production and marketing margin were not 
considered in Table 5.?. 
However, since 1951 the imposition of the replanting cess on 
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TABLE S.IO SMALLHOLDING: SECOND APPROXIMATION ESTIMATE OF PROGRE^SIVITY 

















































38 0,?760 0.8^93 0.5839 0.5060 0.5308 1.4692 — 1.2580 1,4544 1 .5074 
58 O.O8Q3 0,l8if3 0.1267 0.1558 0.1612 0.3648 - 0.3098 0.3524 Oo3659 
78 0,0672 0.1033 0.0710 0,1132 0.1938 0.2847 0.2002 0.2^701 0.2940 0.3521 
98 0.0583 0.0718 0.0^9^ 0.0966 0.2244 0.2526 0.3186 0.2999 0.3500 0.3904 
118 0.0536 0.0550 0,0378 0.0878 0.2544 0.2368 0.3225 O02I58 0.3748 0.4057 
38 100 308 212 183 192 532 - 456 527 5^6 
58 100 205 141 174 180 406 - 3^5 392 405 
78 100 154 106 169 288 426 298 402 438 524 
98 100 123 85 166 385 ^33 5^7 51^ 600 670 
118 100 103 71 164 475 442 602 496 699 757 
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38 8.07 8.07 8.06 8.07 9.85 8.07 _ 8.73 8.67 8.07 
58 2.66 2.67 2.67 2.67 3.06 2.67 2,86 2.67 2.67 
78 2.02 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.1^ 2.02 2.01 2.10 2.01 2.02 
98 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.83 1.76 1.76 1.87 1.76 1.76 
118 1.62 1.62 1.6^ 1.62 1.66 1.62 1.37 1.35 1.62 1.62 
oo 
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38/ifO 3.^580 3. +^37 ^.^372 3.4378 lo2023 - 1.2910 1.1793 1.2589 
58/60 1.1225 1.1221 1.1224 1.1226 1.1222 .4859 - .5048 .4623 .4831 
78/80 1,0952 1 1.0058 1.09^5 o9536 06477 I0O949 o7071 06619 .7336 
98/100 1.0823 1.0822 1.0810 1.0818 1.0816 .7356 1.0819 .8419 .8323 .8581 
118/120 1.1381 1.1-^ -81 1.1.^76 1.1378 1.13^^6 .8399 1.1377 .9199 .9496 .9640 
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the smallholders has changed the relative position of the two sectors. 
This increases tho burden of the smallholding sector vis-a-vis that of 
estates. (Table 5-12). 
In summary we may point out that in the first approximation 
estimate, for any given T, P is the determining factor in affecting 
producers ability to bear the export tax. Given that the estate's P is 
larger than the smallholder's P, the intersectoral tax burden is in 
favour of the estates. 
In the second approximation estate, for any given P and T, 
C exerts the most influence on the tax burden. In the earlier periods, 
the intersectoral tax burden favoured the smallholdings because of their 
lower cost of production. However, the inclusion of the replanting cess 
led to a different conclusion: the tax burden of smallholdings increased 
relative to that of estates. For the 1975 system, for any given P and 
other variables, T plays the dominant role. However, at the lower price 
level, C is still the dominant factor, 
5.11. TAX AWARENESS 
The quantitative estimates in the above models could only make 
use of certain measurable variables in determining the export tea burden. 
A completer picture requires more variables to be included so that the 
taxable capacity of producers could be better measured. As explained, 
many such variables are beyond measurement or adequate information is not 
available. There is one of these factors which must be mentioned. This 
is tax awareness. 
Experiences in other countries with regard to certain taxes, 
particularly the personal income tax and the property tax, reveal that 
the tax payers feel the tax burden is heavier if they are more aware of 
the taxes they are paying. For instance, it is difficult to convince 
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the Frenchmen that they have some of the highest taxes in the world. The 
reason is that more of the taxes are 'wrapped' up in the prices of the 
commodities they buy. In contrast, the U.S. consumers are keenly awsire 
of such taxes like the sales tax. This awareness of the taxes they are 
paying makes them feel the ta:x; burden more. Generally, an average tax 
payer could feel the 'weight' of the personal income tax and property 
tax but not many other indirect taxes which are not easily discernible. 
One can draw a similar analogy for the estate and smallholding 
producers. The estates are very knowledgeable of every tax they pay. 
Estate owners and managers know all the details of the export tax 
schedule. In contrast, most smallholders are ignorant of the actual 
amount of the export tax they have to pay. In most cases, they are 
indifferent and do not even bother to find out. However, they know they 
have to pay the replanting cess. The publicity given to replanting and 
the replanting grant is the main reason why this cess is generally better 
known. Even then, most smallholders have appeared to have forgotten 
about the various taxes they are paying. They are mostly concerned with 
the changing price levels of rubber. 
Consciousness of the export tax on the part of the estates make 
them feel the weight of the export tax more than the smallholders. 
During the survey, estate owners and managers frequently mentioned the 
heavy burden of the export tax though they were not sure of the actual 
burden. Unfortunately, there is no satisfactory way of constructing an 
index of awareness which can be used to modify the estimates of the 
export tax burden. But this 'psychological' aspect of the tax burden is 
real and has to be kept in mind. 
5.12. EXPORT TAX AND PROFITABILITY OF RUBBER PRODUCTION 
In this section, we will try to establish the relationship 
between export tax and the profitability of rubber production. Because 
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of the lack of data on smallholdings, the emphasis is on the estates. 
There are two concepts of production costs used by ©states. 
The first is revenue cost per pound, and the second is total f.o.b. cost 
per pound. 
Revenue cost includes the following items: 
1) maintenance of mature areas (which includes weeding, 
manuring, pest and disease control, maintenance of 
roads, bridges, drains) 
2) tapping and collection cost (includes transport, 
tools etc.) 
3) manufacturing cost (includes labour cost, repairs etc.) 
k) general charges (e.g., housing, medical services) 
5) packing and despatch to a port. 
Total f.o.b. cost is revenue cost with the addition of 
1) export tax and research cess 
2) selling charges. 
Sometimes, depreciation and maintenance costs of immature trees are 
included in total f.o.b. cost. However, in this study selling charges 
are reclassified vmder revenue cost. This is to ensure that the effect 
of the export tax on profitability can be isolated for analysis. 
Data. Information on cost of production could not be obtained 
for all the 50 estates surveyed. Some of them refused to release 
information on production cost. The usual excuse they offered was the 
confidentiality of the data. The 32 estates which provided data on cost 
varied in size between to 3000 acres. Yield per acre varied between 
800 to 1300 pounds per acre. 
Revenue Cost and Yield Per Acre Per Annum. It is postulated 
that revenue cost is a function of yield per acre per annum, that is, 
RC = f (Q). A linear form was found to be quite suitable and can be 
expressed as 
RC = a - b Q + u 
The estimated equation is 




R = .68 . . . (5.19) 
'i'his equation was estimated on the assumption of a price of 
80 cents. From this function, the RC's for other prices are derived. 
It is assumed that the major influence of RC is the tapping and collection 
cost, which averaged ^ to 50 per cent of total cost of production per 
pound of rubber. The tapping and collection cost is based on the MAPA 
agreement.^^ It is indexed on rubber price levels. For a 10 cents drop 
in the rubber price, the wage declines by 5 cents (at the 5 0 - ^ price 
range) or 20 cents (at the higher prices from 70 cents upward) depending 
on the height of the rubber prices. A 20 cents change in the wage rate 
is equivalent to 1.12 cents change in the revenue function. 
With this information, the other revenue cost functions are 
derived for other prices. They are presented in Table 5.13. 




Revenue Cost Functions^^ Total F.O.B. Cost Functions^^ 
a b a b 
ko 75.78 - O.Oi+5 78.38 - 0.0^5 
50 76.06 - 0.0^5 79.06 - 0.0^5 
60 76.62 - 0.045 80.03 - O.Oi+5 
70 7 7 . ^ - 0.0'45 8k.72 - O.OU5 
80 78.59 - 0.0^5 87.75 - O.Oi+5 
90 79.70 - 0.0^5 92.95 - 0.0^5 
100 80.85 - 0.0'+5 
L . 
98.10 - 0.0'+5 
1 
i 
1) Based on equation 5«19. 
2) Based on equation 5.20. 
^^ See Appendix 8 . I 3 . 
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From these functions, the total f.o.b. coat functions are 
constructed. It will be remembered that the difference between the two 
costs is the export tax. Though most estates differ slightly over certain 
details in their accounting procedures, the general approach is to 
consider export tax as a cost and replanting cess as a revenue. This ie 
because the latter is recoverable at a future date. We have thought that 
it is also realistic too to include in the cost the research cess since 
it is also not recoverable. 
The export tax (plus the research cess of 1 cent) for various 
prices is thus added to the corresponding revenue functions to obtain 
the total f.o.b. cost functions. Thus, at the price of 80 cents the 
export tax is S.lj^ i cents and the research cess is 1 cent. The total 
amount, 9-13 cents per pound, is then added to equation (5.19) to give 
C^ = 87.13 - 0.0'+5 Q ... (5.20) 
Results. The results computed in Tables 5.1^ + - 5.15 are 
derived from the respective cost functions in Table 5.13. To find out the 
aenaitivity of the profitability per pound of rubber, we have worked 
out estimates assuming Q to range from 8OO pounds to I6OO pounds per acre 
per annum and with prices ranging from kO to 100 cents. 
For the case where revenue cost is only considered the net 
profit per pound is therefore 
NP = P^ - MM - RC ... (5.21) 
where MM is the marketing margin, P^ is fiSS 1 price, and RC, is 
revenue cost. 
If the total f.o.b. cost is considered then 
NP = P, - MM - (RC + T + T ) ... (5.22) 1 e r 
or NP = P^ - MM - C^ 
where T and T refer to the Schedule I export tax and research e r 
cess respectively, and C^ equals (RC + T^ + T^). 
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In Table 5.1'+, there are only three cases of non profitability: 
at and 50 cents when the yield is 600 pounds per acre, and at kO 
cents when the yield is 8CX) pounds per acre. 
TABLE 5.1'+. ESTATE: NIiTT PROFITABILITY PER POUND (CETITS) 








600 800 1000 1200 1400 
38.9 - 9.88 - 0.88 8.12 17.12 26.12 
47.17 - 1.89 7.11 16.11 25.11 34.11 
57.72 8.10 17.10 26.10 35.10 44.10 
64.77 11.14 20.14 29.14 38.14 47.14 
75.70 24.11 32.11 42.11 51.11 60.11 
82.21 29.5 38.5 47.5 56.5 65.5 
94.1 40.26 49.26 58.26 67.26 76.26 
Calculated from Equation 5«21. 
In Table 5.15 there are also three cases of unprofitability. 
They also occur in the same situations as in Table Comparing 
the estimates of Table 5.1'+ and Table 5.15 it could be seen that the 
profit per pound in the latter is smaller than the former by the 
existence of the export tax and research cess. The obvious conclusion 
is that the more progressive the export tax is at the higher price 
bracket the larger is the reduction of p>rofit per pound. 
From the cost functions and given the price the estates received 
one can determine the break-even yield. Thus, for a price of ^ cents 
for RS3 1 the break-even yield is derived in this way 
38.9 = 78.38 - 0.045 Q . . . (5.23) 
where 3 8 . 9 is the actual price the estates received after deducting for 
marketing margin, and the expression on the right hand side is the cost 
function (total f.o.b. cost) for that price level. At hO cents the 
yield per acre per year must at least be 8?? pounds for the estates to 
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b r e a k - e v e n . At 50 c e n t s , t h e b r e a k - e v e n y i e l d must be a t l e a s t 709 pounds 
p e r a c r e p e r y e a r . 
TABLE 5 . 1 5 . ESTATE: NET PROFITABILITY PER POUND (CENTS) 
USING TOTAL F . O . B . COST 
RS3 1 \ 
P r i c e - N. 
M a r k e t i n g 
M a r g i n ^ 
Y i e l d 
i n 
L b / A c r e 
600 800 1000 1200 
3 8 . 9 - 1 2 . ^ 8 - 3 . ^ 8 5 . 5 2 1 ^ . 5 2 2 3 . 5 2 
^ 7 . 1 7 - 4 . 8 9 ^ . 1 1 1 3 . 1 1 2 2 . 1 1 1 3 1 o i l 
5 7 . 7 2 ^+.69 1 3 . 6 9 2 2 . 6 9 3 1 . 6 9 ^ . 6 9 
6 1 . 6 1 3 . 7 2 2 2 . 7 2 3 1 . 7 2 4 0 . 7 2 
7 5 . 7 0 
1 
1 4 . 9 7 2 3 . 9 7 3 2 . 9 7 ^ 1 . 9 7 5 0 . 9 7 
8 2 . 2 1 1 6 . 2 5 2 5 . 2 5 3 ^ . 2 5 ^ 3 . 2 5 5 2 . 2 5 
9 ^ . 1 2 3 . 0 1 3 2 . 0 1 ^ 1 . 0 1 5 0 . 0 1 5 9 . 0 1 
C a l c u l a t e d from E q u a t i o n 5 . 2 2 . 
Comparing t h e s e e s t i m a t e d b r e a k - e v e n y i e l d w i t h t h e i r 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g p r i c e s t o the o n e s i n T a b l e 5 . 1 5 » i t i s c l e a r why a t +^0 
and 50 c e n t s t h e r e i s a l o s s i f t h e y i e l d p e r a c r e p e r annvim i s o n l y 6OO 
p o u n d s . S i m i l a r l y , t h e l o s s a t kO c e n t s when the y i e l d i s 8OO pounds 
can be e x p l a i n e d i n t h e saine manner. The b r e a k - e v e n y i e l d w i l l be 
s m a l l e r i f t h e r e v e n u e c o s t f u n c t i o n , t h a t i s i g n o r i n g t h e e x p o r t t a x 
and r e s e a r c h c e s s , i s u s e d . T h i s can e a s i l y be computed from e q u a t i o n 
5 . 1 9 . 
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CHAPTER 6 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUPPLY RESPONSE 
AND EXPORT TAX AND REPLANTING GRANT 
6.1. INTRODUTION 
In Chapter it was shown that the actual price per pound 
of rubber received by rubber producers was effectively reduced by the 
appropriate amount of export tax and cesses for a given RS3 1 price 
level. This, plub the deduction made by dealers along the marketing 
chain for marketing margin, consequently reduces the profit per pound 
of rubber sold by estates and smallholders. 
From a priori reasoning, it would appear that this tax payment, 
being a tax burden, has a negative impact on production and investment 
in the rubber industry. In other words the long run supply curve of 
rubber must have been s'nifted to the left because of the imposition of 
the export tax and cesses, and short run production would have been 
larger than what it is. Those^ who have arrived at this conclusion 
unfortunately have not provided quantitative estimates as evidence to 
support the above argument. Their conclusion was mainly based on 
deductive reasoning and an impressionistic view of the problem. 
On the other hand the payment by the government of the 
replanting grant, being a subsidy, would have a positive influence on 
investment in rubber production. 
While the payment of the export tax and cesses reduces the 
streaxn of profit over time, the replanting subsidy reduces the cost of 
^ Eor an example see Edwards, C.T., Public Finances in Malaya and 
Singapore, (A.N.U. Press, Canberra 1970), pp. 2'+5-2'+7. 
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replanting. Thesf two variables thus work in opposite direction in 
influencing the production and investment decisions of rubber producers. 
V/hatever is the actual relationship, the net impact on production an.d 
investment depends on the relative strength of the two variables. It 
also depends on the weight of each in the total array of factors which 
must be considered by rubber producers in their long run investment and 
short run production of rubber. The existence of these other factors 
(for instance, age of trees, past replanting done) influencing rubber 
producers increases the complexity of the problem and makes it difficult 
to separate out the influence of each of these variables. 
Inspite of this, an attempt is made in this chapter and the 
following one to establish evidence whether rubber producers do incorporate 
the export tax, cesses, and the replanting grant into their decision 
making on long run investment and short run production. The following 
hypotheses are therefore examined: 
1) the export tax ajid cesses do not affect the investment 
and production decisions of rubber producers; 
2) the replanting subsidy does not affect the investment 
and production decisions of rubber producers. 
One brief general comment on methodology may be made here. 
In attempting to verify the above hypotheses the standard procedure of 
econometric approach is followed: i.e., specifying the model, estimating 
and evaluating the parameters, and evaluating the analytical or 
predictive power of the model. 
Of the above steps, specification is the most important. At 
the same time it is the most difficult and is also the weakest point in 
econometric research. This is due to three reasons: 
1) the imperfection, looseness of statements in 
economic theories; 
2) our ignorance of the factors which are operative in 
any particular case; 
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p 
and 3) the d<^ ficiency of relevant data/" 
With regard to the evaluation stage of econometric research, 
the standard practice is not to blindly reject nor accept any hypothesis 
using statistical criteria without a further thought. In general, 
statistical criteria should be regarded as secondary to a priori 
theoretical criteria in making the final judgement.^ 
It is in this light that the hypothesi'^ed models of this 
chapter are examined and should be so considered. They, like all models, 
are nothing more than tentative statements of reality. Consequently, 
the statistical results and coDclusions which are derived from such 
models are only tentative and must be subject to further investigation. 
This is best achieved by using the appropriate evidence derived frot! 
field observation and survey information. The above procedure is in 
fact used in this and the following chapter. 
k 6.2. REVIEW OF PAST STUDIES 
Since this is essentially a study of supply response behaviour, 
it would be pertinent to mention the main conclusions of some previoios 
studies, for instance, those of Chan, Stern, Bauer, and 'jVharton. 
All these studies contributed in various ways to the development 
of supply functions for rubber. Earlier works arrived at their 
conclusions, not by statistical investigation, but by deductive reasoning 
^ A.Koutsoyiannis, Theory of Econometrics (MacMillan Press Ltd., 1973) 
p.16. " 
^ Koutsoyiannis, Ibid, pp. 2'}-?.7» 
The important ones are: Bauer, P.T., The Rubber Industry: A Study in 
Competition and Monopoly, (Longmans, Green and Co., 19'+;>); Wharton, 
C.R., "Malayan Rubber Supply Conditions; Some Policy Implications," 
in Silcock, T.H. , ed. Stu(f.ies in the iMalayan Economy, (A.N.U. Press, 
Canberra, I963); Chan, F., "A Preliminary Study of the Supply 
Response of Malayan Rubber Estates Between 19^ +8 and 1959," M.E.R., 
V.y', No.?., 1962, pp.77-9^; Stern, R.M., "Malayan Rubber Production, 
Inventory Holdings, and the Elasticity of Export Supply," Southern 
Economic Journal, V.3I, No.'+, 1965» pp.3l'+-323. 
19^ 
from a thorough understanding of the rubber indiistry.^ On?uy Chan and 
Stern attempted a quantitative study of the supply functions of rubber 
in Malaysia. Nevertheless, there was general agreement in the 
concli;sions of all these studies, i.e., both estates and Braallholdings 
have inelastic supply functions, but the latter have relatively more 
elastic supply curx'es. (See Table 6.1)» 
Chan^ was the first to estimate the elasticities of supply of 
iMalaysian rubber. The dependent variable was output and the independent 
variables were rubber price, composition of the tree stand, mature 
acreage, and trend. Montlily and annual data were used to estimate the 
short run response coefficients. For estates, neither arjiual nor monthly 
data estimates gave significant estimates. On the other hand, the 
estimates for smallholdings were significant for both types of data 
(See Table 6.1.). 
TABLE 6.1. PI?ICE ELASTICITIES OF OUTPUT RESPONSE IN 
SHORT RUN AS ESTIMATED IN EARLIER STUDIES 
Estate 
Period 
1953 - i960 
1951 - 1961 
195^ + - 1961 
Elasticity 
Estimated Source 
Smallholders i 1955 - I960 
I I9J48 - 1961 
1955 - i960 
0.0 















Not significant at 10 per cent level. 
Based on annual data. 
Based on monthly data. 
Stern, R.M., "Malayeji Rubber Production, Inventory Holdings, and 
the El?*sticity of Export Supply," The Southern Economica Journal, 
Vol.51, N o . A p r i l , 1965. 
Chan, F, "A Preliminary Study of the Supply Response of Malayan 
Rubber Estates Between 19^8-1959," Malayan Economic Review, Vol.7, 
No.2, October, 1962. 
5 
6 
For instance, that of Bauer, Ibid. 
Chan, Op.Cit. 
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7 Stern used quarterly data to (estimate separate mode.ls for 
estates and smallholdings. Production was the dependent variable. For 
the estate equation, the explanatory variables were current price 
deflated by estate wages of tappers and field workers, the ratio of 
beginning-of-Quarter estate inventories to estate sales in the pret/ious 
quarter, and a time trend. For the smallholding equation, deflated 
current price of rubber, deflated current price of rice, and a trend 
variable were used to explain output variation. Only the smallholding 
equation had a significant short run price elasticity of supply. 
(Table 6.1). 
The export tax and cesses were not explicitly used as variabl.es 
in the above models. However, it is significant to note that Chan did 
mention that the export tax did not affect the production decision of g 
rubber estates. It is the only conclusion which runs contrary to the 
prevailing one which points out that the export tax does affect supply. 
This significant piece of evidence 'j?as, unfortunately, not further 
explored by the author and is not mentioned in supply response studies. 
Chan's evidence vd.ll be further elaborated on later. 
It is also signJ-ficant to note the absence of any discussion of 
the replanting grant as an explanatory variable of the increase in 
replanting acreage. Though Chan did lag the price variable 7 years back 
in order to take care of its influence on decision to replant, which in 
turn affects current output, it is surprising that he, and others, ignored 
the possible influence of the replanting grant. More of this will be 
said later. 
6.3. THE LONG RUN AND :SHO?!T RUN 
As the influence of the tax variable and the replanting grant 
7 
Stern, op.cit. 
^ Chan, op.cit. 
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on rubber producers' investment and production decisions is to be 
discussed from the long run sjnd short run viev/point, it is important 
to explain what these production periods mean in a tree crop business. 
Using the Marehallian-Cournot approach,^ the short run is 
that time period within which the productive capacity, or stock of 
reproductible capital goods, is fixed. Output variation can only take 
place by changing the combination of \ase of variable factors with the 
given stock of capital assets. On an industrj' level, there should also 
be no entry of new firms. 
For an estate or smallholding, the short run is therefore that 
period of time in which the stand of mature trees, the first productive 
capacity, remains constant and does not itself cause output variation. 
In the short run, output variation can only occur by changing the taTsping 
system, task size, or by using stimulants and fertiliser. 
In the long run, the total stand of mature acreage is not a 
fixed stock of productive assets. Long run output can be changed by 
changing the size of the mature acreage through replanting with higher-
yielding materials. 
For the rubber industry as a whole, in the long run there is 
also the possibility that new firms may enter or existing ones may go 
out of the rubber business. In the case of the short rion supply of the 
rubber industry it is complicated by the possibility that the total stand 
of mature trees is not as fixed as that for a firm. This is because the 
probability of nev; trees being brought into tapping and old ones replanted 
would be greater for the industry as a whole than for any p,articular firm 
of a given total acreage. This could therefore affect the short rim 
output. However, the shorter the time period, say a day, the smaller the 
9 See V/harton, op.cit, p. 139. 
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magnitude of this change would be. 
For this reason, it is not wise to use annual date to measure 
output response for the short run supply faction. The estimates are, 
in fact, actually measurement of a.n amalgam of long and short r^ .^ supply 
responses. Hence, for a more accurate measure of the true short run 
supply function the shorter the period of observing the responses the 
better. Ideally, this means that daily responses would be the best 
observations since technologically changes and variation in mature stand 
of rubber trees are insignificantly small. However, because of d^ta 
constraint it is not possible to use daily responses in the study. The 
closest to this is bi-v?eekly and monthly data. For the study of long run 
supply response, annual data would suffice, 
6.4. THE LONG Rim MODEL 
In the specification of the long run supply function model, 
there are a few dependent variables which could be used, vis, output, 
new planting, and replanting. For our purpose, i.e., to test the influence 
of the replanting grant ajid the export taxes on long run investment, 
replanted acreage appears to be the most relevant choice. 
This is because replanted acreage is a better indicator of the 
long run supply response behaviour of rubber producers. For replanted 
acreage, in comparison to output, gives a m.ore direct reflection of the 
long run investment decision of rubber producers. Replanting, and not 
output variation, is the first direct result of the long run supply 
response. Potential changes in the amount of output is a fLUiction of 
this first change, i.e., output variation is a consequence and a product 
of changes in replanted acreages. 
Besides, it is more difficult to specify and to estimate 
accurately the output-subsidy or the output-tajc relationship since they 
are compounded with many other factors like age of trees, tj^ pe of tapping 
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syetera used, ajnd so on. It is therefore? easier, from the viewDOint of 
empirical analysis, to measure the first response, i.e., change in 
replanting, than the subsequent response, i.e., output variation. 
New planting could be used as the dependent variable to indicate 
the first reaction in the long run supply model. However, the 
preference is still for replanting. First, the rep.lajiting grant scheme 
was established specifically to stimulate replanting. As such it is only 
appropriate to focus on replanting. Secondly, new planting is only 
important in new land schemes, which are wholly smallholdings. New 
planting among individual rubber producers is not significant mainly because 
of the difficulty of acquiring new land. Given the insi,gnificance of 
new planting among individual producers and the fact that new land schemes 
are established not only because of economic but also political reasons, 
change in new planting would not therefore reflect sufficiently the ?s.ong 
run response behaviour of individual rubber producers. Hence, replanting 
remains the appropriate indicator of long ran response behaviour of 
individual producers. 
The basic assumption underlying the analysis is that estate 
and smallholding producers behave in an economically rational manner. 
Profitability is assumed to be the major motivating force behind 
investment in replanting.^^ This is particularly true for estates. One 
evidence in support of this is the willingness of estates to replant 
existing old stands of rubber with a more profitable crop like oil palm 
^ We recognize that profit maximization is not necessarily the only goal 
of rubber producers. Indeed, as Dr.Colin Barlow has perBonally pointed 
out to the author, other non economic factors could be important in the 
decision making process. For instance, Dr.Barlow has found in his 
own research on the rubber industry that some Directors in certain 
estate companies would continue v/ith a certain line of polic;/ in order 
to perpetuate their own position. Nevertheless, the idea of profit 
maximization offers a simplifyi-ng assumption. Besides, as mentioned 
in the text, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the profit 
motive is a strong one in guiding the decision making of rubber 
producers. 
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if soil and capital constraints do not restrict them. 
It is not unrealistic to assume that they majcimize long term 
net returns from their inx'-estraent. Estates are not constrained by the 
cultural and social factors that affect smallholders in their approach 
towards investment and production of rubber. Rubber estate companies 
were founded for the sole purpose of making money. They do so within 
the framework of constraints imposed by their strict adherence to a set 
of agronomic practices. 
The profit maximisation assumption is also quite valid for the 
smallholding Case despite the fact that other non—economic considerations 
enter into their decision making in long term investment. One must not 
forget that the rapid growth of the smallholding sector in the early 
history of the rubber industry was associated with the attractive 
profitability of rubber production vis-a-vis other agricultural enterprises. 
Evidence of the smallholders relatively larger price elasticity of 
11 
response as given in other studies, and which are confirmed later in 
this chapter, are some indicators of their attempt to maximize their 
returns, at least in the short run. 
Given the level of technology, yield distribution, resovirce 
availability, and cost of production, it is hypothesised that expected 
profitability becomes a direct function of expected price. Under these 
conditions, expected profitability and, therefore, planting decisions 
are a function of the series of expected output prices throughout the 
rubber trees' economic life. That is, 
t t+m t+m+l' t+m+2 t+m+n 
where R is replanting in year t 
P, is the expected price in year t 
n is the gestation period of the rubber trees 
^^ See for instance Chan, op.cit. 
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rn is the assumed maximum productive life of the rubber trees. 
Since the producer is expected to base his planting decision 
on these expected future prices, he is assumed to be able to find some 
weighted average of the expected future prices so as to derive a single 
future expected price to be used as the decision variable. 
In the case of equal weight being giiR?n to the various expected 
future prices, this means that 
P = P = P »,« P t t+m t+m+1 * " t+ra+n 
This indicates that the producer assumes that all future expected prices 
are the same as those expects at present. 
In the case where he assigns unequal weights to the series of 
future expected prices this implies the discounting of the prices to 
their present value. The discounting process itself implies unequal 
weighting of the future prices. The average of the discounted prices is 
then derived. Thus 
p = m n 
i = m 
n 
vvhere r is the discount rate. 
On the basis of P. , the producers makes his planting decision. 
The remaining problem is how to determine P^ since expected 
future prices are not observable. In order to get an observable price 
variable, a stable relation is assumed to exist between past observed 
prices and the average future prices. This is not an unrealistic 
assumption. For it follows from the plausible assumption that past 
experience is usua.lly used as an indicator of future expectations. New 
price expectations are thus formed, and old ones redefined, on the basis 
of past prices obtained. This can be expressed by the Nerlovian 
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equation^^ below: 
where is the observed price in the period t-1; and 
B is the parameter describing the coefficient of expectation. 
What equation ( 6.2) means is that the future price expected in period 
t is some function of the price which was e:<pected in t-1 period and 
the price that actuany occurred in that period. Equation ( 6.1) and 
(6.2) can nov? be combined to express acreage planted by the producer as 
a functi 
on of known prices. If, as assumed, plantings in year t are 
a function of the future price expected in that year, the relationship 
between acreage planted and expected prices can be shov/n as 
Since P^ is in turn postulated to be a function of past 
observed prices, P^ ^ in (6,3) can be substituted for by combing 
equations (6,2) and (6.3), The new relationship is then 
\ = % \ 3 P t - i ^ ^ ^' s) ••• (6,^) 
That is,, p?-anting is functionally related to past prices 
(which in turn determine expected future prices), These past prices 
could have various relative weights: 
B, B(1 - B), B(1 - B)^, and so on. 
Because 0 ^ B ^  1, the weight carried by observed past prices 
in the determination of future expected prices declines as these past 
prices become less recent. This is to say that prices observed in the 
more remote past, say 10 years ago, have less infl.uence in the formulation 
of expected future prices than those observed in the more immedilate pact. 
One major difficulty is the determination of the relative 
weights to be attached to the observed past prices. This is because an 
^^ Nerlove, M., The Dynamics of Supply: Estimation of Farmers' PeaponBe 
to Price, (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 195o;, 
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infinite number of such relative? weights could be possible. If, in 
equation (6.2.), B = 0 then P^ ^ = t^^ "* * meajis that observed past 
price changes plaj' no part in influencing expected future prices and, 
therefore, do not affect planting decisione. However, if B = 1 then 
^t ~ ^t-1* means that the expected future price in period t 
depends wholly on observed price in period t-1. The prices before t-1 
period are of no significance in influencing planting decision. This 
is the simple Nerlovian model which is commonly used in supply response 
s t u d i e s . I n other cases, B would be expected to lie between zero and 
unity. 
Economists have often used this simple Nerlovian model in their 
Ik 
supply response studies. It is based on the belief that more remote 
past prices have already been forgotten, or, if remembered they are given 
very little significajice compared to the prices which occurred in the 
immediate past year. To ascertain the validity of this hypothesis, 
questions were asked of estate owners and smallholders regarding their 
price expectations. (Table 6.2). 63 per cent of the estates and 72 per 
cent of smallholders answered that the present price level would continue 
into the future. This confirms that the naive Nerlovian assumption has 
validity. 10 per cent of estates and I8 per cent of smallholders reported 
that they would base their price expectation on the trend of some past 
prices. This is akin to the weighted average of past prices. 
27 per cent of estates and 3-0 per cent of smallholders indicated 
that their price expectation was based on a study of price changes in 
the world mfirket situation. These belonged to the group of producers 
which were more exposed to market information and which might engage in 
^^ Nerlove, Ibid. 
H 
See Peter A^y, "Supply Pesponse Functions in Tropical Agriculture, 
Bulletin of Oxford Institute of Economics and Statistics, May I968, 
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som«» rfsearch on the world market conditions. This is particularly true 
of the better organised estates. 
TABLE 6.2. FORMULATION OF PRICE EXPECTATIONS 
BY RirBBER PRODUCERS 
Price Expectation Model 1 Pe:^centage of Respondents 
i Estates ! 1 Smallholders 
1) Present Price level to 






2) Next Year's Price depends on 
the past few years' trend 1 10 
1 
18 
3) Next year's Price depends on 





It is also hypothesized here that investing resources in rubber 
replanting involves an opportunity cost. That cost is the forgone 
income that could have been derived from investing the same resources 
in the next most profitable enterprise. It is thus necessary to include 
the price of a substitute crop in the long run supply function in 
explicit recognition of the opportunity cost incurred. For estates, 
J 5 
palm oil prices serve the purpose quite well.'' One should not, however, 
be misled into thinking that every estate company can switch to oil palm 
production. Soil, capital, and technological constraints restrict the 
ease of substitution between rubber and palm oil production. 
For smalj-holdings, the choice of the next most profitable 
agricultural production is even more difficult. Just as estates have 
substitution bottlenecks, smallholders also face a similar problem. The 
^^ We must also recognize that some estates could possibly invest in 
other forms of investment like Government bonds or securities. It is 
felt that since the Malaysian capital market is not highly developed 
the number of estates diverting capital to this investment area is not 
expected to be large. However, it may be mentioned that foreign 
owned ©states might find more opportunities in other foreign capital 
markets. Unfortunately, no data are available on this, but this point 
must be kept in mind. 
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soil, topography of th?? land, size of the existing rubber plot, the 
availability of additional suitable land, and the smallholders' ignorance 
regarding investment opportunities are some of the restraining factors. 
In most studies on the smallholder problem it has often been 
taken for granted that smallholders can easily produce either padl or 
16 
rubber. This in fact is generally not very correct. For rubber and 
rice land are not easily substitutable. However, considering that 
smallholders often compare rubber-rice prices, because of the importance 
of rice in their diet, and that evidence was available to indicate that 
some smallholders did consider growing padi in periods of low rubber 
17 
prices, the price of padi is used in the long run supply equation for 
smallholdings. 
The commitment of resources to rubber plantings is a dynsunic 
process. It is thus a plausible assumption to suggest that investment 
in replanting depends not only on the perception of expected future 
prices, but also on how far the past desired adjustments in plantings 
were achieved. For instance, if the desired replanting to be carried out 
by a smallholder or estate company is all completed then future replanting 
cannot take place BO soon again. To take care of this, an adjustment 
variable is included. This is the replanted acreage lagged one year. 
One of the two main hypotheses to be tested in this chapter is 
that export tax and cess payment does not affect the investment decision 
on replanting, Chan^ was the only one who has provided evidence that 
^^ See Stern, op.cit. 
" Bauer, op.cit., Chapter and Bauer, Report on a Visit to the Rubber 
Growing Smallholdings of Malaya, (London: His Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1 9 p p . i ^ - ^ 
l8 Chan, op.cit. 
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the above hypothesis ie true. This was mentioned only in passing by him. 
Unfortunately ^-hce was no elaboration on the theme. 
An. aspect of the approach Chan used nay be commented on here. 
First, he regressed estate output against RSS 1 f.o.b. world price and 
obtained an estimate for the price coefficient. Then the export tax was 
deducted from the RSS 1 price ajid the same equation was estimated again. 
The estimates of the two price coefficients were then compared. It was 
found that they did not differ much in magnitude. From this he drew the 
conclusion that the export tax did not affect the dependent variable, 
in this case output. 
In his approach, there was the possibility that estate producers 
were actually responding to the price changes rather than to the changes 
in the export tax. There is no way of telling since no separate estimate 
was made for the tax variable. 
In order to estimate a separate coefficient for the tax variable, 
the export tax payment is included in the estimating equation. For 
estates, the export tax includes the research cess. For smallholders, 
the replanting cess is additionally included. The former receives back 
the replanting cess, but not the latter. This explai.ns the difference 
in the composition of the tax variable. 
If two explanatory variables are highly correlated a high 
1 o 
degree of multicollinearity r e s u l t s . T h i s is "harmf'xL" in that the 
estimates of the regression coefficients become imprecise because of the 
large variances of the least square estimators. Thus, if the two 
explanatory variables are RSS 1 price and the Schedule I export tax then 
there is a possibility of high multicollinearity existing. This is due 
19 
Kmenta, J., Elements of Econometrics (Macmillan Co., London 1971), 
pp.3^^)0-390. First it may be pointed out here that multicollinearity 
is a matter of degree and not of kind. Secondly, it refers to the 
condition of the explanatory variables which are aseum.ed to be 
nonstochastic. Here, the variables RSS I and export tax are clearly stochastic variables. 
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to the fact that the export tax variable is actual?:.y a function of 
RSS 1 prices. Fortunately, this is not acute in our case since the tsjc 
variable includes other cess payment, which does not vary with price 
movement but with output exported. 
The other major hypothesis to be tested is that the replanting 
graiit does not affect the investment decision of rubber producers. To 
evaluate this, the total replanting grajit paid out respectively to each 
sector by the government is used as a variable in the investment function. 
Given the difficulties of borrowing in an imperfect capital market and 
the lack of necessary capital, replanting reserves or plough back profits 
and income are thus significant determinants of replanting. The proxy 
used for this liquidity variable is the replanting grant. The coefficient 
of this variable will indicate the response in planting to capital 
availability.^*^ 
Also included in the long run supply function is a time trend 
variable. This is to 'catch' some of the technological effects and other 
trend influences on plantings done over the years. The coefficient of 
the variable could be regarded as a measure of autonomous growth. 
Various lags are incorporated in the variables in several 
estimating equations. The rationale is that lags are made necessary by 
the time span between a decision to invest or produce and actual planting 
and production. Institutional and agronomic factors are the cause of 
this time lag. This points to the dynamic process of investment and 
production adjustment in which time is clearly involved. 
The response relationships so far discussed can now be expressed 
in mathematical form for each sector. The complete functional relationship 
See M.J'.Bateman, "Supply Pelatione for Perrenial Crops in the Lees-
Leveloped Areas" in C.R.Wharton (ed.), Subsistence Agriculture and 
Economic Development, (Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago, I969). 
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for estate replanting is 
where 
where 
Re, . . (6.5) 
Re is estate replanting in period, t 
is estate replanting lagged. 1 period, the adjustment 
variable 
P is the RSS 1 price f.o.b. in period t-1 
Ps^ ^ is the price of the substitute crop in period t-1 
X^ is the export tax and research cess in period t 
G^ is the total replanting grant payment 
t is the time trend 
U^ is the error term 
The smallholding replanting function is 
Rs^ = f ^^Vl' ^t' ^t' 
Rs is smallholder replanting in period t 
Ra , is smallholder replanting in period t-1 t"" JL 
P. T is RSS 3 price in period t-1 t—J. 
Rs. , is the price of the substitute crop in period t-1 L*^  X 
X is the export tax, research cess, and replanting cess in 1/ 
period t 
G is the total replanting grant payment V 
t is the time trend 
U^ is the error term 
6.5. TIE SHORT RUN MODEL 
In the short run supply function, output is the dependent 
variable. There is no doubt that this and not changes in acreages 
is the appropriate variable to be used. For at any given time in the 
short run it is assumed that acreage changes are zero; i.e., mature 
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acreages, which determine output, are a constant. 
There are therefore fewer variables which induce a change in 
the level of the output. It is hypothesized that the following are the 
most important: expected price of rubber, export tax and cess payment, 
21 seasonal influence, and a time trend. 
In Malaysia, rubber production is affected by seasonal changes 
known as "wintering". Wintering or the defoliation of leaves occurs 
during the period between February and June following the dry spell in 
the weather. Though this occurs earlier in the north of the peninsular 
than in the south the regional variation is small. During this period, 
the latex flow is markedly reduced. This is clearly shown in the seasonal 
index of smallholders' and estates' monthly production. (See Table 6,3.) 
To take care of this effect, a dummy variable is included into 
the short run supply function. 
The time trend factor is a proxy for changes in productivity 
over time. The other two variables, expected price and export tax and 
cess payment, are similar in explanation as in the long run functions. 
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Source: Survey Data, The Index is constructed using data on output 
for period August I969 - October 1973 as basis. 
21 In the short run it is not envisaged that cost of production would 
vary greatly to influence production. 
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The short run model can be expressed symbolically thus 
Qt = * ^ ^t-V ••• 
where Q^ is the short run output 
D^ is the dummy variable for the seasonal effects due to 
wintering. 
The rest of the variables have a similar meaning as in equation (6,5). 
It would be noticed that the short run model does not 
incorporate a variable to indicate the possibility of substituion in 
production or substitution in the use of labour when there is a change 
in the relative price ratio of rubber and another competitive crop. 
Stern, in fact, did use the price of rice to show this substitution 
possibility.^^ 
In the estate case, the inclusion of a competitive variable in 
the short run model is hard to justify. This is because the whole 
organizational structure and resource use in the estates have been 
geared for the specific purpose of rubber production. Once the resources 
are committed, it is difficult in practice to transfer them in and out 
of rubber production in response to short term price changes. In fact 
no estate can enjoy such resource mobility because of the high degree 
of inflexibility in agricultural production. 
In comparison to estates, smallholders appear to have relatively 
more flexibility because of their more flexible and simpler system of 
organization. Even then, in spite of this, they do not and usually 
cannot shift their meagre resources and limited labour supply to the 
production of other crops with any small decline in rubber prices. 
Besides, in general it does not make economic sense to neglect rubber 
production though prices have fallen. This is especially true in the 
short period. Abandoning the rubber trees or reducing output in response 
Stern, op.cit. 
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to falling prices only leads to a direct reduction in total family income. 
During the survey no smallholders reported that they had abandoned rubber 
trees or reduced output because rubber prices had fallen in the past. It 
was more rational to continue production. In fact, many smallholders 
have pointed out to the author that they would try to produce more to 
maintain their regular income. They could not do so only because the 
teclmological maximum of obtaining latex has already been reached during 
regular tapping periods. 
In the longer run, the possibility and potentiality for 
adjustment is present. The inclusion of a competitive variable in the 
long run model is therefore more justifiable. For the short run period 
where monthly data are used, the exclusion of the competitive variable is 
not crucial to the understanding of the short run response behaviour of 
the estates and smallholders. 
6.6. PERIOD OF ANALYSIS AND DATA 
1956 - 1973 has been chosen as the period of analysis for the 
estates' long run supply function. For smallholdings, the period 
analyzed is 1953 - 1973. 
The choice of 1956 for estates and 1953 for smallholdings as 
convenient bench-marks is significant. These respective base years were 
the start of the payment of the replanting grant in the various replanting 
schemes. Ideally, a longer period or time series would give a larger 
degree of freedom especially when lags are used. But since one of our 
main interests is to investigate the effect of the replanting grant on 
investment, and since the sub/?idy started only during those years 
mentioned, the inclusion of earlier years would not help to improve the 
analysis very much. 
In studying the short run supply response function, the period 
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of analysis starts from August I969 to October 1973. There are two 
major reasons for this choice. First, adequate time aeries for both 
prices and output were collected during the survey for analysis. 
Secondly, during this time there was one period of falling prices 
(from August I969 to September 1972) and one of rising prices (from 
September 1972 to October 1973). These periods of fluctuating prices, 
and thus fluctuating export tax rates, are suitable for analysing short 
run output response behaviour. 
Data for the long run supply function are taken mainly from 
the Malayan Rubber Statistical Handbook. Since 19^ f7 there have been 
annual estimates of replanting by estates and smallholders. Data on 
replanting are quite well recorded, particularly for smallholdings, 
since the government replanting schemes were started in 1953. 
Annual average RSS 1 prices f.o.b. have been available since 
19^ +7. They are the average of bujers' mid-day prices for rubber, 
RSS 3 prices paid by dealers were collected from 1953 onwards and 
these are used in the smallJiolding equations. 
Price of palm oil and rice are taken from the Economic Report 
of the Malaysian Treasury. Rice price is the wholesale price of 
Kedah rice, and palm oil price is London c.i.f, price. Both are 
converted to cents per pound to facilitate comparison with rubber prices. 
The replanting grant payment is obtained from the Rubber 
Industry Smallholders Development Authority. The export tax and cess 
payment is calculated from the relevant tax schedules applicable to the 
annual and monthly prices in the period under study. That is, a new 
time series is constructed for the export tax and cess payment for the 
estate and smallholding sector separately for each period of analysis. 
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The data for the short run model are from our survey of 
prices and output of estates and smallholders. 
6.7. RESULTS OF LONG RUN MODEL 
Various specifications and functions basing on the naive 
Nerlovian model have been experimented with during the estimation of 
the coefficients of the equationso Tables 6J+ and 6.5 present the 
results of the linear functions which are found to be illuminating in 
several respects. 
The smallholding cess is first discussed. The leading 
equations are 1 and 2 in terms of R*" and overall performance (Table 
for the smallholding replanting model. There is not much of a choice 
between the two. However since equation 1 includes the substitute 
variable, Ps^ -j , we shall focus on it for discussion. 
As expected, the coefficient of the rubber price variable 
is positively correlated with replanting. However, it is not 
statistically signifiCc\nt at the 5 per cent level of significance using 
that t test. Though the statistical confirmation is weak we cannot 
reject that price and replanting is not related particularly since the 
coefficient has the correct sign. 
The coefficient of the price of padi variable has the wrong 
sign, and is not statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
This confirms our doubt on the substitutability of rice and rubber land. 
The adjustment variable is significant at the 5 per cent level, 
with the expected negative sign. What it means is that as more 
resources like land and capital are already used in the previous replanting, 
the immediate replanting programme of the smallholders is affected. Due 
to the fixity of the existing assets (rubber trees) in rubber production, 
replanting decisions are therefore dependent on the total acreage and 
213 
the proportion of it already replanted. 
Are the two major null hypotheses regarding the absence of 
effects of the export tax and replanting grant variables valid? 
The coefficient of the export tax variable, as expected, is 
negative. However, it is not significant. Using this statistical 
criterion only it means that the null hypothesis of no relationship 
between the tax and the replanting variable can not be rejected. 
However, there is a risk of accepting the null hypothesis if only 
statistical evidence is relied on. The risk is that the alternative 
hypothesis of the tax having negative influence on replanting might be 
the correct one. In this case, "classical statistical theory provides 
incomplete grounds for accepting H^; acceptance must be based also on 
23 extra-statistical judgment, with prior belief playing a key role." 
The a priori reasoning in this case is that the tax has an 
adverse influence on long term investment. The causation is not a direct 
one in the sense that smallholders incorporate into their decision 
making the influence of the export tax and cess payment on their 
replanting. Survey information, later elaborated, shows that they attach 
more weight to other factors. Nevertheless, the fact that the payment 
of the tax and cess reduces their profitability of production, which in 
turn affects their saving potential, consequently affects their investment 
capability. In this way the export tax and cess payment has an 
unfavourable impact on investment in replanting. But the tax variable 
might not be used directly as a decision variable. 
Until we discuss in some detail the actual variables considered 
in the decision making process of rubber producers in their investment 
programme, the tentative conclusion is that the null hypothesis regarding 
^^f.Wonnacott, R.J. and Wonnacott, T.H. Econometrics, (John Wiley and 
Sons, Inc., London, 1970). PP.6'f-67 and Koutsoyiannis, op.cit. pp.23-26. 
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Independent Variables 1 
D 
^ t-1 ^t 
n 
"t t 
1 Rs 15.220 0.258 O.S54 - 0.352 - oa52 1.592 3.178 0.81 t (1.^33) (0.589) (1 .851) (0.163) (3.956) (2.299) 
2 Rs. 20.uie 0.262 - 0.253 - 0.4^)5 1.648 3.642 0.81 t (1.388) (1.056) (0.578) (4.322) (2 . 101) 
3 Rs. - 62.93^ O.^Gh 1.789 - 0.248 0.973 0.894 0,73 t (1 .914) (2.001) (C,773) (1.061) (2.936) 
Rs. - 26,910 0.524 0.192 0.357 0.672 0.64 t (2.344) (0.747) (0.375) (2,149) 
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The export tax is not rejected. This evidence weakly confirms Chan's 
conclusion mentioned earlier. 
What about the second null hypothesis regarding the replanting 
grant? This case is more clearcut. A priori reasoning would argue that 
the replanting subsidy has a favourable influence on replanting. This 
is confirmed by the highly significant coefficient of the replanting 
grant variable, and the coi-rect positive sign. 
There is a wider implication to the replanting grant. In this 
model, the variable is more than a mere subsidy. It also indicates the 
need for income on the part of the smallholders during their replanting 
programme. It reflects on the low investment capability of the 
smallholders and their dependence on the grant. 
If equation 1 in Table is correctly specified as the 
replanting investment function, then it can be seen that the replanting 
grant has a greater influence on replanting than the export tax payment 
has. The size and sign of the coefficients clearly show the effect of 
the replanting grant on replanting. 
Are the estates different regarding the two major hypotheses? 
Table 6.5 shows the estate replanting case. Let us examine 
leading equation 1. First, the coefficient of the replanting grant 
variable is not statistically significant, but its sign is correct. 
This should not mean that the null hypothesis has to be accepted. It 
is quite illogical to infer that estates, particularly the smaller ones, 
do not need the replanting grant to subsidize their replanting. The 
a priori belief that the grant is an incentive to replanting is much 
stronger than the weak statistical evidence seems to suggest. This will 
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k - 7,83if 0.129 
(0.529) 
~ 0.707 
(3«052) (2.215) (0.189) 
0.93 
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The export tax variable is not significant at even the 10 per 
cent level. However, it has the correct sign. 
Of the remaining variables in equation 1 (Table 6.5), the 
adjustment variable, that is, previous period replanting, is the jnost 
important explanatory variable. The coefficient of Se^ ^ is negative 
and significant at 5 pe- cent level. A similar interpretation of the 
role of this variable applies as in the smallholder case» 
The coefficients of the two price variables have the signs 
correct. But only the rubber price coefficient is significant at 5 V^^ 
cent level. 
6,8o ELASTICITY OF LONG RUN RESPONSE 
The coefficients presented in O'ables 6.4 and 6.5 are marginal 
measures of response. They show the magnitude of change in the dependent 
variable when there is a one unit change in the independent variable 
with the rest held constant. These coefficients are actually measures 
of the slope of the investment functions. 
In comparison, elasticity measures the percentage change in 
the dependent x'-ariable as the dependent variable changes by one per cent, 
with the rest held constant. The coefficient of elasticity of one 
variable with respect to the other measures these percentage changes. 
Elasticity measure is preferred to slopes mainly because the former is 
not affected by the scale of the variables measured. The major limitation 
of the elasticity measure is the ceteris paribus assumptions which may 
vitiate some of the results. 
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 present a number of response elasticities 
which are derived from their respective equytions in Tables 6.4 and 6.5. 
The elasticities are computed at the arithmetic mean. 
In the smallholder case (Table 6.6), the response elasticity 
218 
of the replanting grant variable is greater than 1 for replanting. The 
elastic response of replanting to the grant confirms the results 
analyzed earlier regarding the critical role of the subsidy in 
smallholders replanting. 
TABLE 6.6. ESTIMATED SM/vLLHOLDSRS ACREAGE RESPONoE ELASTICITY 
1 Partial Elasticity With Respect to 
i ! "^t-i s i s ''"t-l i \ M t 
i ; ^ 
Long Run Replanting ! 
Equation ' | 
No. 1 1 0.283 1 0.301 




0.031 1.274 i i 
0.001 1.320 
Replanting has low elasticity of response to the export tax 
variable. The conclusion is that the smallholders' replanting is not 
responsive to export tax changes in the long run. 
Price does not seem to play a significant role in inducing 
replanting. The response elasticity of replanting to price is small. 
Similarly, the response elasticity of replanting with respect 
to the price of a substitute crop is also low. 
The adjustment variable, i.e., previous planting done, also 
has inelastic response. 
Table 6.7 shows the estate case. The elasticity of response 
to the replanting grant variable is small in contrast to that of the 
smallholders. This, as earlier explained, indicates that the grant is 
not necessarily the most important factor influencing estate replanting. 
Indirectly, it means that estates are in a stronger financial position 
to undertake replanting than the smallholders. 
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TABLE 6.7. ESTIMATED K3TA^'E ACREAGE KSSPONSE ELASTICITY 




Partial Elasticity With Respect to 
•D f KS i t-1 X. 
0.196 I 0.509 I 0.7^ 5 
0.171 I 
0.159 
0.696 0.11-'+ 0.066 
0.063 
The coefficient of response elasticity of replanting to the 
export tax Vciriable is small. Replanting is inelastic to export tax 
changes. 
The response elasticities for the remaining variables are all 
less than 1. The adjustment variable has the largest coefficient of 
response elasticity, and price the lowest, 
6,9.. ESTIMATED GOSFFIGII^TS OF SHORT xRUN MODEL 
The null hypothesis in the short run model is that the export 
tax and cess payment has no effect on output. To test this, two periods 
are chosen for ajialysis: one of falling prices which corresponds to 
August 1969 to September 1975, and one of rising prices which corresponds 
to September 1972 to October 1973. 
The estate sector is subdivided into two groups: group 1 has a 
monthly output of over 80,000 pounds, and group 2 v/ith a monthly 
production not exceeding this figure. This roughly corresponds to 
estates over 1000 ac:^ es and below 1000 acres respectively. The respective 
number of estates in the two groups is I8 nnd 20. 
The smallholding sector is subdivided into group 1 v/hich hfAS a 
monthly pjreduction of over 250 pounds and group 2 with a monthly output 
of less tlxan this volume. This corresponds approximately to smallholders 
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with an acreage over '4.5 acres and those below thj.s nize. The respective 
nijjnber is and 22. 
The total namber of producers included in the pooled regreEsion. 
run haB been determined by the completeness of the price ond output 
series for the period under study. Many smallholders ha.ve been loft out 
because of incompleteness in the time series in either one or both the 
variables. 
Tables 6.8 to 6.11 show the results of the short run model. 
The price coefficients for the smallholder case during the period of 
falling prices are positive and are not significant. Group 1 has a 
slightly larger coefficient. The results could possibly be interpreted 
to meetn that smallholders do not decrease output during periods of 
falling prices. For it is not economically and financially wise to do 
so. In fact, they might even try to increase output paj'ticularly if they 
have a target income to maintain. 
For both groups, the tax coefficients ha.ve the correct sign 
but are not significant at the 5 or 10 per cent level. The size of the 
two coefficients are very small. Tentatively the null hypothesis is 
not rejected. 
The negative signs of the weather dummy variables show that 
wintering has displaced the output downward. The positive sign of the 
trend coefficients probably indicate the effect of rise in production 
due to the use of fertiliser, stimulant or change in the yield profile. 
During the period of rising prices, the theoretical belief is 
that output would rise in respond to price rise. However, the price 
coefficients, though positive and significant, are very small. The 
response is weak because the regu].ar output is already the maximum one. 
It is difficult to exact more latex output without damaging the trees. 
fV 
f\J 
TABLE 6.8 ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS OF SMALLHOLDER SHORT RUN OUTPUT RESPONSE 
Period of Fa l l i ng 
Prices (August 19^9 
- September 1972) 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Period of Ris ing 
Prices (September 1972 

















































TABLE 609 ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS OF ESTATE SHORT KUN OUTPUT RESPONSE 
Period of Falling 
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The tax coefficients are negative but not statistically 
significant. As in the falling price period, the null hj'pothesis of no 
relationship between the tax and output is not rejected. 
The wintering effect ±s shown by the negative sign of the 
weather dummy variable. Over time, output has increased due possibly to 
the use of fertilizer or stimulant. This is indj.cated by the positive 
sign of the t variable. 
In the estate case (Table 6.9), the price coefficients are 
slightly larger than, the smallholders' ones for the periods of rising 
and falling prices. They are, however, not statistically significant. 
Regarding the null hypothesis of the export tax having no 
influence, the results in Table 6.9 for all estate groups and for the 
two price periods indicate that it may not be rejected. 
6.12. ELASTICITY OF SHORT RUN RESPONSS^^ 
Comparing the estate with the smallholding groups during the 
period of falling prices it can be seen in Tables 6.10 and 6.11 that the 
former has a slightly larger price elasticity of response. In both cases 
the short run output elasticity is smaller than 1. That is, both are 
inelastic in their short run output response. 
TABLE 6.10. Ei>TIMATED SMALLPIOLDEI^  SHORT RUN ELASTICITY 
Partial Elasticity With Respect To 1 
^ X 
1 
Period of Falling Prices 1 i 
Group 1 1 0.132 o.okz 
Group 2 1 0.317 0.071 
Period of Rising Prices ( 1 I 
Group 1 1 0,3P-1 0.049 
Group 2 0.561 
i 
0.091 
The general conclusion of low price elasticity found in this study 
confirms the results of previous studieE done by Chan and Stern. 
Table b.l of this chapter. See 
TABLE 6.11. ESTIMATED ^iSTATE SHORT .RUN ELAi^TICITY 
! 1 Partial Elasticity With Respect To 
X t-1 
^^ 
Period of Falling Prices 
Group 0.061 0.001 
Group 2 0.088 0.002 J 
Period of Rising Prices 
Group 0.088 1 0o002 1 
1 Group 2 0.103 1 0.003 1 \ 1 
The low elasticity can be explained by the cost of maintaining 
the mature rubber trees. The maintenance cost is quite lov/. Producers 
would continue to produce during period of low prices as long as the 
operating cost is recovered. Furthermore, reducing output means lowering 
the income level which is not an acceptable proposition to rubber 
producers and particularly to smallholders» 
In the period of rising prices, smallholdings and estates again 
are inelastic in their response to price rise. Smallholders ha^ 'e, 
however, larger elasticity coefficients* As explained earlier, though 
prices may have risen rubber producers who have been producing the regular 
volume, which is usually the maximum, find it difficult to produce more. 
Possibilities exist for output increase by using 8tim.ulan.t, intensive 
tapping, and the re-tapping of abandoned areas. There are, however, 
25 T -i imitations to the increase by such means. 
The very small coefficients for the tax variable elasticity 
response seera to confirm the negligible impact of the tax in affecting 
the output of rubber producers during price rise or decline. That is, 
output is independent of the export tax changes in the short run. Other 
factors play a relatively more important part in influencing changes in 
25 See discussion in Chapter 
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output. 
6.11, LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
The study v/as based on the least-square single equation approach. 
This approach requires the specification in advance the dependent and 
independent variables. In real life situations, most economic Vfiriables 
are inter-dependent. The simultaneous-equation approach may provide 
better estimates to some of the functions we have analyzed. However, the 
choice of technique is restricted by the availability of data. The single 
equation approach does not require as much date, as the sim.ultaneous one. 
Besides, if only certsin hypotheses are to be verified and if only 
approximate magnitudes of certain coefficients are required, the single 
equation approach is quite sufficient. 
A more limiting aspect of this econometric approach is that it 
implicitly assumes in the functional relationship that there is perfect 
and reversible substitutability between the various variables, and also 
perfect divisibility of the factors. This is obviously not realistic. 
It is also not very realistic to assume that an infinitely small 
change in the rubber producers' price expectation will result in some 
infinitely small change in acreage response. There is probably a certain 
minimum, discrete magnitude of price increase that justifies a discrete 
amount of new investment in the planting of rubber trees. The sajne may 
be said of some of the other variables. It is plausible that the supply 
function is discontinuous rather than smooth and continuous as presented 
here. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, probably the most serious 
defect of this type of model is the possibility that they give misleading 
results because of misspecification of the function. Thus there may be 
certain significant factors which are left out in the rubber supply 
function. In studying the response of rubber producers to price, subsidy, 
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and tax variab3.es the simple econoraetric model mif;;ht not be able to 
reveal the actual decision malcing process of the producers. For instance, 
in deciding to replant do rubber producers actually consider the export 
tax and other cess payment in their decision making? If yes, is the 
weight attached to it as much as that given to other factors? If no, 
what are the other v;airiables rubber producers actually take into account. 
How do they rank each of these factors? Are there differences in their 
weighting because of differences in resource base, in entrepreneiirial 
behaviour, and in other such like factors? These are not answered by 
the results of econometric techniques. 
But such dynamic considerations can not be ignored. Probably 
a better insight could be obtained from a survey by posing relevant 
questions to the decision makers regarding their perception of the 
important variables in long run investment and short term production, 
and the various constraints they face. The conclusions from survey 
approach could supplement the results of the econometric approach. 
This is done in the next chapter where the actual decision 
making process as practised by smallholders and estates is analyzed. 
The analysis carried out there would help to verify some of the 
conclusions reached in this chapter. Then the policy implications of 
the conclusions will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DEC I SIGN-MAKING IN RUBBER INVES'P-^ ENT AND PP.ODUCTION 
In constructing a qua^ntitative model of the supply resporLse 
behaviour of rubber producers, the use of econoinic theory - despite its 
limitations - could help in determining the relevant variables and in 
limiting the area to be investigated. This helps to focus attention 
on the important aspects of the subject. 
If the model is correctly specified and if the statistical data 
accurately represent the x'ariables in the model, then the estimated 
coefficients are reliable in their predictive power. Given this, 
hypotheses can be rejected or accepted strictly on a probability basis. 
However, economic models and their estimates can only provide 
a simplified version of the actual economic system of response behaviour. 
This is because the 'real' situation is a complex maze of interconnecting 
economic and non-economic forces. Any faithful copy of this in model 
form is impoBsible. 
There is thus the possibility that such simplified constructs, 
while enlightening in certain respects, could obscure the actual 
interplay of the variables. Consequently, inconclusive or misleading 
results are produced. It is in this light that the quantitative estimates 
of the producer response behaviour of the previous chapter m.ust be 
re-examined, 
Tn order to have a better understanding of the '.Tnderiving 
mechanism of the response function we need to adopt a more inclusive 
frame of reference than that provided by the mechanics of regression 
equations. This former approach is useful in two ways. First, it can 
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provide additional knowledge on the behaviour of rubber producers which 
statistical equations are not in a position to supply. Secondly, survey 
information can verify the results of the quantitative modeLs which 
were studied in the previous chapter. 
In this chapter, we will make use of survey data collected by 
the writer for the purpose of studying the institutional background of 
decision makers, the process of decision making itself, the main decision 
variables and the regsons for their selection. These data help to exp3.ain 
the long run investment in rubber replanting, and also the short run 
production of rubber. Some conclusions can then be derived concerning 
the relative role of the export taxes and replanting grant vis-a-vis 
that of other determining factors on investment and production. In 
analyzing the above issues the estate and smallholding cases are compared. 
7.1. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Estates, as corporate entities, can. assume various legal forms. 
They include public company, private com.pany, sole proprietorship, and 
partnership,^ The legal status of each type of company defines the 
pattern of ownership and the degree of control amongst the shareholders 
and management. 
The common feature of estates is their e3.aborate organizational 
structure, particularly the public and private companies, within which 
the process of decision-making takes place. 
An illustration of an organizational structi.ire of a public 
company is depicted in Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2.^ At the top of the 
pyramidal structure are the directors w?ho are accountable to the shareholders, 
For some other details refer to Chapter 2. 
Refer Chapter 2 for other details. 
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If the company is registered abroad, say United Kingdom, it is assisted 
and advised by a secretarial firm and an agency house, which is normally 
located in Malaysia. Sometimes the agency house also acts as the 
secretarial firm of the company. The planting advisers 8Jid visiting 
agents are the representatives of the agency house at the field level. 
The man in charge of the estate is the manager, who may be assisted 
by an assistant manager. At the bottom of the chain are the clerical 
staff and workers. 
Figure 2.2 shows the typical structure of a large company. 
Smaller estates, particularly sole proprietorships ajid partnerships, do 
not have the full array of aioxilliary services of the larger services. 
Our survey indicated that sole proprietorships and partnerships rarely 
engaged the services of agency houses. The major reason was the saving 
in cost. Probably, because of their smaller size, (Table 7-1) the owners 
or partners could manage the estates along the line of a family business 
with the owners and partners performing all the decision-making. That 
is, ownership and management generally are incorporated in the same 
persons. In contrast, the larger estates are operated more along the 
line of modern business firm.s with separation of ownership and management, 
Such differences have led to differences in the assignment of 
decision areas to the decision-makers in the various types of companies. 
A schem.atic picture of the relationship between decision-m.akers 
and their decision areas in a model estate organization is presented in 
Figure 7.1. Variants of this m.odel are used by estate companies. The 
actual system of control used depends on the type of company, that is, 
whether it is a partnership or public company. 
The purpose of long range planning is to decide on the goals 
of the company. For estates, the chief long run goal is profit making. 
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FiaraE 7.1. DECIGION MAKERS AND DECISION AI^ EAS IN 
A MODEL ESTATE 
Decision Areas Anrent; Functional Details 
Long Range Planning (-
(Objective Planning) 
Top Management — 
Directors, 
Advised by Agency 
House, Manager of 
Estate 
Decisions on policy; 
e.g., replanting 
Short term planning <- Directors; Managers^ 
Planting Advisers, 
Visiting Agent 
->Biidgetary control and 
estimates; production 
methods; e.g., 











estate and fields 




i mm a t ur e fields 
-> Physical work; e.g., 
tapping and maintenance 
of estate fields 
To achieve this, the company has other long term sub-goals v;hich are o.imed 
at achieving the primary objective of profit. One of these is replanting. 
During oior fieldwork, it was found that for all the estates surveyed, 
the ultimate decision on replanting was made by the directors in the case 
of public and private companies, and by the owners or partners in the 
case of sole proprietorships and partnerships. There was, however, another 
important difference between the two groups of companies. All the public 
and private companies were advised by agency houses concerning their 
replanting programmes. Only 1 partnership company out of the l6 surveyed 
engaged an agency house to advise it on replanting. None of the sole 
proprietorships used the services of agency houses. 
Short run planning in an estate would cover the various 
budgetary programmes for the year. For instance, budgeting the manuring 
programme, the estimated monthly production, the labour supply, and the 
preparation of other requirements for daily production and maintenance of 
both mature and immature rubber areas. 
The estate manager plays an important role in short run planning 
by supplying all the necessary information so that an estimate annual 
budget covering all aspects of production and replanting could be worked 
out at headquarters. Sometimes the manager may provide a draft budget 
for his estate to be confirmed and finalised by headquarters. 
On the technical aspects of rubber production the plejiting 
advisers and visiting agents have a recommendatory role. For instance, 
in formulating a weeding, manuring, and tapping programme for various 
fields for the year the advices of these experts may carry more weight 
than that of the manager. Generally, we were informed, the directors 
would accept such advices. The implementation of the policies was done 
by the manager. 
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In the case of partnerships and sole proprietorships, the 
owner or partners are the principal decision-makers. If there is an 
employed manager he plays a small advisory role. It was found that 
in 6 of these companies, the annual programme was not well defined 
and was not strictly enforced. In fact, the budgeted programmes had 
been changed several times in one year, to the annoyance of the 
employed manager. This is not so much an example of flexibility in 
such companies as of inconsistency in implementing the budgeted 
programmes. This, perhaps, may be due to disagreements or changes of 
mind on the part of the owners or partners, or it may be due to a 
shortage of funds to carry out the original programme. 
Short run administration, as the term implies, refers to the 
daily co-ordination and supervision of resources for daily production. 
This is actually the realization of the programmes of the long range and 
short term plans. Some examples of this short run administration v?ork 
are the assignment of tappers to various tasks, undertaking the manuring 
and weeding programmes, recording the details of work and production. 
The manager carries the main responsibility for implementing 
the daily routine of production and work allocation in a public and 
private company. The visiting agent or planting adviser pay regular 
visits to check on certain aspects of the short run administration of 
the estate. Reports are then made to the directors or owners. 
In sole proprietorships and partnerships, the owners or 
partners, or employed majiager, carry out the adjninistration of the 
estate for daily production. During the survey partnership 
com.panies reported employing planting advisers to advise them on 
weeding and manuring. 
In all estates, there is a small clerical staff to assist the 
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manager or owner or partner (as the case may bo) to do the administrative 
work. 
From this description of the relationship between decision 
makers and decision areas, we can draw the following conclusions. First, 
in public and private companies, the manager is generally restricted in 
his scope of decision-making. In most cases, he is responsible for the 
execution of policies and plans determined by the owners or directors. 
In Bome cases, where he is given more latitude, he has the authority to 
employ workers or even to participate in deciding the annual budget for 
the estate. In all cases, he has to report on the progress of work of 
the estate. 
Secondly, the agency house performs an important role in 
advising the company on various technical problems. In public and private 
companies which are foreign owned, the task of selling rubber is usually 
given to agency houses. In other cases, the directors are normally the 
decision-makers on the marketing of rubber. 
Thirdly, the ultimate decision-makers on long and short term 
planning of the estate are the dii-fectors or owners. 
In contrast to the above, u.nless they employ the services of a 
planting adviser or an outsider as a manager, sole proprietors and 
partners are the principal decision-makers on all issues in their estates. 
In this type of estate, planting advisers and managers play only an 
advisory role. 
In some respects, the organizational structure of the small sole 
proprietorships and partnerships, except for the differences in size, is 
quite close to that of the smallholdings. 
Smallholdings, being mainly f/rimily farms, have a very sim.ple and 
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informal organization structure for decision-making.-^ The orgamzational 
unit consists of family members and niembers of the extended family 
system if the latter h-e.ve a share in the ownership. The family unit is 
the source of entrepreneurship and labour supply. Decision—making on 
long run investment or short run production is done by one 'patriarch' 
or a few influential members. If it is a partnership, the partners 
participate in the decision-making. The essential characteristic of 
such economic units is the absence of a large hierarchical structure with 
a vertical division or authority and responsibility as is found in 
estates. It is quite usual to find the role of decision-maker, 
administrator, and worker all wrapped up in one person in many small-
holdings. Where a few family members are involved in the decision-
making process, this becomes an interaction and interplay of personalities, 
self-interests, motives, and differences in perception of the issue and 
the future. The dominant person or persons, of course, would play the 
influential role in decision-making. 
In those cases where the smallholding is rented according to 
some customary system between the owner and operator, a relatively more 
formal arrangement is present. This formality, usually a verbal 
agreement, covers the tapping system to be used, the sharing of the output, 
the responsibility of maintenance, and length of the contractual 
agreement. Other than this formality, the actual unit or organization 
is still a simple one involving a few people. 
Larger smallholdings which use wage labour have a relatively 
larger management structure, but without any of the complexity of the 
estate organization. In such a case, the family members or partners 
perform the task of administration of daily production. All decision-
making is still made by them. 
^ For other details see Chapter 2. 
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7.2. DECISION-MAKING STEPS 
A farm, be it, an estate or a smallholding, must have some 
planning and co-ordination of the use of its limited physical, financial, 
and human resources so that its goals can be achieved. 
Irrespective of the size of the economic unit, this planning 
process and decision-making requires certain basic steps. First, the 
decision-makers must define the goals of the firm. Secondly, they must 
have some estimates or formulations of the future economic conditions. 
These two areas must be defined before resources can be committed for 
investment or production. Thirdly, the investment or production plan is 
formulated. Fourthly, the plan ie implemented. Fifthly, the decision-
makers must accept responsibility for the consequences. 
The above steps are necessary particularly for long run 
investment, for instance, in rubber replanting. In the short run 
situation, for instance, daily production of rubber, the degree of 
planning is minor. It is in fact an implementation and realization of 
the longer term plan made earlier. This is especially true of estates 
whose budgeted estimates to operate the estate are not constajitly revised 
in response to, say, changing rubber prices in the very short run. 
In this regard, smallholdings have the advantage of flexibility 
as they do not have inflexible budgetary plans for the year. Short 
term plane, for example, in manuring, can be changed immediately by swift 
decisions amongst the few partners or by the owner, in response to changes 
in economic conditions. Daily tapping system.s can be similarly changed 
since the use of a fixed tapping regime is not incumbent on them. 
In the rest of this ch0.pter, we shall amplify steps two and 
three of the decision-making process mentioned above. In particular, 
what are the decision variables which estates and sm.allholders consider 
236 
before they commit resources to replanting? How significant are the 
export tax and replanting grant ars decision variables in long run 
investment? Secondly, what are the constraints and variables which 
determine short run production? 
7.3. DECISION VARIABLES IN LONG RUN INVEiSTKENT OF ESTATES 
AND SMALU-IOLDINGS 
All estates in the survey reported that they had done some 
replanting in the past. However, not all the estates had repl.anted all 
their acreage. The proportion of acreage under pre-war rubber which 
has yet to be replanted is given in Table 7.1. 
Generally, both public and private companies, which were 
concentrated in the larger size grouping of over 1000 acres, had been 
more progressive in their replanting than the smaller partnership and 
sole proprietorship. On the average, public and private companies had 
respectively 13 to I6 per cent of their total area still under pre-war 
rubber in 1972. In com.parison, partnerships and sole proprietorships 
had a slightly larger percentage of 19 and I6 respectively. 
To investigate whether replanting is related to the size and 
ownership pattern of estate producers, a simple chi-square test is 
performed. A chi-square estimate is obtained from a contingency table 
constructed from Table 7.1 for each case. The chi-square estimate at 
1 degree of freedom is 0.'+^ + for the ownership-replanting case, and 0.25 
for the size-replanting case (Tables 7.2 and 7-3). Neither is 
statistically significant at the O.O5 level of significance. That is, 
replanting is not correlated with the two variables in this sample. One 
cannot conclude that no cause-effect relationship is directly involved. 
It only shows that in this sample, there is no major difference between 
replanting progress correlated with the other two variables for the two 
sets of estate groups. 
r--
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TABLE 7ol REPLANTING OF ESTATES BY OWNERSHIP AND SIZE GROUPS, 
SELANGOR 1973 








Proportion of Area 




500 - 999 2 1 7 ^ 870 17^ 32 
1000 and above Ik k3S6k 3276 14^ 31 
Private Company 
500 - 999 5 4075 815 15% 33 
1000 and above 9 16510 1841 18?^  35 
Partnership 
^99 and below 8 2640 220 20% 39 
500 - 999 6 3642 607 19^ 39 
1000 and above 2 1130 1130 20^ 38 
Sole Proprietorship 
499 and below 4 319 319 165^  39 
All Group 50 76980 
(1) Refers to age of trees of those areas felled for replanting. 
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All estates reported during the survey that they intended to 
replant the pre-war rubber areas. Only k public and 3 private companies 
had plans to plant oil palrn. Not all estates could diversify into other 
agricultural crops. One obstacle is the financial constraint which 
smaller estates face, for only the larger estates are in a position to 
ventui-e into capital intensive production like oil palm. Another factor, 
which is often overlooked in all econometric models, is that not all 
estates have the soils which are suitable for crops other than rubber. 
This limits the available alternatives in the diversifying programme of 
certain estates. 
TABLE 7.?. ESTATE OWNERSHIP GROUPS AND PROPORTION OF 
AREA. UNDER PRE-WAR AND REPLANTED RUBBER 
Ov/nership Under Pre-War Rubber | Replanted Area (Per Cent) | (Per Cent) 
Public and Private 
Companies 





1 22 1 78 
i 1 
26 1 7^ 
S 
i 1 
X^ 0.'+^. Not significant at 0.05 level. 
TABLE 7.3. ESTATE SIZE AND PROPORTION OF AREA UNDER 
PRE-WAR AND REPLANTED RUBBER 
Acreage Under Pre-War Rubber i (Per Cent) 
I Replanted Area \ 
(Per Cent) : 
1 
1000 and above 
1 






2 X = 0.25. Not significant at 0.05 level. 
To determine the relative importance of the export tax and 
replanting grant variables vis a vis that of others, estates were asked 
to rank the following variables accordingly: price of rubber price of a 
substitute crop (here it is palm oil), the export taxes, replanting 
grant, replanting reserves of estates, replanting done in previous years, 
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and age of trees. All the variables, except for age of trees and 
replanting reserves of estates, have already been tested in the 
quantitative model of the previous chapter. For lack of time series 
data, the other two variables could not be included in the model. 
The method which is used to determine the ranking of 
variables by rubber producers is the Kendal coefficient of concordance, W. 
The details of this method are explained in Appendix 7 .1 . 
The results of the ranking by the fifty estates are shown in 
Table 7.^ +. R. is the sum of ranks of the variables as reported by all 
the estates. The coefficient of concordance is estimated to be 0.89^, 
A chi-square using formula (2) in Appendix 7.1 gives a X^ estimate of 
268.2. With 6 degrees of freedom, this is highly significant at the 
0.001 level and more than significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels. With 
considerable assurance, one can conclude that the agreement among the 
estates in their ranking for most \'ariables, at least, was not due to 
chance. The null hypothesis that estates' rankings are vmrelated in 
some way is therefore rejected. 
From Table 7.4, the variable with the lowest R^ is the most 
J 
important and the one with the highest R. is the least important to 
3 
estates' ranking of decision variables. Accordingly, in order of 
importance the variables are: (l) age of trees, (2) replanted acreage, 
(3) reserves of estates, (k) price of rubber, (5) replanting grant, 
(6) price of palm oil, and (7) the export tax variable. 
We shall now examine the general ranking of variables by all 
estates. First, it is not very surprising that estates in general 
considered age of rubber trees as the most important decision variable 
determining replanting. At first sight this fact, besides being obvious, 
does not seem that significant. After all, if the trees are old, implying 
o 
(\1 
































For explanation of method see Appendix 7.1. 
Numbers in parentheis refer to ranking. 
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low yield and hirh cost of jjroductior., they have to be r<^placed by better 
high yielding matoricils. But this point is significant. It chows that 
in general estates were capable of replanting and that ?/hen the rubber 
trees were ready for replanting other factors did not constrain them» 
This situation contrasts that of the smallholdincs. As will be 
discussed later, srriiillholders may not be in a position to replant even 
though the treos needed to be replanted because of low yield and age. 
The criterion used by estates in judging the readiness of trees 
for replanting was the existence of "user" cost, that is, the loss of 
bark from tapping which finally leads to low yield over time. This is 
strictly a technical type of judgment as only the agronomic aspects are 
considered. I%ing this criterion, the average age of rubber trees 
replanted by public and private companies was about 33 years. In 
comparison, jiartnerships and sole proprietorships replanted at a later 
age, i.e., around 38. However, if the economic aspects of replanting 
are considered these "technical" ages are not necessarily the optimum 
one. This issue is analy/.ed in Chapter 10. 
In the supply response model, past repl'siiting is shown to be a 
critical explanatory varicxble of the rate of replanting. This conclusion 
was strongly confirmed dotting the survey by the estates which ranked past 
replanting as the second most important variable among the decision 
Vfiri ables. 
In the extreme cjise where the total acreage of an estate is 
already replanted, the future rate of repl;mting is consequently reduced. 
That is, past replantings tie up resources and also reduce the remaining 
area for future replanting. When no replanting has taken place before, 
ceteris paribus, the future rate of replanting ought to be larger. 
Estates r;.mked replanting reserves as the third most important 
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variable. Although, during the survey we had not obtained information 
on saving for investment by the various estate groups, there is some 
secondary information which is enlightening on the financial aspect 
of estate replanting. This information, provided by K.R.Chou, covers 
the publicly incorporated companies. 
In his study on saving and investment in Malaya, Chou observed 
that the major source of replanting finance was depreciation allowances 
plus ploughed back profits of current income. He also pointed out that 
the annual average gross rubber investment in the 1960's was $40.6 
million. This indicated a ratio of roughly O.S between gross investment 
and net profits over the postwar period. Unfortunately, there v/as no 
distinction made on the proportion of gross investment financed from, 
depreciation allov/ances and that from profits. 
One indirect indication is this. Chou found that 44 per cent 
of net profits were retained and only 30 P'^ r cent were spent on 
investment in fixed assets. Most of the remainder went into liquid 
assets. In effect, about l6 per cent of the net profits were reinvested 
in rubber. Depreciation allowances averaged about 2 per cent on the 
value of issued capital and accounted for about 40 per cent of gross 
investment in fixed assets. The remaining 60 per cent came from retained 
profits. 
This indirect evidence points out that the larger estates in 
general are quite capable of financing their investment programme 
internally. It is therefore not surprising that larger estates in 
general (those over 1000 acres) reported no financial difficulties in 
their replanting progroTnme. 
It is interesting to note that the replanting gr,ant WAS not 
considered high up the list of decision variables. There are two 
^ Chou K.R., Saving and Investment in Malaya, (Donald Moore, I965). 
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possible reasons. First, estates are retixrned the replanting cess 
which is a major source of replanting reserves. Secondly, on top of 
the replanting cess they have sufficient funds of their own to finance 
their replanting programmes. This means that estates could afford to 
replant even if no external grant is given them. 
When the estates were asked whether the withdrawal of the 
replanting grant in I969 had seriously affected their replanting 
programmes, all reported in the negative. This should be further 
clarified.- What it means is this: as all estates had reported during 
the survey, they would rep],ant whether or not the replanting grant was 
available. This does not mean that for some smaller estates the pace 
of replanting might not be slightly slowed down. However, this is 
quite different from saying that without the grant estates' replantings 
would not be undertaken. But this is what has happened to smallholdings. 
As will be pointed out later in this chapter, many smallholdings reported 
that they could not replant if the grant was not given. This did not 
happen to the estates which were surveyed. The availability of the 
replanting grant did influence replanting in so far as it was a form of 
additional aid. But it would not deter estates' replanting if the aid 
was not in existence. 
In the overall assessment of the price of rubber variable, 
estates ranked it in the fourth position (Table 7.^ +). It will be 
remembered that in the supply response model, the rubber price variable 
is significant and has the correct sign. But this aggregate result 
hides the fact that there may be differences among estates in their 
sensitivity to the rubber price variable. This difference in sensitivity 
to the rubber price is revealed by their answers t.- the question whether 
rubber price was an important factor in their replanting decision. 80 
per cent of the estates above 1000 acres and 56 per cent of the estates 
zkk 
below 1000 acree replied in the affirmative. The response is summarized 
in Table 7.5. 
^ABLE 7.5. IS THE PRICE OF RUBBER AN IMPORTAI^T FACTOR 
IN YOUR REPLANTING PROGRA.wME? 
Estate Size Group Percentage of Estates Answering 
Yes , 1 No. 1 
1000 acres and above 70 1 ^ i 
1000 acres and below 60 
i 
[ +^0 t 
1 ' 
? i 1 
1.76. Significant at 0.01 level. 
A chi-square estimate of 11.76 was obtained from Table 7.5. 
This is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. It may be inferred 
that the larger estates were, therefore, more responsive than the 
smaller ones to the price variable in their replanting programmes. 
Ng had found similar evidence in his study. For the larger European 
estates price was an important variable in their decision-making, but 
not for the smaller Asian estates. 
In addition, large estates, especially European owned ones, may 
be sensitive not only just to changing prices of rubber but also to the 
relative returns from other forms of investments. Once agedn, indirect 
evidence is provided by Chou.*^ He found that estates owned by European 
companies had few obstacles in transferring their liquid funds to 
relatively more profitable investments abroad. The existence of a larger 
number of alternative investments for these multinational companies 
explains their higher ranking of the relative importynce of rubber price 
vis-a-vis thnt of smaller companies in replanting decision. 
^ C.S.Ng, "Estate Replanting" (Mimeographed), RRIM, 1970. 
Chou, op.cit. 
It is of interest to note those estates, which had plans to 
replant» had postponed implementation of their replanting programme 
during the survey period because the price of rubber was around 70 to 
90 cents per poimd. This is a strong piece of evidence of short run 
profit maximization. A corollary to this is that estates would prefer 
to replant when the price is low and not during a period of high rubber 
prices. 
It is interesting to note that 80 per cent of the estates 
reported that it would be unprofitable to replant if the future expected 
price is below 50 cents per pound. The rest reported an average price 
of 45 cents per pound. In most cases, the former were large estates. 
The low ranking given by estates to substitute variable, i.e., 
price of palm oil, indicates that estates (at least those surveyed) could 
not diversify that easily. Switching from rubber planting to oil paLm 
involves not only the question of their relative returns. It is also a 
question of soil suitability. Besides, as pointed out by the smaller 
estates during the survey, the relatively more capital intensive nature 
of palm oil production, which requires heavy financing and technical 
know-how, effectively deterred them from planting oil palm. Only some 
of the larger estates could diversify into oil palm planting. This 
survey evidence corroborates somewhat the result of the statistical 
model on the palm oil coefficient. 
The low ranking given to the export tax variable shows that it 
was not an important variable in the decision-making of estate producers 
vie-a-vis other factors. However, this conclusion is valid only in the 
sense that estates had given more weight to the other factors. For most 
estates, this variable was considered an exogenous factor v;hich they 
could do nothing about. When the export tax was used as a decision variable 
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it was done so indirectly via the price. Estates showed much more 
concern over the future expected price than future tax rates. No estates 
reported planning on the basis of export tax changes. But estates did 
plan on the basis of changes in expected prices. 
Nevertheless, the payment of the various export taxes would 
have an influence on the supply of investible funds via lower prices 
received, in the rubber industry. By reducing the profit of rubber 
producers, the proportion which can be ploughed back as retained earnings 
and depreciation earnings is consequently reduced. In this process, the 
tax is important in affecting future investment in rubber. However, 
considering the rapid progress made in the replanting programmes of 
estates in the past, the adverse effect of the export taxes is not as 
great as it appears. The relative returns from rubber are sufficiently 
high to warrant reinvestment in the industry. 
Because of differences in resources and organization, the 
investment behaviour of smallholders and estates is expected to be 
quite different. The most important characteristic of family farms is 
that they are not pure firms but firm-household complexes. Investment 
is influenced not only by relative returns from alternative investments, 
but also by the way current income is allocated between present 
consumption and future income. This very much depends on the subjective 
perception of the importance of these variables in the livelihood of the 
family operators. Factors like the cultural background and the social 
environment are relevant in the study of f<ainily farms, more so than in 
that of estates. 
Smallholders, like estates, were asked to rank certain variables 
which would influence their repltuiting. The only difference in this case 
is that the substitute crop was assumed to be padi and in the place of 
2^ +7 
the firms' replanting reserves family saving was iised. The result is 
given in Table 7 . 6 . 
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Nurrbers in parentheses refer to ranking. 
A Spearman rank correlation test of estate and smallholders' 
ranking gives an estimate of 0.536. This is not si,gr.ificant at the 
0.05 and 0.01 levels. That is, estates and smallholders did not show 
general agreement on the way they ranked certain economic variables 
which influenced their replajiting decision. 
Table 7«6 shows that the replanting grant was given first 
rarJcing by all smallholders. This survey evidence confirms the 
statistical conclusion of the supply response mode]^. In contrast estates, 
because of their stronger financial capacity, placed it in fifth position. 
Family saving was ranked second by smallholders. Both of these factors 
reflect on the importance of finance and monetary liquidity in smallholding 
replanting. The reason is obvious. Most smallholders, particularly those 
around 5 acres and below, find it difficult to obtain capital financing 
to cover the direct cost of replanting and to bridge the loss of income 
during the maturation period. 
Fisk,"^ in a study of Malay reservation, found that 8l per cent 
of smallholders who had started replanting owned more than 1 lot and 
could rely on income from other land till the new trees matured. This 
7 Fifik, E.K., "Productivity and Income from Rubber in an Established 
Malay Reservation," M , Vol.VI, No.l, April, I96I. 
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evidence is supported by t?ie relationship shown in Table 7.7. 86 per 
cent of the emallholders reported that they would not replant if the 
replanting grout was not available. 65 per cent of this was in the 
group below 1 0 acres. 80 per cent of smallholders reported that they 
relied on the graiit as their major source of finance for replanting. 
The remaining 20 per cent mentioned the use of family saving and the 
grant. 
TABLE 7.7. WOULD YOU REPLANT IF NO REPLANTING GRANT IS GIVEN? 
Size (Acres) Smallholder's Answer 
Yes No Total 
10 and above 1'+ 21 35 
Below 10 0 65 65 
86 100 
f 
X^ ' = 30.36. Significant at 0.05 level. 
The above evidence confirms very strongly the statistical 
evidence we have found for the replanting grant variable in the supply 
response model. That is, because of financial constraints smallholders 
are extremely responsive to the replanting subsidy in their decision to 
replant. Only when they are assured of financial assistance, particularly 
external finance, do smallholders consider replanting. This explains 
why, in contrast to estates, they did regard age of trees as the most 
important but fourth in rank in their decision-making. 
Though ranked third by smallholders, and second by estates, past 
replanting or replanted acreage is in fact of more critical importfuice 
to the former than the latter. For given the much smaller total acreage 
of area smallholders have, any replanting done in the past would really 
be substantial in size, proportionately speaking. To use an extreme 
illustration, if a smallholder has only one acre and if it was replanted 
2^9 
last year, thcni future replanting would bo significantly unimportant 
till 30 over yeartj later. 
The lack of emphasis on this point by smallholders thus 
confirms the evidence of this variable in the supply response model. 
There is some similarity in the response to the rubber price 
factor for both estate and smallholding groups. All those smallholders 
which had intended to replant temporarily postponed replanting during the 
survey period because of the high rubber prices. A few smallholders 
p reported slaughter tapping during this period.''' 
The statistical evidence provided by the supply response model 
shoy;s that the coefficient for the price of rubber variable has the 
correct sign, but it is not significant. The plausible explanation is 
that price may be important to replanting, but smallholders cannot 
respond because of the constraints discussed above. Besides, the response 
to price is not a continuous process. For moat smallholders, replanting 
can be done only once or twice in their lifetime. The only opportune 
time for them to replant is when they are most capable, financially 
speaking, to do so. The question of price response is, therefore, of 
subsidiary importance to smallholders. In any case, given the lack of 
alternative investments the choice of portfolio for whatever liquid assets 
they have is extremely limited. Rubber planting is still the choice of 
smallholders if they can replant and a 'good' price is something to be 
hoped for. 
Though the price of a substitute crop, price of padi, was used 
to find out the response coefficient, it was done with some skepticism. 
Rice and rubber land are not really competitive except perhaps, for labour 
g 
Slaughter tapping is not a normal practice as it soon kills the tree. 
However, immediately before replanting it is common to slaughter tap 
in order to get the most out of the tree. 
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in certain conditions. They ,are not perfect substitutes, despite the 
fact that their relative returns have changed somewhat recently 
because of the dip in rubber prices. No smallholders reported that 
they v/ould use the replanting grant to plant padi though it is an 
approved crop. Beside the problems of soil imd terrain which delimit 
this substitution, one must remember that switching crops involve 
changing a certain type of work regime, and, more importantly, a way of 
life. 
This explains the very low ranking of the price of padi as this 
was not considered as relevant in decision-making for rubber replanting. 
This supports the insignificance of the coefficient of the padi variable 
in the supply response model. 
If the export tax variable is thought to reduce the amount of 
investible fund of the estates, then it is more so for smallholders. 
Assuming an average low yield of 600 pounds per annum, a productive life 
of 30 years for the rubber trees, and a price of 60 cents per pound, the 
total amount of export tax and cesses paid would total Sl,260 per acre. 
Assuming that the smallholder is returned 11750.00 for replanting, he 
still suffers a loss of ttSlO.OO per acre of potential investible fund. 
The export tax, by entering the saving-investment and profit 
nexus in the above manner, therefore, affects potential replanting. 
But no smallholders had reported the export tax as a conscious factor in 
their planting decisions. The very idea of the export tax did not enter 
hiB mind when the smallholder considered replanting. Mis only concern 
was his finance to repl.ant when the trees wore ready for replanting, and 
if the income gap during the maturation period could somehow be bridged. 
It is often pointed out that Malay and Chinese smallholders 
9 
exhibit different investment behaviour in their replanting. Voon has 
o Voon, P.K., Chinese Rubber Smallholdings Industry in Selangor, M.A. Thesis (University of Malaya, I967). 
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shown that Malay smallholders were slower in their replanting rate than 
Chinese smallholders. Both economic and non-economic reasons have been 
advanced for this differential between the two ethnic groups. 
One of the non-economic reasons cited is the Islamic and Malay 
customary laws of inheritajice which have led to sub-division and 
fragmentation of the original piece of land in each generation. The 
resultant minute plots of land not only do not permit economic and 
efficient production, but have also hindered replanting. From the 
agronomic viewpoint, it is technically difficult to replant very small 
areas because of overshading by neighbouring trees and because of keen 
competition for plant nutrients between the matiire and immature trees. 
Another result of the inheritance laws is difficulty in 
reaching agreement amongst joint owners. However this problem is not 
confined to Malay smallholders alone. It is a chronic problem facing 
all types of joint ownership. 
One consequence of the above features is the reduction in income, 
which in turn affects the saveable surplus which can be used for 
supplementing the replanting grant during replanting. 
Swift^*^ argued th/it the saveable surplus of the Malay smallholders 
was also affected by their cultural trnd social behaviour. The concept of 
'malu' or shame was introduced to explain the Malay smallholders' high 
preference for present consumption, and the need to sustain it, which 
leaves little for future investment. The danger lies not only in having 
a high preference for current consumption hut also in the striving for a 
level which is higher than he can afford. This short-run economic 
orientation is inimical to long run investment, for the latter 
necessitates present abstinence in the long run interests. 
Swift, M.G. 'Economic Concentration anci Malay Peasant Society' 
(Mimeographed A.N.U., Canberra, 1971). 
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In comparison, the Chinese smallholders have a cultural and 
social background which is more conducive to long run investment. First, 
they are less plagued by social customs regarding the division of the 
land. Leaving it to the eldest son of the family is a common practice, 
•'•his helps to keep the land intact. Even in the case of the property 
being shared among family members, there is a very strong reason for not 
subdividing it. Land is difficult to acquire, and once obtained it is 
seldom relinquished. It is the collective responsibility of the family 
members to keep this asset and to maintain it properly as an additional 
source of income. In most cases, the family members would have other 
sources of income and the family farm is Just a subsidiary, albeit 
important, extra source. 
This strong collective sense of responsibility explains the 
willingness of the farm owner to sacrifice high present conBumption so 
that investment in replanting to secure future income for the other family 
members is possible. The life cycle of the Chinese smallholding is thus 
longer than that of the Malay one. For the latter, their weak collective 
responsibility to perpetuate the holding and to 'renew' the asset leads 
to deterioration and final disintegretion of the farm. 
One should not, however, over-emphaaize this issue. There is 
no doubt that such non-economic forces do play a part, but until more 
empirical evidence is available it is difficult to say how much of the 
unreplanted areas of Malay smallholders is due to such non-economic 
reasons. 
But it is clear that the Malay smallholders hnve a greater 
financial constraint, whether caused by economic or non-economic factors, 
than the Chinese smallholders. A study in 1965 of 395 Malay holdings. 
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in Kedah revealed that two-thirds had no money to replant.^^ Of these, 
60 per cent had no capital to start with, and the rest could not afford 
to forgo the income from the holding during the replanting period. 
On this issue, an accident of history had put the Chinese 
smallholders in a slightly better economic position. The resettlement 
of Chinese squatters during the Emergency period into villages near the 
urban centres enlarged their economic base. The family members could 
obtain additional sources of income from petty hawking, supplying food 
for the urban areas, or working in nearby mines. Being nearer to urban 
centres they are also better informed about the replanting schemes of 
Government. 
Inspite of this, the financial constraint is a problem facing 
all smallholders. When the two ethnic groups are asked to rank the 
variables in their decision-making on replanting both point to the 
replanting grant as of the greatest importance. Those who do not do so, 
especially the larger Chinese smallholders ov/ning 20 acres or more, are 
in moLit cases absentee landlords from the urban areas. 
CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the institutional and organizational bac'-:ground 
of estates and smallholders provides some understanding of the different 
emphasis they place of the various variables affecting their decision-
making in replanting. It confirms the statistical findings regarding 
the significance of certain variables in the replanting function. 
Of particular interest is the role of the replanting grant and 
the export tax variables. The general conclusion is that the replanting 
grant variable is positively related to the replanting functions of 
^^ Mohd. Amin, Replanting by smallholding, Kedah, (Mimeographed) 
M I , 1965. 
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estates and smallholdings. As a subuidy, its influence, from a priori 
ground and empirical evidence, shows that it helps to shift the 
replanting function to the right. 
However, its relative importance in influencing the replanting 
investment of estates and smallholders is not the same. This arises from 
the difference in their resource base. Our evidence shows that, in 
general, estates would continue to replant even if the replanting grant 
was not given to them. They are financially more able to do so than 
smallholders. Besides their internal sources of funds, they are also 
in a better position to obt?an external finance for large scale expenditure, 
This explains the lower ranking given to the replanting grant variable 
by estates in comparison to the other factors. 
The ranking changes when financial constraint becomes a 
critical factor. Smallholders demonstrate this. The inability of 
smallholders, especially the smaller ones, to finance from, internal 
reserves, to obtain easy credit from external soiirces, or to afford 
the income loss during the immaturity period, makes the role of the 
replanting grant most significant. 
Decision-making therefore depends critically on the resource 
background of the rubber producers. Investment decisions depend not only 
on the future expected returns but also on the ability to undertake the 
capital financing. Estates could solve the latter problem and, therefore, 
concentrate on the various ways available to achieve the former. Small-
holdf'rs nre concerned with the latter difficulty. 
The payment of export taxes may influence investment by 
1) hindering the incentives for investment, 
?.) by reducing the monetary means for investment. 
If the investment decisions of a firm are determined entirely 
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by the future expected return, every reduction of profits and the smiount 
of investible funds reduces the incentive and ability to invest. 
Investors would shift capital and other resources to other investment 
areas where the tax rates are lov/er or where net returns are higher. 
The historical experience of rubber replanting in Malaysia has, however, 
shown this to be not very important. It is not that the payment of the 
export taxes is not a burden. In a strict sense, every tax is a burden 
on the payer. But this has to be examined in the context of expected 
returns and the existence of alternative investment possibilities. For 
local estate companies, the choice of alternative investments is narrower 
than for foreign owned companies which have investment interests over a 
wider area both geographically and businesewise.. Chou in fact pointed 
out that there was nothing to prevent the outflow of liquid funds from 
European estates. However, the high rate of capital return discouraged 
the movement of capital into other fields of production. Besides, rubber 
estates cannot, because of the nature of rubber production, readily 
shift resources in and out of rubber in response to changes in the export 
tax rates. For a satisfactory price range expected to hold in the future, 
estates would continue replanting. The export tax, though a burden, is 
accepted as a given factor. If taxation has adversely affected rubber 
replanting, it would be the company profit tax of '+0 per cent which is 
relatively heavier than the export tax for most price levels at which a 
profit could be made. This argument does not deny the possibility that 
if the export tax had not been imposed there was a likelihood tliat 
rubber investment in replanting could be more rapid or larger. 
Smallholders in comparison to estates are more restricted in 
their investment choice. In terms of finance find management capability, 
they are generally not in a position to move to more profitable enterprises 
in non agricultural areas. Within agriculture itself, probably except 
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for oil palm production, there are still no investment opportunities as 
profitable as rubber production. More importantly, it has also become 
a way of life to many smallholders. The export tax payment does affect 
income and thus, it does affect the potential amount of family saving 
of smallholders. In this sense, it affects the rate of replanting. 
But smallholders do not think of replanting investment in terms of the 
expected rates of taxes. If they can overcome the critical threshold 
of capital financing they would replant. That is, the positive influence 
of the replanting grant is much greater than the negative effect of the 
export tax on future replanting. 
7.'+. DECISION MAKING IN SHORT RUN PRODUCTION 
In the last section, we have established that the substitution 
and income effects^^ of the export taxes are not as powerful as that of 
the replanting grant in affecting replanting investment. The overall 
climate for investment is a mucli more important factor than the adverse 
influence of just one variable, the export taxes. The argument has validity 
for estate and smallholding producers, though for the latter the income 
effect of the replanting grant is more powerful than for estates. For the 
smallholdings too, the substitution effects of the export taxes are close 
to zero because of their limited alternative opportunities for investment 
vis-a-vis that of estates. Estates could move their capital into other 
investment areas in the long run as the alternatives available are 
relatively larger. 
The long run not effects of the export taxes and replanting grant 
on the short run situation determine the number of mature acres of rubber 
available for tapping and the potential yield of these trees. It is only 
in this process that their favourable or unfavourable effects are felt. 
At any moment in the short run production period, this effect is given. 
^^ For discussion of terms, refer Reckteriwald, U.C., Tax Incidence St 
Income Redistribution, (Wayne State University Press, 1971.' pp. '-'9-32. 
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The question is whether in the sliort run the payment of the export taxes 
would adversely affect prodviction. 
This is essentially determined by the elasticity of the supply 
curve of rubber, which as shown is less than unity. As explained in 
Chapter 6, smallholders have a relatively more price elastic supply 
curve than estates for both periods of falling and rising prices. For 
both groups of producers, the inelasticity is smaller in absolute terms 
in the period of falling prices than in the period of rising prices. 
What accounts for this low elastic supply response? In the 
short run, output response to price or tax changes can only take place by 
varying the intensity or frequency of tapping, by using stimulants, by 
abandoning areas or restarting the tapping of abandoned areas„ At any 
given moment in the short run, the stock of trees is constant and exerts 
no influence on short run production. The exception is when certain areas 
become mature and are brought into tapping during the moment. 
It was found during the survey that for any given mature acreage, 
estates and smallholders would exact the maximum amount of output 
technologically possible and if variable costs are covered. This would 
be so irrespective of the price changes. This is the single most important 
reason for the inelasticity of the supply curve of rubber with respect to 
changes in the other economic variables. 
In a period of falling prices, as long as the variable cost of 
production is covered, it makes sense to continue tapping. For the flow 
of latex is more or less continuous, so that "a crop unharvested is a crop 
lost." In the case of certain estates which have a certain proportion of 
low yielding areas this general argument may not hold. If the price is 
below '+0 cents per pound, the cost of tapping may make it uneconomic to 
continue production. This is especially true of estates paying MAPA wage 
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rateR. The area has therefore to be temporarily abandoned. This, 
however, is not a common case, as most estates have high yielding areas. 
It was found during one survey that estates were reluctant to 
lay off labour in a period of falling prices. There are two reasons for 
this. First, the falling prices may be a temporary phenomenon. Secondly, 
because of this, most estates would 'hoard' labour rather than retrench 
them. Retrenchment disrupts the organization of the use of labour. Tappers 
are skilled labour and estates have invested in training them to tap well. 
No estates retrench labour in a temporary price fall and recruit again in 
an upturn in rubber prices. This only occurs in a severe depression. For 
such reason, the labour is still retained for the production of rubber as 
long as the variable cost is covered. 
Another factor making for the inelasticity of supply is that 
estates do not speculate on the trend of the market by accumulating stocks. 
From the survey it was found that estates only stocked rubber to get it 
ready for disposal and not for price speculation. All current output was 
thus sold as soon as possible. 
In a period of rising prices, estates could respond by increasing 
the intensity of tapping or by using stimulants. In practice, few estates 
reported doing this. The reaction of the manager, under the direction of 
the owners or agency houses which are in most cases conservative, is to 
continue the budgeted tapping system for all fields. The conservatism 
arises from their over-estimation of the user cost, that is, the loss of 
bark from tapping. It was found during the survey that estates were 
concerned with proper maintenance of the trees. Frequent changes in 
tapping systems in response to price changes were not reported by estates. 
Stimulants are becoming commoner in estates for increasing yield. 
It was found that the practice was to apply stimulants only to certain 
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clones and only Eiftfjr the twelfth yecir of tripping. But because the long 
term effects of certain stimulant applications have yet to be established, 
most estates adopted a cautious approach. Hov/ever, if the fields were 
close to repl;:jnting time, then, estates were more willing to maximise 
exploitation by using stimulation three to four times a year. 
Like estate?^, smallholders reported during one survey that they 
di' not tap less often oi" cut output because of falling prices. The 
response could be just the oppositCg Indeed some smallholders, in order 
to maintain a certain income and consumption level tried to produce more 
when prices fell. This shows that, while smallholders may desire an 
increase in income in a period of rising prices, they will strive harder 
to offset a decline in their incomes in period of falling prices. 
Perversity of supply response is a feature accompanying falling rather 
than rising p r i c e s . 
There is,however, a limit to this. Like estates, smallholders 
in fact are producing the technologically permissible maximum level of 
output during their regular period of tapping. The leeway left for 
further increasing output is very small. Still, considering the less 
rigid tapping system followed by smallholders as was found during the 
survey, output can still be increased temporarily by more intense tapping 
in response to a short term increase in prices. Smallholders did report 
the use of daily tapping and the increase in the cut of the tapping. 
But this practice can not last long as dryness of the bark would reduce 
latex flow. 
During the survey it was found that the ase of stimulants in 
smallholdings was not common. The answer given by them was that they 
were unsure of the effect of stimulants on their trees. Another reason 
was that unless the stimulated yield could recoup the extra effort and 
cost expended, then it would not be worth the trouble. T h i s , of course. 
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depends on the price level too. 
The prevalent view that smallholders do not take care of their 
rubber trees, and therefore frequently adopt intense tapping methods in 
response to prices is not very correct. Remembering that smallholders 
have a low income and the fact that the major source is from their only 
asset (i.e., the rubber trees), the frequent use of high tapping 
intensity method, which damages the trees, is not a practice smallholders 
readily adopt. This amounts to capital consumption for short run 
maximum gains. This is against the logic of waiting 6 to 7 years for 
the trees to mature and hoping to enjoy the future streajn of income from 
it. In our survey, slaughter tapping was not reported to be practised by 
smallholders in response to price increase. It was only done before 
replanting time. 
Bauer^^ argued that the relatively more elastic short run supply 
of smallholders is partly caused by the alternative employment they could 
turn to. This means that supply is affected, that is reduced, during a 
period of low prices as smallholders either abandon tapping or put in 
less effort because they can work elsewhere. Our survey evidence disproves 
this, at least in the Malaysian case. First, no smallholders would abandon 
tapping, for this would only result in an immediate loss of income. 
Secondly, smallholders would not reduce their effort to produce less 
either. In fact, as pointed out earlier, if they could they would try to 
produce more to maintain their income level. The supply of output cannot, 
therefore, be affected as Bauer suggested. 
Besides, in a labour surplus economy with high vmemployment, not 
every smallholder can get alternative employment, at least not full time 
alternative employment. But to maintain their income level, smallholders 
reported that they and their family members would look for odd jobs or 
Bauer, P.T., The Rubber Industry, (Harward University Press, Cambridge, 
19^ +8) p.31. 
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petty hawking. In this respect, the Chine,-.e smallholders are sometimes 
more fortunate since they are located near the urban centres and new 
villages. Supplementary income is easier for them to obtain. Malay 
Gmallholdorr, who are in small kiimpongs do not share these employment 
opportunities, and travelling distance is another problem to overcome if 
they wish to leave the farm. 
If the short run supply response with respect to price is low, 
so is the response witli respect to the export tax variable. First, if 
rubber producers do respond to the tax variable tliey would have responded 
more to the price variable. This is because the price has a more 
dominating influence on the behaviour of rubber producers. Price, and 
not the export tax, is in the consciousness of the minds of the rubber 
producers. 
To impede output, the export tax must take la_rge proportion of 
Ik 
the price. Even at the high price of 100 cents per pound, the total 
payment of the export tax and cesses amount to only 21 per cent of the 
price. But at this high price, no rubber producers would reduce output 
because of the tax. At this high price, they wish they could produce 
more, not less. That is, the positive income effect of a price rise is 
much stronger than the negative effect of tax. Output is thus not affected 
by the tax changes. The substitution effect of the tax is also insignificant. 
The reasons earlier advanced for the price variable also apply here. In 
a period of falling prices, with export taxes also falling, output is also 
not affected for similar reasons. In any case, in both price periods the 
elasticity of supply does not vary much as the maximum output has been 
I't 
One would appreciate this better by keeping in mind the effects of 
the income tax on the taxpayer. Thus if the tax takes a substantial 
portion of the income disincentive effects occur, for instance, the 
supply of effort may be reduced. That is, the tax has more 
implications than the mere reduction of income, 'Jo is the case of 
export tax. See Rectenwald, especially Chapter 9-
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regularly produced. Output is thus not affected by the export taxes in 
the short run though the net returns of the producers axe. 
Historical experience had confirmed the above analysis. For 
inst.-mce, under the International Rubber Regulation Agreement"" 
smallholders in the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia) were subject to 
a special export tax specifically meant to keep their output within the 
limits set under the control scheme. In 193^, the tax was five-sixths 
of the f.o.b. price of rubber. Yet the smallholders did not substantially 
reduce production. The quota system on the Malayan smallholders during 
the same period was also not a complete success in curbing production. 
The above analysis thus confirms the results of the supply response 
model regarding the lack of significance of the export tax variable in 
influencing short run output. 
7.S. NON OUTPUT RESPONSES 
Rubber producers may have other modes of response which do not 
affect output in the short run but wkich help to cut cost. We shall touch 
on this briefly. 
The expenditure items of a large estate can be broadly classified 
into: 
a) general expenditure 
b) planting expenditure 
c) capital expenditure. 
General expenditure covers a host of expenditure items r^mging 
from general maintenance, tapping and collection costs, to manufacturing 
costs. Planting expenditure includes items involved in replanting and 
new planting. Capital expenditure covers maintenance expenses on 
machinery and such like items. 
In the short run, it is in the area of general expenditure which 
^ Op.cit., pp. 38-39; 113; ll8; l'+2. 
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allows some manoeuverability for some estates tu cut costs in a period 
of fallin{^ prices. However, this (degree of flexibility depends to a 
great extent on the willingness of the decision-makers to chajige budgeted 
estimates in response to changing prices. Most of the large estates have 
adopted a policy of strict adherence to the budgeted plans. 
For instance, large estates stated that in the manuring 
programme no clianges would be made irrespective of the price changes in 
the short run period. Small estates reported that they were quite 
willing to cut down on the routine application part of the manuring 
budget, but not the portion of the expenditure meant to redress the 
nutritional deficiency of the rubber trees. Such estates also reported 
willingness to cut expenditure on weeding by reducing the number of rounds 
done per year. This, of course, depends on the density of the weeds. 
For young immature trees, estates would not be willing to sacrifice 
growth of the plants for saving in cost. 
In his study on production costs Bauer mentioned that a historical 
feature of the short run maintenance of output in the face of falling 
prices has been the plasticity of costs.^^ Between 1929 and 1933, variable 
costs fell by 75 per cent, roughly the same percentage fall in prices. He 
mentioned that this was due to abandonment of clean weeding, cutting the 
salaries of European managers and consolidating their supervisory 
activities, and to a cut in the wages of labour. 
In the contemporary situation this short run plasticity of costs 
is less significant, particularly for the large estates. For instance, 
the wage rate of tappers and field workers in MAPA estates is tied to 
rubber prices. Though wage rates vary with changes in rubber prices, the 
^^ Bauer, P.T., 'Rubber Production Costs During the Great Depression' 
Economic Journal, December, 19^ +3• 
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provision of fringe benefits and a guariinteed basic wage can prove to be 
a severe cost burden when rubber prices are below cents per pound. 
In this respect, smaller estates which use contract labour, without any 
guaranteed basic wage, are in a better position to cut costs during a 
price fall. 
The smallholders are more flexible than estates. First, they 
do not adhere strictly to any general maintenance plan. Secondly, for 
most of them the degree of commercialized inputs is not as high as the 
estates. On the first point, smallholders reported that they would stop 
the use of fertilizer immediately when the price is below 50 cents. 
However, since most of the labour is family in origin, the saving in 
labour cost is not great. 
7 . 6 . CONCLUSION 
The policy implications of the above analysis on the short run 
situation are quite clear. In the short run, the export tax can be 
increased without serious consequence on production of estates and 
smallholders. Because of the absence of "announcement effects" as in 
the case of the personal income tax, the reactions to export tax changes 
in the short run are negligible. As the tax is collected at the export 
points it is a 'quiet' impersonal tax. Furthermore, most smallholders 
are ignorant of the tax payment. Those who know, like the estates, are 
conditioned to it. Given this, the feeling due to the "spite effect", 
that the tax is an outside interference to economic activity, is not 
present. The psychological reactions, with their accompanying responses 
in terms of work effort and productive activity, arc absent. In any case, 
because of the nature of rubber production and the desire to maintain a 
certain level of income the elasticity of supply response is small. Price 
and export tax changes have thus little impact on short run output changes. 
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But the tax has an impact on short run profit. This in turn 
affects the long run amount of investible funds and incentives to 
reinvest in replanting. If this occurs, the output level would fall 
because of the slower rate of replanting. 
If the above causation process between the export tax and 
investment is correct, then it affects smallholders more than it does 
estates. The exact effect is actually difficult to determine. The tax 
reduces the potential invet.tible fund available to smallholders for 
replanting. But the corollary that if the tax is absent or returned 
smallholders would readily replant is not totally correct. They might 
or might not. For the logic of the corollary implicity assumes the 
extra income is saved for future investment. It might be consumed and 
not saved for investment purposes. 
From the policy viewpoint, therefore, it is not a necessarily 
wise move to abolish the tax to encourage replanting. For the effects 
of this are uncertain. The best approach is still the provision of the 
replanting grant to rubber producers. Imposing the replanting cess as 
a forced saving ensures the existence of a definite sum for replanting. 
This may not be achieved if the reliance is on voluntary saving via the 
return of the replanting cess. The relevant issue then is whether the 
existing replanting grant is sufficient to stimulate smallholders' 
replanting and how to overcome non-economic forces acting against it. 
2G6 
Cn/iPTER 8 
OPTIMAL RTTPLACET^EMT OF RUBBSR TRESS 
R.lo INTRODUCTION 
Two mnjor issues confront the rubber producer in his decision-
raaking on lon^ term investment on his land. The first entrepreneurial 
decision is the maximization of net returns from given resources between 
alternative investments, that is, whether a given piece of land should 
be replanted with rubber or with substitute crops<, This is a question 
in comparative profitability arising from the allocation of scarce 
resources between different investment alternatives which are available. 
TVie second issue, which is examined in this chapter, concerns 
the optimal replacement of a stand of rubber trees. If a decision is 
made to replant a second decision has to be mnde with regard to the 'best' 
timing- in the replacement on an existing stand of rubber trees. That is, 
at what age should a given stand of rubber trees bo replaced such that 
the luture flow of net returns is maximized. To determine the optimal 
replacefif-nt age this requires a comparison of the flow of net returns 
from the existin;^ stand of trees with the future flow of net returns from 
a new stand of trees. The flow of net returns, and thus the optimal 
replacement age, is influenced by a complexity of variables, viz, future 
prices, yields and production costs of existing and future trees, 
replnitting gr^nt, time preference of the producer as ^"Xpressed through 
the >'iscount rate and so on. 
In the case of the smallholders, their decision to replant is 
not only influenced by the above variables but are also affected by social 
Mn ;; rultui-al factors. In this study such non-quan Vi fiable influences are 
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assumed to be given and exogenous to the situation. It is not that they 
have less significance than the other variables. In fact, in many 
individual cases the peasant smallholder may be influenced more by such 
socio-cultural forces than by the economic ones. However, to make our 
models manageable we will assume them to be const;int and concentrate on 
the quantifiable and quantitative variables. 
In Chapter 3 we have given evidence of the positive effect of 
the replanting grant on the long term investment decisions of rubber 
producers. While the replanting grant is known to affect cost and 
profitability there is as yet no study of its influence on the optimal 
timing of rubber trees replacement. We shall therefore single out the 
impact of the replanting grant on the optimal replacement age of a stand 
of rubber trees of a certain clonal material. Since its inception, the 
replanting grant programme has been concerned mainly with the financing 
aspect of the problem, that is, the subsidizing of estates' and 
smallholders' replanting expenditure. The policy of the Government has 
been to motivate producers by giving them an incentive through the grant. 
However, if the replanting grant is an important determinant of replacement 
age then it has great policy significance. For, by altering favourably 
the flow of net returns and by influencing the optimal replacement age 
the replanting grant will affect the number of cycles of tree replacements. 
Thus, for example, one 30 year old rubber tree or two 15 year old trees 
can bf, planted for production in a spiin of 30 years on the same plot of 
ground. This difference in tlie replacement age and replacement cycle will 
affect tlie strermi of net revenue of the rubber producer. From the viewpoint 
of the country, differences in the timing of the replacement cycle would 
affect the uue of scarce resources and thus output and revenue. Optimal 
timing in replacement of rubber trees is therefore essential in maximizing 
net returns to individual producers and also in ensuring efficient use 
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of tlie resourcoG of the economy. 
8 . 2 . THE PROBL i l l OF REPLANTING AGi: 
The life of a stand of rubber trees has two major phases: 
(1) t>ie non-producing period which is the Immaturity period of 5 to 
years, (2) the matur-e output-producing period which immediately follows 
(1) and may continue for as long as 30 years or slightly longer. This 
second phase can be subdivided into three sub-periods: the first covers 
that of rising yield, the second is one of steady yield and then 
declining output, and the last period is one of aging trees and low output. 
The yield of a stand of rubber trees is influenced by numerous 
factors. Some of the most important ones include the age ajid type of 
planting material, climate, soil, spacing of trees, fertilizer, cultivation 
practices, disease and pest control. This might be expressed as 
y = f(a, pm, ts,c, s, st, f, cp, d, p) ... (8.1) 
where y is yield, a is age, pm is planting material, 
ts is tapping system, etc. 
The general idea and prevailing practice amongst rubber producers 
is that it is in the third sub-period of low yield and decreasing net 
returns that rubber trees should be replaced. Replacing an existing stand 
of old low yielding trees with modern high yielding trees will, besides 
re-establishing the production cycle, improve the level of net returns. 
Thus the 'technical' viewpoint is that rubber trees should be 
replaced when the availability of tappable bark reserves is low since 
the latex flow will also be low. 
However, the economically useful life of a rubber tree is 
determined not only by such 'technical' factors but also by economic 
^ This depends mainly on the clone. 
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variables like rubber pricea, production costs and the like. The 'plant' 
life - in terms of bark reserves and latex flow - and the 'economic' life 
therefore need not coincide. In fact, the latter is generally much 
shorter tlian the former as economic factors like low rubber prices may 
make it uneconomic to continue tappinj^ old trees even though some bark 
reserves and latex are still available. 
Using the criterion of available useful bark reserves, the 
Rubber Research Institute of Malaya recommended that seedling materials 
should be replaced at age ''jjk years (with 32/? years of tapping life) and 
budded materials at 38 (with 32 years of tapping life). 'Aliile the advice 
is more specific than that of the Mudie Mission Report^ it must be 
reme bered that it is based strictly on the characteristics of the rubber 
plant. Economic considerations are completely left out. The Mudie 
Mission Report, without specifying the type of planting material, advised 
that a stand of rubber trees 'should be replanted approximately every 
30 years,' and that 3 per cent of the total planted area should be 
if replaced annually. 
There is a slight inconsistency between the two recommendations 
of the Report. If the 3 per cent criterion is used it means that a 
given stand of rubber trees will be renewed every 33-1/5 years. At any 
one time, there will be 21 per cent of the total planted area under 
immature trees. The difference of 3-1/3 years between the two recommendations 
is a little more than half of the immature period of 6 years for modern 
clones. During this 3-1/3 yeai' period resources are tied without net 
2 
Rubber Research Institute of Malaya, "Tapping and Yield Stimulation," 
Planters' Bulletin, 69, 198, (I963). 
^ Mudie, R.F., Raeburn, J.T. and Marsh, B., Report of the Mission of 
En(piiry into the Rubber Industry of Malaya, (Government Printer, 
Kuala Lumpur. 
k 
Ibid, p.11 and p.l4. 
returns being necessarily maximized. 
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Though the Mudie Mission Report recommended a 30 year replacement 
cycle it did not explain on what basis the criterion of J>0 years has 
been arrived at. The 3 per cent criterion was based on the policy of 
large estates of the time which "have regular programmes for replanting 
3 per cent or more of their planted area each year." In our survey of 
estates we have also found that about 10 per cent of the sampled estates 
did follow the guide of 3 per cent. In the case of smallholders no such 
specific guide has been used. Instead factors like availability of 
finance are the significant variables in determining when a stand of 
trees should be replanted.^ The average age of trees which were replanted 
by all estates in our survey was 35 years (with approximately 28 years of 
tapping life). In comparison the average age of the smallholders' trees 
was found to be around +^3 years old. 
Such recommendations as have been given by the Mudie Report and 
the Rubber Research Institute are only generalizations which are of 
limited usefulness to a rubber producer who wants to maximize net returns 
from his given resources. The optimal replacement age for a stand of 
rubber trees cannot be generalized into an applicable guide for all rubber 
producers. The reason is that each producer has a different cost-revenue 
function for each stand of rubber trees, and wliat is optimal for one is 
not necessarily so for the other. Unless there is perfect homogeneity in 
every aspect of production there will thus be different optimal replacement 
ages for every acre of a given type of planting material. 
^ This assumes great significance when the number of such cases 
is increased. 
^ See Chapter 7 . 
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8.3. rOTLTITIAL ARl^ A FOR Rl'^ L^ATITING 
The significance and urgency of the replacement problem would 
become clear by hnving an idea of the total potential acreages which 
ought to be replaced in the near future. Theoretically, the total 
potential acreages for future replacement should include all the old 
mature areas now under tapping. However, to gain a more accurate picture 
these old mature areas must be classified according to age groups and 
planting materials. This would give an indication of the total potential 
area for replanting to be- carried out sequentially according to age group. 
That is, the oldest areas ought, ceteris paribus, to be replanted first 
7 and then the next oldest group, and so on. 
The existing acreage under pre-war unselected seedling rubber 
should thus be given top priority. By now these are not only physically 
old in age but also low in yield. 
Available statistics indicate that there were approximately 
21,000 acres under unselected rubber for the entire estate sector in g 
1968. This, however, must have been substantially reduced by now as 
estates follow a progressive replanting policy. Assuming that the estate 
sector has been repleuiting the unselected rubber areas at the rate of 
q 
3 per cent per annum there would be less than 17,000 acres left by now. 
In comparison, the smallholding sector had more than 1 million 
acres of unselected seedlings in 1966,^*^ Again, if a 3 per cent replanting 
n 
This is a generalization. For an old stand of rubber trees may 
continue to be tapped as long as it is economically justified. g 
Department of Statistics, Malaysia. 
^ As indicated by some individual estates during the survey and as 
suggested by the Mudie Mission Report. 
^^ Communication with RI3DA. As data on tlie smallholding sector are 
extremely scarce and unreliable this figure should be regarded ae an 
approximation only. 
fvl 





Age of Trees in Years^^^ 
7-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 All Groups 
Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent 
PB 86 3 32 35 (49,676) 30 (42,580) 100 
Tj 1 Seedling 139,^72 13 53 28 (39,052) 6 ( 8,368) 100 
Tj 1 72,589 14 41 22 (15,969 23 (16,695) 100 
RRIM 501 55,651 3 45 23 (12,799) 29 (16,138 100 
G1 1 22,063 11 18 12 ( 2,647) 59 (13,017) 100 
Total (120,143) (96,789) 
(1) From date of planting to 1970. 
Source: Paardekooper, E.C., Planting Material Used on Estates in Malaya, 
(Rubber Research Institute Malaya, Report No. 26, 1965). 
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rate is assumed the total area left under unselected rubber trees is 
approximately 700,000 acres in the smallholding sector. The total 
potential area in both sectors to be replaced is therefore approximately 
716,590 acres. However, given the slower replanting progress of the 
smallholding sector it is not unrealistic to conclude that there may be 
more than 71 per cent of 1 million acres of unselected rubber in the 
country which are not yet replanted. This is a substantial figure. 
Table 8.1 shows other planting materials, distributed by age 
group and acreage, for the estate sector. To date there are approximately 
97,000 acres which are potential areas for replacement. These belong to 
the 21-25 age group existing in 1970 and which by now are around 27 to 
31 years old. Quite a sizeable portion of these older clones which are 
to be replaced are G1 1, PB 86 and RRIM 50 1 materials. 
There are no data on the area and age distribution of various 
clonal materials for the smallholding sector. Popular planting materials 
amongst smallholders have been PB 86, TJ 1 seedling and RRIM 50 
TECHNIQUE OF OPTIMAL REPLACEMiiINT 
In classical production 
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quantity of output 
0.. (8.2) 
... (8.3) 
The above can be modified to help determine the optimal 
^^ RISDA. 
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replacement of a tree crop. In tree crop replfacement, two time periods 
and two sets of revenue-cost functions are involved. The first set of 
revenue-cost function is that of the existing stand of trees and the 
second set belongs to the future stand of replacement trees in another 
period. Using the marginalist principle, a stand of trees should only be 
replaced when the incremental net return from the existing stand is equal 
to the highest amortized present value of anticipated net return from 
the new stand of trees,^^ That is, replace rubber trees when 
MR ^ AR 0 ... (8./+) 
where MR = marginal return from existing trees 
AR = highest amortized present value of net return 
from the replacement trees. 
As a corollary, do not replace when 
MR > AR > 0 ... (8.5) 
The optimal age is then easily determined from equations 
(8.4) and (8.5). It is that age, A, when the marginal net returns of 
existing trees equals or exceeds the largest amortized present value of 
the future trees at t point of time and when the former is lower than 
the latter at t - 1 point of time. Symbolically, 
A = MR^ ^ AR 
= r.R^  ^ ^ AR ... (8.6) 
There are tv/o terms used above which need some explanation. 
They are marginal net return and amortization. Marginal net return here 
is actually the annual net return of the existing stand of trees. It is 
12 
?or details refer Ward, L.E. and Faris, J.E., A Stochastic Approach to 
Replacement Policies for Plum Trees, (Giannini Foundation Monograph 
No.?2, University of California, 19^ 8^)5 Faris, J.E., 'Analytical 
Techniques Used in Determining the Optimum Replacement Pattern', 
Journal of Arm Economics, (Vol.'+?, No.'4 November 1060), pp. 755-766; 
Burt, O.R., 't;conomic Replacement', Siam J^ evifcw, (Vol.5, No.3-uly 
19^0), pp.203.-208, Ng Choong Sooi, A Study of Management and Planning 
in Rubber Estates in West Malaysia, (University of Aberdeen, 1971). 
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the additional .'irnount of money earned when the otand 13 kept for another 
year. As for the replc?cement trees, the net returns can only be obtained 
in future points of time. Because of this, the producer faces the 
problem of time preference. In effect it meanu that a certain sum of 
money to be received in the future has to be discounted in order to derive 
its present worth or value. This only points out that the producer 
attaches a lower value to a future flow of income. How much he values 
the future income now depends on how much he discounts future, that 
is, on his subjective preference between present and future income. 
The formulci for trfmsforming a certain sum of income, (Y), to 
be received n years later, into its present value at a discounted rate 
(r) is 
PV = Y ... (8.7 
(Ur)" 
r is a composite term. It reflects not only the subjective 
preference, and the intensity of the preference of the producer but also 
the opportunity cost of investment alternatives. V.'hile the former is 
less amenable to quantification the latter can be given some appropriate 
value which should be equal or close to the earning rates of alternative 
investments. 
^sing the present value formula, all net returns from the future 
stand of trees are then discounted to provide the present value equivalent. 
This is then accumulated and a total net return is obtained for each 
year. The lump-sum, in order to have a valid comparison with the marginal 
net returns of the existing stand, is then amortized. This means that the 
lump-sum or capital stock is transformed to an equivalent income flow or 
annuity. The formula^^ to do this is 
^^ Ibid. 
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A - y pv ) ... (8.S) 
Z _ (l-r)^ - 1 
t-1 ^ 
As mentioned earlier, replacement should take place when the highest 
amortized present value of the flow of returns from the future stand 
exceeds that of the present stand of rubber T;rees. This will give the 
optimal age of replacement. 
The above technique will be used below to construct several 
models of rubber tree replacement, with varying assumptions on the 
replanting grant, rubber prices, and discount rat'is. 
8.5. ASSUMPTIONS AND DATA 
Tliis section discusses the assumptions and the data which are 
used in the various replacement models. The unit of study is an acre 
of rubber trees which are to be replaced. The decision-maker in the 
smallholding case is the smallholder who is assumed to be an owner-
operator so that he can decide on his investment alternatives. The 
decision on estate replanting is assumed to be carried out by the board 
of directors who are advised by the manager and experts from the agency 
houses. No intercropping is assumed. The reason is that no satisfactory 
data on costs are available. Assuming no intercropping would not damage 
the analysis, for the main objective is to analyze the impact of the 
replanting grant on the replacement age. 
Planting Materials. Three types of planting materials have been 
chosen for this study: pre-war unselected seedlings, PB 86, and RRIM 600. 
The first two are extensively planted in the country and have reached 
the stage for replacement. RRIM 600 is assumed to be the replacement 
clone as it has the desirable qualities. Pre-war unselected seedlings 
are of mixed parentage. Their characteristics, like yield, resistance to 
wind damage and brown bast, are not as predictable as that of modern 
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clones. As pointed earlier, there are about 716,590 acres under 
unselected rubber which need to be replaced. 
PB 86 is the older modern high yielding material which the 
Rubber Research Institute recommended during the 1950's. Among the 
various older clones, e.g., Tj 1 clone and RRIM 500, PB 86 has been the 
most popular with the smallholders. It was listed as class 1 material 
by the RRIM. This means thr^ t the planting material has favourable 
characteristics in terms of yield imd other botanical features. In fact, 
PB 86 has desirable secondary char icteristic:; like good bark renewal and 
responds well to most environment.jl condi lions. The yield of PB 86 is 
on the avera[j;e lower than RPIK 600. At tho moment tlie estimated estate 
area under PB 86 is about k'^ ,000 acres. In another 10 to 15 years time, 
this area will increase by another 50,000 acres when the 16-20 age group 
grows older. (;^ ee Table 8.1). 
RRIM 600 is the currently recommended class 1 material for 
estates and smallholdings. Of the total budded planting materials in West 
Malaysian estates in 1970, 'fO per cent was RRIM 600. This clone has very 
high yield and good secondary characteristics which include low 
susceptibility to wind damage, low incidence of brown bast, good girthing 
and good bark renewal. 
The yield distribution of the three planting materials are shown 
in Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. As given in equation (8.1), the yield, and 
its distribution over the life of the rubber tree, depends on a host of 
Variables. There are basically two groups of factors in equation (8.1). 
One group may be classified as the resource base. This includes the 
planting material, age, soil, climate, and spacing of trees. The other 
group may be classified as annua] inputs and includes fertilizer, 
cultivation practices, disease and pest control. For any given planting 
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annual inputs. 
The determination of the optimal replacement aire requires a 
comparison of the flow of income from the existin(5 stand of rubber trees 
with the strecun of income from the replacement stand. This requires two 
sets of long term revenue-expenditure budgets for the two stands of 
rubber trees. 
The yield profile of each planting material must therefore be 
known. This is a difficult exercise as th'^re is no representative yield 
data for the clones over sucVi a long time period, particularly after the 
I't 
Z'+th year. As such, the yield profiles which are constructed here are 
more of a "synthesized" type. That i s , yield data for the three planting 
materials are derived from virious secondary sources. Beyond the 2'+th 
year, when such data are not available, the yield is estimated forward.^^ 
The major sources of data on yield are the various experimental studies 
and surveys carried out by the Rubber Research Institute. These include 
the Management Study, Soils and Nutrient Survey, and the records of 
estates deposited with the Rubber Research Institute. The details on the 
^^ RRI experimental data are available up to the 2^th year only. 
^^ Using the available time series data and expressing yield as a function 
of tapping years some of the yield data for the later years, which ajre 
not available, are derived. Of the various equations tried 
Y = aX° . . . (1 ) 
Y = a + bX 2 . . . (2) 
Y = a + bx + cX . . . (3) 
where Y is yield ( lb . per acre) 
X is tapping year, 
the quadratic equation gives the best fit for estimating purposes. The 
results are:- p p 
RRIM y = + 379X - 38 . 3 X^ R = .60 
600 ( 2 . 1 6 0 ) ( 3 . 112 ) ( 2 . 713 ) p p 
PB 86 y = kll + 70X - 10 . 7 X R = 
( 1 . 9 2 1 ) ( 3 . 015 ) ( 3 . 181 ) 
Expressing yield as a mere function of tapping age is a simplification 
of the actual production function. As said earlier, the determinants 
of yield are many. The exact form of the production is therefore 
difficult to specify. This is made difficult by the host of interacting 
factors. For instance, the output of any given year depends not only 
on the inputs of this year but also is influenced by inputs of previous 
years. For such reasons, the time series data used in this study must 
De considered to represent only one of the many possible sets which 
actually exist because of different botanical and agronomic conditions. 
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yield curves are given in Appendices B.l to 8.3 for unselected 
seedlings, PB 86 and RRIM 600. The yield profiles for the three planting 
materials are shown in Figures 8.1, 8.2, and 
To ensure that there is a proper comparison between the estate 
and smallholding sectors, it is assumed that the yield profile for each 
planting material is the same for the two groups. This assumption may 
seem unreali?;tic as there are differences between the tv/o sectors. 
However, for our purpose it is ^^ uile justi fi-^ ble. By holding the technical 
relationship constant we can concentrate on the effects of the other 
economic variable oi^  the replacement pattei-ns ol' the two sectors. Besides, 
it has been reported that some of the more progressive smallholders do 
17 have yield profiles as high as that of the estates. 
Gross Revenue. Using the yield distribution derived above and 
assuming various input needs and product prices, we can construct streams 
of revenue and costs for each planting material over future years. As 
the number of possibilities is very large it is not feasible to budget 
for all the situations. Since the purpose of this chapter is to suggest 
the application of the replacement technique to the rubber industry and 
to investigate the effect of the replanting grant or replacement timing, 
a few illustrative cases would suffice. 
The first step then is to construct the gross revenue stream. 
Gross revenue is defined as 
GR = P,L + P S ••• 1 s 
where GR is the gross revenue, P^ is the price of ribbed smoked sheet 
output, L is the amount of RS3, P is the price of scrap, and 3 is the s 
proportion of scrap rubber. 
^^ r.ee Appendices 8.1, 8.2, and 8 . 3 . 
17 From RI3DA officials. 
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In tlie various budgetary situations used in this study, the 
proportion of scrap rubber (S) is assumed to vary between 15 to 20 per 
l8 
cent of the total output. Scrap rubber is made up of cup-lump, tree 
lace and earth scrap. The proportion of scrap rubber in the total output 
varies with the type of tapping system used, the clonal material planted, 
and v/ith each staje of the productive life of the rubber tree. 
The next variables to be considered are the prices of RSS and 
scrap rubber. The prices of rubber are determined by supply and demand, 
which in turn are influenced by a host of economic and non-economic 
factors like the U.S. stockpile policy, the world political situation, 
competition from synthetic rubber and so on. Because of the interplay 
of numerous forces it is difficult to predict the future prices over the 
life span of a st<ind of rubber trees. For this reason, it is unwise to 
use any particular price level for long term planning. A few levels of 
prices should be chosen. Secondly, the use of a few price levels would 
help to indicate the sensitivity of replacement timing to price changes. 
Thus three prices are assumed in this study: ^ cents, 6o cents 
and 8o cents per pound of RoS. The 'K) cent assumption represents the 
minimum level wliich rubber prices are not likely to fall below. Since 
the Korean Boom, the prices of rubber on an annual basis have not fallen 
to tliis level. However, some of the monthly price levels did touch this 
price level and for a few months even slightly below it. This occurred 
aui iiif^  1967 and 1972. The 80 cents assumption represents the higher 
level rubber prices would reach in the future. This is actually an 
average of the minimujn and the maximum prices for 1973i which occurred 
respectively during January and December in that year. The 60 cents 
assumption is the "moderate" price level which government planners have 
18 This is the average figure reported by rubber producers. 
28') 
19 been using in their forecauting and planning for tlio Malaysian economy. 
The:3e are world prices, f.o.b. The actual price which is 
received by estates and smallholders is, as exj)lained in Chapter 
sinaller than tlie world price. The difference is duo to the payment of 
the various export t;.xes and to the existence of the marketing margin 
absorbed by thf' rubber dealers. In the smallholding case, 
P-. = - X^ - R - Rep - MM o.. (8.10) 1 P t 0 ^c 
where IV^  is the world price, X^ is Schedule T export tax, R^ is 
Schedule III research cess. Rep ic Schedule IV replanting cess, MM is c 
the marketing margin. 
In equation (8.10), R and Rep are independent of the price c c 
level. That is, they are constant amounts irrespective of the price 
level. R^ is 1 cent per povind and Rep^ is cents per pound, X^ is 
1.6 cents, cents, and 7.5 cents per pound of rubber exported for the 
respective price level of +^0, 60, and 80 cents per pound of RSS 1. The 
marketing margin assumed is 2.7 cents per pound. This is an average of 
20 
the margins found in several states during periods of steady prices. 
For the world prices of kO, 60, and 80 cents per pound, P^ in 
the smallholding case becomes respectively 30.2, and 65.3 cents 
per pound after deductions are made for the various taxes and marketing 
margin. 
P^ for the estate case is defined in a slightly different way. 
Only the marketing margin of 2 cents per pound is deducted. This is the 
average margin found during the survey. The various taxes are not 
^^ Personal communication with Officials of Economic Planning Unit, 
Prime Minister's Department, Malaysia. With improvement in 
business conditions this assumption of 60 cents is now regarded as low. 
20 See S.C.Lim, A Study of the Marketing of Smallholders' Rubber at 
the First Trade Level, (M.Sc. Thesis, University of Malaya, 19^^), 
and Chapter of this thesis. 
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deducted from P^ in equation (8.10) in accordnnce to the normal 
accounting practices of estates. During the survey it was found that 
estates considered the taxes as a cost to be added to the other cost 
items in rubber production. This is shown in the Statement of 
Expenditure £;iven in Appendix l.U (See Items 5? to 59). 
P g , the price of lower grade rubier, is derived from the 
functional relationship between RSS 1 and scrap prices. In their study, 
Barlow and Ng^^ have found the RSJ I: lower ^rade price ration to be 1: 
0.538. For '+0, 60 and 80 cents RSS I, the respective scrap price is 
thus "^1.52, 32.28, and '+3.0'i cents. 
Using equation (8.10) the gross revenue stream for each type 
of planting material is then computed for estates and smallholdings. 
(Appendices 8.^+ to 8.6, and 8.I9A to 8.I9C). 
Costs. Corresponding to the two major phases, the immaturity 
and maturity period, of the life of a rubber tree are two sets of 
costs. The first is the initial expenditure on replanting. This is 
spent during the first 6 years, which is the immaturity period. Such 
expenses are incurred for operations like the felling of old rubber 
trees, planting and supplying of trees, and the maintenance of the stand 
till maturity. 
The replanting expenditure of estates is given in Appendix 8.7. 
The date are taken from ik estates which had replanted 62 fields between 
i960 and 1973. These are average figures for the period. The replanting 
expenditure for an acre of rubber will vary with the topography of the 
land, the type of replanting methods, the immaturity period and so on. 
The data therefore represent one such set of possibilities. 
^^ C.Barlow and Ng, C.S., "Some Principles of Estate Budgeting," 
Planters' Bulletin. (87, 208, I967). 
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Tt. was not po.saiblc to obtain repl:mting; exyeruses direct from 
smcillholders durinf^ the survey. There are two reasons: first, 
smallholderr. have very poor records of their expenditure. Secondly, 
they could not provide data on the amount of fainily labour time spent in 
various opeiv ^Lion;:, in Mie r Dplajitinij programme. If d they been able to 
do '-hlvi, the rep^arling fx^endi t uj'• could have been imputc-d. Thirdly, 
for Lhe above rea:Jons, it is not pos.nble to find out the distribution 
of their replanting expenditure over the i nniat _:ri ty period. However, 
most smallholders reported a blarket fii^ ure they thought they incurred 
for replanting. This ^^aried betv/f-en '5950 to 51500 per acre. This 
figure covers perhaps the -ictual modal amount. Because of the vagueness 
of their replies (all given frcm memory) we thought it best to rely on 
the estimates of the Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority 
(Appendix 8.8). 
These data were estimated by the Assistant Replanting Officere 
who had helped smallholders to replant. Probably these cost figures are 
the closest to the actual replanting costs of smallholdings one can 
possible obtain. Though the A.R.O's knew the conditions of smallholding 
replanting and other aspects of it, it must be mentioned that their 
estimates are actually synthesized estimates of a few hundred smallholders 
who have replanted since 1953. These data must thut. regarded as 
representing one of the many possible sets of costs. 
The replanting expenditure during the immature period is, 
however, subsidized by the replanting grant when this is given. That is, 
the grant alters the revenue-cost pattern of the production of rubber. 
This in turn influences the age of the trees to be replanted. To 
investigate the effect of the grant on the replacement agt, the following 
casc^ are analyzed: 
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1) no replantiriii- grant is given, that is , the producer 
be;^rG the total repl^mting cost; 
2) the gr.uit is per acre for estates and $750 per 
acre for smallholdings; 
3) the grant is '^1000 per acre for estates and for 
smal]holdings; 
'+) the grant is 'I'.l'r-OO per acre Tor estates and for 
smallholdings. 
3ince 1953 the replanting gr^int has be. n fixed ;;750 per acre for 
smallholdings^. The amount given to ©states used to he $H30 per acre 
until it was terminated in 1 9 ^ 9 / 3oth ari represented in case ( 2 ) . 
The assumed amount of !>1000 per acre represents the case which the 
government intends to implement in the near future for both estates and 
TO 
smallholdings.'''" The case of no grant is in fact the actual situation 
the estates are now in. This assumption of no grant also serves to 
evaluate the sensitivity of replacement timing when the grant is taken 
away. Finally, the S1500 grant assumption also serves the purpose of 
the sensitivity test. 
The distribution of the grant over the immaturity period is 
shown in Appendix 8 . 9 . The number, and size, of the instalments follows 
that of RISDA's payment policy. 
In all the caaea, except case (l) where no grant is given, the 
cost of replanting is reduced by the amount of the replanting subsidy. 
The net cash flow, that is the difference between the cost of replanting 
and the subsidy allocated for each year, is given in Appendices 8 ,10 and 
8.11. 
2"' 
See Chapter 3 for details, 
22 
Personal communication with RIoDA Officials. 
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The yecortd S'^  t of cocts i;. incurrnd during tiie production period. 
'.Ve shall discusa the estate case first. ,yre two groups of costs 
incurred durin^j; tlds period. The first is inourrf>d irrespective of 
output and correspor.dr to the concept of fixed cost. Some examples of 
these items arc lu.magerr.'^ -iit, land tco;, insurance. The other set of costs 
varies with output. A prime exajcple of thi:: is processing and 
manufacturing cost. The details and budgetary assumptions of the various 
annual inputs are (/iven in Apr^ondix These have been budgeted from 
the records of estates s-.irveyed and from th'.- records of the Management 
otudy of the Rubber T^esearcli Institute, F-'l;ysia. 
The items are in most cases self explanatory. The expenditure 
on tapping and collection needs some clarification, however. The labour 
cost component in estates comes to as much as 60 per cent of the total 
cost of production. The wage payment is based on the existing M P A 
23 
(Malaysian Agricultural Producers' Association) system. It is a 
complex wage system which details every aspect of wage rate with varying 
conditions of planting materials, tapping system, topographic conditions 
and other factors. 
There are three components in the wage payment: the basic wage, 
a latex incentive, and a scrap incentive. The MAPA agreement, 1972, 
provides a rubber tapper with a basic daily wage of 'J3.10 when the price 
is less than cents per pound. V/hen the rubber price is above +^0 cents 
per pound the basic wage increases to ^3.20. This is maintained constajit 
over this price level. The tapper is also paid an incentive bonus for 
latex if he brings in an average daily collection (d.r.c.)^'^ exceeding 
^^ See Appendix 8.13 for a summary of the details of the KAPA conditions. 
The choice of estates adopting MAPA terms for this study is (l) the 
convenience in studying a group of estates practising the same wage 
system; (2) most of the large estates in the country have already 
adopted this system. Estates which have not done so practise some 
variants of the MAPA system. 
Dry rubber content. 
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:.l ]b3 for hlt^ li yielding; mitterial cuid 1') poun '^ for low yielding material. 
For the former, the inc^'ntive st trt^ at cents at > price level of '+0 
cents and increases by 1 cent for every increase of cents in the price 
of rubber. For the low yielding- materinl, the incentive starts at 6 
cents when '>ie price of rubber is 'lO cent.-; £Uid inci-jases by 1 cent for 
pv..- / 1 cent increa:-;e in rubber u^ i^cc. 
The scrap incentive civer, tlie tapper ^ cents for the first 
pounds of scrcxp runber braUL:!!! ir when the pric( is below 55 cents. This 
is increased b^  1 cent for every 10 cents increase in price. If the 
poundnge brought in -xceedr: poui.iu, h. i given an additional 3 cents 
if the rubber price is below 55 cents. This increases by 1 cent for every 
10 cent increase in price. 
On tlie top of all these a price bonus is also given. The price 
bonus is 5, 10, 15 and 20 cents per pound respectively when the average 
price of rubber is within the price zone of 50/55, 55/60, 6O/65 and 
65/70. The price bonus increases by 10 cents for every 10 cents increase 
from this last range of 65/70 cents. 
A general method to calculate tapping cost wliich includes all 
these items is formulated below.^^ 
The first part is the basic cost (cents per acre). This is 
Basic cost = (W + K) (8.11) 
whore D is number of tapped rubber trees per acre 
R is frequency of tapping per annum 
T is the task size or number of trees tapped per m,an day 
'.V is the basic wage minus the amount given for minimum 
poundage plus price bonus in cents per man day 
K is the labour benefit iii cents ])er man day. 
-ir 
Adapted from Ng Eng Kok, "Economic /.nalysis of Tapping Experiments," 




The latex incentive formula i s Y^ . T^ 
Y^ is latex yield in pound per acre 
is latex incentive in cents per pound (d .r 
The scrap incentive formula i.-^  
6 . 6 6 Y + 1 .66 (Y - o T)R) 
C C 
.C . ) 
. . (.^.12) 
where 6 . 66 is the dry v^eight equivalent cf wet scrap incentive 
at h cents per pound. 
Y is scrap yield in pound per acre 
c 
1 .66 if; the dry weight equivalent of '.vet scrap incentive 
9 is the dry weight equivalent of h pound wet rubber. 
The combined versi n of the three part wage system becomes 
DP 
(W + K) 6 .66 Y - 1 .66 (Y - Q DR) 
c 
( 8 . 13 ) 
Details of the assumptions and calculation of tapping and 
collection cost using the above equations are illustrated in Appendices 
S . lh to 8 . 151 . 
A summary of the cost items is given in symbolic form below: 
Total Cost -- Fixed costs + Variable coots or 
FG = M, + M + IV + + PD + S + PO + M „ . . (8.l'+) 
t E f 8 
where FC is fixed cost per acre 
M is management cost per acre 
M is manuring cost per acre 
S 
".V is weeding cost per acre 
M^ is field mainten;uice cost per acre 
PD is peat and disease control cost per acre 
S is CO,-it of stimulant per acre 
PO is panel opening cost per acre 
M is cost of other miscellaneous items like land tax. 
s 
VC = T -t- K + T + FO^. + X^ 
c c r t 
T is tapping and collei~tion cost per acre 
c 
. . . ( 8 .15 ) 
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M is manufacturing cosjt per acre o 
T^ is transport cost per acre 
FOB is f.o.b. charges and vary with poundage exported 
X^ is the export tax which varies with jjrice and amount 
exported. 
It will be noticed that vhile T and X vary with the output c I, 
and price level of rubber, the other items in VC vary with the output 
of rubber only. 
A summary of the fixed cost items and total export tax payments 
is given in Appendices P).16a - 8.170. 
The net revenue Ftream is then derived in the following manner. 
First, during the immatui-e period the net cash flow is: 
NCF (Net Oash Flow) = RG - IRE ... (8.I6) 
where RG is replanting grant 
and RE is replanting expenditure 
Secondly, during the tapping years the net cash flow or net 
revenue stream is 
NR = QR - TPC ... (8.17) 
where GR is gross revenue 
and TPC is total production cost, which is the sum of all costs 
discussed earlier. 
Equation 8 . 1 7 is actually the difference between equations 
8.9 and 8.12. 
Using equations 8.I6 and 8.I7 the strecim of net revenue for 
each clonal material under varying price and replanting gr,unt conditions 
is derived. (Appendix 8.18). 
The annual revenue and co:.t of production for smallholdings is 
budgeted on different assumptions. This is due to their different 
organizational and resource use nnttern. 
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Barlow and Chan have estimated that '^ O to 8r per cent of the 
holdings use unpaid famijy labour.^^ Because of this, and the 
cifficulties associated v/ith imputing a wage rate to family labour, 
they have suggested the concept of family labour return. This family 
labour return npproxim,.j.to3 the return to capital, nianagement and unpaid 
•^ ainily labour, ""hat is, it is the difference between gross revenue and 
material and hired labour (if any) costs. This ai^sumption is quite 
acceptable in llii;; study sircc wc are only int^rented in the replacement 
policy of rubber producers and net so much w'th the real income or real 
returns to smallholders. 
As in the case of gross revenue, the cost budget for the 
smallholding situation is quite different from the estate one. For 
inst'ince, certain items like the costs of providing fringe benefits (like 
free medical case) and management are not included in the cost budgeting. 
The budgetary assumptions found in Appendices 8.I9A - 8.I9C are therefore 
in line with smallholding practices. 
Discount Rate. ' One last item to be discussed is the choice of 
the discount rate. In selecting the appropriate discount rate one must 
consider the individual rubber producer's perception of the future, his 
economic circumstances and the alternative investment opportunities 
available to him. Because of such diverse circiimBt.-tnces facing each 
rubber producer, it is difficult to pinpoint the "true" rate of discount 
wiiicii is representative of the situationo In fact, it is not realistic 
to assume that there is such a rate. Probably there is a range of such 
Barlow, C. and Chan, C.K. 'Towards an Optimiwi Size of Rubber Holdings,' 
Journal of Ri-ilM, (21, 5, 6I3, 
27 
' The discount rate and the interest rate are used interchangeably here. 
For a theoretical discussion of the two refer. L.D.James and R.R.Lee, 
I^conomics of Water Resources Planning, Chapter 6, (McGrawhill Co. 1971). 
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rates in which rubber producer.? having different weights of discounting 
would fall in betv.-een. 
One practical approach is to use the alternative earning rates 
which can be objectively derived. Table 8.2 presents some of the rates 
of returns in the major sectors of the Malaysian economy. As can be 
seen the range is between 5 to 9 per cent. In this study we have 
selected ? and 10 per cent. Th.e former is close to the ruling rate of 
return in the commercial sector for rubber^ The latter, a higher rate, 
is meant to takf^  care of possible higher discounting by some producers 
and for the piiri;ose of oensitivit;y aualy;/.i..-. It might be of interest 
to note that the Mudie Mission Report has suggested a rate as high as 
15' per cent. Indeef*, amongst some padi farmers loans have been contracted 
28 
at interest rates as high as 50 to 100 per cent per annum. " It is, 
however, felt that both the sets of rates suggested are on the "high" 
side for rubber. V/hile it is true that padi farmers face a very 
imperfect system of land tenure and non competitive money market condition, 
the situation is not the same for rubber producers. For this reason, the 
choice of 7 and 10 per cent seems more representative of the conditions 
in the rubber sector. 
8.6c RCPUCmEMT PATTERN IN E3TAT!^S 
Before we discuss the results proper it may be pertinent to 
explain the manner in which the future revenue from the replacement clone 
is amortized. Table 8.3 shows an estate case and is used as an 
illustration. The assumptions are that the price of Ro'", I is 60 cents 
per pound over the entire life of the star.d of treoR, the discount rate 
is 10 per cent and the replanting subsidy is per which is 
given in 7 instalments. 
">8 Uommunic;:ition with officials of National Paddy Board, Malaysia. 
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rp A UT V R liLTl'IWC ™ M INVU^TriENT IN CCMMiiRCTAL BATJK DiTOSITS 
AND r m i c COMPANY SIIAl-i^  IN MALAYSIA, 19?'+ 
Per Cent Range 
Depos.its (Fixed) 
moi:tho 
9 montlis 7 
12 nonth.s P 
I.oaus and Advances 
Prime rpte o 
Prefere:!ti il rote 
Shares 
Rubber (30)^ 
Oil Palm (6) 0-28.2 
Industrial (96) 
(l) Dividend yield is the grons dividend per share divided by the 
market price. 
(?) I\efei-s to the number of companies. 
Sourcee: Derived from various issues of Straits Tines (Financial Page), 
Singapore Stock Exchange Journal, Malaysian Stock Exchange 
Journal, and Bank Negara Reports. 
During the immaturity period of the rubber trees negative net 
revenue is incurred. The loss would be larger if not for the replanting 
subsidy. It is therefore valid to charge an interest rate, which 
represents either the interest on loanable funds or the opportunity 
cost, on this unpaid balance for each year. This will be done till this 
accumulated loss is completely offset by accumulated revenue. 
The interest is paid at the end of the year on the unpaid balance 
at the beginning of each year. For instance, an interest payment of 
56.5 is made in year 1 against in year 0. In year 2, ®37.3 is 
charged against t{373.2 in year 1. The significance of this interest 
change can be seen by the addition of iil355 per acre (discounted) to the 
total establishment costs. 
It would be noted that while in the net return column the losses 
are incurred only during the first 6 years of the immaturity period, in 
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the accumulated net return colujT'n the losses -ire extended to year 13, 
Fron year 13 a positive net return, after charging total replanting costs 
and interest payment, is realized. 
The adjusted net returns are the sum of the original net returns 
and the interest charges. This stream of adjusted net returns is then 
transformed to its present value equivalent by discounting. The stream 
of present value of net returns is ther accumulated to give a lump sum 
for each period. The lump s^um o"" each period is then amortized to give 
the amortized present value of net returns shown in the last column 
of Table 8.3. 
For instance, the amortized present value of net returns of 
1J16.7 in year 1 means a loss of this amourt per year incurred from, year 
0 to year 1'+. In this example, it is only in year 15 that the amortized 
present value of net returns become positive. This means that a positive 
net return is earned for each of the years between year 0 and year l^. 
It is this value, in annual terms, which is compared to the marginal 
(annual) net revenue of the present stand of rubber trees. 
The adjustment for interest charges is not made to the net 
returns from the existing trees. This is because the adjustment affects 
net returns only in the early years of planting. By the time the 
replacement decision has to be made for existing trees the accumula.ted 
net returns will be positive already and what happens during the early 
period is irrelevant. 
The computed results are given in Appendices 8.20A to 8.21. 
Replacement of Unaelected Ordinary Seedlings. Most of the 
uneelected ordinary seedlings were planted before the Second V/orld War. 
By now, moot of them are over the 30 age group. In considering their 
replacement, it is therefore more realistic to plan on the basis of their 
TAI3L!'; 8.3 KSTATE: AMOHTIZKU NET RKTURNS FOR RKi'I.Ad^ ME.JT CLONK RRIM 600 (t/ACRE) 
Assume (l) RSS 1 ® 60 cents per pound 
(?) Discount rate C? 10 per cent 
(3) Replanting fjrant $450.00 per acre 
Accumulated 1 Amortized 
Age 
Net Interest Accumulated Adjusted Present Present Present of 








0 - 65.3 - 65.3 
i 
- 65.3 1 - - 65.3 - 65.3 1 -301.4 - -373.2 -307.9 j -^79.9 -345.2 -379.7 
2 -215.5 - 37.3 -626.0 -252.8 1 -208,8 -554.0 -319.1 o > -177.8 - 62.6 -866.4 -240.4 ! -180.6 -734.6 -295.3 
4 -165.4 - 86.6 -1118.4 -252.0 1 -172.1 -906.7 -285.6 
5 -150.5 -111.0 -I38O.7 -2C2.3 -162.8 -1069.6 -282.2 
-172.9 -.138.1 -1691.7 -310.9 -175.3 -1244.9 -235.8 
7 34.9 -169.2 -1826.0 -134.3 - 68.9 i 1 -1313.8 -269.3 
8 216.2 -182.6 -1792.4 + 33.6 + 15.7 -1298.1 -243.3 
9 366.8 -179.2 -1604.8 187.6 79.5 -1218.9 -211.6 
10 473.1 -3 60.5 -1292.2 312.6 120.5 -1098.3 -178.7 
11 649.5 -129.2 -771.9 520.3 182.4 -915.9 -141.0 
12 652.3 - 77.2 -196.8 575.1 183.2 -732.7 -107.5 
13 699.3 - 19.7 +482.8 679.6 196.4 -536.3 - 75.4 
14 746.0 746.0 196.2 1 i -340.1 - 46.2 
15 888.8 888.8 212.4 -127.7 - 1Sj7 
16 952.8 952.8 206.8 + 79.1 10.1 
17 719.0 719.0 142.2 221.3 27.6 
18 702.6 702.6 126.3 347.6 42.4 
19 846.1 846.1 138.3 485.9 58.1 
20 1034.3 1034.3 153.7 639.6 75.1 
21 845.7 845.7 114.2 753.8 87.1 
22 653.2 653.2 80.2 834.0 95.0 
23 578.7 578.7 64.6 898.6 101.2 
24 513.6 513.6 52.1 950.7 105.8 
25 444.8 444.8 40.9 991.6 109.2 
26 403.1 403.1 33.8 1025.4 111.8 
27 707.2 707.2 53.7 1079.1 116,5 
28 613.4 42.7 1121.8 120.0 
29 538.6 538.6 ! i 33.9 1155.7 123.3 
30 466.7 466.7 26.6 1182.3 125.3 
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pronent ago rather th-iii from yeur 0 which h-is no rolevance in the 
renlacemont decision matrix. 
The results for the 4^0, 60, 8o cents imd-r varying replanting 
grant nn;^  diccount rate assiim.ptions are summarized in Table S.k to 8.6. 
••'/ithout consiVeririf ropl-:ement, it cnn he seen that when the 
price is 80 cents per pound it is still profitable to continue the 
tapping of the ordin.'^ ry sc^  dling:^  till ..gc -'fl. lunvever when the prices 
are reduced to 60 and hC certs per pourd it not profitable to do so 
anymore. 
In the ca.se of" the So cent.'; situatiori if replacement by a high 
yielding clone is considered It is not necessarily xirofitable to continue 
tapping. 
Let us now review each case under varying replanting grant and 
discount rate assumptions for three price situations. The first is when 
the current price of the existing stand of rubber trees is assumed to be 
the same as the expected future price of the replacement clone. The 
second price situation is when the current price exceeds the expected 
future price. And the last price situation is when the expected future 
price exceeds the current price. 
From Table 8.7, which summarizes the results from Tables 8.^ to 
8.6, it can be seen that at price '+0 cents per pound and no replanting 
grai^ ^ the amortized net returns are negative at 7 per cent and 10 per cent 
discount rates. Under such circurastJinces both continued tapping of the 
old trees beyond age «nd replacing them with RRIM 600 are not 
economically justified. However, if one is thinking in terms of 
minimizing loss then the unselected seedlings should be replaced at age 
26 when the discount rate is 7 per cent and continues tapping the old 
trees when the discount rate is 10 per cent. But this is unsound economics 
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TABLE 8.A IrtT R I T C m s or ESTATES' EIISTITIO HUBBER STANDS AJID AMORTIZED »ET 
RETURNS or RRIM 600 RSS 1 PRICE AT 40 CENTS PER POUKD 
N»t R»tuniB at P r e a m t Slanci A m o r t l n i Pr«s«nt Value of W«t R t t u m of RRIM 600 
of 
Tr««« Pr«-Wttr 
S e t d U n g 
PB 86 
No Replanting Orant Replanting Orant | 4 5 0 . W Replanting Orant 51000 . 00 Replanting Orant H J O O . O O 
7 Per Cent 10 Per Cent 7 Per Cent 10 Per Cent 7 Per Cent 10 Per Cent 7 Per Cent 10 Per Cent 
0 - 1 6 7 . 1 - 2 1 5 . 3 -215 . 3 - 65.3 - 65 , 3 118 118 2 8 4 . 7 2 8 4 , 7 
1 - 1 0 9 . 9 - 6 O 6 . 9 -619,7 - 3 7 5 , 8 -379 .7 - 10 . 2 - 18 . 2 143 . 2 151 . 7 2 - 3 3 . 8 - 4 6 6 . 8 -4 8 4 . 1 - 3 1 0 , 9 -319 .1 - 1 2 5 . 0 -124 .3 3 7 . 6 4 3 . 6 
3 3 2 . 3 - 4 1 5 . 3 -438 . 0 - 2 8 2 , 9 -295 .3 -124 . 3 -126.2 14 . 1 1 8 , 9 
4 8 6 . 4 - 3 8 8 . 1 - 4 1 6 . 0 -269 . 3 -285 . 6 -128 .4 -132 .4 - 4 , 7 - 0 , 1 
5 9 3 . 0 - 3 7 2 . 5 -405 . 7 -261 , 7 -282 . 2 -129,8 -13^ . 1 - 13.7 - 9 , 6 6 1 0 3 . 0 -367 . 2 - 4 0 5 . 5 -261,7 -285 . 8 -100 . 1 -110 .6 - 25.4 - 21 , 4 
7 1 2 6 , 0 -351.2 - 3 9 5 . 9 -253.1 -281 .3 -102 . 7 -114 ,0 - 3 3 . 2 - 29,8 8 1 3 3 . 9 -329.0 - 3 8 1 . 0 -235.6 -270 ,5 - 9 3 . 5 -107 .3 - 27.9 - 2 6 , 3 
9 1 4 0 . 2 - 3 0 4 . 2 -363.5 -215.2 -255 .5 - 7 8 . 2 - 9 4 . 9 - 15.5 - 16,2 
10 1 3 7 . 8 -279.6 - 3 4 6 . 6 -193 . 3 -239 .6 - 60.6 - 86,9 0 . 2 - 3 . 0 
11 1 1 4 . 7 -251 .9 -327.0 - 167.7 -220.4 - 3 8 , 2 - 67.6 2 1 , 1 1 4 . 9 
12 1 1 4 . 6 - 2 2 8 . 3 -310.6 - 1 4 5 . 5 -203 . 1 - 18 .2 - 50j5 3 8 . 6 29.8 
13 • 8 2 , 6 - 3 9 5 . 8 -124.fi - 1 8 0 , 8 0 . 7 - 33.8 5 4 . 0 43 . 4 
14 8 0 . 5 - 1 8 5 . 6 - 2 0 1 . 8 - 1 0 4 , 6 -174 , 0 18 , 2 - 1 8 . 5 69.7 56.0 
15 9 7 . 4 -163.4 - 2 6 6 . 9 - 82 , 7 -157 . 9 3 7 . 1 - 2 , 6 8 6 . 7 69.7 
16 1 4 6 . 5 - 1 4 1 . 6 -252.2 - 61.1 -141 , 8 5 5 , 0 12 ,3 1 0 2 , 8 82 . 2 
17 1 4 1 . 3 - 1 2 6 . 8 _2'2.9 - 4 ^ . 9 -130 . 9 65.1 2 1 , 2 1 1 1 . 1 89 . 4 
18 1 3 0 . 7 - 1 1 3 .5 - 2 3 4 . 7 - 3 4 . 7 -121 . 1 7 3 . 8 2 8 . 6 1 1 8 . 9 9 5 . 9 
19 1 0 7 . 4 - 9 8 . 6 - 2 2 5 . 6 - 2 1 . 6 -112 ,2 8 4 . 4 37 . 1 128 . 0 1 0 3 . 0 
20 54 . 4 2 5 7 . 5 - 8 2 . 2 -215.0 - 7 . 1 - 9 8 . 1 9 6 . 0 46 .4 1 3 8 . 9 . 1 1 1 . 2 
21 2 3 , 7 1 8 9 . 4 - 70.1 -206.9 3 . 2 - 89 .4 1 0 4 . 6 52,8 146 . 1 116,7 
22 1 2 . 3 1 8 7 . 2 - 61.7 - 2 0 1 , 3 1 0 . 1 - 83 .4 1 09 . 3 5 7 . 0 150.0 119 .7 
23 3 . 4 1 6 3 . 0 - 5 5 . 3 - 1 9 6 . 6 15.2 - 7 8 . 8 112 . 5 55 .6 152.2 121 .7 
24 - 8 . 8 1 3 8 . 8 - 50.1 -192.7 19.2 - 7 5 . 2 1 1 4 . 5 6 2 . 9 153,8 123.2 
25 - 16 . 3 1 1 4 . 7 - 4 6 . 1 -189 ,4 2 2 , 1 - 72 . 4 116 .2 63.3 154.8 123 . 9 
26 - 25 . 7 9 0 . 5 - 4 2 . 9 - 1 8 6 . 5 2 4 , 1 - 70.1 1 1 7 . 0 64 ,2 155 .2 124 .4 
27 - 34 .4 6 6 . 2 - 3 7 . 2 -182 . 2 2 9 . 1 - 66 . 4 1 2 0 . 0 66 . 9 157 , 5 126.6 
28 - 4 2 . 8 6 6 . 2 - 32.6 - 1 7 8 . 6 3 2 . 8 - 63.2 123 . 2 68 . 7 160.4 128 .1 
29 - 5 0 . 8 4 0 . 8 - 29.1 - 175.5 3 5 . 4 - 61.1 124 . 9 69.9 161.7 129.0 
30 -102 .7 3 8 . 9 - 2 8 . 1 -173.1 37 . 4 - 3 9 . 6 1 2 i . O 7 1 . 0 162 .4 129 .3 
31 -106 .7 
32 -110 .7 
33 -113.2 
34 -117. ' ' 
35 -107 ,7 
36 -109 .0 
37 -111 .2 
38 -113 .2 
39 -115 .3 
40 -115 .4 
41 -118 .7 
42 -121 . 6 
43 -121 .5 
44 -127.4 
45 -130 .3 
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TABI.E 8 . 5 NET [fliTURHD OF liST/lTES' EXIST1!IG nUDHKll ST'.HDS AMll AMORTIZED IIEI 
RETUiin;; or rrih 600 rss 1 prick at 60 ceiits per pound 
Age 






No Replanting Grant Roplantins Grfvnt $450.OC Replanting Grant 51000.00 Replanting Grant SI5OO.OO 
7 Por Cent 10 Per Cent 7 Por Cont 10 Por Cont 7 Per Cent 10 Per Cent 7 Per Cont 10 Per Cent 
0 - 97 .8 -215.3 -215.3 - 65.3 - 65.3 118 118 284.7 284 .7 
1 - 12.2 -606.9 -619.7 -375.0 -379.7 - 10.2 - 98.2 143.2 151.7 
2 102.2 -466.8 -484.1 -310.9 -319.1 -125.0 -124,3 37 .6 43 .6 
3 201.2 -415.3 -438,0 -202,9 -295.3 -124.3 -126.2 14.1 10.9 
2 8 ; . 8 -388.1 -416,0 -285.6 -128.4 -132.4 - 4.7 - 0 .1 
291,4 -37'^.5 -405.7 -261,7 -282,2 -129.8 -136.1 - 13.7 - 9 .6 
6 305 .3 -367.2 -405,5 -261,7 -285,8 -100.1 -110.6 - 25.4 - 21.4 
7 340 ,3 -337.9 -383.9 -239.9 -269.3 1 ! - 89 .6 -102,1 
- 20.1 - 17.8 
6 349.4 -298.0 -353.7 -206.0 -243.3 - 63.9 - 80,1 1 .6 0 .9 
9 361 .5 -254,0 -319.8 -167.5 -211.6 - 30 .0 - 51.3 31.9 27.7 
10 347.7 -210.1 -285,7 -127.5 -178.7 5 .0 - 19.7 63 .0 55.6 
11 327.3 -161.7 -247.5 - 82 .0 -141,0 45 .8 16.3 100,9 87.7 
12 326 .1 -119.4 -213.9 - 42.3 -107.5 79 .7 45.9 131.0 
114.1 
13 278 .5 - 79 .4 -182,4 - 5 .5 - 75.4 110.4 7 i . 3 159.1 
137.9 
14 275 .1 - 42 , 8 - 152.1 27 . 8 - 46.2 138.6 96.2 185.4 
159.6 
15 290 .5 - 5 . 8 -119.9 62 .1 - 16,7 
168,4 121.2 213 .9 182.5 
16 363.7 28 .6 - 9O.C 44 ,0 10.1 196.4 14?.7 
240.4 203.9 
17 355.7 50 .9 - 70 .0 114.2 27 .6 213 .5 158.0 
255.8 216 .5 
18 339.3 70 . 6 - 53.1 131.6 42.4 226 .9 169.4 267.9 
227,2 
19 304.0 91 .3 - 35.5 150.6 58.1 244 ,3 i e : ) . i 284 .3 
238.2 
20 170.1 512 .0 114,4 - 16 .9 171.5 75.1 263.6 198.8 301.1 
253.2 
21 152,7 409.2 130.7 - 3.4 187.2 07.1 276 .6 207.8 313 .8 
262.4 
22 135.4 406 .7 141.3 5 . 8 195 .8 95 .0 202 .9 215.2 321.7 
267.9 
23 110,9 369 .3 149 .5 13.0 203 .8 101.2 289.7 
218,6 326.4 271.8 
24 103.3 332.4 155 .8 18.7 208 ,6 105.8 292 .9 
223.0 320.9 274.5 
25 90.3 295 . 8 160.3 23 .0 212 .8 109.2 295 .9 
224.9 331 .5 276.3 
26 63.2 259 .3 163 .9 26 , 4 215,4 111.8 297.5 237.2 332.5 
277 .0 
27 63.2 222.6 173.4 3^ .1 221 ,1 116.5 
301.4 240,7 335.0 280.3 
28 50.5 222 .6 176 .6 36 . 4 227,1 120.0 306.9 243.7 
341.0 283.4 
29 38.4 184 ,8 180 .8 39 .8 229.4 123.3 
307.8 257.1 341.4 285,1 
30 - 11 .8 176 .0 103.6 42 .4 233.1 125.3 311.2 
286,5 344.6 206,0 
1 31 - 18,1 
32 - 24.2 
33 - 28 ,0 
34 - 31.9 
35 76.6 
36 73 .6 
37 - 30.0 
38 - 33.2 
39 - 36.6 
40 - 38.2 
41 - 43 .0 
42 - 47 .8 
43 - 52.6 
44 - 57.0 
•5 - 61,6 
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T A B L 8 I f F T R E T U R N S O r E S T A T E S ' E X I S T I H O R U D B K R S T A H D S A N D A M O R T I Z E D N E T 
R E T U R N S O F R R I M 6 0 0 R S S 1 P R I C E A T 8 0 C E N T S K R P O U N D 
A g « 
o f 
T r e « « 
N a t R e t u r n s o f P r e s e n t S t a n d A u o r t l s e d P r e s e n t V a l u e o f N o t R e t u r n o f R R I M 6 O O 
P r « - J i ( a r 
S « e ( i l l n g 
P B 8 6 
N o R e p l a n t i n g O r a n t R e p l a n t i n g G r a n t 5 4 5 0 , 0 0 H o p l a n t l n e G r a n t S I O O O . O O R e p l a n t i n g G r a n t $ 1 5 0 0 , 0 0 
7 P e r O o n t 1 0 P e r C e n t 7 P e r C e n t j 1 0 P e r C e n t 7 P e r C o n t 1 0 P e r C e n t 7 P e r C o a t ! 1 0 P e r C e n t 
0 2 0 2 , 2 - 2 1 5 . 3 - 2 1 5 . 3 - 6 5 . 3 6 5 . 3 1 1 8 1 1 8 2 8 4 . 7 2 8 4 , 7 
1 3 3 3 . 5 - 6 0 6 . 9 - 6 1 9 . 7 - 3 7 5 . 8 - 3 7 9 . 7 - 1 0 . 2 - 9 8 . 2 1 4 3 . 2 1 5 1 . 7 
2 5 0 9 . 6 - 4 6 6 , 8 - 4 8 4 . 1 - 3 1 0 . 9 - 3 1 9 . 1 - 1 2 5 . 0 - 1 2 4 . 3 3 7 , 6 4 3 . 6 
3 6 6 2 , 3 - 4 1 5 . 3 - 4 3 8 . 0 - 2 8 2 , 9 - 2 9 5 . 3 - 1 2 4 . 3 - 1 2 6 . 2 1 4 . 1 1 8 . 9 
4 7 8 7 . 1 - 3 8 8 . 1 - 4 1 6 . 0 - 2 6 9 . 3 - 2 8 5 . 6 - 1 2 8 . 4 - 1 3 2 . 4 - 4 . 7 - 0 , 1 
5 7 9 7 . 5 - 3 7 2 . 5 - 4 0 5 . 7 - 2 6 1 . 7 - 2 8 2 . 2 - 1 2 1 . 8 - 1 3 i . l - 1 3 . 7 - 9 . 6 
6 8 1 8 . 9 - 3 6 7 . 2 - 4 0 5 . 5 - 2 6 1 . 7 - 2 8 5 , 8 - 1 0 0 . 1 - 1 1 0 . 6 j - 2 5 . 4 - 2 1 , 4 
7 8 7 0 . 9 - 3 2 8 . 8 - 3 7 4 . 9 - 2 3 0 . 2 - 2 6 1 . 0 - 8 0 . 5 - 9 3 . 8 - 1 1 . 0 - 9 . 5 
8 8 9 0 . 4 - 2 7 8 . 9 - 3 3 5 . 0 - 1 8 5 . 6 - 2 2 4 . 0 - 4 3 . 5 - 6 1 . 9 2 2 . 0 1 9 . 6 
9 9 0 3 . 4 - 2 2 3 . 7 - 2 8 9 . 4 - 1 3 4 . 2 - 1 8 1 . 1 2 . 1 - 2 0 . 8 6 3 , 7 5 6 . 6 
1 0 8 9 6 . 9 - 1 6 8 . 4 - 2 4 3 . 6 8 2 , 0 - 1 3 6 . 6 4 8 . 9 2 1 . 3 1 0 6 , 4 9 3 . 9 
1 1 8 6 4 . 5 - 1 0 7 . 5 - 1 9 2 , 6 2 3 . 3 - 8 6 . 2 1 0 0 . 9 6 6 . 5 1 5 4 . 5 1 3 5 . 7 
1 2 8 5 8 . 0 5 3 . 9 - 1 4 7 . 4 2 6 , 7 - 4 1 . 4 1 4 3 . 9 1 0 6 . 9 1 9 4 . 6 1 7 2 . 9 
1 3 7 8 6 . 4 - 5 . 2 - 1 0 4 . 6 7 1 . 4 - 2 . 0 1 8 3 . 1 1 4 0 . 9 2 3 0 . 9 2 0 3 . 8 
1 4 7 7 9 . 9 3 8 . 7 - i 5 . 5 1 1 1 . 6 3 3 . 2 2 1 8 . 0 1 7 0 . 1 2 6 4 , 5 2 3 1 . 6 
1 5 7 7 3 . 2 8 3 , 2 - 2 6 . 9 1 5 3 . 6 6 8 , 4 2 5 5 . 8 2 0 2 . 1 3 0 0 . 0 2 6 0 . 8 
1 6 8 0 4 , 0 1 2 4 , 7 - p . l 1 9 2 . 4 1 0 1 , 1 2 9 1 . 1 2 2 9 . 5 3 3 3 . 6 2 8 7 . 9 
1 7 8 7 0 . 9 1 5 1 . 5 3 1 . 5 2 1 7 . 0 1 2 2 , 1 3 1 2 . 6 2 4 7 . 4 3 5 3 . 6 3 0 4 . 2 
1 8 8 4 4 , 9 1 7 4 . 5 5 1 , 3 2 3 8 . 1 1 3 9 . 9 3 3 0 . 9 2 6 1 . 7 3 6 9 . 2 3 1 8 . 1 
1 9 7 8 9 . 9 1 9 9 . 5 7 2 . 0 2 6 1 . 3 1 3 8 . 9 3 5 1 . 6 2 7 3 . 9 3 9 0 . 5 3 3 3 . 7 
2 0 2 6 1 . 8 1 0 8 3 , 6 2 2 7 , 4 9 4 . 0 2 8 7 . 8 1 7 9 . 5 3 7 5 . 9 2 9 7 . 5 4 1 3 . 7 3 5 1 . 2 
2 1 2 4 0 . 0 9 2 3 , 7 2 4 7 . 1 1 0 9 . 9 3 0 6 . 1 1 9 4 . 0 3 9 2 . 2 3 0 9 . 7 4 2 9 . 2 3 6 2 . 9 
2 2 2 1 8 . 6 9 1 7 , 4 2 6 0 . 0 1 2 0 . 8 3 1 6 . 5 2 0 3 , 7 4 0 2 . 3 3 1 9 . 4 4 3 6 . 5 3 7 0 , 3 
2 3 1 9 8 . 4 8 6 0 , 0 2 6 9 . 5 1 2 8 , 8 3 2 6 . 2 2 1 0 . 7 4 0 9 . 0 3 2 3 . 3 444.5 3 7 5 . 3 
2 4 1 7 6 . 7 8 0 2 . 7 2 7 6 . 2 1 3 5 . 3 3 3 1 , 9 2 1 6 . 2 4 1 3 . 0 3 2 9 . 2 4 4 7 . 9 3 7 8 . 9 
2 5 1 6 3 . 2 7 4 5 . 3 2 8 2 . 1 1 4 0 , 1 3 3 7 . 0 2 2 0 . 1 4 1 7 . 0 3 2 2 . 1 4 5 1 . 4 3 8 1 . 2 
2 6 1 4 3 . 1 6 8 8 , 0 2 8 6 . 2 1 4 3 . 9 3 4 0 . 3 2 2 3 , 0 4 1 9 . 2 3 3 3 . 7 4 5 3 . 0 3 8 2 . 9 
2 7 1 2 9 . 3 6 3 0 . 7 2 9 3 . 3 1 5 0 , 4 3 4 8 . 0 2 2 9 . 2 4 2 6 . 0 3 3 9 . 1 4 5 7 . 0 3 8 7 . 4 
2 8 1 1 3 . 4 6 3 0 . 7 3 0 1 . 2 1 5 5 . 4 3 5 3 . 9 2 3 2 . 6 4 3 0 . 9 3 4 1 . 2 4 6 3 , 8 3 8 8 . 9 
2 9 9 8 . 4 5 7 2 . 6 3 0 6 . 0 1 5 9 . 1 3 5 8 . 1 2 3 6 , 7 4 3 4 . 1 3 4 2 . 8 4 6 6 . 8 3 9 2 . 7 
3 0 4 8 , 5 5 6 9 . 2 3 0 9 . 5 1 6 2 , 0 3 6 1 . 0 2 3 9 , 0 4 3 6 . 2 3 4 6 . 6 4 6 8 . 5 3 9 4 , 2 
3 1 4 0 . 8 
3 2 3 3 . 0 
3 3 2 7 . 5 
3 4 2 3 . 6 
3 5 3 0 . 8 
3 6 2 7 . 1 
3 7 2 2 . 7 
3 8 1 8 . 5 
3 9 1 4 . 4 
4 0 1 2 . 1 
4 1 5 . 9 
4 2 - 0 , 1 
4 3 - 6 . 3 
44 - 1 1 5 
45 - 1 7 . 2 
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since the investor can obtain 7 or 10 per cent 2)0.sitive returns in 
investments outside the rubber sector. Given this, ceteris paribus the 
producer is better off getting; out of rubber production. 
TABLIC P..7. EJTATEG: SUMMARY Q] OPTIMAL RLTLACE:-I:NT AGE FOR 
UriOETLEGTlJD ORDINARY SE/]DLTNGS . ASSUME 





















80 IR 25 IR 22 IR 
< 
IR IR IR 
60 IR 29 IR 23 IR IR IR IR 
'fO NJ NJ 21 NJ IR IR IR IR 
IR = Immediate Replacement of existing trees. 
NJ = Where either continued tapping of 'existing trees or replacement 
by RRIM 600 is not economically justifiable. 
It vnll be noticed that the situ.ition will not change at the 
discount rate of 10 per cent even when a grant of per acre is given. 
However, when the discount rate is 7 pei" cent then existing stands of 
unselected seedlings should have been replaced at age 21. This is 
because the highest amortized present value of RRIM 600 ('537.'+) is larger 
than the marginal net return of from the old seedlings. When the 
grant is increased to fi.l000 and S1500 per acre immediate replacement of 
the unselected seedlings should be carried out. 
At 60 cents per pound the old seedlings should be replaced 
immeciiately if the discount rate is 7 per cent. At a discount rate of 
10 per cent, the replacement age is reduced with the progressive increase 
in the size of the grant. The situation for 80 cents per pound is almost 
similar to the 60 cents case. 
It is clear that the replanting grant does affect the replanting 
age. In fact, when the grant is substantial immediate replacement of 
the old trees in called for whatever the price or discount rate situations 
may be. 
V/hat hapfjens if the expected future price of the replacement 
clone is lower than that of the current price of the existing stands of 
trees? (Table 8.8). That is, for instance, if the current price is 
80 cents per pound for unselected rubber and the expected future price 
for RRIH 600, the replacement clone, is 60 cents per pound. 
TA31^ 8.8, SVW.A'R'i OF OPTIKiVL H-il'LACEI^ EriT AGE VOR OSDiriAHY 




Grant Grant 1:1000 Grant 51500' Grant 

























NJ NJ 30 NJ 23 26 21 23 
IR = Immediate Replacement of existing trees. 
ViJ = V/here either continued tapping of existing trees or replacement 
by RHIM 600 in not economically justifiable. 
For any given discoimt rate; where the current price is 60 cents 
per pound and the expected future price is only cents per pound the 
effect of the replanting subsidy is to rtduce the replanting age. Thus 
the optii-nal age of replanting is reduced by 9 years if the grant is 
increased to from per acre at a discount rate of 7 per cent. 
In the case where no grajit is given, or only V^^O is given but the 
discount rate is 10 per cent, it is not economically justified to continue 
tapping or to replace with RRIf 6OO. 
The effect of the replanting grant in bringing forward the age 
of replanting is also shown in the case when the current price is BO cents 
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per pound and the expected future price is 60 cents per pound. For any 
discount rate when the ^-rant is' from 7^1000 per acre and beyond the policy 
should be iminediate replacement. 
'Vliat happens '.vlien the expected future price exceeds the current 
price? (Table 8 . 9 ) . Here, with the exception of tl.e 10 per cent discount 
rate v;itli no i-eplanting grant when the age of replanting should be 21, 
all cases indicate replanting should be immediately done. 
TABLE F-^TATC: ".UMrARY OF OPTIKAT, Pl.-nn^ -i^ -'T AGK FOR 
U N S E L E C T : : D O R D I N / . I ^ ' ASPAIMS 




Grant: S^f^O Grant : SIOOO Grant; : $1500 

























IR 21 IR IR IR IR IR 
i 
IR 
Replacement of PB 86. First we examine the case when the 
current price and expected future price are expected to be the same 
(Table 8 . 1 0 ) . At 80 cents per pound the stream of net returns from PB 86 
is high and does not warrant replacement by RRTM 6OO. This is so inspite 
of the planting subsidy. (Table 8.10). 
At a lower price, 60 cents per pound, the situation is slightly 
different. Except at the 10 per cent discount rate for the no grant and 
the tl'+50 grant per acre cases, the rest of the situation is affected by 
the replanting grant. At a discount rate of 7 per cent, the replanting 
age is brought forward from 30, where no replanting grant is given, to 
where a grant of 31500 per acre is given. 
30^ 
TA13LE 8.10. CUMllAirr OF OPTIMAL AGE 
FOR PB 86. ASSUME CURRENT PRICE 





•'\nt Grant; Grnnt: Siooo Grant: 31300 
















80 cents NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 
60 cents 30 NR 27 NR 25 26 2k 26 
'4O cents NJ NJ 31 NJ 25 27 2h 25 
What about the case when currf^nt price exceeds expected future 
price? (Table 8.11). From Table 8.11 it can be seen that there is no case 
for replacement because the present stream of net returns from PB 86 is 
sufficiently high to justify its continuation. 
TABLE 8.11. ESTATE: SUMMARY OF OPTIMAL REPLj\CBaiIT AGE 
FOR PB 86. ASSUME CURRENT PRICE 
EXCEEDS EXPECTED FUTURE PRICE 
Price 
No Replanting Grant : Grant: ;fiooo Grant: SI5OO Gr •ant 1 
Situations 7 Per 10 Per 7 Per 1 10 Per 7 Per 10 Per 7 Per 10 Per 
Cent Cent Cent Cent Cent Cent Cent Cent 
Current 




Price: 60/ NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 
Expected 
Price: '^ 0/ 
What happens when expected future price exceeds current price? 
(Table 8.12). V/hen the expected future price ic 80 cents per pound and 
the current price is 60 cents per pound, and given a discount rate of 
7 per cent, the effect of the replanting grant is to bring forward the 
age of replanting marginally. However, at 10 per cent, the effect of the 
grant shortens the replanting age by more than 13 years (at age 36 with no 
replanting grant compared to age 23 with a grant of ']1500 per acre). 
505 
TABLE 8 . 12 . ESTATE: GWmARY OF OPTIMAL RiJPLAGEKEriT AGE 
FOR PB 86. ASGUME EXPECTS FUTUPE 
PRICE E:(CEEDS CURRENT PRICE 
Price 
No Replanting 
Grant Grant : Grant : SIOOO Grant; : 1^1500 



















Price: 60;!^  




Price: '+0/ | 
23 29 IR 25 IR IR IR IR 
'//hen the expected future price ie 60 cents and the current 
price is ^0 cents per pound the immediate replacement of PB 86 should be 
the policy when the grant is IHOOO or more per acre. At a 10 per cent 
discount rate, a ©'+50 grant per acre brings forward the replanting age 
by k years (29 compared to 25). At a discount rate of 7 per cent, the 
difference there should be immediate replacement when a grant of $'+50 
ie given compared to the no grant case. 
8.7. REPLACEMENT PATTERN OF SMALLHOLDINGS 
Cld Seedlings. The net returns from existing stands of old 
seedlings and PB and the amortized present value of net returns from 
RRIM 600 at va;;'ioUf5 priceti, discount rateo, and replanting grants are 
summarized in TaV.'le.s 8.13 to 8.15. The details are found in Appendices 
8.21A to 8 . : a x . 
We will first excunine the case when current price of existing 
trees is asEumed to be the name as the expected future price of the 
replacement clone. From Table 8.l6, it can be seen that except for the 
case of a 10 per cent discount rate for no replanting grant and replanting 
grant of i|.750 replanting grant per acre, all pre-war ordinary trees must 
be immediately replaced. This is because the highest amortized value for 
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TABLE 6 . 1 3 KET HKTUraiS OF SMALLHOLDliRS' EXISTING RUDDER STUN US AND AMORTIZED 
NET RETURNS OE RRIM 600 liSS 1 PRICE AT 40 CENTS PER POUND 






No Replanting Grant Replanting Grant $750.00 Replanting Grant SIOOO.OO Replanting Grant J1500.00 
7 Per Cent 10 Par Cent 7 Per Cent 10 Por Cent 7 Per Cent 10 Per Cent 7 Per Cent 10 Per Cent 
0 -242.8 -242,8 + 7.2 + 7.2 + 90.53 + 90.53 +257.2 +257.2 
1 -448.3 -493,17 - 94,05 - 93.83 + 28.4 + 31.0 273.4 281.1 
2 -300.1 -367.23 - 91.59 - 92.58 - 8.7 - 6.9 150.1 155.3 
-306.7 -.326.26 - 86,00 - 00.75 - 15,4 - 10.2 115.3 120.3 
4 -287.8 -310.62 - 90,09 - 94.92 - 28. - 26.9 84.5 90.1 
5 -277.1 -303.49 - 93,04 - 90.54 - 34,4 - 33.7 68.4 73.8 
6 -271 .1 -301.20 - 95.77 -102.71 - 40,0 - 39.9 55.9 61.6 
7 23.4 -239.8 -276.8 - 77.30 - 87.61 - 25.6 - 27.6 61.6 65.0 
8 01.9 -205.8 -249,1 - 51.80 ^ 65.93 - 4.3 - 7.7 76.6 79.2 
9 148.0 -171 .7 -221,34 - 23.05 41.73 + 21.5 ^ 15.3 95.7 96.2 
10 206.7 -139.2 -194.88 + 40.3 17.35 46.2 37.3 115,0 113.1 
11 254,0 -105.3 -167.06 33.23 8.64 72.7 60.3 137,1 131.96 
12 255.5 - 75.9 -142.74 57.34 29.92 94.9 79.3 155.9 147.7 
13 266.0 - 48.2 -119.95 70.09 48.73 114.9 96.2 173,0 174.3 
U 205.8 - 23.1 - 98.4 98.29 65.47 132.0 111,3 107.2 199.2 
15 293.2 + 1,58 - 76,54 118.09 07.15 151.1 125.9 204.4 226.2 
16 298.1 24,2 - 56.0 136.50 97,42 168.4 140.7 219.7 251.3 
17 293,0 39,7 - 43.04 148.30 107.32 178.2 149.8 227.6 257,8 
16 283.5 52.98 - 31.32 I5B.36 115.70 187.4 157.0 235.4 262,4 
19 277.8 67.1 - 19.34 169.65 124.78 199.2 165.9 246.2 269.5 
20 188.5 250,7 82.4 - 6.9 182.38 134.64 209.9 173.8 255.4 277,2 
21 175.2 248.2 93.6 + 2.29 191.26 141.62 210.3 181.4 262.9 281.6 
22 167,1 255.3 101.1 8,8 196.86 146.13 223.1 104.8 266.7 283.3 
23 157.3 303.7 107,2 14.01 201.06 149.50 228.5 180.6 271.7 286,2 
24 147.8 298.8 112,2 18.37 204.46 152.37 230.2 189.7 272.4 285.6 
25 137.7 2S8.8 116.0 21.85 206.05 154.48 233.3 191.7 275.0 2B6,7 
26 127.7 449.2 119.2 24.63 200.61 156.02 235.4 192.9 276.6 287.1 
27 122.2 382.1 124.3 28.54 212.43 150.82 236.5 195.2 276.7 280.5 
28 114.5 323,2 128.3 31.66 215,32 160.96 239.1 196.7 278.9 209.2 
29 107.2 3207,7 131.4 34,14 217.42 162.56 240.8 199.4 280.0 291.9 
30 100.3 296.8 133,0 36.01 218.88 163.73 244.6 199.7 283.9 291.3 
31 96.3 276.7 135.6 37.65 219.03 164.57 244.7 199.6 283.5 293.0 
32 92.4 252.2 137,1 38.99 220.61 165.15 244.4 201.1 282 .7 . 291.8 
33 89.9 232.6 138,3 40.06 221.00 161.77 243.6 200.4 201.5 293.1 
34 67.5 210.7 139.1 40.9 221.27 165.75 245.6 201.4 203.4 291.3 
35 65.1 210.7 139.8 41.55 219.84 165.93 244.0 202.2 281.3 292.1 











ma m RKTtJSSS Of SMLLHOLOEnS ' SIISTTIQ STiSDS AJJD AKORTIZED 
W RSTUITiS or RRIM 600 HES 1 PaiSZ AT 60 OlitTS ?XI? POUID 
»f 
Tr«eii 
S«l Sttunn of Pr9i«ol Standi i»orti«od Pm««a\ 7alu« of )l«t R«(,arn of 600 
SotiU PS 36 
Ho Res'lanting Ormt Ssplar.t tag aiT.til 5750.00 R«l)Xactin« Orsnt tlCOO.OC Rsplaat^ag O^ an-t S1300,00 
7 C«nt XO ?tr C.nt 7 P«r C«at ' 10 Ptr C»n'. 7 P*r C.atf 10 ?«r 0»nt 7 Per C«nt 10 P«r C«at 
0 »242,n ».?42.8 » 7.2 - 7.2 * ?0.53 
1 
• 90.5 +257.2 •257.2 
1 -447.8 -493.13 - 94.2 - 93.8 . 28.4 - 3 1 ,0 273.4 291.x 
2 -350.3 -367.2 - 91.4 - 93.2 - 8.7 - 6.9 150. 1 155.35 
3 -306.4 -V0.2 - 86.: - ' - 15.4 - 10.2 U5.3 120.3 
4 -202.6 -310.6 - 91.2 i - 96.4 - 28.0 - 26.9 34.5 09.9 
5 -272,8 -303.5 - 93.6 - 97.3 - 34.4 - 33,7 60.4 73.7 £ -267,3 -298 - 96.5 - 103 .0 - 40.0 - 39,9 55.9 65.5 
7 79,3 -224,2 -?62.f - 65.1 - - 12.6 - 15,7 74.6 77.8 
8 173.9 -172.4 -21f).7 - 2 ; . 5 - 66.9 . 28.0 » 20.7 106.7 106.8 
9 239.4 - 1 18 . 1 -172.1 - 26.6 - 40,6 72.0 60.4 144.3 140. 
10 389.5 - 64.99 -126.3 72,5 - 16.8 114,8 98.2 181.7 172.9 
11 <71.3 - 6.04 - 76.3 120,9 » 20.3 160.5 138.0 223.2 200.9 
12 <75.6 + 39.3 - 34.0 161.4 68.4 199.0 171 .0 _ 258.3 238,3 
W 492.2 81.3 34.6 197. e 99.8 233.6 200,2 ' 290 . 1 1 264 ,8 
U 526.2 118.96 36.6 229.1 134.0 263.0 226,4 316.8 I 288.5 
15 539.0 156.8 69.1 263.7 157.7 296.5 251.6 346.3 313 
16 547.5 191.05 90.7 294.8 1«9.9 326.4 277.5 376.4 335.97 
17 540.7 215. 110.6 313.0 196.8 343.4 293.4 391.5 350.0 
18 522.1 234.9 135.6 330.0 216.0 359.4 306.0 406.1 361.96 
19 514.7 256.5 1 5 ) . 3 351.2 236,5 380.0 321.4 425.3 375 
20 >s6.3 467.8 280,2 172.0 370.2 258.6 398.3 334.7 442.5 390.3 
21 324.9 -163.5 297.2 105,6 305.5 275.4 412,9 348.1 456.2 40C,4 
22 309.5 468.8 30a,2 194.7 394.1 263.7 420.9 353.8 46 3.'3 406.5 
23 292.4 547.8 326.5 201.0 403.9 273.0 430,4 360,3 472.3 410,9 
24 276.3 539.2 323.2 207.5 1 406.9 201.0 432.9 361.9 473,S 414.3 
25 261.1 522 .1 328.2 211.9 412.3 287.4 438.0 365.1 478.5 ; 416.55 
26 243.6 782.4 331.9 215.3 416.1 292.9 441.5 367.1 431.5 418 
27 232.3 680.1 339.3 220,8 418.1 300.2 442.9 37-.0 461.9 421,89 
28 219.0 577.2 346.4 225.9 424.3 307.1 448.8 37'..3 437.3 435.5 
29 206.4 572.9 350.6 229.2 427.2 312.0 451.4 379,1 409.5 427.4 
jO 194.6 535.2 353.'"' 231.6 433.9 316.0 458.1 3-;9.4 496.2 423.7 
31 187.8 497.5 355.7 233.5 434.2 319.3 450,1 37H.9 495.7 429.4 
32 181.1 <57.2 357.5 235.1 433.8 322.1 457.4 381.6 494.5 •430 
33 176.9 421.9 358.6 236.3 432.4 295.0 455.4 380.2 «?2.4 430.3 
34 127.7 384.1 390.5 237.1 435,9 296.7 458,9 382,0 495.9 430.37 
35 168.7 384,1 416.4 237.7 433.2 298.1 455,9 383,5 492.4 430,77 
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^ R e p l a n t i n g O r u r . l R e p l a n t i n g J r a n t S 7 5 O . O O R e p l a n t i n g O r e i n t £ 1 0 0 0 . 0 0 He p l a n t i n g O r a n t $ 1 5 0 0 , 0 0 
7 F o r C e n t 1 0 P » r C « i i t 
1 
7 P e r C e n t 
1 
1 0 P e r C e n t ! 7 P e r C e n t 1 0 P e r C e n t 7 P e r C e n t 1 0 P e r O i a t 
0 ~ 2 4 2 , 8 - 2 4 2 , 6 » 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 •• 9 0 . 5 3 9 0 , 5 3 + 2 5 7 . 2 4 - 2 5 7 . 2 1 
I - < 7 7 . 0 - 4 9 3 . 1 3 - 9 4 . 1 0 - 9 3 . 8 + 2 8 . 4 •f 3 1 . 0 2 7 3 . < 2 8 1 . 1 j 
2 - 3 5 0 . 3 - 3 6 7 . 2 - 9 1 . 3 4 - 9 3 . 2 - 8 . 7 - 6 . 9 1 5 0 . 1 1 5 5 . 9 
3 - 3 0 6 . 4 - 3 2 6 . 2 - 8 5 . 8 5 - 8 8 . 4 - 1 5 . - 1 0 . 2 1 1 5 . 3 1 2 0 . 3 
4 - 2 8 2 . 6 - 3 1 0 . 6 - 9 0 . 8 0 - 9 6 . 4 - 2 8 . 0 - 2 6 . 9 3 4 , 5 
5 - 2 7 2 . 8 - 3 0 3 . 5 - 9 ? . 9 9 - 9 7 . 2 - 3 4 . 4 - 3 3 . 7 6 8 . 4 7 3 . 7 
6 - 2 6 7 . 3 - 2 9 8 , 6 - 9 5 , 7 3 - 1 0 3 . 0 - 4 0 . 0 - 3 9 . 9 5 5 . 9 6 1 . 5 
7 1 2 6 . 3 - 2 1 3 . 1 - 2 8 1 . 9 - 5 3 . 2 7 - 6 7 , 3 - 1 . 5 - 5 . 7 8 5 . 6 8 7 . 0 
e 2 5 1 . 5 - 1 4 9 , 7 > 5 . 3 a - 1 3 . 7 5 4 . 0 4 4 , 5 1 3 2 . 2 1 2 9 , 9 
9 4 0 8 . 0 - 7 7 . 4 - 1 6 1 . 2 6 9 . <7 + 4 3 . 4 1 1 3 . 8 9 8 , 4 1 8 5 , 5 1 7 7 , 3 
10 5 4 3 . 5 - 6 . 6 - 9 9 , 2 1 3 0 . 5 ? 9 7 . 3 1 7 1 . 6 l ' '9.7 2 3 8 , 1 7 . 2 3 . 5 
1 1 6 5 < . ' 1 6 6 , 8 1 - 3 1 . 9 1 9 - . . 3 0 1 5 1 . 7 2 3 3 . 5 2 0 3 . 6 2 9 5 . 8 2 7 3 . 6 
12 6 6 1 . 1 1 2 7 . 5 2 3 . 5 ? < ! 8 , 0 3 2 0 6 . 9 2 8 5 . 7 2 4 0 . 4 3 4 4 . 7 3 1 4 . 7 
1 3 6 0 2 . 7 I U I . 6 7 2 , 1 2 9 6 , 8 7 24-^.5 3 3 2 , 6 ? 'JU.O 3 8 8 , 9 3 5 1 . 4 
14 7 2 8 , 0 2 3 0 . 2 1 1 5 . 2 3 4 0 , 3 4 2 0 9 . 5 3 7 2 . 5 3 2 3 . " 1 2 5 . 9 3 8 4 . 5 
1 5 7 4 6 . 1 2 7 9 , 4 1 5 7 . 0 3 8 5 . 1 9 3 1 ' ! . 4 4 1 7 . 9 3 5 7 . 5 4 6 9 , 4 4 2 8 . 9 
16 7 5 7 . 7 3 2 5 . 1 l ' ' 6 . 6 4 2 7 . 0 7 3 5 8 . 4 4 5 0 . 5 3 9 2 . 7 5 0 8 , 2 4 5 0 . 0 
17 7 4 9 , 3 3 5 ' < , 9 5 2 2 . . 5 4 5 3 , 6 3 3 9 0 . 5 4 8 l . 5 4 1 4 , ' ! f 7 9 . 3 4 6 9 . f 
1 6 7 ^ 3 . : ' 3 8 0 . 5 4 ? 6 , i ; 3 8 6 , 9 5 0 3 . 2 4 3 1 . 2 5 4 9 . 6 4 8 6 , 4 
1 9 7 1 3 . 7 4 0 8 , 6 2 6 7 . 6 5 9 1 . 7 6 4 1 5 . 0 5 3 1 . - 1 4 5 2 , 2 5 7 6 . c 5 0 4 . 7 
20 4 8 0 , 1 6 5 0 . 7 4 3 9 . 6 Z 9 2 . 3 5 3 0 . 6 2 4 4 5 . 1 5 5 5 . 8 4 7 0 . 3 5 9 9 . 8 5 2 5 . 3 
2 1 4 5 2 . 0 6 4 5 . 0 4 6 1 . 6 • n o . o 5 5 0 . 5 8 4 6 8 . 2 5 7 5 . 7 4 8 8 , 6 6 1 8 . 8 5 3 9 . < 
22 4 3 0 . 2 6 4 0 . 7 < 7 5 . 6 3 2 1 . 7 5 6 2 , 7 0 4 4 4 , 7 5 0 6 . 5 4 9 6 . 2 6 ^ 8 . 7 5 4 7 . 9 
n 4 0 7 . 1 7 5 3 . 3 4 8 5 . 9 9 3 3 0 . 7 5 7 1 . 5 1 4 5 7 . 4 5 0 5 . 0 6 4 1 . 1 5 5 3 . 9 7 
24 3 8 5 , 1 7 4 1 . 8 4 9 1 . 2 3 3 ' ' . 8 5 7 8 , 2 8 4 6 8 . 3 6 0 2 . 4 5 0 7 . 0 6 4 3 . 2 5 5 8 . 6 
25 3 6 4 . 6 7 1 8 . 7 5 0 0 . 7 3 4 - 1 . 3 5 8 2 . 9 3 4 7 3 . 1 6 0 9 . 3 5 ) 1 . 2 6 4 9 . 6 5 6 1 . 8 
3 4 1 . 9 1 0 6 1 , 4 5 0 4 . 6 6 3 t 7 . 5 5 0 6 . 1 7 4 8 4 . 5 6 1 4 . 0 5 1 3 , 9 6 5 3 . 8 5 6 4 
27 3 2 5 . 7 9 3 2 . 8 5 1 4 . 0 3 5 4 , 6 5 9 4 . 4 3 4 9 4 . 6 6 1 5 . 6 5 1 9 . 1 6 5 4 . 5 5 6 9 . 3 
23 3 0 7 . 6 7 9 2 , 7 5 2 1 , 0 3 6 0 . 0 6 0 0 . 4 ? 5 0 2 . 8 6 2 1 , 5 5 7 2 . 3 6 5 9 . 9 5 7 3 
2 ? 2 9 0 . 7 7 8 7 . 0 5 2 6 , 2 3 6 4 , 2 6 0 ' . , 7 1 5 0 9 . 5 6 2 5 . 0 5 2 8 . 8 6 6 3 . 0 5 7 5 . 8 
30 2 7 4 . 6 7 3 5 . 8 5 3 0 . 7 3 6 7 . 8 6 0 8 , 4 3 5 1 5 , 5 6 3 5 . 2 5 i 9 . 7 6 7 3 . 1 5 7 8 
31 2 6 3 . 5 6 8 4 . 7 5 3 3 . 2 3 7 0 , 0 6 1 0 , 1 2 5 2 1 , 1 6 3 5 . 0 5 2 8 . 9 6 7 2 . 5 5 7 9 . 2 
32 2 6 6 , 5 6 3 1 . 0 5 3 5 . 3 3 7 2 . 0 6 1 1 , 4 9 5 2 5 . 1 6 3 4 . 0 5 3 2 . 7 6 7 1 . 0 . 5 8 0 
33 2 5 0 . 7 5 8 2 . 4 5 3 6 . 5 3 7 3 . 4 6 1 2 . 1 1 4 8 0 , 7 6 3 1 . 7 5 3 0 . 7 6 6 0 . 2 5 8 0 , 6 
34 3 ^ 5 . 0 5 3 1 . 2 5 3 7 . 1 3 7 4 . 4 6 1 2 . 1 1 4 8 2 . 6 6 3 6 . 5 5 3 3 . 1 6 7 3 . 0 5 8 0 , 7 
35 2 3 9 . 5 5 3 1 . 2 5 3 7 . 2 3 7 5 . 0 6 1 1 . 6 5 4 8 4 . 6 6 3 2 . 3 5 3 5 . 2 6 6 8 . 3 5 8 0 . 6 
36 2 3 4 . 2 4 8 0 . 1 5 3 6 . 9 3 7 5 . 4 6 1 0 . 3 5 4 8 6 . 2 6 3 5 . 6 5 3 1 . . 7 6 6 3 . 0 5 8 0 . 3 
37 2 2 8 , 9 
3 a 2 2 3 . 9 
3 ? 2 1 8 , 6 
40 2 1 3 . 6 
41 2 0 C . 3 
42 1 9 9 . 2 
<3 1 9 2 . 2 
! 44 1 1 8 5 . 5 
<*• 
1 ^  1 7 9 . 0 1 
1 
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R.RIK 600 in all these caties is larger than th*^  whole- stream of net return 
from the pre-war seedling trees. If we assume that the rubber producer 
discounts the future heavily by 10 per cent when the optimal replanting 
ages are (for 80 cents and no replanting grant) and 27 (for 60 cents 
and no replantinj^ grant). At '+0 cents without a grant given and at 10 
per cent discount rate, replanting i^ postponed till over '+5 years. It 
is interesting to note that if a grant of $750 is given, replacement 
should be at age 23. a larger grant ia given there should be immediate 
replacement. 
At a di.,coiint rate of 7 i'' '^ en'", the effect of the grant is 
similar. '.'Jhen no grant is given the replacement age is 25. Thereafter, 
wVion a grant is given, tliere should be immediate replacement. 
TABT.S 8 . 1 6 „ SKALLHCLDING: SUMM-'I^Y OF OPTIMAL RKPLY-CILLEJIT AGE FOR 
PR::-WAR ORDINARY GE!OD].INGC. A S G W E 





-ant Grant: 5750 Grant: SIOOO Grant: U300 
















80 cents IR 25 IR IR IR IR IR IR 
60 cents IR 27 IR 23 IR IR IR IR 
' 4 O cents 25 NR IR 23 IR IR IR IR 
Table 8.17 shows the assumption of current prices exceeding 
exj)ected prices for pre-war trees. '.Vhen the current price is 80 cents 
the expected price is 6O cents, the influence of the replanting grant 
coupled with the current price assumption of S O cents do not accelerate 
replacement much if the discount rate is 7 per cent because the difference 
in th'- strean. of revenue between the replacement clone and the existing 
one is not large, in spite of the subsidy. Discounting the future at 10 
per cent exerts a greater influence, however. Thus, at 10 per cent with 
no grant given the replacement age is 36. However, when a grant of S1500 
310 
in given this is reduced to 23, « 13 years difference. 
TAIL!.; P. 17. n;!iiLLHOLDir;G: SUTIMARY O F RirLAC^;n';l.,NT AC.Ii: 701? 
PiiE-WAR SICEDLING. ASnUME cuRRi^riT P R I C E exceed:: E:':fECTm p r i c e 
Price 
No Replanting 
Cirant G raXi t: Grrmt: ; SIOOO Grant: 51500 

























h? NR 28 36 26 30 2k 2k 
IVhen the assumed current price drops to 6o cents per pound emd 
the assumed expected price is ^ cents, the higher discounting of the 
future at 10 per cent does delay replanting. But for each interest 
assumed, the influence of the replanting griuit is still to quicken the 
pace of replanting. When no replanting grant is given, at 60 cents 
current price the replacement ages are 'older'. This is because at an 
expected low price of ^ cents, and given that the present value of a 
dollar is worth more at 10 per cent, farmers are willing to delay 
replanting. It is economically justifiable to do so. 
The case when current prices are below expected prices (Table 
P . l f t ) shows that the trees should be replaced immediately. It is 
uneconomic to continue tapping the existing stand of old low yielding 
trees when expected prices exceed current prices. This is also favourably 
iriflufncod by the giving of the replanting grant. However, it can be 
.se'-n th.it even when no grant is given it is still worthwhile to replant 
immediately. The giving of thf- grf;nt, and the larger the size of the 
gr iut, m( nna th.'.t the: net returns from the r«;placerr.'nt treefi nre larger 
during the initial period of repl^-.nting. 
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TABLE 8.18„ SMALLHOLDING: SUMMARY OF REPLACEMENT AGES PX:R 
PRE-/MR ORDINARY SffiDLINGS. ASr.UME 
EXPECTED PRICE EXCEEDS CURRENT PRICE 
Price 
No Replanting 
Grant Grant : %730 Grant: :nooo Grant: 31500 



























IR IR IR IR IR IR IR 
PB 86. Table 8.19 shows the situation when the current pricc is 
equal to the expected future price. When no replanting gr.ant is given 
the relatively high yielding PB 86 trees should be kept at any of the 
three prices when the future is discounted by 10 per cent. The main 
factor is the higher valuation of the present by the farmer and tliis makes 
for the lack of an economic justification to replant the high yielding 
trees. wTien the discount rate is 7 per cent the influence of the higher 
prices (60 and 80 cents) is felt. For 60 and 80 cents, replant at age 3k. 
At 4o cents there is no re^ jlitcement yet. 
TABLE 8.19. SMALI.HOLDING: SUM>:ARY OF OPTIMAL REPLACEMENT AGE FOR 




Grant Grant ,: U750 Grant: Siooo Grant: 51500 
















80 cents NR 36 32 32 
60 cents NR 33 NR 32 36 32 33 
kO cents NR NR 3^ NR 33 36 31 31 
When a grant of %730 is given, the replanting age at all three 
levels of prices is 'younger' for a discount rate of 7 per cent compared 
M2 
to the situation of no replanting grant. The same may be said when the 
grant is increased from to ItlOOO and 91500. At a given price and a 
given discount rate the replanting age is generally 'younger' when the 
grant increases. 
V/hen the current prices exceed the expected (Table 8.20) 
no replacement is necessary yet for almost all prices and all rates of 
interest. The only exception is when a replanting griuit of 'lilf^ OO is given. 
At a discount rate of 7 F^r cent, the large grant of 5U500 brings forward 
the replanting age to 36 oven though the expected price of 60 cents is 
lower than the current one of Po cents per pound. 
TABLE 8.20. Sf;j.LHOLDTNG: GUMHAHY OF OPTIKAL REPLACE;i:[^ ,T AGE FOR 




Grant Grant: t730 Grant: tjiooo Gr.'in t: 
151500 



















Price: 6 0 / 





NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 
V/hen asr.uming expected prices to exceed current prices, (Table 
and assuming no replanting grant, a higlier discounting of the 
future leads to an 'older' replanting age for each given current and 
expected price level. The replanting age is also sensitive to the size 
of the replaating gmnt. Gen'U'nlly, the age of replanting is 'younger' 
with the increase in the size of the grant for any given discount rate 
and current and expectf^d prices. 
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TADLK 8 . 2 1 . Sf'ALLir^LDinO: GUMMAT^ y or OPiMi.AL KEPLACEMErrT FOR 





Grant; : S7'70 Grant: U O O O Grnnt: ivi500 


















Price: GCi^  





2 7 3 3 2 7 30 I R 27 : R ! 
8 , 8 . POLICY If'TLICATIOriS 
Out of a hOot of factors which influence replanting we h-Tve 
sin^tled out tliree significant ones for our «eiisitivity analyuio. 
Theoretical optimal replacement ages are computed using different 
assumptions with regard to tlie size of the replanting gr tnl., Liie price of 
rubber, and the discount rates. These three sets of variables have 
different effects on tlie ago of replanting. The hypothesis t}ia t the 
replanting grmt shortens the replanting age by meJ-'.ing replanting at an 
earlier aj^e economically justifiable is verified in tlie conclusions above. 
This is more easily seen in Table 7 . 9 where a comparison is iriade between 
the situ;ition of no repl'inting grant and a gr,aiit of (^500. The replanting 
grant effect can be observed separately ^rom the other variables. In all 
cases the effect of the replanting grant has resulted in a 'younger' 
optimal replanting age. 
The discount rate effect is to delay replanting the higher the 
rate of interest used. Discounting the future greatly means that the 
present is given more significance. The discount rate effect plus no 
replanting grant results in a much older replacement age for any given 
price level. A future low expected price in such a situation further 
prolongs the replarting age. 
31'+ 
The broad effect of price is to delay replacement when current 
prices ^re high. This confirms oia^  survey evidence elaborated in 
Chapter 7 which points out that Gome producers have delayed replanting 
because of the recent high rubber prices. This cajri be explained by the 
influence of the discounting factor which interacts with the price factor. 
The high value attached to the current price and income by producers 
during the survey, which shows a high discounting of the future, is the 
reason for their answer. On the other hand, if the discounting is smaller 
then the price effect is to replant when the current price is low. 
However, one effect is certain: given the discount rate and the 
price, the rubber producers would replant at an earlier age v/hen a grant 
is given than when no grant is given. In terms of policy implications it 
means that the Government can in^'luence the replanting rate and replanting 
ages of rubber trees by manipulating the replanting grant. Ceteris 
paribus, if the theoretical optimal replanting age for a given planting 
material is found then the Government should aim at influencing producers 
to achieve this through the replanting grant. This, if successful, would 
ensure more efficient use of resoui-ces and a more effective maximization 
of income than the present haphazard system of replanting which depends 
on 'rule of thumb' criteria. It has to be pointed out that this is an 
oversimplification of reality when we advise the above solution. 
The results of the replacement technique which is applied in 
this study, are luseful as a guide in defining a replanting policy 
pertaining to general conditions only. They give us indications of the 
v'>-ioMs possibj-lities vrhen significant variables like the r'^planting grant 
are manipulat*)d by the Government. However, at the micro level - that is, 
from the viewpoint of the estate or smallholdjing - other considerations 
and constraints must be taken into account. 
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ThuR, nludien'"' done by other research workers have shown thaat 
there are sti?.! many acres of low y?Lelding stands of rubber, particularly 
in smallholdings, which are past their optimal replanting age. For 
instance, Arshad found in Batang Kali that the average age of trees was 
?5 find 'a considerable proportion much older'. In Terachi Valley, Ho 
found 3?.0 per cent of the trees to be years old, 30.3 per cent to 
be ^1-50 years old, and 6.7 per cent to bo over 50 years. In I^asa, Fryer 
found that '+3 per cent of the "^ .rees there is 30 to '+0 years old. 
This evidence shows that in practice there are certain factors 
which inhibit the smallholders from replanting ejirlier despite the 
existence of the replanting grant. It is not that the grant would not 
stimulate replanting and therefore optimize the use of resources. But in 
practice there would be deviations from the theoretical optima we have 
estimated. This is because smallholders confront complex social and 
economic forces which influ-^ncc their decision-making. An individual 
smallholder, facing an uncertain future and being not very knowledgeable 
about economic costing, discounts the future very heavily. Ke may discount 
not only for time prefererice but also for the other uncertainties like 
future costs and future prices and future yield of the new stand. This, 
compounded with unwillingness to sacrifice present income during the 
replanting period because of low income, has delayed the replanting of 
smallholdings. Probably if the replanting grant is so large that the 
waiting pei'iod of smallholders does not involve a sacrifice of income 
then the above problem becomes unimportant. Other factors which work 
against the stimulating influence of the replanting grant are problems 
arising from multiple ownership, small si:<e of tho smallholding, the long 
immaturity period, and low income. 
- —-T!-omi- of the above f?ictor^ apply to som'^  eatates too, particularly 
smaller on<^ s. Because of the uncertainty about th*- future, ajid this 
' ' Fisk, E.Ko, "Productivity and Income from Pubber in an Established Malay 
Peservation," MlOP, Vol., 6, No.T, 19^1; Pobert Vo, "Pubber Production by 
Feasants of thTTerachi Valley, T'alaya, "^rans. Instit. of British 
r}eographers, VolJU. Fry^r, D.V/. et.al., "Peasant J^ roducer;; or l-rban 
FXantersV I'he Ohinenr. Pubber r.mnllhold'. rs of Ulu G.Aangor," Pacific 
Vi>-wpoLnt, Vo^ .7, r.'o.2, 1066. 
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includes the political condition besides economic Vi\riables, the rate of 
discounting the -^ u^ture will be high. This is because corporate decision-
makers will incorporate into the normal discounting for time preference 
an additional subjective discoun-ting for non-economic uncertainty. This 
has the effect of reducing the amortized value of the replacement trees. 
Consequently, this will prolong the optimum replacement ages of the 
present trees. 
Besides, the present condition of scarce capital fund in the 
country aggravates the financial liquic.Uty problem of rubber producers. 
The discount rate will also thus increase. If this is so, rubber 
producers will tend to continue tapping their existing trees for a longer 
period. 
However, if the replanting subsidy is sufficiently large it will 
offset the other adverse influence of the high subjective discount rate 
and low rubber prices v.'hich are delaying replanting. 
The theoretical optimal ages we have calculated assume certain 
conditions to exist, viz, the tyv^ of tapping system, the use of 
stimulation and so on. It is obvious that if these change then the 
optimal replanting age will also change. Thus if the immaturity period 
is shortened from 6 to h- yea-^ s th' n it will be worthwhile to replant 
earlier. We have also assumed that the producer will replant with rubber. 
This may be restrictive since thorf^  are other approved crops he can plant. 
A similar treatment can be done if we wish to compare these other crops 
with rubber and then calculate the optimal replanting ages. However, 
wh-i we use only polrit to thn f.-jct thnt there is no one 
single and general optimal replanting age or policy for every producer or 
even for a stand of rubber trees. The only certainty is that the optimal 
replanting age is 'younger' the larger the replanting grant given, as this 
alters the cost-revenue function in favour of early replanting. 
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CHAPTTR 9 
SIM'^ARY A.ND CONCLUSIONS 
The concern of this study has bf)en to analyze some of the 
effects arising frori the imposition of the rubber export taxes and the 
provision of the replanting jrant in the rubber industry. In this 
chapter, a summary, but not a detailed resume, of the salient points 
which emerge from the study of the above issue is given. It will also 
comment on the problem of restructuring the rubber export tax system. 
Since its introduction in I877 into the country, rubber 
production has experienced a phenomenal growth. Because of its large 
planted acreage and its contribution to the revenue, income, and 
employment of the country, the rubber industry now occupies a strategic 
position in the Malaysian economy. 
The rubber industry is arbitrarily divided into two sectors, 
estates and smair^holdings. The government definition of an estate is a 
holding of 100 acres and above. A smallholding is one with an acreage 
below 100 acres. There are important differences between the tv/o groups 
of producers with respect to their organizational structure, size 
distribution, yield and quality of output, utilization of resource inputs, 
mnrkt^ 'ling practices, access to capital funds, and replanting progress. 
From, this, one can easily notice evidence of dualism existing between the 
two sf-ctors with regard to re;.;ource use and tlie institutional structure. 
Hivc.'n this, Lhf- introducticm of the export tax system to the 
rubber industry gives rise to different repercussions on the two groups 
of producers. 
In the historical development of the .Vest I-'alaysian economy, 
the export 8Pctor has beer the nucleus o,'^  the market economy. Compared to 
the rest of the economy, this sector nas, nnd still is, the most developed 
and monetized. Thus, the evolution of the fiscal system was closely 
associated with the export sector. It was therefore a natural development, 
particularly given the limited tax sources, that trade taxes becnme the 
dominant source of revenue to the Government. 
The earliest ex'idence of the use of export taxes in V/est 
Malaysia v/as the percapita tax of five riksdollars on each adult slave 
exported from the state of Malacca in the seventeenth century. The 
Schedule I rubber export tax was introduced in 190^^. Since then, the 
development of the rubber export taxation system has been the result of 
responses to the needs of the Government in ('^ leneral and to that of the 
rubber industry in particular. The present system is com,prised of the 
following components: 
1) the Schedule T export tax, which caries with the price 
of RS3 I 
2) the Schedule III research cess of 1 cent per pound of 
rubber exported 
3) the Schedule IV replanting cess of '4.5 cents per pound 
of rubber exported. 
The objectives of Schedule I are to raise revenue and to act as 
a counter-cyclical instrument during periods of inflationary pressure due 
to the rise in rubber prices. The latter assumed a significant role 
during the Korean Boom when rubber prices rose rapidly. At the present 
time, this function of Schedule I has diminished in sig-nificance because 
of the- reliitively low rubber price level and because of the improvement 
in monetary and fiscal techniques to control the economy now available 
to the Government. As a source of revenue, Schedule I has also declined 
somewhat in importance because of the development of other so'-irces of tax 
revenue. 
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The other two ccsnes - Schedule III and Schedule IV - are 
earmarked taxes. The Schedule III recearch cess is meant to fund 
research expenditure in the rubber industry/. Schedule IV is collected 
for the purpose of subsidizing replanting in the rubbor industry. To 
accomplish this, Fund A for the estates and Fund 3 for the smallholdings 
were established. In 1973, the P.ubber Industry Smallholders Authority 
centralized the administration of these two funds. The replanting cess 
is refunded to each estate every quarterly according to its production 
statistics. But the replanting cess is not similarly refunded to 
smallholdings. 
From the fund of the replanting cess, qualified smallholders 
are given a grant of $7^0 per acre to help them replant. A grant of 
5'i-50 per acre was also given to estates until this programme ended in 
1 9 6 8 . This gra.nt for the estates, however, came from a lump-sum grant 
given by the Government to the estate sector from the general revenue. 
In effect, the smallholding sector h^s been subsidizing its own replanting 
from the replanting cess collected from the smallholders. 
The use of export taxes like the Schedule I tax by the Government 
has been an expedient fiscal act. Besides being an important source of 
revenue, the rubber export taxes are easy to administer and difficult to 
evade. The Schedule I tax is also the most practical method of taxing a 
large number of scattered smallholders. One additional attractive 
feature of the tax is its "inconspicuous" and "impersonal" nature in 
comparison to other taxes, for instance, the personal income tax. For 
this reason, and also due to its vague incidence, the imposition of, and 
changes made in, the rubber export taxes elicit little reaction from the 
general public and from, the rubber producers. 
Whilst the objectives of the Government in establishing the 
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rubber export taxation system are clear, there are certain irnplications 
due to the impositior. of the tax system which are not so obvious. 
At the theoretical and empirical level, there have been few 
studies on the export tax issue and fewer still on the rubber export 
taxation system in 'Vest Malaysia. This could be due to the conceptual 
difficulties and data problems which are inherent in an analysis of the 
1 
export tax issue. One major conclusion from international trade and 
public finance studies on the export tax is that its incidence and burden 
are determined by the relative demand and supply elasticities. 
vVe have found sufficient evidence from other studies to conclude 
that the imposition of the rubber export taxes is really an internal 
issue. Because of the relatively elastic demand for and relatively 
inelastic supply of Malaysi3.n rubber, it is not possible to shift the 
export tax abroad. Consequently, the offeet of the export tax payment is 
to reduce the domestic price receivable by the producers. 
To have an understanding of the internal aspect of the problems, 
it is therefore essential to study the pricing and distribution system 
of the domestic market. 
From a survey of 100 smallholders and 30 estates, it was found 
that the domestic marketing system for rubber was characterized by a 
multi-tiered framework with a multiplicity of operators. Marketing 
activities at the primary (first level), secondary (intermediate or 
second level), and tertioary levels (third level) by the dealers, remillera, 
packers, and exporters formed a highly integrated system. Through the 
provi'lon^T'a wide range of services such as warehousing, processing, 
grading, and credit facilities, these middlemen not only provided an 
efficient marketing network but they also had a tight control over it. 
From the sarvey it was found that the marketing system facing 
~ Indeed both have been encountered throughout this study. 
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the smallholders wis moro imperfect than that of the estates. This, 
and their inefficient marketing and production practices, had placed the 
smallholders in a disadvantaged position vis-w-vis the dealers. As a 
resalt, the dealer's price which was offered to smallholders for any 
given grade of rubber was relatively lower than would otherwise be the 
case. In addition, practices like the downgrading of the quality of 
smallholders' rubber also caused "price erosion". In contrast, estates 
normally secured competitive prices. 
The above was verified by a dummy regression model and by an 
analysis of the symmetry of the dealer's marketing margin to the change 
in world prices during different periods of price trends. The quantitative 
estimates confirm that smallholders were in a weaker position than the 
estates. IVhereas the dealer's price given to estates moved very closely 
with the change in the world price, that of the smallholders suffered 
from price rigidity. 
In general, the pricing process for both estates and smallholders 
can be summarized thus: 
l) world's price minus export tax and cesses equals 
exporter's price; 
?) exporter's price minus his marketing margin equals 
intermediate dealer's price; 
3) itLtermediate dealer's price minus his marketing margin 
equals first level dealer's price; 
'() first level dealer's price m.inus his m.arkp-ting margin 
equals price offered to rubber producers. 
formal payer of the export taxes is the exporter. However, 
through the price transmission process the burden is shifted by the 
middlemen all the way back to the rubber producers. The effective burden 
is tlierefore on the rubber producers. 
The question arises as to liov; much ol the ochedule T tax would 
be returned to the rubber producers if there is a reduction of the tax 
d\':ring a price fall or by the Government. 
To find this out, the elasticity of response coefficient of 
dealer's price to the Schedule I export tax changes was first derived. 
Then this was multiplied by the average world price for a particular grade 
of rubber. The re55ult was then divided by the average export tax for the 
period. This would give the amount of tax benefit returned to producers. 
The estimated results indicated that 99 per cent of the tax 
benefit would be given back to estates. Smallholders producing RSS 3 
would receive back 6,5 per cent of the tax reduction. Those producing 
USS would get back only 55 per cent. 
Two explanations can be offered for the above results. First, 
the imperfect marketing system allowed the dealers to absorb a large part 
of the tax benefit due to a tax reduction. Secondly, the low level of 
tax awareness and "tax ignorance" amongst smallholders also contributed 
to this possibility. 
From the viewpoint of policy decisions one potential use of the 
above analysis lies in the area of minimum price support schemes for 
rubber producers. For instance, if the necessary response coefficients 
and aniount of tax sharing due to the tax reduction can be accurately 
established, then the desired minimum price for smallholders can be fixed. 
The overall conclusion of the analysis points to the critical 
necessity to reform and to improve the smallholder;;' marketing system and 
m^^!o;Ling practices as a prerequisite to t.MX reformc. Tax reforms are by 
themselves only partially effeclxve unles;; the smallholders c.an enjoy the 
benefits of an improved productio!) and distribution syst'-'m. 
'.Vhile there is general agreement thni the burden of the export 
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taxes is effectively' on the rubber producers it i,s not known what the 
intersectoral burden is between the estates and smallholdings. 
A few measures were therefore developed to estimate the 
progressivity and burden of the export tflxes. 
On the historical chani^es in the progressivity of the Schedule I 
export tax, it was fo'und that since 19'+^; this tax has become more 
progressive with the rise in T prices. However, comparing changes 
in progressivity between different price brackets, most of the increase 
in progressivity has occurred only since 1953, particularly between the 
price range of 80 to 120 cents. It was also found that from 19.50 to the 
present time, a proportional tax structure has been enforced when the 
prices are at 60 cents and below. 
This idea of progressivity of the Schedule T tax is related to 
the tax base, that is, the level of T^SG I prices, which is uniformly 
applied on all producers. The concept of a progressive export tax system 
is not defined in terms of ability-to-pay and the principle of equity. 
In fact, on this criterion of equity the rubber export taxation system 
is an "unfair" one. This is because the e?qjort tax payment, unlike the 
personal income tax, is in no way related to the economic position of the 
payer. There is no exemption allowance incorporated into the export tax 
structure like that of the personal income tax. Irrespective of hie 
economic position, cost a.nd efficiency of production, or the quality of 
his output, his export tax payment is based solely on one tax base, the 
RSM T price. The burden is thur: un'fairly distributed amongst producers 
of rii v^-pee--©oonomic background. 
This was found to be the situation between the estate and 
smallholding sectors, losing various measures of tax burden, with the 
element of ability to pay included, we have found that since 1951 the 
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intersectoral export tax bui-den has been in favour of the estate sector. 
This has been due in particular to two factors: first, the use 
of RSS I as the tax base and the fact that smallholders do not earn 
RSS I prices for their lower grade o^ rubber have put them in a weak 
economic position vis-a-vis the estateso Secondly, this has been 
aggravated by the payment of the replanting cess, which is refundable to 
estates but not to smallholders. Indeed, for those smallholders which 
have not replanted the replanting cess is but an additional tax. 
From the survey information on the economic and institutional 
background of rubber producers, it was found that there is little 
possibility for them to shift the export tax burden to the factors of 
production used by them. For instance, estates cannot shift the tax to 
the labour force as the wage structure is institutionally determined by 
wage agreements. In the case of smallholdings, the tax burden is shared 
by the family members working on the farm. Besides, because of the 
immobility of most of the factors involved in the production of rubber, 
for instance, land and capital are tied up for a long period of time, at 
.any given time it is not possible for the rubber producers to evade the 
tax by shifting resources out of rubber production. In the long run, 
there is also no attempt to do so as the alternative returns from other 
uses of land are relatively low com.pared to rubber production. 
If the price per pound of rubber which is received by rubber 
producers is effectively reduced by the export tax pa^Tnent, s priori 
reasoning suggests that this would have a negative impact on production 
anc^  investment- in the rubber industry. On the other hand, the effect of 
the replanting grajit, being a subsidy, would have a positive influence 
on investment in replanting. 
This was examined in two ways in the study. First, the effects 
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of the export tax and replanting;; grant variables were checked in a few 
long run and short run supply responGC functions, secondly, these 
variables v;ere further expir.ined by survey data with regard to their 
significance as decision variables by estates and smallholders. 
The statistical estimates indicated that in the smallholding 
long run investment function, the replanting grant has been a significant 
factor in stimulating replanting. T'he elasticity of response of the 
replanting investment function to the replnnting grant variable is larger 
than one. In the Cct.se of estates, the elasticity of response is less 
than one. 
In the short run output behaviour, botli estates and smallholding 
have inelastic responses to changes in the export tax variable. 
During the survey, estates and smal],holdings were asked to rank 
the export tax and replanting grant variables along with other major ones 
lik'^  the price of rubber, the price of a substitute crop, the replanting 
reserves or family savings, etc. 
In the general ranking of variables by smallholders the replanting 
grant was placed first, followed by family saving, and the export tax last. 
Estates ranked the replanting grant in fifth position and the export tax 
last. To estates, age and yield of trees, followed by rubber price, were 
more important in their replanting policy. 
From the survey, it was also found that producers did not give 
any significance to the level of export tax rates in their short run 
supply. Irrespective of the tax rates the normal tapping routine was 
cont, nued. 
The above evidence thus confirm.s the sto.tistical estimates of 
long and short run response models. 
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The dif.fr>rpnce in em]>ha'^ is between and smallholders 
on tlie ranking of the replanting grant as a vn.rinble in their decision-
making reflects mainly the diff^^rence in their financial background. 
Estates, besides having access to other sources of capital funds, normally 
have sufficient replanting reserves for their replanting programmes. In 
contrast, most smallholders are characterized by their inability to finance 
replanting and to tide over the replanting period when income is at a 
m.inimal. Because of their ability to finance replanting, estates consider 
other variables like age and yield of the trees to be m.ore important in 
detei-mining their replanting programme. 
Though the export tax is not given prominence in the decision-
making of rubber producers thio does not mean it has absolutely no effect. 
As long as it reduces the prices to be received by rubber producers, it 
will reduce their profit level. This in turn will reduce their investible 
funds. In this way, the export tax payment has its effect on investment. 
However, the adverse influence of the export tax Vciriable could be swamped 
by the positive influence of other variables, for instance, the high 
returns from rubber production, so that the net impact has not led to a 
fall in the investmejit in the rubber industry. 
The policy implications of the above main conclusions are quite 
clear. In the short run, the export tnx payment can be increased with 
little serious consequence on production of rubber producers. Because of 
the absence of "annoimcement effects," as ir the case of the personal 
income tax, the reactions to export tax changes in the short run are 
negligible. Besides, because of the nature of the production process, 
the supply is relatively inelastic to the price and particularly to the 
export tax changes. 
However, the export tax payment affects the profit level which in 
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turn affects the potential nr^ount- of investible fund in replanting. In 
the long run, if this adverse influence is powerful the output level 
would be affected because of the slower rate of replanting. This would 
affect smallholdings more than estates as the latter have better access 
to capital funds. 
But the corollary that replanting might be increased if the 
export tax payment is reduced or abolished is not necessarily correct. 
In stimulating replanting, this approach is unreliable. The provision of 
the replanting grant is still the better method, at least for smallholdings. 
The only question is whether the replanting grant should be increased in 
value. 
Besides affecting the stream of costs and profits over the years, 
it v/as found that the replanting grant has an influence on the optimal 
age of replanting. Applying the Faris replacement technique to three 
planting materials, unselected seedlings, PB 86 and RRIM 600, it was 
found that the replanting grant shortens the replanting age by making 
replanting at an earlier age economically justifiable. 
For any given discount rate and price level the rubber producers 
would replant at an earlier age when a grant is given than when no grant 
is given. In terms of policy implications, it meajis that the Government 
can influence the replanting rate and the optimal replanting ages by 
adjusting the size of the replanting grant. If the optimum age for a 
given planting material is known, ceteris paribus, the Government should 
aim at influencing producers to achieve this. This would lead to an 
eff; of resources and a maximization of income for the producers. 
The present haphazard system of replanting which depends on "rule of 
thumb" criteria has to be improved. 
Knowing that the replanting grant can be an instrument to influence 
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not only the rate of replanting but also the replncement ages is only 
one aspect of the overall problem in replanting. It har, been known that 
despite the availability of the grant, many Bmallholders have not made 
full use of the subsidy to replant. This only points to the presence of 
other factors, such as multiple ownership and small acreage size, which 
are hindering the progress of replanting. A balanced approach in 
attacking the replanting problem must thus entile the social and economic 
reforms of the institutional environment. 
There are t'wo characteristics in the export tax system which 
are very snti.sfying to the Government: ease of 'jd .instration and certainty 
of payment of the tax. Except during periof^s of very low prices, it is 
also a good soiirce of revenue. These, however, are only two aspects of a 
tax system. One must also consider the equity side of it. 
In a -progressive income tax, consideration is given to the 
ability-to-pay of the tax payers. 'Adhere tax payers are of identical 
economic position, they are required to pay the same amount of tax. The 
implication is that it is equitable to treat them alike for tax purposes. 
'tVhat is achieved is horizontal equity, '..here the tax payers are unlike 
and unequal in their economic positions, then the more able to pay (i.e., 
the ricVi) are required to pay proportionately more than those less able 
to pay (i.e., the poor). This is vertical equity. To achieve this, the 
tax sl-iould bp progressive in the sense that the burden of the tax has to 
be distributed fairly and equitably amongst the capable and less capable 
tax payers. 
basis on the present export tax system implicitly assumes 
horizontal equity. There is, however, no prem.ise for this. It is obvious 
that between smallholdings and estates there are differences in actual 
prices received, output quality, co'-.ts of production, resource availability, 
and such like factors. Furthermore, amongst estates and amongst small-
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holdincs thptnr,elves, suc>i differences plro exist. Thus, in the present 
ey.stem the use of a sinjjle base, the T?r,o T price, cis t?ie basis of the 
export tax which is applied to all producers is inequitable. Thus 
since not all producers receive I prices this inequity is even more 
serious from the angle of vertical equity which requires differential 
rates for different economic units of different ability-to-pay strength. 
'Ve have found in Chapter 5 that although some of the export tax 
struct! ires are found to be price progressive they are actually regressive 
from the equity viewpoint. If the criterion of ability-to-pay is used 
to assess the tax systems v/hich have been used since it will be 
observed that there has been no consideration given to the concept of 
equity and fair distribution of the tax bui-den at all. In fact, all have 
been regressive since no allowance has been given to the achievement of 
vertical equity. 
While it is generally understood that vertical equity is best 
served if all taxpayers bear an equal subjective burden of taxation 
through a progressive tax structure, it is difficult in practice to 
determine how progressive the structure should be and what the degree of 
sacrifice is involved. The insoluable problem encountered is to define 
what is fair and equitable to the taxpayers. 
There are terms with emotive connotations. There are no 
scientific criteria or measures of what is 'fair' and 'equitable'. This 
2 
is so despite the large volume of literature on this issue. '-Vhat is 
widely agreed is that tliere must be some degree of progressiveness in a 
' ffar' and--'-equitable' tax nystem. This, in turn, implies that some can 
sacrifice more than others in their tax jjayment. For instance, the equity 
criteria which are given in theoretical models, viz, the equal absolute 
p 
' Gee the excellent analysis by A.K.3en in Economics of Inequality, 
(Clarendon Press, 197;^), and th'> literature reierrcd therein. 
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f ^ . T - r i f i c e , o - u a l p r o p o r t i o ! : . ^ ! r ; a c r i . f i c e , an.l c-qu.:-"! n i . -u- inal s a c r i f i c e 
trix m o d e l s , a r e d-vfinf^d In t e r m c o f t h e degre 'r o f a n c r i f i c p . 
Sucli t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u r t r . a r e i l l u n i i n a t i n c i n many w a y s . 
But nc p r a c t i c a l c u i . l a ^ t o p o l i c y - m r k e r s t h e y a r e o b v i o u L j l y n o t 
d e f i n i t i v e . One o " tlif>ir most l i m i t i n ' : a:3pectn i f : th^ ^ a r s h a l l i a n 
w e l f a r e ar3i;,umptions r e g a r d i n g t h e n o a r u r a b i l i ^ y , a d d i b i l i t y , and 
comp.-n-abi l i ty o f u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s nmonc^t . l i^for '^nt t a x p a y e r s . I t 
i s on s u c h a s s u m p t i o n s th/it t h e v - r i o u s s a c r i ' ' i ce a|;.^;roriches a r e c o n s t r u c t e d . 
But thp d e g r e e o f s a c r i f i c e r ( a ' j : i r e d i s , u n f o r t u n T t n l y , i m p o s s i b l e t o 
measui-e s c i e n t i f i c n l l y . In r r . - i c t i c c , t l ie s n ^ r i f i c e o f a p o r t i o n o f o n e ' s 
incarrip i s t l ie b a s i s . I t i s ba..ed on t h e i d u a o f e q i i a l i ^ y o f t a x biu:'den 1 %/ 
h(?t\vef'v. p e r : ; o n s o f u n e q u a l p o s i t i o n . T h i s , o f c j u r s e , i s n o t a p e r f e c t 
measiaa-. I t i ; i non p e r f e c t becau; .c Lh^ i n c j.Ti'^-welfrire r e l . ' . t i o n s h i p o f a 
p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u o . 1 and o f a r r o u p o f i n d i v i d u a l s i s y e t t o be f u l l y 
defiru^d. The o f f a i r r . e s s or e q u i t y in t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f w e l f a r e 
does n o t s p e c i f y aiiy p a r t i c u l a r incor^'e d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h e r e i s no one 
c o n c e p t o f f a i r n i . ' s s s i n c e i t v a r i e s wi Lh d i f fer</r i t s i t u a t i o n s . I n the 
l a s t r e s o r t , what i s f a i r and e q u i t a b l e becomes a p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n . 
Those a r e v a l u e s t h a t must be de^'in-.-r^ by the s o c i e t y and t h e government 
At t h e p r a c t i c a l ond a d m i n i s t r - i t i v e l e v e l , e q u i t y must be d e f i n e d i n an 
o p e r a t i o n a l and f u n c t i o n a l v.'ay. Th/is i s the o n l y f e a s i b l e a p p r o a c h s i n c e 
tlit.Tf^ i : ; no f i i i i i i answi-r to the pb. i lo ' 0])hy <ji' e q u i t y aud f a i r n e s s . 
""hus, ..i.iic<.- t h e r e i s no s>ci .nLi^xC method ^vvnilablt; t o h e l p d e s i g n 
^ The two ^';roup;, mi/jht o n u f l i c t bocMiise th-'v hav.r di rfer..>nt. v a l u e s 
i-e/^a'-dint: wh . t i s c i n i t ' i b l e . 'I'lsi;, "in K ' l - ' y i - ' th-' ^ov- rum.'111 f e e l s i t 
i • [ j j u i -uqui t,-ihi'.' to lu.'lp th'-' r.'il;iys. liy r-ed • s I r i buliji,p; incom'.' and 
] • to t h e i r r . ivoui-. To do t h i s , a 30 pr-r cent fi[:;uro i s f i x e d a s 
t h f b a s i s o f d i s t r i b u t i o n i n j o b o^.-portunitie.-, , ov ;ncrship o f w e a l t h , and 
so o n . H o w e v e r , some may rej3,ird tViis a s " u n f - ^ i r " . '.7};at s h o u l d be n o t e d 
i s t h . i t t l i i s e q u i t y norm i s d e f i n e d acroT'dinr': t o p o l i t i c a l - c u m s o c i o -
f^conon.ic c r i t e r i a .and i s then t r - m s f o r m e d i n t o * p o l i c y m e a s u r e . 
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an equitable tax structure, it is in th- final a_nalysis up to the 
Government to decide on the degree of vertical equity. Only the 
Government, perhaps with the general agreement of the taxpayers, can 
define the equity norm. For instance, if the Government thinks that 
producers of lower grade rubber deserve a lower tax burden because of the 
lower prices they receive, then a certain equity norm is already defined. 
There remains the practical task of formulating the tax structure to 
achieve this equity norm. 
To do this, the Government must have various considerations in 
mind. A tax uystem must not only be equitable. It must also be 
administratively feasible and rewarding in terms of raising revenue. 
Besides, as with the export tax, some of its specific functions like 
stabilizing the economy cannot be ignored. However, there is no optimal 
solution. Besides, a second best solution is not necessarily a better 
solution. Given the Vr3rious constraints most tax systems are usually 
unsatisfactory compromises. Not surprising too, most Governments would 
satisfy their revenue requirement first. 
With the above in mind, let us illustrate with some numerical 
examples the problems of formulating an export tax system. This is meant 
not to give final answers but only to illustrate the difficulties of 
constructing a new export tax system. 
Considering the significant contribution of the export tax to 
Government revenue, any proposal for reform of the export tax structure 
must not negl'='ct this aspect of the problem. In most developing 
co>uitr.ii.^ ,--trVie sources of revenue are restricted in one way or another. 
For this reason alone, most Government invariably give more priority or 
weight to revenue than to equity. Keeping the revenue problem in mind 
and also the need to have a 'fairer' distribution of the tax burden, the 
33? 
Government could devise various export ta/ sy^tens and then select one 
which best suits its defined objectives. A few hypothetical cases are 
examined below. 
Existing: Hates but Different Tax Base. The first set of models 
uce the existing tax rat-^ s but the tax base is modified. S^^Tnbolically 
they are 
Y _ Tl 
> 3 = •'l •^10 * (P3' 5s ••• 
where the various s refer to the export tax revenue obtained 
for each case. 
rl = -1 ••• 
is 
is 
p is 0 





SHH, latex, scrap, and is also the tax base for T^ 
le price of scrap and other crepe rubber, and is 
also the tax base for T^ 
Q the total quantity exported of all grades 
le higher grade rubber and is the total quantity of 
RSS I, SMS, latex exported 
other grades, excepting R33 I, SM!^ , latex, scrap 
exported 
Q^^ is the total quantity of Q^ and Q^ exported. 
Different Rates and Different Tax Base. The second set of models 
u-c iifrer'ent tax rates and also different tax bases. Symbolically, they 
are 
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Y = T ( -t- T I'P ^ r, fn 
where T^ is the t 
dx rjitf? wi. t-h 
P^ as t')X base 
T^ is the tax rate with 
P as tax base 
o 
T is the tax rate with 
s 
P as tax base 
s 
and the other symbols are defined as in equations 9 . 1 to 9 . 3 . 
Let us briefly explain some of t.he terms and assumptions used. 
To obtain each Y^, the export tax revenue, for each price level the 
Government can adjust or introduce nev/ tax rates and tax bases for the 
vnrious grades of rubber exjiorted. Tliis is what is given in the two sets 
of equations. For instance, Y^ ^^  - T^ (P^) q in equation ( 9 . 1 ) is the 
export tax structure now in use. That i s , the revenue to be obtained 
depends on the tax rate T^ , which varies with the T price level P^ , 
the tax base, for each pound of rubber "exported. It will be noticed that 
irrespective of the grades of rubber exported the tax base is st i l l RSS I , 
i . e . , P^ , and that for any given P^ the tax rate is T^ . 
The Government can of cour.<;e, as pointed out, change or use 
various combinations of tax rates and tax bases. For instance, in equation 
where Y , = T^ ( P , ) J , + T (P )d different tax rates and different 
r q- 2 1 1 o o "-o 
tax bases for different grades of rubber are used. The problem is to 
adjust such variables like the tax rates and tax bases to achieve the 
target revenue Y^. 
. . .Iu__the _ firiit set of equations (9-1 -^o 9 . ^ ) , T^ refers to the 
197'5 export tax rates now in use. T^ , the tax rate for scrap, is 
assumed to be 50 per cent of T^ for each corresponding US5 T price level. 
P^, the price of middle grade is asr,umed to be 2 cents lower thnji P^ , the 
price of RG:", I rubber, for ewery corresponding price level. 
33'+ 
In the second set of e.^uations to T the tax rate o 
for middle grades is f^ sr^ umed to be 20 jjer cent of T^ , the 1975 tax 
rates. For instance, using the 1973 export tax rate for Rf-C I at 
centG in o . n o ' l . T^ being 20 per cent lower i,s therefore 0 . 0 3 2 . 
Let us aGGume that the Government feels that it is 'fair' to 
tax the estate sector relatively more and to exact more "acrifices" 
from it than from the smallholdert; or producers of lower (?rade rubber. 
Oiven this, then T^ ^ must exceed T^. Here it is assumed that T^ is 1.5 
times higher than T^. That is, the export tax for the estate sector or 
producers of high grade rubber pay 1.5 times more tax then the small-
holding; sector or producers of middle lower grade rubber. The rates 
for T^ and T^ ore calculated for each price level and are given in 
9.1. 
TABLE 9.1. NU/; EXrOT?T TAX RATES Ai^yV^ING T IS 20 
PER CET^ T LOV/ER THAN T^ '-"^  ' AMD T° IS 1.5 
TIMES HIGHER TTTA.^? T 
Rubber 
• Tax Rate with RSS I Price 
As Tax Base 
• Tax Rate with Lower Grade 
Price As Tax Base 






1 0 0 
1 2 0 
.0^+9 
.o^f9 
. 1 2 ' + 
. I 9 B 
1 . 9 8 
2 . 9 ' + 
9 . 8 9 
1 9 . 7 6 
2 9 . 1 2 
. 0 3 2 
. 0 3 2 
. 0 8 2 
. 1 3 0 
. 1 6 0 
1 . 2 2 
1 . 8 6 
6 . 3 7 
1 2 . 7 ^ 
1 8 . 8 8 
(1) T^ is the 1975 Schedule I export tax rates. 
In calculating the total gain or loss of revenue to the 
Government, the export figures of 1971 '^ re used. The breakdown for the 
V jjouo grades io: total export of nil grades = 29 million pounds; all 
sheet rubber, including SMR, air dried sheets and latex = 2'+ million 
pounds; crepe rubber = 5 million pounds; RSS I (including SMR, latex, air 
^ The figure chosen is quite arbitrary. The Government can of course 
impose a heavier burden on the ostnte sector if it wants to exact more 
sncrifices from it. Then T^ „yceod T^ by a larger difference. 
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dried sheets) = 13 million pound::.; other sheet rubber not included in 
Roo I = 11 million pounds. 
Let U3 asse.'^ s each of the equation from tho viewpoint of tax 
burden to estates and snallholders and also from the Government view 
regarding revenue. From the viewpoint of Government revenue, equation 
9.6 is most acceptable. (Tables 9.2 and 9.3). There is a net gain 
of revenue at every price level. The increase is due to the higher rate 
of tax, T^. Equation 9.6 is the only case where the Government does not 
lose any revenue by the change in the tax structure. 
Equation 9.2 hat a tax system which involves the Government with 
the smallest loss of revenue at every price level. And equation 9.3 
involves the Government with the largest loss in revenue. 
Table 9.'l shows the direct money burden per acre. In calculating 
tho tax burden a yield of 1700 pounds (or ikk^ - pounds in RSS I and 255 
pounds in scrap) is assumed for estates. For smallholdings, the yield 
is assumed to be 85O pounds per acre (or 68O pounds of sheet rubber and 
170 pounds of scrap rubber). 
Of all the tax systems suggested, only equation 9*3 benefits the 
estates. Compared to the existing tax system, this proposal would reduce 
the tr^ x burden from 100 to 93 (Table 9.^) at the price level of ^ cents, 
and to 92 at the price level of 120 cents. This in equivalent to a money 
gain of iJ2 and t^ 30 per acre respectively. 
The tax system proposed by equation 9.'+ has the heaviest burden 
for estates. Compared to the present pystom, this proposal would increase 
thf- burden from 100 to 120 cents per poujid. 
To the sraallholders, the system of equation 9-5 has the lightest 
tax biirden. At 40 cents, the tax burden declined from 100 (using the 
present system as the base) to 71, and to 75 at 11« cents. 
TABLE 9.2. RSVENUE RECEIPT OF GOVSR-II-EK? UNDER DIFFERENT EXPORT TiiX STRUCTURES 
(NILLICN 8) 
Equation ( 9 . 1 ) ( 9 . 2 ) ( 9 . 3 ) ( 9 . 4 ) ( 9 . 5 ) ( 9 . 6 ) 
Rubber 
Prices 
\ Mo. Y = 
" n 
T ^ P ^ a 
+ T p a l o o Y r 2 T ^ P ^ a ^ + T ? 1 s VA + T ? a 0 0 0 T „ p a 2 1 1 + T ? a 0 0 0 + T p a s 3 s r 5 T P a . 2 1 1 f T ? a 3 s s Y , r o 
4 0 46 2 0 , 8 2 4 . 3 4 5 . 1 3 8 . 4 4 4 2 . 4 2 5 . 3 1 9 . 5 4 5 . 0 2 5 . 3 1 3 . 4 4 . 9 4 4 . 1 4 7 . 0 j 4 . 9 5 2 . 5 
6 0 7 0 3 1 . 2 3 7 . 1 6 8 . 3 5 7 . 6 0 5 ; . 6 3 3 . 3 2 9 , ' 7 6 c . 0 3 3 . 3 / -00 • - / u , 0 -.4 i - • ^ 
8 0 2 3 6 1 0 5 . 7 1 2 7 . 4 2 3 3 . 1 1 9 5 . 1 2 0 . 3 2 1 5 . 4 1 2 8 . 5 1 0 1 , 8 1230.3 1 2 8 . 5 7 0 . 0 0 9 9 2 2 0 . ^ 2 3 7 . 2 2 5 9 . 4 
1 0 0 4 7 1 2 1 1 . 3 2 3 4 . 9 4 6 6 . 2 3 9 0 4 0 . 6 « 2 5 6 . 9 o n - ; q 4 6 0 . 7 2 5 6 . ^ 1 4 0 . 1 4 ^ . 4 4 . - 6 . 4 4 7 - ' . ; 4 ^ . 4 5 2 3 . 6 
1 2 0 
1 
6 9 6 3 1 2 3T.G 6 3 9 . 6 5 7 6 6 0 OJO 
i 
3 7 3 . 6 
1 
3 0 2 . 1 6 8 0 . 7 3 7 s . 6 2 0 7 . " 7 2 . 3 6 5 9 . 1 6 9 3 . ? 7 2 . 3 7 7 1 . 7 
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TABL!^ 9.3. NET GAIN OR Lozr. TO gov^hh'imet:? iji:der 
VAKIOUS E<PO:^ T TAX ST^ UCTUPK'^  
Rubber 
Price 
( 9 . 
ir 
J. r 1 - ^ 2 
( 9 . 1 - 9 . 3 ) 
rl r3 








ho 0 . 9 - 3 . 6 - 1 . 0 i - 1 . 9 
i 
i 6.5 
6 0 - 1.7 - l 6 o ' + - 2 . 0 I - 3 . 9 ; S . o 
P)0 - 2 . 0 - 2 0 . 6 1 ^ r-, ' 1 - 3. r 1 - 1 3 . 3 2 3 . 
1 0 0 - - lioA - 1 0 . 3 i - 2/+.6 3 2 . 6 
1 2 0 - 6 0 . 0 - I S . 3 ; 
t 
1 
- 3 6 . 9 7 5 . 7 
(1.) That is, difference in export tnx revenue bet-.veen present 
system and proposed one. Figures are derived from Table 9.2. 
The tax eyRtem su^f^eBted by equation 9.6 has the heaviest 
burden on smallholdings. Compared to the present system, the money 
burden per acre increased by Sl.l? at price level of f^O cents, and by 
1119 at 120 cent level. This is equivalent to an increase of 10^ and 
115 respectively when compared to the base index of 100. 
When the intersectoral export tax burden is compared, except 
for systems 9.1 and 9.2 (for the respf^ctive estate and smallholding case) 
which have the same lax burden foi' both sectors, the o bher suggested 
systems are more in favour of the smallholdin£^ sector. 
oince each pi-oposed system involves either a gain or a loss for 
at least one of the tliree groups (Government, estates and smallholdings), 
it is impossible to satisfy all the three sectors simultaneously. Thus, 
th^ - estate sector's first preference is system 9.3 and the least preferred 
is system 9.'t. omallholders would prefer system 9-5 and the last choice 
is system 9.C. From the viewpoint of Government revenue, system is 
th'-- b^ -st and the worst is system 9.3-
There is no concurrence of preferences simultaneously for the 
sectors. In such a situation, the Government must decide on the 'best' 
course of action to take. This is essentially a ranking of priorities. 
In arriving at a solution, the Government must weigh the gains and losses 
oc 
TABLE 9.4. DIRECT MONEY BURDEN OF EXPORT TaI PER ACRE ($) 
Estate Smallholding 
Present Present 
Rubber Systen System Systen Systea Systea System Systen Systea Systea Systen Systen Systea 
Prices (9.1) (9.2) (9.3) (9.4) (9.5) (9.6) (9.1) (9.2) (9.3) (9.4) (9.5) (9.6) 
1700 1700 1445 1700 1445 1445 850 850 680 Lb. 850 630 Lb. 680 Lb. 
Lb,/Acre Lb,/Acre Lb./Acre Lb./Acre Lb./Acre Lb./Acre Lb./Acre Lb./Acre RSS 3 + Lb./Acre RSS 3 + RSS 3 + 
RSS I RSS I RSS I + RSS I RSS I + RSS I + 170 Lb. 170 Lb. 170 Lb. 
255 Lb. 225 Lb. 225 Lb. Scrap/Acre Scrap/Acre Scrap/Acre 
Scrap/Acre Scrap/Acre Scran/Acre 
40 27 27 25 35 31 
t 
31 14 12.92 12.36 10.33 9.88 15.27 
60 41 41 38 52 46 46 20 19.72 18.04 15.76 15.10 22.52 
80 133 138 127 175 154 154 69 67.66 67 54 50.83 74.77 
100 276 276 256 350 311 311 138 135 125 108 103 151.2 
120 408 408 378 515 458 458 .204 201 183 160 153 222.8 
INDSI OF CHA:IGES 
40 100 100 93 1 3 0 1 1 5 1 1 5 100 92 88 74 71 103 
60 100 100 93 1 2 7 112 1 1 2 100 99 90 79 76 112 
80 100 100 92 1 2 7 112 1 1 2 100 98 97 78 74 108 
100 100 100 92 1 2 7 112 1 1 2 100 98 9 1 78 75 , 110 




from the an3le of earh .sector. From its own angle, the Government is 
concerned with the possibility of loss of revenue with any change in the 
tax system. Thi.s is understandable. T^oonomic development needs revenue 
besides other requirements. Most Governments would be reluctant to 
forego a large G I J T I of revenue in order to achieve some vague obiective 
like equity unless the amount is not a severe loss and unless the 
decision-makers are politically pressured to do so. It would be quite 
willing to do this, however, if it can recover the amount of revenue lost 
from some other sovu-ces. Unfortunately, the sources of revenue are few. 
Besides, the imposition of a new tax or the change in the structure of 
other taxes would also create problems of inequity and disincentives, as 
well, in many cases, as additional administration costs. 
The Government must also consider the impact of a change in 
the existing export tax structure on the taxpayers. It cannot ignore 
the disincentive effects created if the tax burden is too heavy. But, 
if a particular sector is lightly taxed then more revenue can be extracted 
from it with little dajnage to that sector. 
Let us assume then that the Governinent is willing to sacrifice 
only the smallest amount of revenue in order to lighten the burden of 
the lower grade producers. For the moment we assume they are smallhol-ders. 
The system suggested by equation 9.? then appears to be the most 
acceptable of all the models hypotheeizedo To the estates, the tax burden 
has not changed. This therefore would not affect their investment 
incentive. Smallholders benefit by the lighter burden. This incurs a 
lose of revenue varying between 110.9 million (at a rubber price of 4^0 
cents per pound) to million (at a rubber price of 120 cents per pound.) 
The loss of revenue at this range of prices is bearable to the Government 
and can be made up by taxing other luxury items. This loss is equal to 
the benefit of the smallholders. That is, around ".9 to 156.'+ million 
3^ +0 
would be returned to the Kmnllholdin,- sector at this low price range, 
assurr.inc tlie tax re due ti or: all roaches the smallholder in some manner. 
The above hypothetical case.s are to be considered as illustrations 
of some of the possibilities the Government can look into in reformulating 
the rubber export tax systems. Obviously the final revised tax system 
must in the end be able to achieve the policy priorities of the 
Government. Here, it mn-^ l not only care about r"V(-nue. It is time that 
some thoughts should also be given to the equity aspect of the rubber 
export tax system. 
What has been said so far concernpd the Schedule I export tax 
only. '.Vhnt about the research cess and replanting cess? The research 
cess and the replanting cess are essentinlly earmarked taxes. They are 
imposed for specific objectives. The rationale appears to be some vague 
criteria of the benefit approach in tnx-itlon tiieory. The benefit approach 
ai-gues that equity is best served if beneficiaries of Government 
expenditure pay for these benefits in proportion as they benefit. 
Assessing the research cess on this criterion, it will be found that the 
benefits a^ -e not received proportionally by all producers who pay this 
cess. In gexieral the estates have, at least in the past, obtained more 
benefits from the research expenditure financed by the cess tlian have 
the smallholders. With improvements in extension services this imbalance 
should be corrected in due time. 
It is felt that the research cess must continue to be collected 
at all price levels. The cess is only 1 cent per pound and would not be 
a big burden even at the lower prices. Rut the cess is needed to fund 
renearch expenditure which la vital to the viability of the rubber industry. 
The replanting cess, however, should be retiu^ned during periods 
of low prices to the smallholders. For instance, at GO cents and below, 
tho cenc; ohould become inoperatioual in order to lighten their burden. 
For estates, t})e present system of re^andin^j; the replanting 
cenc could be Continued. Unlike the srnallholdprr., estates would not 
squander the refund. Besides, they have a progressive replanting policy 
wiiich relies mainly on their own replantin^- reserves. If the cess is 
not refunded to estates, their replanting reserves would be affected 
especially since they are not at the moment subsidized by any financial 
assistance from the Government. For smallholdings, the present system 
of enforced saving by the Government and returning the cess in lump-sum 
form is still the most effectual nethod to help them to replant. 
In spite of this we mu.-.t point out that the benefits of the 
provision of the replanting rrant are unevenly distributed. Only those 
smalllioldcrs who use the gr^int would benefit, and for those who do not 
the replanting cess is nothing biit another tax. li^ ven amongst those who 
have used the subsidy, the benefxLs are not evenly distributed. A numerical 
example will reveal this. 
Assume • the following number of smallholders who wish to replant. 
Tlio yield per acre pex' annum for e.nch of tl-iem is given below. Also assume 
the trees have been tapped for 30 years. 
T)i f fere nee Between Cess 
Repl.'inting Cess Paid & T^eplanting Grant 
Smallholder Yield/Acre Paid in 30 Years Assumed Given Per Acre 
VAcre 1^ 750 .UOOO.OO 
1 '(00 'J>kO 210 k60 
2 I^O 1U2 392 
^ 7'(3 7 251 
li 8 SO ll'iP - - I'fp 
1000 IJ'f'O - f.oo - 350 
c 1?00 1620 - 870 - 620 
From the above it is obvious that smallholdings with low yield 
per acre benefit more than those with high yield in terms of the amount 
of replanting cess paid and in terms of the amount given back for 
3^ 42 
replanting per acre„ For instance, smallholder 1 has paid '^^kO per acre 
in replanting cess in a 30 yenr period. During replanting he is paid 
back more than he has paid out. Thus, if the replanting grant is S750, 
he mpkes a 'profit' of or if the grant is $1000.00 he 'profits' by 
1i'+60. On the other hand, smallholder 6 loses f;.870 or 1I.620 per acre during 
replanting. 
As a general rule,the longer the rubber producer keeps his 
trees from being replanted, the more ropl.mting coss, besides the export 
tax and research cess, he has to pay out. The total amount of replanting 
cess paid over a longer life span of tlie rubber trees will exceed the 
amount of the rej>l,9nting grant by an increasing difference. Ceteris 
paribus, if only this net difference ir> considered then it appears 
sensible to replant early. 
A fairer system is to impose a different replanting cess on each 
prodiJcer on the basis of his yield per acre. This assumes that the 
purpose of tlie cess is to help him to replant and that he would not do so 
if he is given back the cess as in the case of the estates. To ensure 
that the money is not frittered away by the smallholders, the Government 
must administer this enforced saving. Given this, the proper amount of 
the replanting cess can be computed thus: 
"c = IVir -
where is the replanting ceos 
RG is the replanting grant to be given 
Y is the yield per acre 
M is the number of years in production up to the time of 
replanting and is assumed to be 30. 
Given the above, for a smallholding with an average yield of 
<+00 pounds per acre, the replanting cess to bo imposed is 6.25 cents 
per pound of rubber. If the yield is 1200 pounds per acre, then the cess 
is 2.08 cents per pound. In both cases the replaiitinc grant is assumed 
to be >750 per acre, which is t(, be given. If the grant is 51000.00, then 
the respective cess for the two situations to be imposed is 8.33 cents and 
2.78 cents per pound of rubber exported. 
The proposed approach is based on an incentive system to motivate 
smallholders or estates with low yielding materials to replant. Low 
yielding producers are deliberately made to pay a higher replanting cess 
per pound vis-a-vis high yielding producers. The intention of this 'penalty' 
is to stimulate low yielding producers to convert to high yielding producers. 
Unfortunately, this theoretical construct has great difficulties in 
administering it. First, the Government must have detailed information on 
each smallholding on its yield and age of trees. It is a herculean task. 
The other problem is the actual collection of the cess. Since the cess 
is not collected directly from the smallholders, but from the exporters 
who later deduct it back from the former, the actual collection of the 
cess is therefore very difficult. Despite administrative difficulties, 
there is no doubt that an incentive type of payment is preferred to the 
existing system, which is essentially a proportional tax. Some variants 
of the above model could be worked out to overcome the administrative 
problem. 
The replies given by smallholders with respect to the sufficiency 
of the replanting grant indicated that S750 is not enough to defray the 
replanting expenditure. The cost of replanting an acre of rubber was 
reported by smallholders to range from to Tpl^ OO. Though we are unsure 
how reliable the replies were there is no doubt that the cost of replanting 
has risen because of inflation in the economy. RISDA's estimated 
replanting cost is 51200. This falls within the smallholders' rtmge. If 
the objective of the replanting grant is to fully subsidize smallholding 
replanting then the present amount of t^ 7!}0 per acre is definitely inadequate. 
'Vhile the Governnient contenplatos nn iricre.-Ace of the graiit to 31000 per 
acre, it is su[^ tiested here with the subsidy should be raised to 1^ 1200 
per acre. This will fully subsidize the replanting cost of an acre 
according to RISDA's estimate. 
An alternative to the present rubber export tax system in 
Malaysia is difficult to find. Besides, it is not certain that other 
methods of taxation, for instance a land tax, even if administratively 
as simple and as cheap in collection as the rubber export tax system, 
would not have other undesired effects. For the above reasons, it seems 
for some time to come the existing rubber export tax system has to be 
continued. However, it should be modified to lighten the burden on the 
smallholders. 
This thesis has studied only some selected aspects of the rubber 
export taxation system. Because of the conceptual difficulties and data 
problems encountered, the study, like others in the field of taxation 
research, has its limitations. Inspite of this, it is hoped some of the 
complex issues of the rubber export taxation system have been clarified 
and that they are of use to policy makers. More r^^search, of course, 
needa to be carried out in other areas of export taxation and to verify 
further some of the conclusions of this work. 
It may be concluded here that caution should bo exercised when 
we try to generalize the main conclusionfi of this study. This is because 
the economic effects of tlie use of a particular system of export taxation 
depend cn the way the tax is structured and administered (whether a 
m.a-k.-tLng board or the export tax proper), the typos of commodities taxed 
(wliether a staple crop or a raw material), the ownership, production, and 
market orgaiiization, and the stage of economic development of the economy. 
Tt also depends on the objectives of the study :xnd tlie methodology which 
is used to accomplish the task. And not least of all in importance, it 
dopcnds on dita availal)Lli iti th»? topic concefncfl. 
'vVhal n a y be g e n r h e r e its t h e approac}'. taken in thib 
Gtudy. T t icj fell t l i a t for a r o n e a r c h pi-ogr-inirtK; o f t h i n nnt\ i r e one m u s t 
not only quantitative; melliod:^ to analyze publich''d d i t a , but on'^ 
Ghould alf^o try to obtain aui'vey data and al;:;o h<: equips ' d ;/ith a 
thoroufjh understandintj; of thi- production characteristics of thr- commodity 
and the inGtitutio/ial enviromnerit of the producerr,. T o obtain such 
information, a p u r v e y approach could bo useful. T h e ur;e of ourvey 
techniques in studying tax problems i s still not well developed. I t is 
hope the analytical approach u..ed in this study would be further developed 
to help in the analysis of the impact of taxation on tax payers. A 
deeper understandint^; of the behaviour of tax payers would definitely 
contribute to sound policy making in taxation issues. 
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APPENDIX 1.1. SURVEY OF SMALLHOLDINGS 
Name: Location: 
Age: Enumerator's name: 
lo Status of tapper 
2. Details on rubber holding 
Materials used Matured Aco Yr Pltd Immatured ACo Yr Pltdo 
3. Details on other crops 
Crops Acres 
k. What is the average number of tapping days for each tapper per month? 
i) No, is 
5o What is the tapping method most used in your rubber holding? 
i) half spiral 
ii) full spiral 
iii) other 
6o Is the same tree tapped i) daily 
ii) every other day 
iii) every third day 
iv) other 
7, Do you sell your rubber every day? 
i) yes ii) no 
Reasons: 
8o Mode of transport i) Bicycle 
ii) lorry 
iii) other 
9. Do you sell to only i) one rubber dealer 
ii) two 
iii) more than two 
Reasons: 




How often do you get it? 
11. Have you agreed to sell yoirr rubber to anyone for a fixed price 
for a certain period? 
i) yes ii) no 
Reasons: 
12. If yes, give details on amount sold, prices agreed, to whom and 
date of deliveryo (To be recorded in book) 
13. Do you expect the general economic condition in the country in 
the next year to 
i) be better than now 
ii) remain the same as now 
iii) be worse than now 
iv) not sure 
I'+o Do you expect the price of rubber during the next 6 months or next 
one year to 
next 6 mths next 1 year 
i) remain around present price 
ii) rise above present price 
iii) fall below present price 
iv) other 
Reasons: 
15c Is your answer based on what you know of 
next 6 mths next 1 year 
i) present prices 
ii) past prices 
iii) supply and demand 
iv) other 
If ii) name the year or group of years you have in mind: 
YearCs): 
1 6 . What price range do you expect to get during your next selling 
time for 
Price expected Date 
Highest Price Lowest Price 




Reasons for such expectations: 
17o How sure do you feel you get such prices? Circle one value below. 
complete ^ yO gO 90 100 
uncertainty certainty 
1 8 . If you are asked to sell your rubber now what is the lowest 
price you are willing to accept? 
i) lowest price is: 
19. Does the price of rubber affect your tapping policy? 
i) yes ii) no 
20. If yes, which price do you have in mind? 
i) actual price received from dealer(s) 
ii) world price 
iii) other 
Explain in what way it affects your tapping: 
21c, During the recent months ( 
increased from to 
) the price of rubber 










Did you tap more trees per day? 
Did you tap the same tree every day? 
Did you slaughter tap? 
Did you hire tappers or workers? 
Or hire more: 
Did you use more fertilizer? 
Or start to use fertilizer? 
Did you use more stimulant? 
Or start to use: 
Did you spend more on general 
maintenance of rubber holding? 
Did you try to produce better 
grades of rubber? E.g., 
smoke your rubber now. 
22o In the past the price of rubber fell to quite low levels. E.go, 
in 19 the price was . In 19 it was 
No change If yes, indicate 
changes made 
A. Did you use less/more/stop the 
use of fertilizer? 
R. Did you use less/more/stimulsnt? 
C. Did you reduce the number of 
workers? 
Do Did you spend less money or time 
on general maintenance of your 
rubber holding? 
E. Did you spend more time or money 
on other crops? 
F. Did you stock some rubber and 
wait for better prices? 
23. Did you at any time in the past work off the farm because the 
rubber price was low? 
i) yes ii) no 
If yes, what job and wage: 
when : 
2ko Did you in the past change any of your plans for your rubber 
holding because the price of rubber changed? 
When price increased When price fell 
(Date: J (Date: 7 
State what plans 
25o Details on past replanting: 
Year replanted Materials used Acres 
26„ Rank the following items which influenced your decision to 
replant your rubber 
Ranking 
a) Price of paddy 
b) Price of rubber 
c) Export tax 
d) Replanting grant 
e) Replanted acreage 
f) Age of trees 
g) Family saving 
27. Details on present replanting, if any 
Year replanted Materials used Acres 
28. If no future replanting is planned give reasons: 
29o Sources of past and present replanting finance Past Present 
(Per cent of Total 
Fund used) 
i) replanting grant 
ii) loans 
iii) family saving 
iv) other 
30„ Was slaughter tapping done before you replanted? 
i) yes ii) no 
31. At what age of the trees did you replant them? 
i) age from planting: 
Reasons: 
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32. Is the price of rubber an important factor in your decision 
to replant? 
i) yes ii) No 
If, yes, state whether i) past prices. Give example: 
ii) present prices 
iii) future prices expected. 
Give level expected: 
33<- Would you have replanted if the replanting grant was not available? 
i) if no grant, no replanting 
ii) replant whether grant is available or not 
3^+. Is the replanting grant of $750 per acre enough to cover 
replanting cost? 
i) enough 
ii) not enough 
Explain 
35. How much money did you use to replant one acre of rubber? 
i) amount spent: 
360 If you had used replanting grant to plant other approved crops 
what were the crops? 
Crops Acres 
37o Who do you think actually pays for the export tax on rubber? 
i) foreign buyers 
ii) rubber producers 
iii) middlemen like dealers 
iv) government 
v) dont know 
How did you arrive at this answer? 
38, oources of your income: 
i) from sales of rubber 
ii) from sale of other crops 
iii) other 
income/month 
39t. Give the details on amount of rubber sold and prices received, 
(to be recorded in book) 
APPENDIX 1„2. 
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SURVEY OF RUBBER ESTATES 
Name of estate: 
Name of Agency: 
Enumerator's name; 
Location: 
Date of survey: 
1. Ownership: i) public company 
ii) private company 
iii) partnership 
iv) individual proprietorship 
v) other 
2. Registered in 
i) Malaysia 
ii) elsewhere ( ) Year registered: 
3o Major shareholder (owning 51% and over of total shares) 
i) Malaysian 
ii) Non-Malaysian 
k. Is it a MAPA member: 
i) yes 
ii) no 
5. Estate sells its rubber through: 
As Per cent Frequency of sale 
of Total 
i) Agency house 
ii) rubber dealer/broker 
iii) direct to foreign buyer 
iv) other 
Give details on forward contract sales (if any) 
Date of R.S.S.I Latex S.M.R. 
Delivery Price Qnty Price Qnty Price Qnty 
Others 
Price Qnty 






certainty of price 
expects price to fall below contracted price 
assured of certain income 
helps estate planning 
other 
8, Reasons for not having contractual sales: 
i) expects price to rise 
ii) may not be able to fulfil contract 
iii) lack of know how, facilities 
iv) other 
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9. ^o you stock, rubber in estate or elsewhere? 
i) yes ii) no 
If yes, 
Average Quantity per month Place 




wait for better prices 
use stock to fulfil contract 
other 
llo Reasons for not stocking rubber: 
i) no storage facility 
ii) output is small 
iii) costly 
iv) other 
12. Do you expect the general economic condition in the country in 






remain the same as now 
be better than now 
be worse than now 
not sure 
13. Do you expect the price of rubber during the next 6 months or 





remain around present prices 
(month: ) 
(present price is: ) 
rise above present prices 
fall below present prices 
other 
Next 6 mths Next 1 year 
Next 6 mths Next 1 
1'+. Is your answer baaed on what you know of 
i) present prices 
ii) past prices 
iii) supply and demand conditions 
iv) other 
If (ii) name the year or group of years you have in mind: 
year 
15, What price range do you expect to get during your next marketing 
period for 






16. Reasons for such expectation: 
17. How sure do you feel you get such prices? Circle one value below: 
complete ^ ^^ 30 4^0 50 60 70 80 90 100 ^^"'Pl®^® uncertainty ^ ^ i y ^ ^ certainty 
l8o If you are asked to sell your rubber now what is the lowest price 
you are willing to accept: 
i) lowest price is: 
19o Can you name a few measures used by your estate to minimize the 
effects of price fluctuations? 
20o Which price is used by the estate for its planning? 
i) actual price received from buyer 
ii) world price (f.Oob.) 
iii) other 
Why is this price used: 
21o During the recent months ( ) the price of rubber 
increased from ^ 
(For Questions (a) to ( ). 




b) Did estate increase the use of stimulants? 
i) yes 
ii) no 
If yes, is it applied to trees 
i) of age 
ii) of age 
iii) of age 
c) Did estate increase use of fertilizer? 
Mature Areas Immature Areas 
i) yes 
ii) no 
Date Expenditure on fertilizer 
d) Did estate try to increase its total output of rubber during 
the recent months? 
i) yes 
ii) no 
Explain how (if yes) and why not (if no) 
e) What other changes have been carried out by the estate 
because of the price increase? 
22. For certain periods in the past the price of rubber fell to quite 
a low levelo E.g. in 19 the price was 
in 19 the price was 
a) Did the estate make changes in the task size for certain fields? 
i) increase the task size 
ii) decrease the task size 
iii) no changes made 
b) Did estate 
i) increase use of stimulants 
ii) decrease use of stimulants 
iii) no changes 
In increase, is it applied to trees 
i) of age 
ii) of age 
iii) of age 
c) Did estate 
Mature area Immature area 
i) increase use of fertilizer 
ii) decrease use of fertilizer 
iii) no change 
d) Did estate use selective tapping of tasks? 
i) yes 
ii) no 
e) Did estate use selective tapping of trees within tasks? 
i) yes 
ii) no 
f) Did estate reduce weeding in 
Mature area Immature area 
i) yes 
ii) no 
g) Did estate reduce wages of its labour force? 
i) yes 
ii) no 
If yes, type of laboiir affected 
amount of reduction 
If no, reasons: i) trade union pressure 
ii) must follow government regulations on 
wage payments 
iii) other 
h) Did estate reduce size of labour force? 
If yes, number 
type 
for how long 
If no, reasons: i) trade union pressure 
ii) recruitment problems 
iii) work disruptions 
iv) other 
i) Were changes made in the type of work done by the labour force? 
355 
j) What other changes were made by estates because of the 
fall in price? 
2 3 . If estate has past new planting give details on 
Year Crops Acres 
Reasons for changes 





2 5 . Rank the following items which influenced the company's 
decision to replant: 
Ranking 
a) price of oil palm 
b) price of rubber 
c) export tax 
d) replanting grant 
e) replanted acreage 
f) age of trees 
g) replanting reserves of company 
2 6 . Details on present replanting in rubber 
Year Acres Materials used 
2 7 , If estate has no future replanting in rubber give reasons: 
280 Sources of past and future replanting finance 
Past Present 
T K ^ F e r cent of Total 
i) replanting grant 
ii) loans 
iii) retained profits 
iv) other 
2 9 . Is slaughter tapping done before an area is replanted? 
i) yes 
ii) no 
5O0 At what age were the rubber trees replanted on the average? 
Age from planting: 
Reasons: 
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3 1 . Does your estate replant a fixed certain percentage (say y^) 
of the total area each year? 
i) yes 
ii) no 
If y e s , how is this rate arrived at? 




If y e s , state whether i) average of past priceso Give e.g.: 
ii) present prices 
iii) future price anticipated 
(state level expected ) 
iv) other 
If price is important for replanting do you replant when 
existing price is 
i) low 
ii) high 
iii) none of above? 
What is the lowest price which is unprofitable for further 
replanting 
Price is: 
33, If estate had changed its plans for rubber replanting in the past 
give year and reasons for changes: 
Year Reasons 
3^0 Who do you think actually pays for the export tax on rubber? 
i) foreign buyers 
ii) rubber producers 
iii) middlemen like dealers 
iv) other 
v) dont know 
How did you arrive at this answer? 
35. Give details on sales of rubber and prices received, 
(to be recorded in book) 
557 
APPENDIX 1.5 SURVEY OF ESTATE RICPLANTING COSTS 
Name of Estate: 
Field No: 
Acreage: Year Planted: 
Planting Materials: 
Location: 
Date of Survey: 
Enumerator's Name; 
Financial Year: 
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A P P E H D U 1 . 5 YIELD STATISTICS 
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Reserve Land etc . 
Total Acreage 
APPENDIX 1.6 SURVEY OF SMALLHOLDER RUBBER DEALERS 
Shop name of dealer: Location: 
Ethnic Ownership: Name of Enumerator: 
lo Are you a member of the Rubber Dealers' Association? YeS/No. 
2. What proportion of your purchases of rubber in 1972 was from 
% 
R.S.S. U.S.S. Latex Scrap 
i) Estates 
ii) Smallholders 
iii) Other dealers 
iv) Others 
3. What distance does your business cover? In miles: 
What factors do you consider when giving a price to 
R.S.S. U.S.S. Scrap 
5. How do you determine the quality of sheet rubber? 
i) examine every sheet 
ii) examine a few sheets from batch 
iii) examine the batch as a whole 
iv) base on past experience of customers' rubber 
v) others 
6. Which grade do you normally get from smallholder? Grade: 
7. What proportion of smallholders' R.S.S. do you assess as: 
R.S.S. 
1 2 3 ^ 




8o What proportion of smallholders' U.S.S. do you assess as: 
U.S.S. 
1 2 3 ^ : 
USS from Malay customers 
Chinese customers 
Indian customers 
9. Do you weigh to 
i) nearest half kati per pikul 
ii) nearest kati per pikul 
iii) others 
10. How many percentage do you deduct for moisture content? 
Average percentage is: 
Or percentage range of deduction: 
11, What is the proportion of customers who bargain with you? 
Chinese Indians Malay 
Selling R.S.S. 
Selling U.S.S. 
12o What is the price you use to arrive at the price paid to smallholders 
for their rubber? 
U.S.S. 
R • S «3 • 
13. Why do you use this price? 
I't, From whom do you get this price? 
15. How often? 




17. How much deductions do you make from this price for: 
Amount Per Pikul % of Price $ 
1. Handling cost 
2. Transport cost 
3. Smoking 
k. Rent 
5. Other costs 
18. Record of Dealers' total monthly purchases from smallholders by grades 
(R.S.S., U.S.S., Latex) and months (to be recorded in a book.) 
APPENDIX 1.7. SOME COMMENTS ON THE SECONDARY DATA % 7 
All economic statistics which are used in quantitative studies 
contain errors in their measurement. The sources of errors can be 
classified into the following groups: 1) errors due to deliberate 
misrepresentation; 2) errors due to unintentional misrepresentation; 3) 
errors due to inadequate data. The categories are, of course, not mutually 
exclusive. 
Deliberate misrepresentation by those interviewed may be done 
out of fear or suspicious of the intention of the data collector and in 
order to mislead the observer. An example of this is the series of prices 
purportedly offered by the rubber dealers to the rubber smallholders and 
reported monthly by the former to the government. The slightly inflated 
prices as reported to the government by the dealers is done for the purpose 
of representing a favourable picture of themselves, i.e., they are not the 
exploitative middlemen which they are criticized to be. 
Unintentional misrepresentation may be errors in response because 
the respondents are illiterate, errors in coverage due to poor planning 
of the sample, and errors in processing and publishing the information. 
In 1950 the Department of Statistics tried to collect information on the 
rubber smallholders by the mail questionnaire method. But this was 
finally abandoned when the returned questionnaires had too many 
inconsistencies in the replies. The coverage of the sample was also badly 
done. 2000 questionnaires were sent out even though the actual location 
of the owner was uncertain. 
Errors due to inadequate data arise because the statistical 
series for the desired variable are not available or when available the 
desired period is not. The latter is illustrated by the price series of 
dealer's prices given to smallholders. This series starts only from 1953 




InformHtion on thp rubbf?r industry is more complete than other 
industries in Malaysia. This is because the rubber industry has been 
playing a vital role in the Malaysian economy since the early 1900's and 
the government has been documenting various aspects of the industry since 
then. The major source of our secondary data is the Rubber Statistics 
Handbook, Malaysia. This is an annual issue which started its first 
publication in 1929. Only during the Second World War (19^1-19^5) was 
the publication of the Handbook interrupted. During this long period 
there were many changes in the format and comprehensive coverage of the 
various aspects of the industry. For instance, before the Federation 
of Malaya the data were presented individually for the three political 
units of the Straits Settlements, UFMS and FMS. In 196? data on the 
rubber industry in East Malaysia was first published as an appendix. 
The data before the war (19'^ 1 and before) were less reliable 
than in later years. This was due to the poor organization of the 
Department of Statistics. Within the period from 19^6 to 1972 the data 
collected before 195^ suffer from certain 'abnormalities'. The period 
immediately after the war was not normal years for the rubber industry 
as the effects of the Japanese occupation on the rubber industry could 
still be felt. It was a period of reconstruction for the economy and 
the rubber industry.. The various departments responsible for the 
collection of information on the rubber industry, viz., the Rubber Research 
Institute and the Department of Statistics were only resuming their 
activities and whatever data collected actually reflected on the aftermaths 
of the war period. That is, the data were not 'normal period' data. 
The communist insurgency, started in mid 19'-^ ,^ also contributed to the 
'abnormality' of the data collected during this period. Only when the 
Emergency was more settled around 195^ was the rubber industry left 
uninterrupted in its production activity. Thus data on the rubber 
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industry from 195^ + onwards are more reliable in terms of accuracy and 
coverageo 
Some of the means of verifying the data in more developed 
countries are usually not available in a country like Malaysia. It is 
usually not possible to cross-check the reliability of the series of a 
variable as two related series are normally not available. However, in 
the case of the rubber industry the output of the estate sector and the 
replanting of the smallholding sector could be verified from 1953 onwards. 
In 1952, the Kubber Industry (Replanting) Fund A for estates and the 
administrative unit for managing this fund were established. When the 
Board credited each estate the proper amount of the replanting cess 
earlier collected from them it required that each estate submit the output 
data for that period. The Board then verified the output claims of the 
estates against the monthly and annual returns submitted by the estates 
to the Department of Statistics. Revisions and rectifications could then 
be made by both the Board and the Department regarding the accuracy of 
the output figures. 
Since 1953 the data on replanting by smallholders have become 
more reliable. Before this period, information on replanting was mainly 
supplied by the rubber instructors of the Rubber Research Institute,, 
With the establishment of Rubber Industry (Replanting) Board, Fund B, 
which subsidises smallholders' replanting, more accurate data on replanting 
in this sector could be obtained. 
Since 1953, the Department of Statistics has also started 
collecting monthly avorage of daily prices poi d by rubber dealers to rubber 
smallholders for RSS 1 and RSS 3 rubber at five major towns in West 
Malaysia„ 
In 196^ + fertilizer consumption by estates was first made available 
and additional tables on estates regarding number, yield, acreage and 
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production distributed by size and ownership were given new classifications. 
And in 19^9 a few additional tables on smallholdings concerning their 
production at District level were also published. 
The Handbook now provides information on distribution of estates 
by various classifications (e.g., by size and ownership), acreage, output, 
yields, various prices for the different grades, imports, exports and 
domestic consumption, stocks, dealers,, labour force, fertilizer use, 
capital and maintenance expenditure (started in 1964) and world rubber 
statistics. 
It must be pointed out that the coverage of the above data is 
somewhat uneven in terms of the time period. This is to be expected 
since information on certain variables, e.g., capital and maintenance 
expenditure in estates, is collected from 196'+ onwards only. We must also 
point out that most of the time series are more complete both time-wise 
and variable-wise for the estates than for the smallholders. This is due 
mainly to the inability to collect information directly from the 
smallholders by the mail questionnaire method as is done for estates. 
Most of the vital information on smallholdings, e.g., output and prices 
received, are derived from the dealerso 
We will briefly explain the methods of data collection by the 
Department of Statistics which publishes the Handbook. All the vital data 
on estates are derived from the Annual Census of Rubber Estates and the 
Monthly Surveys of Rubber Estates. Since all estates are registered 
firms and since all are contacted by the Department we may assume that 
the coverage is extremely thorough. Of course, errors still creep in 
during the response by the estates and during the processing time by the 
Department. There may also exist a marginal error regarding smaller estates 
(around 100 acres) which are sometimes classified as smallholders. If 
this group of estates is significant numerically and if they behave quite 
differently in their responses to price changes then this definitional 
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error could distort the statistical conclusions of senders on the rubber 
industry^ 
Information on the smallholders is not collected in the same 
manner as in the case of the estates. They are collected via the rubber 
dealers. This applies particularly to production. Rubber dealers have 
to be licensed in Malaysia and they are the only firms which the 
smallholders generaly sell their rubber to. The estimates provided by 
the dealers on production give an estimated figure on smallholders' 
production. This figure is slightly larger than the actual output of 
the smallholders since dealers also buy from other dealers and from 
estates. The Department of Statistics, however, can cross-check these 
estimates for smallholders' output against the residual of the total 
export figure after estate output and estate stock (only the ones 
released for that period) are deducted. The discrepancy is usually 
small. Information on other aspects of smallholdings like total acreage, 
their size distribution presents more difficulties. 
PRICES 
As we are interested in the rubber producer's response to the 
price and the modification of this price by the export tax, it is 
important that the adequacy of the price data be examined. The prices 
used in studying the estates are RSS 1 price in cents per pound and the 
price of palm oil in Malaysian ringgit per ton. The latter price is 
obtained from the Oil Palm, Coconut and Tea Statistics published by the 
Department of Statistics. The RSS 1 price, like other rubber prices, is 
the average of buyer's mid-day prices for rubber f.o.b. Singapore and is 
issued by the Singapore Chamber of Commerce Rubber Association on the 
reports by rubber brokers on business done that day. As explained earlier, 
from this series of RSS 1 prices we have constructed a new series of prices 
net of the relevant export tax. This is used to study the effects of the 
export tax on the estates. The deduction of the relevant export tax from 
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the RSS 1 prices is done on a monthly basis and not a yearly basis. 
The latter method is not the correct procedure as the export tax 
structure has been changed several times over the years and within the 
same year for some separate years. If the export tax is deducted from 
the average annual price it would be difficult to decide, for some 
individual years where the tax rates have changed within months, which is 
the appropriate export tax formula to use. The same treatment is done 
for RSS 3 prices which are generally regarded as the better representative 
prices which smallholders receive since they produce the bulk of grade 
three rubber. We have also used rubber dealers' prices, given in the 
Rubber Statistical Handbook, for the smallholders. The price here refers 
to RSS 3 offered by rubber dealers. 
However, as mentioned earlier, these prices which the dealers 
claim to be given to the smallholders are slightly biased upwards. 
There are two reasons for suspecting this. First, this is actually an 
amalgam of various prices paid to smallholders and other dealers. The 
price quoted for the latter isusually slightly higher than the one paid 
to the smallholder who is in a weaker position. This introduces the first 
element of bias. Secondly, the dealers - mainly Chinese - may be misleading 
the government or the public that the price they give to the smallholders 
is not an 'exploitative' one and therefore quote a higher priceo Some 
other factors also contribute to make these prices less representative of 
the actual ones received by the smallholders. Kor instance, these prices 
are collected only in the large urban centres from two samples in each 
centre. It is not explained by the Department of Statistics how the 
sample was chosen and for this reason we are unsure of the representativeness 
of the prices quoted by the dealers. However, discounting the above 
defects these prices are still closer to what the smallholders actually 
get compared to the Singapore prices. 
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The price of the competitive cfop for smallholders is an 
averap;e of No. 1, 2 and grade Kedah rice which is obtained from the 
Monthly Statistical Bulletin, West Malaysia published by the Department 
of Statistioso These prices were obtained by the Department from rice 
dealers. The exact number of these dealers sampled is not mentioned in 
the Bulletin. 
ACREAGE 
Data on planted acreage of estates are more reliable than those 
of smallholdings. The Handbook does not have time series on total 
planted acreage of smallholdingso An estimate of total planted acreage 
for both smallholdings and estates is given for some years. However, 
the estimated part of the smallholding acreage is of dubious value. The 
Handbook claims that the estimates are derived from private sources. But 
it is not explained what these private sources are nor how such private 
sources obtain their data. 
The total planted acreage for estates is made slightly less 
accurate because of conceptual errors. The legal definition of an estate 
is any rubber land, contiguous or non-contiguous, under a single legal 
ownership and from 100 acres onwards in size. The Handbook admits that 
some such marginal estates may be classified as smallholdings. As 
pointed out before, if such large smallholdings behave quite differently 
from the 'genuine' smallholdings then a bias is introduced in the 
response model. The estate data for the early 1960's period is also 
rendered less accurate because of the fragmentation of rubber estates. 
Many such fragmentation and sales of estates to the smallholding sector 
were not, reported and those which reported did so only much later. These 
two sources of errors might not affect the size of the total planted 
acreage very much since percentage-wise they were quite small in magnitude, 
Howevf-r, because of the inaccuracy in the total planted acreage 
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for smallholdings we have decided to use replanting and newplanting as 
variables for the long run response study.^ Both of these figures are more 
reliable than the so-called estimates of the smallholders' total planted 
acreage. The annual data for replanting and newplanting are available 
from 19^7 onwards. Before the establishment of the Rubber Industry 
(Replanting) Board in 1952 the data for replanting and newplanting, 
particularly in the case of smallholdings, are not very accurate. Much 
of this information depended on the reports of the Rubber Research 
Institute rubber instructors. Since 1952 when the government started to 
subsidize the replanting and newplanting more accurate data are gathered 
and cross-checking is also possible in the case of estate replanting and 
newplanting. Data on smallholding replanting are given in the Handbook 
and in the Report on Operations of the Rubber Replanting Fund Board for 
the year by the Chief Replanting Officer. The latter is an annual issue 
which gives information on the value of grants paid to smallholders and 
the amount of replanting done in each state. 
^ See chapter 6. 
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APPENDIX 2 . 1 . AN INTRODUCTION TO RUBBER PRODUCTION 
The objective of this appendix is to provide the reader with 
some background on the production of rubber. Detailed description of all 
aspects of rubber production are found in the classic study Manual of 
Rubber Planting, (Incorported Society of Planters, 1958) by A.T.Edgar. 
Unfortunately this standard reference is slightly dated psLrticularly on 
discussion of certain agronomic practices and clonal materials, 
more up-to-date information the reader is advised to refer to the various 
issues of the Planters' Bulletin which reports the latest development in 
the natural rubber industry. 
Nature of Rubber 
Rubber is the coagulate derived from latex, the white milky 
juice of certain plants. The basic constituent of rubber, the 
hydrocarbon isoprene (C^ Hg), g i v e s it resilience and elasticity. 
Isoprene units are arranged in a long chain called polyisoprene. Each 
specie of plant producing rubber has a different proportion of 
polyisoprene. The latex of the tree Hevea brasiliensis, the principal 
source of natural rubber, contains over 90 per cent polyisoprene. Raw 
rubber is not pure. It contains substances like hydrocarbons, sugars, 
resins and various inorganic compounds. Before it is vulcanized crude 
rubber is a soft and elastic material which is brittle when cold and 
sticky when h o t . The melting point for rubber is about 300° farein heit. 
Natural rubber can be transformed, in combination with other 
materials, into useful products like tyres, shoes and other widely used 
commercial and scientific items. The wide acceptance and usefulness of 
natural rubber are due to its properties which include abrasion resistance, 
elasticity, electrical insulation and impermeability to gases. 
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Hevea Brasilienais - The Rubber Tree 
Hevea is a member of the spurge family. Other members of the 
spurge family are casaara, candlenut, castor bean and tung. 
Hevea is a medium-sized tree. It averages 10-20 ra. high 
with robust, glabrowa branchlets and contain much milky juice. The 
leaflets are short stalked and elliptic-oblong in shape. Hevea bears 
large, compressed, obtusely three-lobed fruits. The seeds are large, 
quadrangular-ovoid and have a pale brown colour. 
Hevea is commonly found or grown in the lowlands between 10° 
north and 10° south of the equator. The best areas are within 6° of the 
equator. A rainfall of between 75 to 105 inches per annum is ideal for 
the growth of Hevea. It will grow best if the rainfall is evenly 
distributed with 100 to 150 days of rain per annum and at altitudes 
below 600 feet. 
Hevea has a strong and widely ramified root system. It needs 
deep, fertile and permeable soils. However, it can still grow profusely 
in less fertile lateritic soils as are found in most parts of Malaysia. 
Where such barren lateritic soils are planted with rubber they are 
usually improved by proper drainage and erosion control, and by the use 
of cover crops and fertilizers. 
CULTIVATION OK HhJVKA BRASILIENSIS 
Planting Materials 
Three alternative planting materials could be used - unselected 
seedJinKB, usual seedlings, and budded stumpso Unselected seedlings are 
grown from seeds of unknown parentage. They are thus variable in growth 
and low in yields. Unselected seedlings giv« an average yield of 300-600 
pounds of latex per annum. 
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The technique for the vegetative propagation of rubber is called 
budding. Buds from the bark of a parent tree, with desirable 
characteristics like high yield, are implanted in the bark of young 
seedlings. The bud becomes the upper part of the tree and the seedling 
forms the root stock. A clone is the progeny of a single parent tree. 
The plantings of budded stumps of a single clone give xmiform growth, 
high yields and other desirable qualities like resistance to diseases 
and wind damage. 
Clonal seedlings are grown from the seeds of a single clone 
or the cross of two clones. They Eire more uniform in their chsiracteristics 
than unselected seedlings but are leas so compared to budded materials. 
Both clonal and budded materials have yield averaging from 1500 to 
2500 pounds. 
Preparation of Land for Planting 
Land areas to be used for planting rubber can be either jungle 
land or those already planted with some agricultural crops like rubber. 
The former is called new planting and the latter is called replanting. 
In the case of new planting using jungle land the general 
sequence of operations involves the following: 
a) cut the undergrowth 
b) fell the trees 
c) leave the felled jungle to dry for three months 
d) burn the dried trees or sell them 
e) clear and stump 
f) terrace, if necessary, and then line, hole, and plant. 
The sequence of operations in the case of replanting is almost 
the same as a b o v e . However the old rubber trees may be sold after 
felling. The stumps may be poisoned to get rid of them. 
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Planting density varies with the typography of the area and 
with the type of planting material. For clonal seed the R.R.I.M, 
recommendation is an initial stand of 2^0 trees per acre. This will 
be reduced, by delicate thinning and involuntary losses due to diseases, 
to about I2O-I6O trees per acre. For budgrafts, the recommended final 
stand is about 120 trees per acre. 
After planting four other operations are carried out: 
fertilizing, pruning, supplying and slashing. Fertilizer needs vary with 
soil conditions. Generally fertilizer has to be applied more frequently 
when the rubber plants are young. 
During the growing period after the transplanting, undesirable 
bud shoots have to be pruned. At a later stage the branches must also 
be pruned. When the tree is more matured all branches below eight feet 
on the stem have to be pruned so that they would not interfere with tapping. 
Those plants which die are removed and new ones are supplied. 
During the first two years supplying is important. Later, when the trees 
are grown up, supplying becomes unimportant as new plants would find it 
difficult to compete with the more mature trees. 
Slashing of undergrowth between the rows of rubber trees 
should be regularly done to stop weeds from retarding the growth of the 
trees. In some estates this slashing is done about once a month. 
During the immature period the rubber trees have to be kept 
in good condition. Field upkeep is thus important. This involves 
proper drainage, the appropriate use of fertilizer and the prevention of 
diseases and pests from destroying the young trees. 
Tapping Control 
At the age of 6)^ to 7 years the trees are matured sufficiently 
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for tapping. Tapping is done by a sharp knife which involves the incision 
of the latex vessels. 
The stem of a rubber tree is made up of three parts: the outer 
dead bark, the intermediate or hard bast, and the inner layer or soft 
bast developed from the cambium. The latex vessels are confined to the 
layer of soft bast and the innermost portion of the hard bast. Beneath 
the soft bast is a thin layer of cells called cambium. The cambium is 
important as it is the growing part of the tree. From it grows all the 
bark and wood of the tree. The tapping must therefore be very carefully 
done. It should be deep enough to cut the latex vessel but not the 
cambium layer. 
To get the maximum yield with the least harm done to the 
rubber tree the proper tapping method must be used. First, the direction 
of cut is important as the wrong direction would result in low yieldo 
Latex vessels spiral up the tree from the bottom left to the top right 
at an angle of about 65 degrees from the horizontal. To get the most 
yield the direction of cut should therefore be downwards from left to 
right and 25 degrees from the horizontal. 
Secondly, the angle of slope of tapping is important since 
this affects the consumption of bark and latex flow. To optimize bark 
consumption the cut should be as flat as possible so that by the time 
the cut reaches the base of the tree, a complete half-spiral will only 
miss a small area of bark. For budgrafts, the slope recommended is 
50 degrees to the horizontal. For seedling trees the sloperecommended is 
25 degrees. 
Thirdly, the height of opening is also important. For seedlings 
with a half-spiral cut the initial opening recommended is 20 inches from 
the ground when the girth is 22 inches. Subsequent panels should be 
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opened at kO inches from the ground level. For budgrafts the height of 
opening is 50 inches when the girth is l8 inches. Subsequent openings 
should be at the same height as the first panelo The reason for the 
difference in height opening between the two planting materials is this. 
For seedlings the latex vessels vary with the height of the tree with 
abundant latex stored at the bottom. For budgrafts the latex is evenly 
stored from top to bottom. 
Fourthly, one must also consider the tapping system to be used. 
The tapping system determines the amount of tapping to be done on a 
particular clone. For each particular clone an optional tapping system 
has to be adopted. 
For budgrafts the appropriate system is S/2, d/2, lOOJt where S 
is spiral incision, d is day, and the percentage refers to the 
intensity of the cuto The intensity of tapping is obtained by multiplying 
a constant factor +^00 to S/2 d/2. That is, 1/2 x 1/2 x = 100?^ 
intensity. For a S/2. d/3 system the tapping intensity is thus 
1/2 X 1/3 X i+OO = 80%. The common type of tapping system is S/2, d/2 
and S/2, d/3. 
Lastly, the time of tapping is important. Early morning hours 
are best for tapping because the surger pressure and hence the flow of 
latex is greatest then. If the latex flows too slowly it coagulates at 
the surface of the cut preventing further flow. 
Latex flow stops if the vessels are plugged with coagulatum. 
To renew the flow, the scrap of rubber has to be removed. 
A tapper can tap 250 to 600 trees a day. The actual task size 
depends on the terrain, the age of the trees, the clonal material, the 
tapping system, and the wage rate. 
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Processing 
It takes one to two hours for the tapper to complete his 
tapping. His next task is to collect the latex which is then brought to 
a collecting station. It is then weighed and recorded and then brought 
to the factory for processing. 
At the factory, the latex is pumped through strainers into 
holding tanks where it is diluted to the proper concentration for 
coagulating. From the storage tank the latex is piped into coagulation 
tanks. Acid is then added to coagulate the latex. Panels are inserted 
which separate the tank into compartments. After coagulation is completed 
the slabs of rubber are then ready for remilling. 
Ribbed smoked sheets (RSS) are made by passing the slabs through 
a battery of three to five mills. The last mill has ridges running 
diagonally around the rollers. After passing through this, the sheet has 
a ridged surface. 
Crepe rubber is made by passing the slabs through a battery of 
rollers with diamond-shaped studs on their surface. The rollers move at 
different speeds so that they tear the sheets into small lumps and knead 
them together. 
After milling, both crepe and ribbed sheets contain 20 to 30 
per cent water. This is removed by heating or smoking. Ribbed sheets 
are dried and smoked for four days at 122° to 1^ +0° F. 
Grades of Rubber 
Grade distinctions are based on cleanliness, quality of curing 
mold and moisture content. The weakness of the grading system is that it 
is based on visual characteristics. The common grades for ribbed smoked 
sheets in order of quality are RSS I, RSS II and RSS III, U.S.S. are 
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unsmoked sheets and have no definite grading system. 
In 1965 the Standard Malaysian Rubber (SMR) scheme was launched. 
Under this system technical specifications are considered in producing 
a standardized type of rubber, SMR is packed in compressed form in 
bales of 75 pounds and is wrapped in approved material like polythene 
sheets. In addition to block rubbers such as hevea crumb, the comnon 
sheet and crepe rubber can also be marketed under the SKR scheme if 
they satisfy the technical requirements like dirt and ash content, etc. 
SMR rubbers are classified according to viscosity and dirt content into 
SMR 5L, 5CV, 5LU, 5, 10, 20 and 50, The government's aim is to increase 
the production of SMR rubber. The major advantage of SMR rubber is 
that it can meet the specific needs and requirements of the industrial 
consumers. This, it is hoped, will benefit the rubber industry. 
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A P P E N D I X 3 . 1 . CIIANGLV- 0 7 T H Z CTL^UCTUPI^ O F T L : T A X 
iq'IS - 2972 
1. December - February 19hG 
Price (Cents Per Pound) Tax Rate (Per Cent) 
20 and below I.00 
20 and less than 22 1.50 
22 and less than ?k lo75 
2h and less than 26 2.00 
26 and less than 28 2.25 
28 and less than 30 2.50 
and less than 3'^  3-00 
35 anrl above 3-25 
2. March - October 19^46 
The tax was fixed at ^ cents per pound for all price levels. 
3® November 19^6 - January 19^7 
The export tax was fixed at 2.5 cents per pound for all price 
levels. A research cess of 0.25 cents per pound was also 
imposedo This cess is called Schedule IDl. 
h. February 19^7 - September 19^9 
The export tax rate was 5 per cent ad valorem plus Schedule 111 
of Oo25 cents per pound. 
5. October 19^9 - May 1950 
Schedule 111 was increased to Oo^ cents per pound. 
6. June - December 1950 
Schedule 111 was increased to 0.5 cents per pound. 
7. November 1950« Government's Proposals 
a) a 5 per cent ad valorem tax when the price was 60 cents 
or less per pound; 
b) when the price exceeded 60 cents but was less than $3 
per pound ^the tax was computed from: 
(P-i+0) (P+60) ^ „ . . 
whenever P is price; 
c) for prices over ^3 the tax rate to be used was the 
one for the S3 level. 
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8. January - Decemher 19S1 
a) Export Duty or Schedule 1: 
If price (P) exceeded 60 cents per pound the tax 
was computed from: 1.33 P -
10 
b) for prices at 60 cents or below the flat rate 
of 3 per cent ad valorem was used; 
c) replanting cess or Schedule 11. 
Relevant only when price (P) exceeded 60 cents per 
pound and computed from O.k^ P - 2? . Schedule 11 
10 
was for replanting and newplanting in the rubber 
industry; 
d) research cess or Schedule 111. 
Fixed at 0.35 cents per pound. 
9. January - April 1932 
Schedule 111 increased to 0.^ cents per pound. 
10. May - August 1932 
When price exceeded 60 cents a replanting cess of 4.5 cents 
per pound (Schedule IV) was collected from smallholders. 
11. September 1932 - February 1933 
Schedule IV operated at all price levels. 
12. March 1933 - May 1933 
Schedule 111 was increased to 0.3 cents per pound. 
13. 1933° Mudie Mission's Proposals 
l o Export Duty or Schedule 1. 
a) On first 60 cents Nil 
b) On next 3 cents 20 per cent of excess 
c) On next 3 cents 30 per cent of excess 
d) On next 3 cents kO per cent of excess 
e) On prices above 73 cents 30 per cent of excess 
2. Replanting cess or Schedule IV. 
A +^.5 cents cess was to be collected from all producers 
at all prices. Cess was to be refunded against 
replanting by producers. 
3 . Research cess or Schedule 111 
Tt was fixed at 0.73 cents per pound. 
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Replanting cess or Schedule 11 to be abolished. 
1^. June 19SS - February 
1. Export Duty or Schedule 1 
a) at 60 cents and below k per cent ad valorem 
b) over 60 cents to 80 cents d = 0.18625 P - 8.775 
c) over 80 cents to 100 cents d = 0.3125 P - l8»875 
d) over 100 cents d = x^ -t- 3x + 50 
where d = export duty, 
X = P - 100/10 
P = Price 
2. Anti-Inflationary cess or Schedule 11 
When price is over 100 cents per pound the cess (c) is 
c. = 5 X where x = P - 100/10; P = Price 
2 
This replaced the Schedule 11 replanting cess. 
3. Research cess or Schedule 111. 
Fixed at 0.5 cents per pound. 
ho Smallholding Replanting cess or Schedule IV. 
Fixed at cents per pound at all price levels. 
15« March 1956 - December 1958 
Schedule was reduced to 2 cents per pound 
16. January - December 1959 
Schedule was increased to 0.75 cents per pound. 
17. January 1961 - December 196? 
1. Fxport Tax (Schedule 1) 
a) 60 cents and below ^ per cent ad valorem 
b) over 60 to 80 cents d = 0.18625 P - 8.775 
c) over 80 to 100 cents d = 0.4 P - 25.750 
d) over 100 cents d - 0.?5 x^ + 3-375 x = l'+.250 
where d = export duty, 
x = P - 100/10 
P = Price 
2„ Anti-Inflationary cess (Schedule 11) 
Incorporated into Schedule 1. 
3. Research cess (Schedule 111) 
Fixed at 0.75 cents per pound. 
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h. Smallholder Replanting cens (Schedule TV) 
Fixed at cents per pound. 
18. January I968 
Research cess or Schedule 111 increased to 1 cent per pound. 
19o February IO7? 
Surcharge of 2 cents per pound when price exceeded 60 cents. 
38? 
APPENDIX 5.1 ESTIMATES OF REVENUE COST FUNCTIONS OF ESTATES 
There are two concepts of productions costs used by estates. 
The first is revenue cost per pound, and the second is total f.o.b, cost 
per pound. 
Revenue cost includes the following items: 
1) maintenance of mature areas (which includes weeding, 
manuring, pest and disease control, maintenance of 
roads, bridges, drains) 
2) tapping and collection cost (includes transport, tools 
etc.) 
3) manufactxiring cost (includes labour cost, repairs etc.) 
k) general charges (e.g., housing, medical services 
5) packing and despatch to a port. 
Total f.o.b. cost is revenue cost with the addition of 
1) export tax and research cess 
2) selling charges. 
Sometimes, depreciation and maintenance coats of immature trees are 
included in total f.o.b. cost. It is not done in this study. Selling 
charges are reclassified under revenue cost. This is to ensure that the 
effect of the export tax on profitability can be isolated for analysis. 
Information on cost of production could not be obtained for all 
the 50 estates surveyed. Most of them refused to release information on 
production cost. The usual reason they offered was the confidentiality 
of the data. The 1^+ estates which provided data on cost varied in size 
between '+00 to 3000 acres. Yield per acre varied between 800 to 1300 
pounds per acre. During the survey the price was around 80 to 90 cents. 
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Revenue Cost and Yield Per Acre Per Annum^ 
It is postulated tl'iat revenue cost is a function of yield per 
acre per annum, that is, RC = f (Q). A linear form was found to be quite 
suitable and can be expressed as 
RC = a - b Q + u « (1) 
The estimated quation is 
RC = 78.50 - 0.0^ +5 Q 
(6.31) (^.78) R^ = .68 D.W. = 2.81 « (2) 
This equation was estimated on the assumption of a price of 
80 cents. From this function, the RC for other prices are derived. It 
is assumed that the major influence of RC is the tapping and collection 
cost, which averaged to 50 per cent of total cost of production per 
pound of rubber. The tapping and collection cost is based on the MAPA 
agreement. It is indexed on rubber price levels. For a 10 cents drop in 
the rubber price, the wage declines by 5 cents (at the 50-^ price range) 
or 20 cents (at the higher prices from 70 cents upward) depending on the 
height of the rubber prices. A 20 cents change in the wage rate is 
equivalent to 1.12 cents change in the revenue function. 
With this information, other revenue cost functions are derived 
for other price levels. They are presented in Table 5A. 
From these functions, the total f.o.b. cost functions are 
constructed. It will be remembered that the difference between the two 
costs is the export tax. Though most estates differ slightly over certain 
details in their accounting procedures, the general approach is to consider 
export tax as a cost and replanting cess as a revenue. This is because 
the latter is recoverable at a future date. We have thought it sensible 
too to include in the cost the research cess since it is also not recoverable, 
Z 
c.f. D.R.Westgarth and R.Narayanan, "The Effect of Rubber Price and 
Yield Per Acre on Estate Production Costs," JRRIM, V.I8, pp.51-66. 
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The export tax (plus the research cesc of 1 cent) for various 
price is thus added to the corresponding revenue functions to obtain the 
total f.o.b, cost functions. Thus, at the price of 80 cents the export 
tax is 8.13 cents and the research cess is 1 cent. The total amount, 
9.13 cents per pound, is then added to equation (l) to give 
C^ = 87.13 - 0.045 Q » (3) 
APPENDIX 5.1 TABLE 5A ESTATE COST FUNCTIONS 
Revenue Co? 3t Functions Total F.O.B. C.ost Functions 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
1 
75.78 - 0.045 78.38 - 0.045 
50 76.06 - 0.045 79.06 - 0.045 
60 76.62 - 0.045 80.03 - 0.045 
70 77.46 - 0.045 84.72 - 0.045 
80 78.59 - 0.045 87.73 - 0.045 
90 79.70 - 0.045 92.95 - 0.045 
100 80.85 - 0.045 98.10 - 0.045 
SourceI Survey Data. 
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APPENDIX 7.1 THE KENDALL COEFFICIENT OF CONCORDANCE, W (1) 
Given N objects and K sets of rankings of them, the way to 
determine the degree of association or concordance among the K sets is 
the Kendall coefficient of concordance, W. 
This is illustrated by a simple example. Assume four estate 
producers are asked to rank seven variables accordingly which affect 

















E 1 5 6 7 k 2 3 1 E 2 5 6 7 3 k 2 1 
E 3 3 7 6 5 2 ^ 1 
E k 1 6 7 5 5 k 2 
Ik 15 
1 
17 17 11 13 5 
Rj gives the sums of the ranks assigned to each variable 
affecting replanting. 
When there is perfect agreement about the variables, that is, 
if they are ordered in identical order by the four estates, then one of 
the variables would obtain four ranks of 1. That is,the R. of this J 
variable is 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = ^ = k. The second most important variable 
would receive four ranks of 2 or 2k, which is 8. The least important 
gets Nk or 28. In general, for perfect rankings among the k sets we get 
the series for R. as k, 2 k, .. Nk. When there is no agreement among 
0 
the estates, the various R.'s would be approximately equal. 
3 
What it means is that the degree of agreement among the k 
estates is reflected by the degree of variance among the N sums of ranks. 
W is a function of this degree of variance. 
(1) Siegel S, Non parametric Statistics for the behavioral Sciences, 
(McGraw Hill, 1956)» 
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The coefficient of concordance is defined thus: 
12 S 
W = . . . (1) 
k"^  (N^ - N) 
where S is the sura of squares of the observed deviations from the mean 
2 
of R . or S = (R . = R ) 
J ( J ) 
^ N ^ 
k is the number of sets of rankings, here the number of estates 
N is the number of entities or variables in our example. 
In the example the sum of all rank totals is 112. The mean 
rank total is 112 /7 = l6 . The sums of squares about this mean is 
S = (1^ - 16)^ + (25 - 16)^ (5 - 16)^ = 562 
Substituting this into (1) 
(7^ - 7) 
This shows the degree of agreement among the estates in their 
rajiking of the variables affecting replajiting. 
Critical values have been worked out for testing the null 
hypothesis of no association. I f the observed S is greater or equal to 
a certain critical value at a defined level of significance, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. 
For example, given k = N = 7 , the tabulated value of S at 
the 5 per cent level of significance is 217 .00 . The observed value of S 
in our example is 362 , which is larger than 217 .0 . The conclusion ie 
that there is significant association. 
Where N is large, the chi-square test can be used. The modified 
formula i s : 
X^ - k (n - 1) W . . . (2) 
with N - 1 degrees of freedom. 
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Where ranks are tied a correction factor is used. The modified 
formula for W is then 
o.. (3) 
61 k^ (N^ - N) - K.T 
12 
where T = ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
and t is the number of observations tied for a given rank. 
A high or significant value of W is interpreted as meaning 
that the estates are applying the same standard in ranking the N 
variables. Their pooled ordering is used as a standard, especially 
when there is no other external criterion for ordering the variables. 
An important corollary of this non parametric test is that 
the order of the various sums of ranks, provides the best estimate J 
of the 'true' ranking of the variables. Note that the 'true' ranking 
is based upon the criteria of the estates' viewpoint. In our example, 
age of trees is most important, with R. = 5» and export tax least 3 
important, with R. = 27, in influencing replanting. 0 
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APPENDIX 8.1 YIliLD ESTIMATION FOR CLONE RRIM 600 IN TAPPING 

















1 641 (13) 512.8 128.2 135 A , , virgin bark 
2 1080 (12) 864.0 216.0 135 
1 
3 1425 (12) 1182.8 242.3 135 
4 1656 (12) 1424,2 231.a 135 
5 2061 (12) 1793.9 267.9 134 
6 2073 (11) 1782.8 290.2 133 Yirgin bark 
7 2172 (10) 1889.6 282.4 131 
8 2270 (10) 1997.6 272.4 129 
9 2581 ( 8) 2322.9 258.1 127 
10 2728 ( 1) 2455.2 272.8 125 
11 2208 ( 1) 1987.2 220.8 123 
12 2168 ( 1) 1951.2 216.8 121 
13 2554 ( 1) 2170 383.1 119 
14 3003 2552.6 450.5 117 
15 I 2553 2170.1 382.9 115 
16 1 2050 1742.5 307.5 113 1st renewed bark 
17 1845 1568.3 276.8 111 
4 
18 1650 1462.5 247.5 109 
19 1550 1317.5 232.5 107 
20 1450 1232.5 217.5 105 
21 2175 1740 435.0 103 2nd renewed bark 
22 1958 1566.4 391.6 101 V virgin bark of high pane . 
23 1763 1410.4 352.6 99 
5
24 1 1587 1269.6 317.4 97 
1429 1143.2 285.8 95 
26 1400 1120.0 280.0 93 2nd renewed bark 
27 1260 1008,0 252.0 91 
U 
^6' 
virgin bark of high panel 
28 1134 907.0 226.8 89 
29 1021 816.8 204.2 89 
30 919 
1 
735.2 183.8 89 
3ouro«B and Notes: (1) Following an iniuaturo period of alx years, 
(2) S/2 d/2 100 per cent tapping ayotem is assumed from year 1 to 20, 
2C/2 ci/3 133 ?<"• cent Is asauraod from year 21 to 28. A higher 
intensivo eystem, i.e. 2C/2 d/2 200 per cent is assumed for the 
last 2 years. Stimulation is assumed to start from year 11 as is 
normully the practice amongat estates. 15 per cent of the total 
yield is assumed to be lower crude rubber from year 1 to 20 and 
20 per cent from year 21 to 30i> 
(3) liaund on planlinR denoitioB of 110 yields surveyed. The decrease 
in the number of trnnn pur a taiiii i o due to thinning, post and 
dinoauo Infeutution, and wind damii/;f. The sumo stunds are assumed 
for other clones. 
(4) Adapted from RRI recommendations. See 'Tapping and Yield 
Stimulation', Planters' flulletin, G'J, 198, 1^63. 
RRIH Planters' Bulletin, RRIM No.112, l'//l, PP. 19-32; 
RRIM Planters' Bulletin, HRIH No.100, I969, pp.24-36; 
Botany IJiviaion, RHIM 
APPENDIX 8,2 YIELD ESTIMATION FOR CLONE PB 86 IN TAPPING 
FOR 30 YEARS 
Year of Tapping" Total Yield^ Latex Yield Lower Grade 
Lb./Aore Lb./Aere Lb»/Aore 
1 311 264.4 46.6 
2 513 436,1 76.9 
3 784 666.4 117.6 
4 1019 866.2 152.8 
1211 1029.4 181,6 
6 1227 1042.9 184,1 
7 1260 1071.0 189.0 
8 1340 1139.0 201,0 
9 1370 1164.5 205.5 
10 1390 1181.5 208.5 
11 1380 1173.0 207.0 
12 1330 1130.5 199.5 
13 1320 1122,0 198.0 
14 1210 1028.5 181.5 
15 1200 1020.0 180.0 
16 1190 1011.5 178.5 
17 1360 1156.0 204.0 
18 13tO 1139.0 201.0 
19 1300 1105.0 195.0 
20 1215 1032,8 182.2 
21 1701 1360.8 340.2 
22 1450 1160.0 290.0 
23 1440 1152,0 288.0 
24 1350 1080.0 270 
25 1260 1008,0 252 
26 1170 936 234 
27 1080 864 216 
28 990 792 198 
29 990 792 198 
30 900 720 180 
Sources and Notes: Same as in Appendix 8,1, 
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APPtlNDIX 8.3 YIKLD ESTII-L'.TIOH FOR PRI^ -WAR ORDIfJARY SEEDLINCJS 
FROM Tinc 21ST YilAR Oi' TAPPIMG 
Year of Tapping^ ^ Total Yield '^^ ^ Liitex Yield Lower Grade 
Lb./Acre Lb./Acre Lb./Acre 
20 900.0 720.0 180.0 
21 355.0 684.0 171.0 
22 812.25 649.8 162,5 
23 771.6 617.3 154.3 
24 733.0 586.4 146.6 
25 696.3 557.4 139.3 
26 661.4 529.1 132.3 
27 628.3 502.6 125.7 
28 596.8 '477.4 119.4 
29 566,9 453.5 113.4 
30 538.5 430.8 107.7 
31 522.35 417.9 104.5 
32 506.67 405.3 101.3 
33 496.54 397.2 99.3 
34 486.6 309.3 97.3 
3b 476.9 3B1.5 95.4 
36 467.4 373.9 93.5 
37 458.1 '366.5 91.6 
38 448.9 359.1 89.8 
39 440,0 352.0 88.0 
40 431.2 345.0 86,2 
41 416.3 334.6 63.7 
42 40^.8 3-^ 4.6 81.2 
43 393.6 314.9 70.7 
44 381.8 305.4 76.4 
45 370.3 296.2 74.1 
Sources and Notes: (1 ) 
( 2 ) 
Pre-war seedling materials are often not tapped aystematically 
according to a schedule like the case of modern clones. Often 
selective tapping with multiple cuts ia the common method. 
From survey of 40 fields and unpublished data of Manaf^ ement 
Study of RIUM, 
See Appendices 8,1 and 8,2. 
\le assume 20 per cent of the total yield to be lower grade 
rubber throughout the period. 
APPESDiX 0.4 ESTATK: OliOSS Ub;Vfc;MUl!; PER ACRK OF PRE-WAI? SEEDLINGS 







Gross Revenue at 
of 1-iitex Grade 40 6ent8 60 Cents 80 Cents 
Trees Per Pound Per Pound Per Pound 
20 720 IHO 331.7 475.7 639.1 
21 684 171 296.7 451.9 607.1 
22 649.8 162.5 281.9 429.4 576.7 
23 617.3 154.3 267.8 407.8 547.9 
24 586.4 146.6 254.3 387.4 520.5 
25 557.4 139.3 241.8 368.3 444,8 
26 529.1 132.3 229.6 349.6 4 6 9 . 5 
27 502.6 l l '5.7 210.1 332,1 446.1 
28 447.4 119.4 207,1 315.4 423.8 
29 4^3.5 113.4 196.7 299.6 402.5 
30 430,8 107.7 186,9 284.7 382.4 
31 417,9 104. 181,3 276.1 371.0 
32 105.3 101.3 175.8 267.8 359.7 
33 •yj'1.2 99.3 172.3 262.5 352.5 
J4 38;). 3 97.3 luO.O 257.2 345.6 
35 3^1,5 95.4 lu5.4 352.1 338.7 
36 yn.'-) 93.5 162.2 347.1 331.8 
37 366, rj 91.6 159.0 242.2 375.3 
30 359.1 89.8 155.Q 2^7.3 318.7 
35 00.0 vy>.n 232.6 312.5 
4 0 345.0 86.2 149.7 227,9 306.2 
41 334.6 83.7 145,1 221.1 297.0 
42 324.6 81.2 140.8 214.5 288.1 
'13 314.9 78.7 136.6 208,0 279.1 
44 305.4 76.4 132,5 201 .8 271 .1 
4^ 296.2 74.1 120.5 195.7 262.9 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
A 2 cent miirketln/r ra;ir^;ln le assumed. 
Gross Heveiiue - P L + P S where P. iu IISS 1 price (net of marketing nuirciQ) 
1 1 a 
and la RSS 1 Bheetu, P ia price of acrnp rubber and S i s scrap rubber. Scrap 
B 
price la derived from the r a t i o of ) : 0.^30 betwoeu IISS 1 and Scrap p r i c e s . 
See text of Chujiter B. 
The above notea apply to Api)endice3 
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APPKNDIX 8 . 5 ESTATE: GHOSS REVENUE PER ACRE OF PB 86 














7 264,4 46.6 1 1 0 , 5 1 6 8 . 4 2 2 6 . 3 
8 4 3 6 . 1 76 .9 1 8 2 , 2 2 7 7 . 7 3 7 3 . 3 
9 666.4 1 1 7 . 6 2 7 8 , 5 424 .5 570.4 
1 0 866,2 1 5 2 . 8 3 6 2 . 1 5 5 1 . 7 7 4 1 . 4 
1 1 1029 .4 1 8 1 . 6 430 .3 655 .6 8 8 1 , 1 
1 2 1 0 4 2 . 9 1 8 4 . 1 4 3 5 . 9 664.3 892.7 
1 3 1 0 7 1 . 0 1 8 9 . 0 447.7 682.2 9 1 6 . 7 
14 1 1 3 9 . 0 2 0 1 . 0 4 7 6 . 1 7 2 5 . 5 974,9 
1 5 1 1 6 4 . 5 2 0 5 . 5 486.7 7 4 1 . 7 996,7 
1 6 1 1 8 1 . 5 208 .5 493.9 7 5 2 . 6 1 0 1 1 . 3 
1 7 1 1 7 3 . 0 207 .0 490.2 7 4 7 . 1 1004 .0 
18 1 1 3 0 . 5 1 9 9 . 5 4 7 2 . 5 7 1 9 . 8 967.7 
19 1 1 2 2 . 0 1 9 8 . 0 469.0 7 1 4 , 7 960.4 
20 1 0 2 8 . 5 1 8 1 . 5 429.9 6 5 5 . 1 880.3 
2 1 1 0 2 0 . 0 1 8 0 . 0 426.3 649,7 8 7 3 . 1 
22 1 0 1 1 . 5 1 7 8 . 5 422 .8 644.3 865.8 
23 1 1 5 6 . 0 204.0 483.2 736 .4 989.5 
24 1 1 3 9 . 0 2 0 1 . 0 476.0 7 2 5 . 5 974.9 
25 1 1 0 5 . 0 1 9 5 . 0 4 6 1 . 9 7 0 3 . 8 945.8 
26 1 0 3 2 . 8 1 8 2 . 2 4 3 1 . 8 657 .8 884.2 
27 1 3 6 0 . 8 340.2 590.3 899 . 1 1 2 0 7 . 8 
28 1 1 6 0 . 0 290.0 503 .2 766,4 1029 .6 
29 1 1 5 2 . 0 288.0 499.8 7 6 1 , 2 1 0 2 2 . 6 
30 1 0 8 0 . 0 270 468.5 7 1 3 . 8 958.6 
3 1 1008 .0 252 437 .2 665.9 894.7 
32 936 234 4 0 6 . 1 6 18 .4 830.8 
33 864 216 374 .8 570 .8 766.9 
34 792 198 343 .6 5 2 3 . 3 703 .0 
35 792 198 3 4 3 . 6 5 2 3 . 3 7 0 3 . 0 
36 720 180 3 1 2 . 3 475 .7 6 3 9 . 1 
APPENDIX 8,6 ESTATE: GROSS REVENUE PER ACRE OF RRIM 600 





Lower T o t a l Gross Revetuie a t 






7 5 1 2 . 8 120.2 222,5 338.8 455.2 
8 864 216 374.8 570.8 766.9 
9 1 1 8 2 . 8 242.3 501.6 764.2 1027.7 
10 1424.2 231 .6 5 9 1 . 1 900.8 1210,7 
11 1793.9 2? .9 739.4 1 1 2 7 . 0 1 5 1 4 . 5 
12 1782.8 290,2 740,0 1 1 2 7 . 7 1 5 1 5 . 5 
13 1889.6 282,4 778.8 1 1 8 7 . 2 1595.4 
14 1997.6 272.4 817.7 1246.5 1675.3 
15 2322.9 258,1 938.2 1430.6 1923.0 
16 2455.2 272.8 991.7 1 5 1 2 . 1 2032.5 
17 1987.2 220.8 802.6 1223.9 1645.0 
18 1 9 5 1 . 2 2 1 6 . 8 788.2 1201.7 1 6 1 5 . 2 
19 2170 383.1 907.0 1302.3 1857.5 
20 2552.6 450,5 1055.5 1625.5 2184.9 
21 2 1 7 0 , 1 382,9 907.0 1382.3 1857.5 
22 1 7 4 2 . 5 307.5 728.4 1 1 1 0 , 0 1 4 9 1 . 5 
23 1568.3 276.8 655.6 1009.5 1342.4 
24 1462,5 247,5 609.1 928,2 1247.3 
25 1 3 1 7 . 5 232.5 550.7 839.3 1 1 2 7 . 8 
26 1232,5 2 1 7 . 5 515 .2 7 8 5 . 1 1055.0 
27 1740 435.0 754.8 1 1 4 9 . 6 1544,4 
28 1566,4 391.6 679.5 1034.9 1390.3 
29 1410,4 352.6 6 1 1 . 9 9 3 1 . 8 1 2 5 1 . 9 
30 1269,6 3 1 7 . 4 550.7 838.9 1126.9 
31 1 1 4 3 . 2 285.8 495.9 955.4 1014.7 
32 1120 280.0 485.8 740.0 994.1 
33 1008 252,0 437.2 665.9 894.7 
34 907 226,8 393.5 599.3 805.1 
35 816,8 204.2 354.3 539.6 725.0 
36 735.2 183.8 319.0 485.7 652.6 
APPENDIX 8,7 ESTIMATED REPLANTING EXPENDITURE ON ESTATES 
(DOLLARS PSR ACRE) 
Tear of Planting 
Total I t e n 
Pre-
plantiag 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
s « V $ t % S $ $ 
Per Acre Per Acre Per Acre Per Acre Per Acre Per Acre Per Acre Per Acre 
Nursery 6.6 4.8 - 0.2 _ — - 10.6 
Pre-felling weeding 26.0 0.4 - - - - - 26.4 
Telling, poisoning & clearing 22.5 15.3 0.3 - - - - 38.1 
Terraces 19.3 7.1 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.1 - 29.0 
Holing, lining & filling 12.8 14.9 - - - - - 27.7 
Roads & bridges 1.6 4.4 1.9 1.8 1.4 1.6 1.1 14.9 
Fences i boundaries 5.1 3.5 1.2 0.6 0,2 0.1 0.2 10.9 
Drainage 4 soil conservation 2.6 4.1 3.6 2.3 1.6 1.7 1.7 18.7 
Planting & budding - 9.3 20.5 0.4 - - - 30.2 
Manuring of rubber 0.1 16.3 14,6 22.5 20,3 1 23.0 22.7 135.1 
Weeding of rubber & cover 1.1 111.0 82.7 68.7 50,0 1 30.5 20.7 372.6 
Supplying, pruning & windfall - 5.9 11.8 5.3 3.6 i 2.6 2.0 31.6 
Pest and disease control , . 
(a) 
Cover establishnent 4 aaintenance 
0.1 1.9 4.3 6.3 8.0 j 10.7 8,3 42.5 
5.6 37.7 10.9 7.2 2.7 0.7 0,1 64.9 
Survey and transport 0.9 4.8 3.4 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 15.8 
Labour Benefits 10.0 20.0 20,0 20,0 20.0 20.0 20.0 130.0 
Management 90.0 90.0 90.0 90,0 90.0 90.0 90.0 630.0 
Land tax 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 70.0 
Total 215.3 361.4 275.5 237.8 
1 
209.6 1 192,5 208.9 1700.0 
(a) Includes planting and supplying, nanuring, pest and disease controls. 
Source: Survey of 14 estates with 62 fields replanted between 1960-1973 
and C.S.Sg "Some Aspects of Estate Replanting and Newplanting Costs", 




APPENDIX 8.8 EXPENDITURE FOR ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING AN ACRE OF 
RUBBER FOR SIX YEARS ($/ACRE): SMALLHOLDING 
Item Year of Planting 0 1 1 2 3 k i 5 6 
Felling, Burning, Clearing 72.0 
1 i ( 1 1 
Terracing 38.0 
Holing, Lining i8.o 
Budding 21.0 
Planting 11.0 
Kp.nuring 60.0 33.0 35.0 ^5.0 45.0 52.0 52.0 
Pest and Disease Control 6.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 
Cover Establishment end 
?-'p.int'=n?.nce 20.0 90.0 90.0 72.0 72.0 60.0 60.0 
Roads and Bridges 15.0 3.0 4,0 4.0 3.0 4,0 2.0 
Weeding and Lallang Control 18.0 20.0 15.0 15.0 13.0 7.0 
Drainage and Soil Conservation 6.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 
Supplying 12.0 6.0 
Miscellaneous (Survey, etc.) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 P ^ 




APPENDIX 8.9 DISTRIBUTION OF VARIOUS SIZKS OF REPLANTING 
GRANT ALLOCATION PER YEAR 
Age of 
, 
U750 5il000.00 S1500.00 
Trees Per Acre Per Acre Per Acre Per Acre 
0 150 250 333.3 500.0 
1 60 100 133.3 200.0 
2 60 100 133.3 200.0 
3 60 100 133.3 200.0 
70 93-3 1^.0 
5 hZ 70 93.3 140.0 
6 36 60 80.0 120.0 
Total ^50 750 1000 1500 
The distribution ratio follows that of RISDA's allocation from 
year 0 to 6, viz., 33.3, 15-3, 15.3, 13.3, 9-3, 9.3, and 8 per cent 
of the total amount of the replanting grant from year 0 to 6. 
APPENDIX 8.10 ESTATE: NET R E T U R N S O R CASH FLOW DURING 
INITIAL PERIOD OF REPLANTING 
Age of 
Trees 









0 -215.3 - 65.3 + 118 28^+.7 
1 -361.'+ -301.'+ -228.1 -161A 
2 -275.5 -215.5 -li+2.2 - 75.5 
3 -237.8 -177.8 -10k.k - 37.8 
k -209.6 -165.8 -116.3 - 69.6 
5 -192.5 -150.5 - 99.1 - 52.5 
6 -208.9 -172.9 128 - 88.9 
(1) Net Returns equals Replanting Grant Allocation minus 
Replanting Expenditure for each corresponding year. Thus for 
year 0 for the S^50 per acre assuption, it is U150 (Replanting 
grant allocation for that year) minus S215.3 (replanting 
expenditure for the corresponding period) which equals -$65.3. 
The negative sign denotes that the replanting expenditure exceeds 
the replanting grant allocation for that year. The data for 
the grant and expenditure are given in Appendices 
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APPENDIX 8,11 SMALlilOLDING: NET RETURNS^^^ OR CASH FLOW 
DURING INITIAL PERIOD OF REPLANTING 
Age of 
— ^ 
Replanting Grant - Replanting Expenditure^ 








0 - 2 4 2 . 8 7 . 2 9 0 . 5 3 257.2 
1 -201.8 -101.8 -68 . 4 7 - 1.85 
2 -181.8 - 81.8 - 4 8 . 4 7 18.15 
5 -161.8 - 61.8 - 2 8 . 4 6 38.16 
k -160.8 - 90.8 - 6 7 . 4 7 -20.85 
5 - 1 4 8 . 8 - 78.8 - 5 5 . 4 6 - 8.845 
6 - 1 4 0 . 8 - 8O08 -60.8 -20.8 
(1) Ab defined in Appendix 8.19 Data on the replanting grant 
and replanting expenditure are found in Appendices 
(2) Replanting expenditure includes land tax and education cess. 
hok 
APPENDIX fit 12 ASSUMPTIONS USED IN BUDGETING PRODUCTION 
COSTS OF RUBBER PRODUCTION 
This appendix exp]ains all the items and the expenditure 
involved in the production of rubber during the mature period. The 
budgeting is based on the data of the Rubber Research Institute, 
Malaysia and the information obtained from the records of estates during 
our survey. 
1. MANAGEMENT 
This item includes Agency fees, salaries of managers and other 
staff members, depreciation and repairs of buildings, bonus and E.P.F. 
of ofdice staff. This is estimated at $50 per acre on the basis of 
estate records in 1972. 20 estates over 1000 acres were averaged for 
this estimate. 
2. TAPPING AND COLLECTION COST 
This is in accordance with the MAPA terms of 1972o 
3o MANURING 
CCM 99 ia used at the rate of 1 lb per tree per annum and at 
the prevailing cost of ik cents per pound. Two applications are carried 
out. One in February and the other in June. The total cost is: 
amount of fertiliser applied x number of applications per 
year x number of trees per acre x cost of each application. 
A labour cost of $1 per acre is also charged. 
From the l6th year only one application of fertiliser is 
assumed. 
^o WriKDTNG 
From year ] to 15 the weeding programme consists of 
1) 1 round rentice spraying S 3.00 
2) 1 round slashing 3.00 
3) 2 rounds selective weeding k.OO 
2 rounds lalang wiping loUO 
5) bracken eradication 3.00 
ftl'+.'+O 
From t.hp ]Ath y»,Mr thp wpodinp; rroprammp is 
1) 1 r.)und rentice sprayin^^ S 3.00 
P) 1 round slashing ^.00 
3) 1 round selective weeding ? 00 
P rounds l.alang wiping l.'+O 
5) bracken control 2.00 
$11.^0 
5. FTKLD MAINTENANCE 
This consists of 
S / lb, 
1) soil conservation .06 
?) drainage .13 
5) census and marking .02 
't) thinning and pruning .02 
5) roads and bridges . 3 9 
6) miscellaneo us like fire patrol ol3 
.75 
The cost is reduced to .73 S per pound after year 20 
of tapping as pruning and thinning is not necessary. 
6. PEST AND DISEASE CONTROL 
Generally the expenditure and effort spent to control disease 
and pest decrease with the increase in the age of rubber trees. The 
distribution of expenditure for this it^ m^ is giv^n in Appendix 
It shows a decline "Trom $7 to %? ovpr the 30 year period. 
7. INTERNAL TRANSPORT 
An average sum of 1i?.S0 per acre is assumed. This is for 
transporting workers and matf^rjals within the estate. 
8. STTMItLATION 
The cost is 3 cents per 2 applications are made per 
annum. Total cost is number of application per annum x cost of each 
applies! ; on x number of tref^s. 
9. TAPPING, AND PAN EI, OPENING 
Panel opening is needed when thf^  trees ar«^  first tapped and 
a new tapping panel is to be tapped. The cost is givi^ n^ in Appendix 
koe 
10. MISCl'lLLANhlOlJS 
This includes minor items of expenditure and include 
1) land tax SlO.OO 
?) education rate (at 15 per cent of land tax) I.50 
3) electricity, water supply 5 .00 
U) insurance, bank charges 3,00 
5) others 3.5O 
$23.00 
11. MANUFACTIimNG COST 
This is for RS.S production. 5.6 cents per pound is the 
average cost of production in estates. 
12. TRANSPORT OF RUBBER 
0.6 cents is charged for the transport of a pound of rubber to 
the nearest dealpr„ Total cost is cost of transport per pound x amount 
transported. 
13. F.O.B. CHARGES 
This includes charges on marketing, handling, storage. 
Approximately 1.0^ cents per pound is charged. 
lU. EXPORT DUTY AND CESS 
For UO, 6 0 , 80 and 100 cents the export duty is respectively 
1 . 6 0 , 2.40, 8.13 and 16.25 cents per pound of rubber exported. A 
research cess of 1 cent per pound is also imposed. 
Total payment for export tax and research cess is (export tax rate for 
a giv^n price +- research cess) the rel(^vant rate of the two cesses 
multiplied by the amount of rubb^^r f^xport^d. 
'+07 
APPENDIX A SUMMARY OF 'fflE MEMORANDUM OF AGHEEMENT 
BETWEEN THE MALAYAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS 
ASSOCIATION AND THE NATIONAL UNION O F 
PLANTATION WORKERS ON RATES OF PAY TOR 
TAPPJiHS AND FIELD WORKERS 
PART I - TAPPERS 
(A) CLASSIFICATION OF FIELDS 
1* It is hereby agreed that for the purpose of determining the 
rates of pay for tappers, fields shall be classified as follows:-
Low Yielding A l l areas under selected and unselected 
Fields: material planted pre-war, including 
areas planted in 19^1. 
High Yielding All areas under selected material planted 
Fields: postwar. 
2 . Areas Newly Bought into Tapping. Areas newly brought into 
tapping shall be classified in High Yielding Fields not later than one 
complete calendar year after commencement of tapping, except where yield 
performance per acre or per tapper does not justify such classification 
in which case it shall be classified in High Yielding Fields as soon as 
classification is justified. 
3 . Reclassification. The classification of a field or area may 
be changed from High Yielding Fields to Low Yielding Fields if in the 
preceding financial year -
(a) the yield per acre has fallen below -
if under Low Level Tapping : 750 pounds; 
if under High L e v e l Tapping : 850 pounds; 
if under High/Low Level Tapping: 1000 pounds; and, 
(b) the average yield per tapper has fallen below 
22 pounds per day. 
k. The Union Committee on the estate affected may make repreaentationa 
to the management if it considers that any field or area should be so 
reclassi fied. 
^^^ Other fringe benefits like vacation leave are not included in this 
summary. 
koF. 
5* Declassification. A field or area in the classification of Low 
Yielding Fields may be declassified if in the preceding financial year -
(a) the yield per acre has fallen below -
if under Low Level Tapping 
if under High Level Tapping 
if under High/Low Level Tapping 
(b) the average yield per tapper has fallen below 13 
pounds per day. 
450 pounds; 
700 pounds; 
750 pounds; and, 
6. The Union Committee in the estate affected may make 
representations to the management if it considers that any field or area 
should be so declassified. 
(B) TASK SIZES 
7. It is agreed that estates shall be at liberty to increase any 
task to an optimum task size provided that such optimum task size shall 
not exceed the standard tasks as set out hereunder:-
( 1 ) In Low Yielding Fields 
(a) Flat Undulating Ground:-
(i) Half-Spiral - Low Level (S2) 
Year of Planting Before 1939 1939-19^1 
No. of Tappable trees ^50 ^ ^ 
(ii) Reduced Spiral - Low Level (SR) 
90 per cent of appropriate number of trees 
for half-spiral. 
(iii) Full-Spiral (Si) 
75 per cent of appropriate number of trees for 
half-spiral. 
(iv) High-Level 
65 per cent of appropriate number of trees for 
Low-Level. 
(v) High-Level - Low-Level 
(a) S2 or V2 High - S2 Low 
Number of cuts equivalent to 85 per cent 
of the appropriate number of trees for 
half-spiral - Low-Level. 
(b) S2 or V2 High - SI Low 
Number of cuts equivalent to 76 per cent 
of the appropriate number of trees for 
half-spiral - Low-Level. 
i+09 
(b) Areas Planted on Contour Terraces:-
(i) Low-Level Tapping 
9'+ per cent of the appropriate number of 
trees for flat undulating ground. 
(ii) High-Level Tapping 
95 per cent of the appropriate number of 
trees for flat undulating ground. 
(iii) High-Level - Low-Level Tapping 
97 per cent of the appropriate number of 
cuts for flat undulating ground. 
(c) Hilly Ground - Areas planted otherwise than on 
Contour 
Terraces:- Task sizes to be agreed at local level. 
(2) In High Yielding Fields 
(a) Flat Undulating Ground:-
(i) Half-Spiral - Low-Level (S2) 
Years of Tapping Up to 5 yrs. 3-10 lO-l^ 13-20 
No.of Tappable trees 600 575 530 510 
(ii) Reduced Spiral - Low Level (SR) 
92 per cent of the appropriate number of 
trees for half-spiral. 
(iii) F u l l Spiral (SI) 
80 per cent of the appropriate number of 
trees for half-spiral. 
(iv) High Level 
65 per cent of appropriate number of 
trees for Low-Level. 
(v) High-Level - Low-Level 
(a) S2 or V2 High - S2 Low 
Number of cuts equivalent to 85 per 
cent of the appropriate number of 
trees for half-spiral - Low Level. 
(b) S2 or V2 High - S I Low 
Number of cuts equivalent to 76 per 
cent of the appropriate number of 
trees for half-spiral - Low Level. 
(b) Areas Planted On Contour Terraces:-
(i) Low-Level Tapping 
94 per cent of appropriate number of 
trees for flat undulating ground. 
(ii) High-Level Tapping 
95 per cent of appropriate number of 
trees for flat undulating ground. 
+^10 
(iii) H i g h - L e v e l - Low-Level Tappi ng 
97 per cent of appropriate number of 
cute on flat undulating ground. 
(b) Hilly Ground - Areas planted otherwise than on 
Contour 
Terraces:- Task sizes to be agreed at local level. 
8 . Should it be considered that the increase made under the 
provisions of paragraph 7 above is beyond the physical capacity of 
tappers in the estate, the Union shall be at liberty to invite the 
Association to and the Association shall open negotiations in the matter 
with the view to arriving at an agreement as to the task size; upon such 
invitation being extended and until such agreement has been reached or 
a settlement has been arrived at under the provisions of the law, the 
tasks to be performed by the tappers shall be the tasks existing at the 
date upon which the increase was made by the management. 
(C) RATES 01'' PAY 
9 . It is hereby agreed that tappers shall be remunerated on the 
basis set out in paragraphs 10 to 20 inclusive. 
10. Basic W a g e . A tapper shall be paid a basic wage of S3.10 per 
day in the price zone of cents and 1^3.20 per day in the price zones 
of cents and above for the performance by him of the full duties of 
a tapper on his task. 
11. Incentive Bonus and Scrap. A tapper shall, in addition, to the 
basic wage, be paid, by way of an incentive bonus, for each pound by 
which the average daily poundage of latex (<Jry rubber content) brought in 
by hirii during the month calculated to the nearest pound exceeds the basic 
poundage and for each pound of scrap (wet weight) as follows:-
Price Zone 
lai 
^^5/50 50/55 55/60 6 0 / 6 5 6 5 / 7 0 7 0 / 7 5 75/80 8 0 / 8 5 85/ K 
Basic Wage 3 . 1 0 3 . 2 0 3 . 2 0 3 . 2 0 3 . 2 0 3 . 2 0 3 . 2 0 3 . 2 0 3 . 2 0 3 . 2 0 3.20 
Basic Poundange 
(H/Y): 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 23 
(L/Y): 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Incentive 
(H/Y): 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 13 Ik 
( L / Y ) : 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 13 Ik 15 16 
Scrap Rate 1st 
15 l b s . k k k 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 
Above 15 l b s . 3 3 3 3 k 4 5 5 6 6 7 
The reduced payment of 1 cent for scrap in each price zone above 
15 l b s . of wet scrap brought in by the tapper will apply only to areas 
stimulated by ethrel or other super-stimulants. 
1 2 . Price Bonus. A tapper shall be p a i d , in additon to the basic 
w a g e , a price bonus of 5 cents, 10 cents, 15 cents and 20 cents respectively 
when the average price of rubber is within the price zone 5 0 / 5 5 , 5 5 / 6 0 , 
6 0 / 6 5 and 65/70 respectively. The appropriate price bonus for the price 
zones 7 0 / 7 5 , 7 5 / 8 0 , 8 0 / 8 5 and 85/9O shall be 30 cents, ^0 cents, 50 cents 
and 60 cents respectively. 
13. Task Bonus. A tapper shall be paid, in addition to the basic 
wage, a task bonus equivalent to 5 cents for every complete 10 trees by 
which his task exceeds the appropriate standard task as set out in 
paragraph 7 a b o v e . 
1^+. Areas Newly Brought Into T a p p i n g . During the period preceding 
classification into High Yielding Fields of areas newly brought into 
tapping, a tapper shall be paid at suitable daily or poundage rates, such 
rates being based on the average earnings of tappers on High Yielding 
Fields on the estate o r , where there are no High Yielding Fields on the 
estate, on earnings for a daily poundage of 32 pounds of latex (d.r.c.) 
on High Yielding Fields. 
15. Declassified Low YieldinR Areas. A tapper working in a field 
or area in Low Yielding Fields which has been declassified shall be paid 
at suitable poundage rates fixed at estate level provided that the 
average earnings of a tapper on any such field or area shall not fall 
below the basic wage and provided further that such poundage rates shall 
not be less than the average earnings for latex (dry rubber content) in 
such field or area immediately prior to declassification divided by the 
average poundage of latex (dry rubber content) per tapper. 
16. Washouts. A day on which tappers are prevented by rain from 
completing their normal duties within their normal working hours shall 
be deemed a washout and shall be treated as a day worked, entitling the 
tappers to payment of wages and rates under this Agreement, including the 
incentive bonus. 
1?. Late Tapping. On a day on which the first tapping for the day 
cannot start due to weather conditions, tappers shall be informed before 
10.00 a.m. that day whether or not there will be tapping and when tapping 
is offered or allowed to commence after 10.00 a.m. the poundage rates 
specified in relation to the incentive bonus shall be increased by 3 cents 
for Low Yielding Fields and 2 cents for High Yielding Fields and the day 
shall be treated, for all purposes, as a day on which work was offered. 
No late tapping shall commence after 1.00 p.m. 
1 8 . (i) Stimulants. A tapper required to apply stimulants shall 
be paid for such work at the same rate as other workers called upon to 
perform such work. 
(li) A tapper who carries out second and subsequent collections, 
shall be paid at the same piece rate as other workers called upon to 
perform such work, such rate being the appropriate incentive rate listed 
an paragraph 12 above for High Yielding >ields. Where the work is carried 
out by a tapper, and the average daily collection for the second collection 
/at T 
calculated over any period of thirty da.yB falls below 15 poimds (d.r.c.), 
the Union shall be entitled to make representations for the purpose of 
negotiating an ad hoc rate for the remaining period of the stimulant 
application cycle during which management requires the second collection 
to be carried out. 
19. (1) 
Double Tapping. Double tapping carried out on any day 
for the purpose solely of making up for days on which no tapping is 
possible due to rain, casual holidays or similar reasons shall be deemed 
to be recovery tapping and shall be paid for at normal rates. 
(2) On a day on which double tapping, not on a recovery basis, 
is performed, the tapper shall be paid as for overtime. 
(3) When double tapping is offered, no tapper shall be 
required to commence work earlier than his normal time of commencement 
of work. 
20. Special Provisions. The Management of any estate shall be at 
liberty, with the agreement of the tappers concerned, to pay tappers 
working in any field or area in High Yielding Fields or Low Yielding Fielis 
poundage rates for latex (d.r.c.) in lieu of the basic wage and incentive 
bonus provided that -
(a) the poundate rates so paid shall be such that the 
average daily earnings per tapper for latex (d.r.c.) 
on any such field in any month shall not be less 
than the average daily earnings for latex (d.r.c.) 
which would have resulted had the tapper been paid 
the ordinary basic wage and incentive bonus; and 
(b) in no case shall the average daily earnings of any 
such tapper for latex (d.r.c.) be less than the 
basic wage. 
PART II - FIELD WORKERS 
21. Basic Wage. Field workers shall be paid a daily basic wage 
as follows:-
(a) Ablp bodied males (up to the age of 60 years) 
ft3.10 in the price zone 35/^+0 cents 
S3-20 in the price zones ^0/^5 and above. 
(b) Able bodied femals (up to the age of 60 years) 
S2.70 in the price zone 35/^0 cents 
$2.75 in the price zones kO/k^ and above. 
(c) Young persons (up to the age of l6 years) 
$2.35 in the price zone 35/'K) cents 
S2.A0 in the price zones ^+0/45 and above. 
(d) Non-able bodied workers 
$2.35 in the price zone 35/'+0 cents 
$2.^0 in the price zones hO/h^ and above. 
22, Price Bonus. A field worker shall be paid, in addition to the 
basic wage, a price bonus of 5 cents, 10 cents, 15 cents and 20 cents 
respectively when the average price of rubber is within the price zone of 
50/55, 55/60, 60/65 and 65/70 respectively. The appropriate price bonus 
for the price zones 70/75, 75/80, 8O/85 and 85/90 shall be 30 cents, 
'tO cents, 50 cents and 60 cents respectively. 
23. Hours of Work. The daily rates payable shall be for eight hours 
of work inclusive of a break of half an hour permitted for refreshment 
in the field. 
'415 
APPENDIX 8.1^ CALCULATION OF TAPPING COSTS 
Tapping costs are computed in Appendices 
according to the terms and conditions of the MAPA Agreement (given 
in Appendix B.I3). The following assumptions regarding tapped 
stand, number of tappings, and task size are used for RRIM 6OO, 
PB 86, and pre-war seedling. 
1^6 
APPENDIX S.l^ +A ASSUMPTION USED FOR COMPUTING TAPPING 


















20 2c/2 d/3 133% 110 
! 
i 103 488 23.2 
21 109 103 484 23.2 
22 107 103 475 23.2 
23 105 103 466 23.2 
2^ 103 103 457 23.2 
25 I 99 104 : 448 23.2 
26 ! 98 104 440 23.2 
27 97 104 435 23.2 
28 96 104 430 23.2 
29 95 104 426 23.2 
30 2c/2 d/2 200% 94 156 422 34.9 
31 93 156 417 34.9 
32 92 156 ! ! 413 3^.9 
33 91 156 4o8 34.9 
3^ 90 156 404 34.9 
35 89 156 400 34.9 
36 88 156 395 34.9 
37 87 156 391 34.9 
38 86 156 386 34.9 
39 86 155 382 34.9 
ko 86 155 382 34.9 
ki 86 155 382 34.9 
42 86 155 382 34.9 
86 155 382 ! 34.9 
kk 86 155 382 i 34.9 
45 86 155 382 3'+. 9 
'+17 
APPENDIX S.l^B ASSUMPTION USED FOR COMPUTING TAPPING 


















1 S/2 d/2 100?^ 135 
i 
1 155 599 3^.9 
2 1 135 155 599 j 3^.9 
3 ; 135 155 599 3^.9 
k 135 155 599 34.9 
5 13^+. 155 595 34.9 
6 133 155 591 i 3^.9 
7 131 155 582 3'+. 9 
8 129 ! 155 573 3^.9 
9 127 155 56^ + 3^.9 ! 
10 i 125 155 555 3 4 . 9 
11 123 155 5 ^ 3^.9 
12 1 121 155 537 
13 
1 1 119 155 528 1 3^.9 
1^ + 117 155 519 3'+.9 
15 115 155 511 3^.9 
16 113 155 502 3^.9 
17 111 1 155 493 3^.9 
18 109 155 J+84 3^.9 
19 i 107 155 475 3^.9 
20 i 105 155 466 3 4 . 9 
21 S/2 d/3 133% 103 155 390 27.2 
22 101 103 : 382 27.2 
23 99 103 ! 374 i 27.2 
2k 97 103 367 27.2 
25 95 103 359 27.2 
26 93 103 352 27.2 
27 91 103 27.2 
28 89 103 337 27.2 
29 89 103 337 27.2 
30 89 103 
! 
337 27.2 
APPKNDIX 8.15^ ESTATE: TAPPINO AND COLLECTION COSTS fOR PHE-WAH SEEDLINOS AT 40 CENTS PER POOTD 
Basic Raoio 
1 [ ! Labour Tota l 
Han Days Cove rage C 0 Tfl rage Late i 1 Bene f i t Tapping and 
of Per Aore Per Man Day Per Aore Incen t i v e 
Lower 
Sub Tota l 
E .P .P . at 
DR K C o l l e c t i o n 
Tr«eB DR W DH W rr I f 
Grade 5 Per Cent 
T CotB 
T ^/TUBk T (K - 60(f) 
20 23,2 215 $49,88 550,40 S12.47 U12.75 !S5,63 J13.92 $132,30 
21 23.2 215 49.88 47.88 11.92 109.68 5.48 13.92 129,00 
22 23.2 215 49,83 45.48 11.60 106.96 5,34 13.92 126,22 
23 23.2 215 49,88 43.21 11.19 104.28 5,21 13.92 123.41 
24 23.2 215 49.80 41.04 10.80 101,72 5,00 13.92 120,72 
25 23.2 215 49.88 39,01 10.44 99.33 4.96 13.92 118,21 
26 23.2 215 49.08 37.03 10,09 97.00 4.85 13 .92 115.79 
27 23.2 215 49.08 35.10 9,76 94.82 4.74 13 .92 113,48 
28 23.2 215 49,88 33.41 9.44 92.73 4,63 13 .92 111,28 
29 23.2 215 49.88 31.74 9.14 90.76 4,53 13 .92 109,21 
30 34.9 215 75,03 30.15 0.86 114.04 5.70 20.94 140,68 
31 34.9 215 75.03 29.25 8.70 112.90 5.64 20.94 139,56 
32 34.9 215 75.03 20.37 0.54 111,94 5,59 20,94 138,47 
33 34.9 215 75.00 27.80 b.44 111.27 5.56 20.94 137,77 
34 34.9 215 75.03 27,25 0,34 1 10 .62 5.53 20.94 137.09 
35 34.9 215 75.03 26,70 8,24 109.97 5.49 20 .94 136.40 
36 34.9 215 75.03 26.17 8.15 109.35 5.46 20.94 135.75 
37 34.9 215 75.03 25.65 8,05 108.73 5.43 20.94 1 3 5 . 1 0 
38 34.9 215 75.03 25,13 7.96 108.12 5.40 20.94 134.46 
39 34.9 215 75.03 24.64 7.87 107.54 5,37 20 .94 133,85 
40 34.9 215 75,03 24.15 7.78 106.96 5,34 20,94 133.24 
41 34.9 215 75.03 23,42 7.66 106.11 5,30 20 ,94 1 3 2 . 35 
42 34.9 215 75.03 22.72 7.53 105.28 5,26 20,94 131,48 
43 34.9 215 75.03 22.04 7.41 104.48 5,22 20.94 130.64 
44 34.9 215 75.03 21.37 7.29 103,69 5.18 20.94 129.81 
45 34.9 215 75.03 20.73 7.18 102.94 5.14 20 .94 129.02 
' t i s 

























E . P . F , at 
5 Por Cent 
Labour 
Benef i t 
DR K 
T 
(K . ion!) 
Total 
Tapping and 
Col loot lon 
Cost 
20 23.2 170 839,44 179.20 S15.47 1 S 1 3 4 . l i 56.70 SI3.92 5154.73 
21 23.2 170 39.44 75.24 14.77 129.45 6.47 13.92 149.84 
22 23,2 170 39.44 71,47 14.31 125,22 6.26 13.92 145.40 
23 23.2 170 39.44 67,90 13.76 121 .10 6.05 13.92 141.07 
21 23.2 170 39.44 64.50 13.25 1 1 7 . 1 9 5.85 13.92 136.96 
25 23.2 170 39,44 61,31 13.22 113.97 5.69 13.92 133.58 
26 23.2 170 39.44 50.20 12,29 109.93 5.49 13.92 129.34 
27 23.2 170 39,44 55.28 11 ,85 106.57 5.32 13.92 125.81 
28 23.2 170 39.44 52,51 11 .43 103.38 5.16 13.92 122.46 
29 23.2 170 39.44 49,08 11.03 100.35 5.01 13.92 119.28 
30 34.9 170 59.33 47.38 10.65 117.36 5.06 20.94 144.16 
31 34.9 170 59,33 95.96 10,44 115.73 5,78 20.94 142.45 
32 34.9 170 59,33 44.58 10,23 114.14 5.70 20.94 140.78 
33 34.9 170 59.33 43,69 10,09 1 1 3 . 1 1 5.65 20.94 139,70 
3< 34,9 170 59.33 42.82 9,96 1 1 2 . 1 1 5.60 20.94 138.65 
35 34.9 170 59.33 41,96 9.83 1 1 1 . 1 2 5.55 20.94 137.61 
% 34.9 170 59,33 41,12 9.71 110.16 5.50 20.94 136.60 
37 34.9 170 59,33 40,31 9,58 109.22 5.46 20.94 135.62 
30 34.9 170 59.33 39.50 9,46 108,29 5.41 20.94 134.64 
39 34.9 170 59.33 38.72 9,34 107.39 5.36 20.94 133.69 
40 34.9 170 59.33 37.95 9,22 106,50 5.32 20.94 132.76 
41 34.9 170 59.33 36.80 9,05 105.18 5.25 20.94 131,37 
42 34.9 170 59.33 35.70 8.89 103.92 5.19 20,94 130.05 
43 34,9 170 59.33 34.63 8.72 102.68 5.13 20.94 128.75 
44 34.9 170 59.33 33.59 8.57 101.49 5.07 20.94 127.50 
45 34.9 170 59,33 32.50 8.41 100.32 20,94 126,57 
<+20 
















U U i 
Ino«ntlv« 
Yf I f 
Lower 
Orade 
Sub Total E.P.F. at 










20 23.2 145 $33.64 $108,00 821.47 $163.11 J8.15 $13.92 $185.18 
21 23.2 145 33.64 102.60 20.47 156.71 7,83 13.92 178.46 
22 23.2 145 33.64 97,47 19.72 150.82 7,54 13,92 172.29 
23 23.2 145 33.64 92,59 18.90 145.13 7,25 13.92 166.30 
24 23.2 145 33.64 87.96 18.13 139,73 6,90 13,92 160.63 
25 23,2 145 33,64 83.61 17.40 134,65 6,73 13,92 155.30 
26 23.2 145 33.64 79.36 16.70 129,70 6,48 13.92 150.10 
27 23.2 145 33.64 75.39 16.04 125,07 6,25 13.92 145.24 
28 23.2 145 33.64 71.61 15.41 120.66 6.03 13,92 140.61 
29 23.2 145 33.64 68.02 14.81 116.47 5,82 13.92 136.21 
30 34.9 145 50.60 64.62 14,24 129.46 6,47 20.94 156,87 
31 34.9 145 50.60 62.68 13.92 127.20 6.36 20.94 154.50 
32 34.9 145 50.60 60.79 13.60 124.99 6,24 20.94 152.17 
33 34.9 145 50.60 59.50 13.40 123.58 6,17 20.94 150.69 
31 34.9 145 50.60 58.39 13,20 122.19 6.10 20.94 149.23 
35 34.9 145 50.60 57,22 13.01 120.83 6,04 20.94 147.81 
36 3^.9 145 50.60 56,08 12.82 119.50 5.97 20,94 146.41 
37 34.9 145 50.60 54.97 12.63 118.20 5.91 20,94 145.05 
38 34.9 145 50.60 53.86 12.45 116.91 5,84 20.94 143.69 
39 34.9 145 50.60 42.80 12.27 115.67 5,78 20.94 142.39 
40 34.9 145 50.60 51.75 12.09 114.44 5.72 20.94 141.10 
41 34.9 145 50.60 50.19 11.84 112.63 5.63 20.94 139.20 
42 34.9 145 50.60 40,69 11.59 110.88 5.54 20.94 137.36 
43 34.9 145 50.60 47.23 11.34 109.17 5.45 20.94 135.56 
44 34.9 145 50.60 45.81 1 1 . 1 1 107.52 5.37 20.94 133.83 
<5 34.9 145 50.60 44.43 10.80 105.91 5.29 20.94 132.14 
kzi 
appendix 8.15D ESTATE; TAPPING AND COLLECTION COSTS FOR PB 86 AT 40 CEKTS PER POUND 
of 
T r t e e 
1 
Man Days 
P e r Acre 
DR 
T 
B a o l o 
C o v o r a g e 
P e r Man Day 
U 
n a a l o 
C o v e r a g e 
P e r Aor« 
DR W 
T 
L a t e x 
I n o s n t i v e 
Yf I f 
i 
Lower 
Orade Sub T o t a l 
1 
E . P . f . a t 
5 Pe r Cont 
Ljibour 
B o n o f i t 
DR K 
(K . 60(f) 
T o t a l 
T a p p i n g and 
C o l l e c t i o n 
Coa t 
1 3 4 . 9 215 S 7 5 . 0 3 J 1 3 . 2 2 !t 7 . 5 6 8 9 5 , 0 1 SU,79 8 2 0 . 9 4 $ 1 2 1 . 5 4 
2 3 4 , 9 215 7 5 . 0 3 21.00 9 . 0 7 105,90 5 , 2 9 2 0 , 9 4 1 3 2 . 1 3 
3 3 4 . 9 215 7 5 . 0 3 3 3 . 3 2 1 1 . 1 1 119.46 5 . 9 7 2 0 . 9 4 1 4 6 . 3 7 
4 3 4 , 9 215 7 5 . 0 3 4 3 . 3 1 1 2 . 8 7 1 3 1 . 2 1 6.56 2 0 . 9 4 1 5 0 . 7 1 
5 3 4 . 9 2 1 5 7 5 . 0 3 51.47 1 4 . 3 1 1 4 0 . 8 1 7 , 0 4 20.94 168.79 
(, 3 4 . 9 215 7 5 . 0 3 52 ,14 1 4 , 4 3 1 4 1 , 6 0 7 . 0 8 2 0 . 9 4 169.62 
7 3 4 . 9 2 1 5 , 7 5 . 0 3 5 3 . 5 5 1 4 . 6 8 1 4 3 . 2 6 7 , 1 6 2 0 . 9 4 1 7 1 . 3 6 
a 3 4 . 9 215 7 5 , 0 3 5 6 . 9 5 1 5 . 2 8 1 4 7 . 2 6 7.36 20.94 1 7 5 . 5 6 
9 3 4 . 9 215 7 5 , 0 3 5 8 . 2 2 1 5 . 5 0 1 4 8 . 7 5 7 . 4 3 2 0 . 9 4 1 7 7 . 1 2 
10 3 4 . 9 215 7 5 . 0 3 5 9 , 0 7 1 5 , 6 5 1 4 9 . 7 5 7 . 4 0 2 0 . 9 4 1 7 8 . 1 7 
u 3 4 . 9 215 7 5 . 0 3 5 0 . 6 5 1 5 . 5 8 149,26 7 . 4 6 2 0 , 9 4 1 7 7 . 6 6 
12 3 4 . 9 215 7 5 . 0 3 56.52 1 5 . 2 0 1 4 6 . 7 5 7 . 3 3 2 0 . 9 4 1 7 5 . 0 2 
13 3 4 . 9 215 7 5 . 0 3 56.10 1 5 . 1 3 1 4 6 . 2 6 7 , 3 1 2 0 . 9 4 1 7 4 . 5 1 
14 3 4 . 9 215 7 5 . 0 3 5 1 , 4 2 1 4 , 3 0 1 4 0 . 7 5 7.03 2 0 . 9 4 168.72 
15 3 4 , 9 215 7 5 , 0 3 51,00 1 4 . 2 3 1 4 0 , 2 6 7 . 0 1 20,94 168.21 
16 3 4 . 9 215 7 5 . 0 3 50 ,57 1 4 . 1 5 1 3 9 . 7 5 6.90 2 0 , 9 4 167.67 
17 3 4 , 9 215 7 5 . 0 3 5 7 . 8 0 15 . 4 3 1 4 8 . 2 6 7 , 4 1 2 0 . 9 4 176.61 
18 3 4 , 9 215 7 5 , 0 3 5 6 , 9 5 1 5 . 2 8 1 4 7 . 2 6 7,36 2 0 , 9 4 1 7 5 . 5 6 
19 3 4 . 9 215 7 5 . 0 3 5 5 . 2 5 1 4 . 9 8 1 4 5 . 2 6 7,26 2 0 . 9 4 1 7 3 . 4 6 
20 3 4 , 9 215 7 5 . 0 3 51.64 1 4 . 3 4 1 4 1 , 0 1 7.05 2 0 . 9 4 169.00 
21 2 7 . 2 215 5 8 . 4 0 6 8 . 0 4 2 1 . 0 8 1 4 7 , 6 0 7,30 16.32 1 7 1 . 3 0 
22 2 7 . 2 215 5 8 . 4 8 58,00 1 0 . 5 a 1 3 5 . 0 6 6 . 7 5 16.32 1 5 8 , 1 3 
23 2 7 . 2 215 5 8 , 4 8 5 7 , 6 0 1 8 . 4 7 1 3 4 , 5 5 6,72 1 6 . 3 2 1 5 7 . 5 9 
24 2 7 , 2 215 5 8 , 4 0 54,00 1 7 . 5 7 1 3 0 , 0 5 6,50 16.32 152.87 
25 27.2 215 5 8 . 4 0 50 ,40 16.67 1 2 5 , 5 5 6.27 16.32 1 4 8 , 1 4 
26 2 7 , 2 215 5 8 . 4 8 46,00 1 5 , 7 7 1 2 1 , 0 5 6.05 16.32 1 4 3 . 4 2 
27 2 7 . 2 215 5 0 . 4 8 43,20 1 4 . 0 7 1 1 6 , 5 5 5 , 0 2 16.32 1 3 0 . 6 9 
28 2 7 . 2 215 5 0 . 4 8 3 9 . 6 0 1 3 , 9 7 1 1 2 . 0 5 5 . 6 0 16.32 1 3 3 . 9 7 
29 2 7 . 2 215 5 0 . 4 8 35.60 1 3 . 9 7 1 1 2 . 0 5 5.60 16.32 1 3 3 . 9 7 
30 2 7 . 2 215 5 8 . 4 8 36.00 13,07 1 0 7 . 5 5 5 . 3 7 16.32 1 2 9 , 2 4 
























E . P . r . at 
5 Per Cent 
Labour 
B e n « f i t 
DR 
T 





1 3 4 . 9 146 t 5 0 . 9 0 J 2 3 . 7 9 S 8 . 3 3 8 8 3 . 0 2 W . I 5 $ 2 0 . 9 4 $ 1 0 8 . 0 1 
2 3 4 . 9 146 5 0 . 9 0 3 9 . 2 4 1 0 . 3 5 1 0 0 . 4 9 5 . 0 2 2 0 . 9 4 1 2 6 , 4 5 
3 3-1.9 146 5 0 . 9 0 5 9 . 9 7 1 3 , 0 7 1 2 3 . 9 4 6 . 1 9 2 0 . 9 4 1 5 1 . 0 7 
4 3 ^ . 9 146 5 0 . 9 0 ri.')^ 1 5 , 4 2 1 4 4 . 2 7 7 . 2 1 2 0 . 9 4 1 7 2 , 4 2 
3 4 . 9 146 5 0 . 9 0 9 2 . 6 4 1 7 . 9 4 1 6 1 . 4 8 8 . 0 7 2 0 , 9 4 1 9 0 . 4 9 
6 3 4 , 9 146 5 0 . 9 0 9 3 , 8 6 1 7 . 5 0 1 6 2 . 2 6 8 . 1 1 2 0 . 9 4 1 9 1 . 3 1 
7 3 4 , 9 1 4 6 5 0 . 9 0 9 6 . 3 9 1 8 . 4 6 1 6 5 . 7 5 8 . 2 8 2 0 . 9 4 1 9 4 , 9 7 
8 3 4 . 9 146 5 0 . 9 0 1 0 2 , 5 1 1 8 . 6 3 1 7 2 . 0 4 8 . 6 0 2 0 . 9 4 2 0 i . 5 8 
9 3 4 . 9 146 5 0 . 9 0 1 04 , no 1 8 , 9 3 1 7 4 . 6 3 8 . 7 3 2 0 . 9 4 2 0 4 . 3 0 
10 3 4 , 9 146 5 0 . 9 0 1 0 6 . 3 3 1 9 . 1 3 1 7 6 . 3 6 8 . 8 1 2 0 . 9 4 2 0 6 . 1 1 
11 3 4 . 9 146 5 0 , 9 0 1 0 5 . 5 7 1 9 . 0 3 1 7 5 . 5 0 0 . 7 7 2 0 . 9 4 2 0 5 . 2 1 
12 3 4 . 9 146 5 0 . 9 0 1 0 1 . 7 4 1 8 , 5 3 1 7 1 . 1 7 8 . 5 5 2 0 . 9 4 2 0 0 . 6 6 
13 3 4 . 9 146 5 0 . 9 0 1 0 0 . 9 8 1 8 . 4 3 1 7 0 . 3 1 8 , 5 1 2 0 , 9 4 1 9 9 . 7 6 
H 3 4 . 9 146 5 0 . 9 0 9 2 . 5 6 1 7 . 3 3 1 6 0 . 7 9 8 . 0 3 2 0 , 9 4 1 0 9 . 7 6 
15 3 < . 9 146 5 0 , 9 0 9 1 . 8 0 1 7 , 2 3 1 5 9 , 9 3 7 . 9 9 2 0 . 9 4 1 8 8 . 8 6 
16 3 1 . 9 146 5 0 , 9 0 9 1 . 0 3 1 7 . 1 3 1 5 9 . 0 6 7 . 9 5 2 0 . 9 4 1 8 7 . 9 5 
17 3 4 . 9 146 5 0 , 9 0 104 . 04 1 8 , 8 3 1 7 3 . 7 7 8 . 6 8 2 0 , 9 4 2 0 3 . 3 9 
18 3 4 . 9 146 5 0 . 9 0 1 0 2 . 5 1 I B . 6 3 1 7 2 , 0 4 0 , 6 0 2 0 . 9 4 2 0 1 . 5 8 
19 3 4 . 9 146 5 0 . 9 0 9 9 . 4 5 1 8 , 2 3 1 6 0 . 5 8 B . 4 2 20 , 9 4 1 9 7 . 9 4 
20 3 4 . 9 146 5 0 . 9 0 9 2 . 9 5 1 7 , 3 8 1 6 1 , 2 3 8 . 0 6 2 0 . 9 4 1 9 0 . 2 3 
21 2 7 . 2 146 3 9 . 7 0 1 2 2 , 4 7 2 6 . 7 5 1 8 8 . 9 2 9 . 4 4 1 6 . 3 2 2 1 4 . 6 8 
22 2 7 , 2 146 3 9 . 7 0 1 0 4 . 4 0 2 3 . 4 1 1 6 7 . 5 1 8 . 3 7 1 6 . 3 2 1 9 2 . 2 0 
23 2 7 . 2 146 3 9 , 7 0 1 0 3 , 6 a 2 3 . 2 7 1 6 6 . 6 5 8 , 3 3 1 6 . 3 2 1 9 0 . 3 0 
24 2 7 . 2 146 3 9 . 7 0 97-20 2 2 . 0 7 1 5 8 . 9 7 7 . 9 1 1 6 . 3 2 1 0 3 . 2 3 
25 2 7 . 2 146 3 9 . 7 0 9 0 . 7 2 2 0 . 8 7 1 5 1 . 2 9 7 . 5 6 1 6 . 3 2 1 7 5 . 1 7 
26 2 7 . 2 146 3 9 . 7 0 8 4 . 2 4 1 9 . 6 7 1 4 3 . 6 1 7 , 1 8 1 6 . 3 2 1 6 7 . 1 1 
27 2 7 . 2 146 3 9 , 7 0 7 7 . 7 6 1 8 . 4 7 1 3 5 . 9 3 6 . 7 9 1 6 . 3 2 1 5 9 . 0 4 
28 2 7 . 2 146 3 9 . 7 0 7 1 . 2 8 1 7 . 2 7 1 2 8 . 2 5 6 . 4 1 1 6 . 3 2 1 5 0 . 9 8 
29 2 7 , 2 146 3 9 . 7 0 7 1 . 2 8 1 7 . 2 7 1 2 8 . 2 5 6 , 4 1 1 6 . 3 2 1 5 0 . 9 8 
30 2 7 . 2 146 3 9 . 7 0 6 4 , 8 0 1 6 . 0 7 1 2 0 . 5 7 6 . 0 2 1 6 . 3 2 1 4 2 . 9 1 
'+23 
APPKNDIX 8 . 1 5 r KSTATE: TAPPING AMD COLLKCTIOII COSTS FOR PB 86 AT 80 CENTS PER POUND 
kg, 
of 















I j i t e * 
I n c e n t i v e 
Yf I f 
Lower 
Orade 
Sub T o t a l 
E , P , f ' , a t 
5 Per Cent 
Uibour 
D e n e f l t 
DR K 
T 
(K . 60/li) 
T o t a l 
Tapping and 
C o l l e c t i o n 
Coot 
1 3 * . 9 97 $ 3 3 , 8 5 J 34 ,37 $ 9 , 8 8 ? 7 8 , 1 0 s 3 . 9 0 ' ;20 .94 1.102.94 
2 3 4 . 9 97 3 3 , 8 5 5 6 , 6 9 1 2 . 9 2 1 0 3 , 4 6 5 , 1 7 2 0 , 9 4 1 2 9 . 5 7 
3 3 4 . 9 97 3 3 . 8 5 8 6 . 6 3 1 6 , 9 8 1 3 7 . 4 6 6 . 8 7 2 0 . 9 4 1 6 5 . 2 7 
4 3 4 . 9 97 3 3 . 8 5 1 1 2 , 6 0 2 0 , 5 0 1 6 6 . 9 5 8 . 3 4 2 0 , 9 4 1 9 6 . 2 3 
5 3 4 . 9 97 3 3 . 8 5 133 ,82 2 3 , 3 1 1 9 0 . 9 8 9 . 5 4 2 0 , 9 4 2 2 1 . 4 6 (, 3 4 . 9 97 3 3 . 8 5 1 3 5 . 5 7 2 3 . 6 3 1 9 3 . 0 5 9 . 6 5 2 0 . 9 4 2 2 3 . 6 4 
7 3 4 , 9 97 3 3 , 8 5 139,•'?3 2 4 , 1 2 1 9 7 . 2 0 9 , 0 ^ 2 0 , 9 4 2 2 8 . 0 0 
8 3 4 . 9 97 3 3 . 8 5 140 .07 2 5 . 3 2 2 0 7 . 2 4 1 0 . 3 6 2 0 , 9 4 2 3 8 . 5 4 
9 3 4 . 9 97 3 3 , 8 5 1 5 1 . 3 8 2 5 , 7 7 2 1 1 . 0 0 1 0 . 5 5 2 0 . 9 4 2 4 2 . 4 9 
10 3 4 . 9 97 3 3 , 8 5 1 5 3 . 5 9 2 6 . 0 7 213.'".1 1 0 . 6 7 2 0 . 9 4 2 4 5 . 1 2 
U 3 4 . 9 97 3 3 . 8 5 1 5 2 . 4 9 2 5 . 9 2 2 1 2 . 2 6 1 0 . 6 1 2 0 , 9 4 2 4 3 . 8 1 
12 3 4 . 9 97 3 3 . 8 5 1 4 6 , 9 6 2 5 . 1 7 2 0 5 . 9 8 1 0 . 2 9 2 0 , 9 4 2 3 7 , 2 1 
13 3 4 , 9 97 3 3 . 8 5 1 4 5 , 8 6 2 5 . 0 2 2 0 4 , 7 3 1 0 . 2 3 2 0 , 9 4 2 3 5 , 9 0 
14 3 4 . 9 97 3 3 . 8 5 1 3 3 , 6 4 2 3 . 3 7 1 9 0 . 8 6 9 , 5 4 2 0 . 9 4 2 2 1 . 3 4 
15 3 4 . 9 97 3 3 . 8 5 1 3 2 , 6 0 2 3 . 2 2 1 0 9 . 6 7 9 . 4 8 2 0 , 9 4 2 2 0 . 0 9 
16 3 4 . 9 97 3 3 . 8 5 1 3 1 . 4 9 2 3 . 0 7 1 8 8 . 4 1 9 . 4 2 2 0 , 9 4 2 1 8 . 7 7 
17 3 4 , 9 97 3 3 . 8 5 1 5 0 . 2 0 2 5 , 6 2 2 0 9 . 7 5 1 0 . 4 8 2 0 , 9 4 2 4 1 . 1 7 
18 3 4 , 9 97 3 3 . 8 5 148 ,07 2 5 . 3 2 2 0 7 . 2 4 1 0 . 3 6 2 0 . 9 4 2 3 8 . 5 4 
19 3 4 . 9 97 3 3 . 8 5 1 4 3 . 6 5 2 4 . 7 2 202 , 22 1 0 . 1 1 2 0 . 9 4 2 3 3 . 2 7 
20 3 4 , 9 97 3 3 . 8 5 1 3 4 , 2 6 2 3 , 4 4 1 9 1 , 5 5 9 . 5 7 2 0 , 9 4 2 2 2 . 0 6 
21 5'7.2 97 2 6 . 3 8 1 7 6 . 9 0 3 8 , 0 9 2 4 1 , 3 7 1 2 , 0 6 1 6 . 3 2 2 6 9 . 7 5 
22 2 7 , 2 97 2 f i .38 1 5 0 . 8 0 3 3 . 0 7 2 1 0 . 2 5 1 0 . 5 1 1 6 . 3 2 2 3 7 . 0 8 
23 2 7 . 2 97 2 6 , 3 8 1 4 9 i 7 6 3 2 . 8 7 2 0 9 , 0 1 1 0 , 4 5 1 6 . 3 2 2 3 5 . 7 8 
24 2 7 . 2 97 2 6 , 3 8 1 4 0 , 4 0 3 1 . 0 7 1 9 7 . 8 5 9 . 8 9 1 6 . 3 2 2 2 4 , 0 6 
25 2 7 . 2 97 2 6 . 3 8 1 3 1 , 0 4 2 9 . 2 7 1 8 6 , 6 9 9 . 3 3 16 .32 2 1 2 , 3 4 
26 2 7 . 2 97 2 6 . 3 8 1 2 1 . 6 8 2 7 , 4 7 1 7 5 . 5 3 8 .77 1 6 . 3 2 2 0 0 , 6 2 
27 2 7 . 2 97 2 6 , 3 8 112 ,32 2 5 . 6 7 1 6 4 , 3 7 8 . 2 1 1 6 . 3 2 1 8 8 . 9 0 
28 2 7 , 2 97 2 6 . 3 8 1 0 2 , 9 6 2 3 . 8 7 1 5 3 . 2 1 7 , 6 6 1 6 . 3 2 1 7 7 , 1 9 
29 2 7 , 2 97 2 6 , 3 8 1 0 2 , 9 6 2 3 . 8 7 1 5 3 . 2 1 7 , 6 6 1 6 . 3 2 1 7 7 . 1 9 
30 2 7 . 2 97 2 6 , 3 8 9 3 , 6 0 2 2 . 0 7 1 4 2 , 0 5 7 , 1 0 1 6 . 3 2 165 .47 
A P P C B D I I 8 , 1 5 0 e S T A T m Ml ILLUSTRATION Or T A P P H O OOST C I L O C U T I O K rOR OLOR! 
RniH 600 AT RBS 1 PRICE Of 40 CENTS PKR POTNO 
1 
i g . 
o f 
T r « « i 
K»n D«y» 1 
P»r A o r » 
PR 
T 
B a i l l o 
C 0 1 « rtt«« 
P t r Man Day 
V 
BKIIO 
C A v t r v ^ 
P»r A o r * 
DR W 
T 
U t « l 1 
I n c * n t l T » 1 
T f 1 / 
1 
L o w t r j 
Qni ( l» 1 
1 
] 
Sub T o t A l j 
1 
E . P . r . a t t 
5 P . r C . D t 1 
i 
! 
L e b c m r 
D e n t f i t 
n s r. 1 
T 
(n - 6 ( V ) 
T o t a l 
T i p p i n g M d 
C o l l « e t l o a 
C o s t 
1 3 4 . 9 2 1 5 r 7 5 . 0 3 
. . . . . ) 
1 
$ 1 1 . 6 4 ; $ 1 1 2 . 3 1 ' 
1 
$ 5 . 6 1 j S 2 0 . 9 4 n . 3 « . 8 6 
2 3 4 . 9 2 1 5 7 5 . 0 3 4 3 . 2 0 1 6 . 0 3 j 1 3 4 . 2 6 6 . 7 1 2 0 . 5 4 161.>51 
3 3 4 . 5 2 1 5 7 5 . 0 3 5 9 . 1 4 1 7 . 3 4 i 1 5 1 . 5 1 7 . 5 7 2 0 . 9 4 i a o . 0 2 
4 3 4 . 9 2 1 3 7 5 . 0 3 7 1 , 2 1 1 6 . 8 2 1 6 3 . O f . 8 . 1 5 J O . 9 4 1 9 2 . 1 5 
3 4 . 9 2 1 3 7 5 . 0 3 l a . t e i 9 . 1 6 2 0 . 9 4 J I J . M 1 
6 3 4 . 9 2 1 5 7 5 , 0 3 8 9 . W 1 9 , ' M 1 B 3 . 9 1 9 . 1 9 2 0 . 9 4 214 ,<M 
1 3 « . 9 2 1 5 7 5 . 0 3 9 4 . 4 3 1 9 . 3 5 1 9 . 4 6 2 0 . 9 4 2 1 9 . 6 5 
8 3 4 . 9 2 1 5 7 5 . 0 3 9 9 . Ob 1 8 . 0 5 j 1 9 3 . 7 6 9 . 6 8 2 0 . 9 4 2 2 4 . 3 8 
9 3 4 . 9 2 1 5 7 5 . 0 3 l l f . . l 5 1 0 . 1 3 i 2 0 9 , 3 1 1 0 . 4 6 2 0 . 9 4 2 4 0 . 7 1 
1 0 3 4 . 9 2 1 5 7 5 . 0 3 1 2 2 . 7 ^ 16.8',? 2 1 6 . 1 0 . 8 3 2 0 . 9 4 2 4 8 . 4 3 
H 3 4 . 9 2 1 5 7 5 . 0 3 9 9 . 3 6 1 6 . 2 7 190.6/) 9 . S 3 2 0 . 9 4 1 2 2 1 . 1 3 
1 2 3 4 . 9 2 1 5 7 5 . 0 3 9 7 . 5 6 1 6 . 0 7 1 0 0 , 6 6 9 . 4 3 2 0 . 9 4 2 1 9 . 0 3 
1 3 3 4 . 9 2 1 5 7 5 . 0 3 1 0 8 . 5 0 2 4 . 3 B 2 0 7 . 9 1 1 0 , 3 9 2 0 . 9 4 2 3 9 . 2 4 
n 3 4 . 9 2 1 5 7 5 . 0 3 1 2 7 . 6 0 2 7 . 7 5 2 3 0 . 3 9 1 1 . 5 1 2 0 . 9 4 ' 2 6 2 . 3 3 
1 5 3 4 . 9 2 1 5 7 5 . 0 3 i o n . 5 0 2 4 . 3 7 2 0 7 . 9 0 1 0 . 3 9 2 0 . 9 4 2 3 9 . 2 3 
1 6 3 4 . 9 2 1 5 7 5 . 0 3 S 7 . 1 3 2 0 . 6 0 1 8 2 . 7 6 9 . 1 3 2 0 . 9 4 2 1 2 . 8 3 
17 3 4 . 9 2 1 5 7 5 . 0 3 7 0 . 4 2 1 9 . 0 7 1 7 2 . 5 2 8 . 6 2 2 0 . 9 4 1 2 0 2 , 0 8 
1 8 3 4 . 9 2 1 5 7 5 . 0 3 7 3 . 1 3 1 7 . 6 0 1 6 5 . 7 6 8 . 2 8 2 0 . 9 4 t 1 9 4 . 9 8 
1 9 3 4 . 9 2 1 5 7 5 . 0 3 6 5 , 8 8 1 6 . 8 5 1 5 7 . 7 6 7 . 8 0 2 0 , 9 4 ! 1 8 6 . 5 8 
j 20 3 4 . 9 2 1 5 7 5 . 0 3 6 1 , 6 3 1 6 . 1 0 1 5 2 . 7 6 7 . 6 3 1 2 0 . 9 4 1 0 1 . 3 3 
2 1 2 7 . 2 2 1 5 5 s . 4 a 8 7 . 0 0 2 5 , 9 2 1 7 1 . 3 0 0 . 5 6 1 6 . 3 2 1 9 6 . 1 0 
22 2 7 , 1 2 1 5 5 0 . 4 8 7 8 . 3 ? . 1 . 6 5 1 6 0 . 4 0 0 . 0 2 1 6 . 3 2 : 8 4 . 7 9 
23 2 7 , 2 2 1 5 5 8 . 4 0 7 0 . 5 2 ; ' i . 7 o 1 5 0 . 7 0 7 . 5 3 1 1 6 . 3 2 1 7 4 . 5 5 
24 2 7 . 2 2 1 5 5 0 . 4 0 6 3 . 4 8 1 9 . 9 4 1 4 1 . 0 0 7 . 0 4 1 6 . 3 2 1 6 5 , 3 1 
25 2 7 . 2 2 1 5 5 0 . 4 0 5 7 . 2 0 1 8 . 3 7 1 3 4 . 0 5 6 . 7 0 1 6 . 3 2 1 5 7 . 0 7 
26 2 7 . 2 2 1 5 5 8 . 4 8 5 6 . 0 0 iS .O-/ 1 3 - ' . 55 6 . 6 2 1 1 6 . 3 2 1 5 5 . 4 9 
27 2 7 . 2 2 1 5 5 8 . 4 0 5 0 . 4 0 1 6 . 6 7 1 2 5 , 5 5 6 . 2 7 ! 1 6 . 3 2 
1 4 8 . 1 4 
28 2 7 . 2 2 1 5 5 ' . 4 8 4 5 . 3 5 1 5 . 4 1 1 1 9 . 2 4 5 , 9 6 1 6 . 3 2 1 4 1 . 5 2 
29 2 7 , 2 2 1 5 5 8 . 4 8 4 0 . 8 4 1 4 . 2 8 1 1 3 . 6 0 5 . 6 a 1 6 . 3 2 
1 3 5 . 6 0 
30 2 7 . 2 2 1 5 5 8 . 4 8 3 6 . 7 6 1 3 . 2 6 1 0 0 . 5 0 5 . 4 2 1 6 . 3 2 
1 3 0 . 2 4 
( J ) C o « p u t » i ! M o o r d l n g t o MAP* T o r e i m d iVi«u«p», i ( jnt g l T » n i n A p p e n d i x B . f l , 
'+25 

















U t > i 
Inoentiye 




E , ? . ? , at 
5 Per oert 
Labour 
Benef i t 
DR K 
T 
(K . 60/) 
Total 
Tapping and 
Col leot ion 
Coot 
1 34.9 146 850.90 $46.15 $13.72 8110.77 S5.53 S20.94 n37 .24 
2 34.9 146 50.90 77.76 19.63 148.29 7.41 20.94 176.64 
3 34.9 146 50.90 106.45 21,38 178.73 8.93 20,94 208.60 
4 34.9 146 50.90 128.18 20,68 199.76 9.98 20,94 230.68 
34.9 146 50.90 161.45 23,09 235.44 11,77 20.94 268.15 
6 34.9 146 50.90 160.45 24,58 235,93 11 .79 20.94 268.66 
1 34.9 146 50.90 170.06 24.06 245,02 12.25 20.94 278.21 
8 34.9 146 50.90 179,78 23.39 254.07 12,'70 20.94 287.71 
9 34.9 146 50.90 209.06 22.44 282.40 14,12 20.94 317.46 
10 34.9 146 50.90 220.97 23.42 295.29 14.76 20.94 330.99 
11 34.9 146 50.90 178,84 15,95 249,69 12.48 20.94 283,11 
12 34.9 146 50.90 175.60 19,68 246.18 12.30 20.94 279.42 
13 34.S 146 50.90 195.30 30.77 276,97 13.84 20,94 311.75 
14 34.9 146 50.90 229,73 35.26 315.89 15.79 20.94 352.62 
15 34.9 146 50.90 195.30 30.76 276.96 13,84 20,94 311.74 
16 34.9 146 50.90 156.82 25.73 233.45 11,67 20.94 266,06 
17 34.9 146 50.90 141.14 23.68 215.72 10.78 20,94 247.44 
18 34.9 146 50.90 131.62 21.73 204.25 10,21 20,94 235.40 
19 34,9 146 50.90 118.57 20.73 190.20 9,51 20.94 220.65 
20 34.9 146 50.90 110.92 19.73 181.55 9.07 20.94 211.56 
21 f.<J,i 146 39.70 156,60 33,07 229,37 11.46 16.32 257,15 
22 27.2 146 39.70 140.97 30.18 210.85 10.54 16.32 237.71 
23 27,2 146 39,70 126.93 27.58 194.21 9.71 16.32 
220.24 
24 27.2 146 39,70 114.26 25.23 179,19 8.95 16.32 204.46 
25 27.2 146 39,70 102,88 23.13 165,71 8.28 16.32 190.31 
26 27.2 146 39,7 100,80 22.74 163.24 8.16 16.32 187.72 
27 27.2 146 39,70 90.72 20.87 151,29 7,56 16.32 175.17 
28 27.2 146 39,70 81.63 19,19 140.52 7.02 16.32 163.86 
29 27.2 146 39.70 73,51 17,69 130,90 6,54 16,32 153.76 
30 27.2 146 39,70 66.16 16.33 122,19 6.10 16.32 
144.61 
1 ^ 2 6 
i P T O i D n 8 . 1 5 1 KSTATEt TAPPinO AND COLLECTION COSTS FOR RRIM 6 O O AT 8 0 CENTS PER P C M I D 
A R « 
of 





B a s i o 
C o v e r a g e 
Per Man Day 
W 
)</Ta«k 
B a s i c 




L a t e * 
I n c e n t i v e 
Yf I f 
Lower 
Grade 
1 — 1 
Sub T o t a l 
1 
E . P . r , a t 
5 Per Cent 
Labour 
B e n e f i t 
DR R 
T 
( R - 6 0 ( « ) 
T o t a l 
Tapping and 
C o l l e c t i o n 
Coot 
1 3 4 , 9 9 7 8 3 3 . 8 5 5 6 6 . 6 6 $ 1 8 . 0 5 8 1 1 8 , 5 6 T 5 . 9 2 $ 2 0 . 9 4 N 4 5 . 4 2 
2 3 4 . 9 9 7 3 3 . 8 5 1 1 2 . 3 2 2 6 . 8 3 1 7 3 . 0 0 8 , 6 5 2 0 . 9 4 2 0 2 . 5 9 
3 3 4 . 9 9 7 3 3 . 8 5 1 5 3 . 7 6 2 9 . 4 6 2 1 7 , 0 7 1 0 , 8 5 2 0 , 9 4 2 4 8 . 8 6 
4 3 4 . 9 9 7 3 3 . 8 5 1 8 5 . 1 5 2 8 . 4 1 2 4 7 . 4 1 1 2 , 3 7 2 0 , 9 4 2 8 0 . 7 2 
5 3 4 . 9 9 7 3 ' ) . 8 5 2 3 3 . 2 0 3 2 . 0 2 2 9 9 . 0 7 I < . 9 5 2 0 , 9 4 3 3 4 . 9 6 
6 3 4 , 9 9 7 3 3 . 8 5 2 3 1 . 7 6 3 4 . 2 6 2 9 9 . 0 7 1 4 . 9 9 2 0 . 9 4 3 3 5 . 8 0 
7 3 4 . 9 9 7 3 3 . 8 5 2 4 5 . 6 5 3 3 . 4 7 3 1 2 . 9 7 1 5 . 6 4 2 0 , 9 4 3 4 9 . 5 5 
8 3 4 . 9 9 7 3 3 . 8 5 2 5 9 , 6 9 3 2 . 1 7 3 2 6 . 0 1 1 6 , 3 0 2 0 . 9 4 3 6 3 . 2 5 
9 3 4 , 9 9 7 3 ; . 8 5 3 0 1 . 9 7 3 1 . 0 3 3 6 6 , 8 5 1 8 . 3 4 2 0 , 9 4 4 0 6 , 1 3 
1 0 3 4 . 9 9 7 3 3 . 8 5 3 1 9 . 1 8 3 2 . 5 1 3 8 5 . 5 4 1 9 . 2 7 2 0 . 9 4 T 2 5 . 7 5 
1 1 3 4 . 9 9 7 3 3 . 8 5 2 5 8 . 3 3 2 7 . 3 1 3 1 9 . 4 9 1 5 . 9 7 2 0 , 9 4 3 5 6 . 4 0 
1 2 3 4 , 9 9 7 3 3 . 8 5 2 5 3 . 6 6 2 6 . 9 1 3 1 4 , 4 2 1 5 . 7 2 2 0 . 9 4 3 5 1 . 0 8 
1 3 3 4 . 9 9 7 3 3 . 8 5 2 8 2 . 1 0 1 3 . 5 4 3 5 9 , 4 9 1 7 . 9 7 2 0 . 9 4 3 9 8 , 4 0 
1 4 3 4 . 9 9 7 3 3 . 8 5 3 3 1 . 0 4 5 0 . 2 8 5 1 4 , 9 7 2 0 . 7 9 2 0 , 9 4 4 5 7 . 7 0 
1 5 3 4 . 9 9 7 3 3 . 8 5 2 8 2 . 1 1 4 3 . 5 2 3 5 9 . 4 8 1 7 . 9 7 2 0 . 9 4 3 9 8 . 3 9 
1 6 3 4 . 9 9 7 3 3 . 8 5 2 2 6 . 5 2 3 5 . 9 8 2 9 6 . 3 5 1 4 , 8 1 2 0 . 9 4 3 3 2 . 1 0 
1 7 3 4 . 9 9 7 . 3 3 . 8 5 2 0 3 . 8 7 3 2 . 9 1 2 7 0 , 6 3 1 3 . 5 3 2 0 . 9 4 3 0 5 . 1 0 
Ifl 3 4 . 9 9 7 3 3 . 8 5 1 9 0 . 1 2 2 9 . 9 8 2 5 3 . 9 5 1 2 . 6 9 2 0 . 9 4 2 8 7 . 5 8 
1 9 3 4 , 9 9 7 3 3 , 8 5 1 7 1 . 2 7 2 8 . 4 8 2 3 3 . 6 0 1 1 , 6 8 2 0 . 9 4 2 6 6 . 2 2 
2 0 3 4 . 9 9 7 3 3 . 8 5 1 6 0 . 2 2 2 6 . 9 8 2 2 1 . 0 5 1 1 . 0 5 2 0 , 9 4 2 5 3 . 0 4 
2 1 2 7 . 2 9 7 2 6 . 3 8 2 2 6 . 2 0 4 7 . 5 7 3 0 0 , 1 5 1 5 . 0 0 1 6 , 3 2 3 3 1 . 4 7 
2 2 2 7 . 2 9 7 2 6 . 3 8 2 0 3 . 6 3 4 3 . 2 3 2 7 3 . 2 4 1 3 . 6 6 1 6 . 3 2 3 0 3 , 2 2 
2 3 2 7 . 2 9 7 2 6 . 3 8 1 8 3 . 3 5 3 9 . 3 3 2 5 1 . 0 6 1 2 . 5 5 1 6 . 3 2 2 7 9 . 9 3 
2 4 2 7 . 2 9 7 2 6 . 3 8 1 6 5 . 0 4 3 5 , 8 1 2 2 7 . 2 3 1 1 . 3 6 1 6 , 3 2 2 5 4 , 9 1 
2 5 2 7 . 2 9 7 2 6 . 3 8 1 4 8 . 6 1 3 2 . 6 6 2 0 7 . 6 5 1 0 . 3 8 1 6 . 3 2 2 3 4 , 3 5 
2 6 2 7 . 2 9 7 2 6 . 3 8 1 4 5 . 6 0 3 2 , 0 7 2 0 4 . 0 5 1 0 . 2 0 1 6 . 3 2 2 3 0 . 5 7 
2 7 2 7 . 2 9 7 2 6 . 3 8 1 3 1 . 0 4 2 9 . 2 7 1 8 6 . 6 9 9 . 3 3 1 6 . 3 2 2 1 2 . 3 4 
2 8 2 7 . 2 9 7 2 6 . 3 8 1 1 7 . 9 0 2 6 . 7 5 1 7 1 . 0 3 8 . 5 5 1 6 , 3 2 1 9 5 . 9 0 
2 9 2 7 . 2 9 7 2 6 . 3 8 1 0 6 . 1 8 2 4 , 4 9 1 5 7 . 0 5 7 . 8 5 1 6 . 3 2 1 8 1 . 2 2 
3 0 2 7 . 2 9 7 2 6 , 3 8 9 5 . 5 7 2 2 , 4 5 1 4 4 . 4 0 7 . 2 2 1 6 . 3 2 1 6 7 . 9 4 
i t 2 7 
APPENDIX 8 . 1 6 A ESTATE : f lXED COSTS FOIi MODERN CLONAL MATERIAL 
( S / A O R E ) 
Age 
f i e l d 
Pest and I n t e r n a l 
I 
t Panel Total 
of Management Manur ing Weeding Dlfioase Transport M i s o e l l a n e o u e S t i m u l a t i o n O p e n i n g and Fixed 
T r t e i 
Maintenance 
C o n t r o l T a p p i n g Cost 
1 5 5 3 7 . 8 0 1 4 . 4 0 7 . 0 0 7 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 1 4 9 . 2 0 
2 55 3 7 . 8 0 1 4 , 4 0 7 . 0 0 7 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 1 . 9 0 1 4 8 . 6 0 
3 5 5 3 7 . 8 0 1 4 . 4 0 7 . 0 0 7 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 1 . 9 0 1 4 8 . 6 0 
4 55 3 7 . 8 0 1 4 . 4 0 7 . 0 0 7 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 1 . 9 0 1 4 8 . 6 0 
5 55 3 7 . 5 2 • 1 4 , 4 0 7 . 0 0 7 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 1 . 9 0 1 4 8 . 3 2 
6 55 3 7 . 2 4 1 4 . 4 0 7 . 0 0 5 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 1 4 6 . 1 4 
7 5 5 3 6 . 6 8 1 4 , 4 0 7 . 0 0 5 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 1 . 9 0 1 4 3 , 4 8 
8 55 3 6 . 1 2 1 4 . 4 0 7 . 0 0 5 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 1 . 9 0 1 4 4 , 9 2 
9 55 3 5 . 5 6 1 4 . 4 0 7 . 0 0 5 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 1 . 9 0 1 4 5 . 3 6 
10 5 5 3 5 . 0 0 1 4 . 4 0 7 . 0 0 5 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 , 0 0 1 . 9 0 1 4 4 . 8 0 
11 5 5 3 4 . 4 4 1 4 , 4 0 7 . 0 0 3 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 1 2 , 9 2 2 . 0 0 1 5 4 . 2 6 
12 55 3 3 . 8 8 1 4 , 4 0 7 . 0 0 3 , 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 1 2 , 7 1 1 . 9 0 1 5 3 . 3 9 
13 55 3 3 . 3 2 1 4 . 4 0 7 , 0 0 3 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 1 2 , 4 9 1 . 9 0 1 5 0 . 7 1 
14 55 3 2 . 7 6 1 4 , 4 0 7 . 0 0 3 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 1 2 . 2 8 1 . 9 0 1 5 1 . 8 4 
15 55 3 2 . 2 0 1 4 , 4 0 7 . 0 0 3 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 1 2 . 0 8 1 . 9 0 1 5 1 . 0 8 
16 55 1 5 . 8 2 1 1 , 4 0 7 . 0 0 3 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 1 1 . 8 6 1 . 9 0 1 3 1 . 1 8 
17 55 1 5 . 5 " 1 1 . 4 0 7 . 0 0 2 , 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 , 0 0 1 1 . 6 6 1 . 9 0 1 3 0 . 0 0 
18 55 1 5 . 2 6 1 1 , 4 0 7 . 0 0 2 , 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 , 0 0 1 1 . 4 5 1 . 9 0 1 2 9 . 5 1 
19 55 1 4 . 9 8 1 1 . 4 0 7 . 0 0 2 , 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 , 0 0 1 1 . 2 4 1 . 9 0 1 2 9 . 0 2 
2 0 55 1 4 . 7 0 1 1 , 4 0 7 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 2 , 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 1 1 . 0 2 1 . 9 0 1 2 8 . 5 2 
21 5 5 1 4 , 4 2 1 1 , 4 0 5 . 0 0 2 , 0 0 2 . 5 0 ? 3 , 0 0 1 0 . 8 1 2 , 0 0 1 2 6 . 1 3 
22 55 1 4 , 1 4 1 1 , 4 0 5 . 0 0 2 , 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 1 0 . 6 0 1 . 9 0 1 2 5 , 5 4 
23 55 1 3 . 3 6 11 , 4 0 5 . 0 0 2 , 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 1 0 . 3 9 1 . 9 0 1 2 5 . 0 5 
24 55 1 3 . 5 8 1 1 . 4 0 5 . 0 0 2 , 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 3 0 . 1 8 
1 2 4 . 5 6 
25 55 1 3 . 3 0 1 1 , 4 0 5 . 0 0 2 , 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 9 . 9 8 1 . 9 0 
1 2 4 . 0 8 
26 55 1 3 . 0 2 1 1 , 4 0 5 . 0 0 2 , 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 , 0 0 9 . 7 7 2 , 0 0 1 2 3 . 6 9 
27 55 1 2 . 7 4 1 1 , 4 0 5 . 0 0 2 , 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 9 . 5 6 1 , 9 0 
1 2 3 . 1 0 
28 55 1 2 , 4 6 1 1 , 4 0 5 . 0 0 2 , 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 9 . 5 6 1 . 9 0 
1 2 2 . 8 2 
2 9 55 1 2 . 4 6 1 1 , 4 0 5 . 0 0 2 , 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 . 0 0 9 . 5 6 1 . 9 0 
1 2 2 , 8 2 
30 55 1 2 . 4 6 1 1 , 4 0 5 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 2 3 , 0 0 9 . 5 6 1 . 9 0 
1 2 2 . 8 2 






P» i t and 
D l i t a s t 
Control 
I n t e rna l 
Tranoport 





r i t ed 
Cost 
1 55 23.50 14,40 7.00 7.00 2.50 21.70 2.50 133.60 
2 55 23.50 14.40 7.00 7.00 2.50 21.70 1.90 133.00 
3 55 23.50 14.40 7.00 7.00 2.50 21.70 1.90 133.00 
55 23.50 14,40 7.00 7.00 2.50 21.70 1.90 133.00 
5 55 23.50 14.40 7.00 7.00 2.50 21.70 1.90 133.00 
6 55 23.50 14.40 7.00 5.00 2.50 21.70 1.90 131.00 
7 55 23.50 14.40 7.00 5.00 2.50 21.70 1.90 131.00 
8 55 23.50 14.40 7.00 5.00 2.50 21.70 1.90 131.00 
9 55 23.50 14.40 7.00 5.00 2.50 21.70 1.90 131.00 
10 55 23.50 14.40 7.00 5.00 2.50 21.70 1.90 131.00 
11 55 23.50 14.40 7.00 3.00 2.50 21.70 12.92 2,00 142.02 
12 55 23.50 14.40 7.00 3.00 2.50 21.70 12.71 1.90 141.71 
13 55 23.50 14.40 7.00 3.00 2.50 21.70 12.49 1.90 141.49 
14 55 23.50 14,40 7.00 3.00 2.50 21.70 12.28 1.90 141.28 
15 55 23.50 14.40 7.00 3.00 2.50 21.70 12,08 1.90 141.08 
16 55 14.75 11.40 7.00 3.00 2.50 21.70 11.86 1.90 129.11 
17 55 1^.75 11,40 7.00 2.00 2.50 21.70 11.6^ 1.90 127.91 
IB 55 14.75 11,40 7.00 2.00 2.50 21.70 11.45 1.90 127.70 
19 55 11.75 11,40 7.00 2.00 2.50 21.70 11.02 1.90 127.27 
20 55 14.75 11.40 7.00 ^ .00 2.50 21.70 10.81 1.90 127.06 
21 55 14.75 11,40 5.00 2.00 2.50 21.70 10.60 2,00 124.95 
22 55 14.75 11.40 5.00 2.00 2.50 21.70 10.39 1.90 124,65 
23 55 14.75 11.40 5.00 2.00 2.50 21.70 10,18 1.90 124.43 
24 55 14.75 11,40 5.00 2.00 2.50 21,70 9.97 1.90 124,22 
25 55 14.75 11,40 5.00 2.00 2.50 21.70 9.76 1.90 124.01 
26 55 U . 7 5 11,40 5.00 2.00 2.50 21.70 9.56 2,00 123.91 
27 55 14.75 11.40 5.00 2.00 2.50 21.70 9.56 1.90 123.81 
28 55 14.75 11.40 5.00 2.00 2.50 21.70 9.56 1.90 123.81 
29 55 14.75 11.40 5.00 2,00 2.50 21.70 9.56 1.90 123.81 
30 55 14.75 11.40 5.00 2.00 2.50 21.70 9.56 1.90 123.81 
'+29 
A P P E N D I X 8 . 1 7 A E S T A T E : T O T A L E X P O R T T A X P A Y M E N T F O R A N A C R E 
O F P R E - W A R S E E D L I N G A T V A R I O U S R S S 1 
P R I C E S 
A g e o f A t ' + 0 C e n t s ? A t 6 0 C e n t s A t 8 0 C e n t s 
T r e e s P e r P o u n d | P e r P o u n d P e r P o u n d 
2 0 S l l - 5 2 ; S I 7 . 2 3 $ 5 8 . 5 3 
2 1 1 0 . 9 ^ i 1 6 . 4 1 5 5 . 6 0 
2 2 1 0 . 3 9 1 1 5 . 5 9 5 2 . 8 2 
2 3 8 . 0 2 I 1 4 . 8 1 5 0 . 1 8 
2 i f 9 . 3 8 1 1 4 . 0 7 4 7 . 6 2 
2 5 8 . 9 1 1 1 3 . 3 7 4 5 . 3 1 
2 6 1 ! 8 . 4 6 1 2 . 6 9 4 3 . 0 1 
2 7 8 . 0 4 1 2 . 0 6 4 0 . 8 7 
2 8 7 . 6 3 • 1 1 . 4 5 3 8 . 8 1 
2 9 7 . 2 5 1 0 . 8 8 3 6 . 8 6 
3 0 6 . 8 9 1 0 . 3 3 3 5 . 0 2 
3 1 6 . 6 8 1 0 . 0 2 3 3 . 9 7 
3 2 6 . 4 8 9 . 7 2 3 2 . 9 5 
3 3 6 . 3 5 9 . 5 3 3 2 . 2 9 
3 ^ 7 . 7 8 9 . 3 ^ 3 1 . 6 5 
3 5 7 . 6 3 i i 9 . 1 5 3 1 . 0 1 
3 6 7 . 4 7 1 8 . 9 7 3 0 . 3 9 
3 7 7 . 3 2 1 8 . 7 9 2 9 . 7 9 
3 8 7 . 1 8 1 8 . 6 1 2 9 . 1 9 
3 9 7 . 0 4 1 8 . 4 4 2 8 . 6 1 
^ 6 . 8 9 8 . 2 8 2 8 . 0 4 
i + 1 6 . 6 9 8 . 0 3 2 7 . 2 0 
k2 6 . 4 9 7 - 7 9 2 6 . 3 8 
6 . 2 9 1 7 . 5 5 2 5 . 6 0 
kk 6 . 1 0 7 . 3 2 2 4 . 8 2 
^ + 5 1 5 . 9 2 f { 
7 . 1 0 2 4 . 0 8 
3^0 
APPENDIX. 8ol7B E S T A T E : T O T A L E X P O R T T A X PAYMENT F O R AN A C R E 
O F P B 8 6 A T V A R I O U S R S S 1 P R I C E S 
A g e o f A t k ) C e n t s ' 1 A t 6 0 C e n t s A t 8 0 C e n t s 
T r e e s P e r P o ' o n d j i P e r P o u n d j P e r P o u n d 
i 
1 S 6 . 8 7 S 8 . 9 8 
i 
$ 2 4 . 1 3 
2 1 1 . 3 3 1 1 4 . 8 2 3 9 . 8 1 
3 1 7 . 3 2 2 2 . 6 5 6 0 . 8 3 
2 2 . 5 1 i 1 2 9 . 4 4 7 9 . 0 8 
5 2 6 . 7 6 3 ^ . 9 9 9 3 . 9 8 
6 2 7 . 1 0 2 5 . 4 4 9 5 . 2 0 
7 2 7 . 8 8 3 6 . 4 1 9 7 . 7 8 
8 2 9 . 6 1 ; 1 3 8 . 7 2 1 0 3 . 9 9 
9 3 0 . 2 7 i ' 3 9 . 5 8 1 0 6 . 3 1 
1 0 1 i 3 0 . 7 1 4 0 . 1 6 1 0 7 . 8 6 
1 1 i i 3 0 . ^ 9 1 3 9 . 8 8 1 0 7 . 0 9 
1 2 2 9 . 3 8 ! 3 8 . 4 3 1 0 3 . 2 0 
1 3 2 9 . 1 7 3 8 . 1 4 1 0 2 . 4 3 
2 6 . 7 3 1 3 ^ . 9 6 9 3 . 8 9 
1 5 2 6 . 5 3 1 ' 3 4 . 6 8 9 3 . 2 0 
1 6 2 6 . 2 9 ^ 3 ^ . 3 8 9 2 . 6 4 
1 7 3 0 . 0 5 1 : 3 9 . 3 0 103.3k 
1 8 i 2 9 . 6 1 ; 3 8 . 7 2 1 0 3 . 9 9 
1 9 • 1 2 8 . 7 3 3 7 . 5 7 1 0 0 . 8 8 
2 0 2 6 . 8 4 3 5 . 1 0 9 4 . 2 8 
2 1 3 5 . 3 7 4 6 . 2 5 1 2 4 . 2 3 
2 2 3 0 . 1 6 3 9 . 4 4 1 0 5 . 9 0 
2 3 2 9 . 8 5 3 9 . 1 6 1 0 5 . 1 7 
2k 1 2 8 . 0 8 3 6 . 7 2 9 8 . 6 0 
2 5 2 6 . 2 0 3 ' + . 2 7 9 2 . 0 3 
2 6 2 4 . 3 3 3 1 . 8 2 8 5 . ^ 5 
2 7 2 2 . 4 6 2 9 . 3 7 7 8 . 8 8 
2 8 ! 2 0 . 5 9 i 2 6 . 9 2 7 2 . 3 0 
2 9 1 2 0 . 5 9 ! 2 6 . 9 2 7 2 . 3 0 
3 0 
i 
1 1 9 . 4 4 1 2 5 . 2 0 
1 
6 6 . 4 5 
APPiJNDIX 8.17c ESTATE: TOTAL EXPORT TAX PAYMENT FOR AN ACRE 
OF RRIM 6 0 0 AT VARIOUS RSS 1 PRICES 
Age of At kO Cents At 6 0 Cents At 8 0 Cents 
Trees Per Pound Per Pound Per Pound 
1 SI3.32 SI7.42 s ^ . 8 1 
2 22.46 29.37 78.88 
3 30.74 40.20 1 107.98 
k 37.02 48.24 1 130.02 
3 46.64 60.99 163.78 
6 46.35 60.61 162.77 
7 49.12 64.24 172.51 
8 51.93 67.91 182.37 
9 60.38 78.96 212.07 
10 63.83 83.47 224.15 
11 51.66 67.56 181.42 
12 50.83 66.33 178.14 
13 56.42 73.78 198.12 
66.36 86.76 233.04 
15 66.42 73.78 198.12 
16 45.30 59.24 141.66 
17 40.77 53.31 143.18 
18 38.02 49.72 133.52 
19 34.25 44.79 120.28 
20 32.04 41.90 112.52 
21 45.24 59.16 158.86 
22 40.72 53.25 143.00 
23 36.66 47.94 128.76 
Zk 33.00 43.16 115.90 
25 29.72 38.86 104.37 
26 29.12 38.08 102.25 
27 26.20 34.27 92.03 
28 23.58 30.83 82.85 
29 21.22 27.76 74.56 
30 19.11 24.99 67.12 
'02 
APPENDIX 8 . 1 a ESTATE: ?IET HETCNaE^^' PER ACW: OF RRIM 6OO, PB 86 AND PRE-WAR SEEDI.INOS AT VARIOUS RSS 1 PRICES 
A g . RRIM 600 » PB 86 0 
1 
Age P r e - W a r S e e d l i n g s 9 
o f o f 
T r a s s 4 0 ^ / L b . (>Oi/lh. 80/i/Lb. 40/i/Lb. GOti/lb. oai/ih. T r e e s 40/f/Lb, 60(i/Lb. mi/hh. 
7 - i 7 8 . > 5 4 . 9 H 3 . 8 - 1 8 7 . 1 - 97.8 202.2 20 54.4 1 7 0 . 1 2 6 1 . 8 
a 4 1 , 8 2 1 6 . 2 336.8 - 1 0 9 . 9 - 1 2 , 2 333.5 21 23.7 152.7 240.0 
9 142,2 3 6 6 , 8 522.3 - 33.8 102.2 5 0 9 . 6 20 1 2 . 3 135.4 218.6 
1 0 2 1 3 , 3 473.1 651.4 3 2 . 3 201.2 6 6 2 .3 23 3,4 1 1 8 , 9 198.4 
1 1 321.0 6 4 9 . 5 867.4 • 06 .4 281,8 7 0 7 . 1 24 - 8.8 1 0 3 . 3 1 7 6 . 7 
12 333.5 652.3 870.8 93.0 291.4 797.5 25 - 16.3 9 0 . 3 163.2 
1 3 3 6 4 . 5 699.3 927.9 1 0 3 . 0 305.3 8.^8.9 26 - 25.7 63.2 143.1 
3 9 6 . 5 7 4 6 . 0 984.8 126,0 340.3 070.9 27 - 34.4 63.2 129.3 
15 4 9 1 . 7 888.8 1159.4 133.9 3 4 9 . 4 890.4 28 - 42.8 5 0 .5 1 1 3 . 4 
16 535.0 952.8 1237.8 140.2 3 6 1 . 5 903.4 29 - 50.8 38 . 4 98 . 4 
17 375.5 7 1 9 . 0 952.9 1 3 7 . 8 •i'il.l 8 9 6 . 9 * 30 - 1 0 2 . 7 - 1 1 . 8 48.5 
l a 364.9 702,6 932.6 1 1 4 . 7 3 2 7 . 3 864.5 31 - 1 0 6 . 7 - 1 8 . 1 40.8 
1 9 460.6 846,1 1 1 1 0 . 3 1 1 4 , 6 3 2 6 . 1 858.0 32 - 1 1 0 . 7 - 24.2 33.0 
20 574.5 1034,3 1342.3 82.6 278.5 786 .4 33 - 1 1 3 . 2 - 28.0 2 7 . 5 
2 1 4 6 0 .3 845.7 1109.9 80.5 2 7 5 . 1 779.9 34 - 1 1 7 . 2 - 3 1 . 9 2 3 . 6 
22 338.8 653.2 886,3 97.4 2 9 0 . 5 773.2 35 - 1 4 7 . 7 + 76.6 3 0 . 8 
23 282.7 578.7 764.1 146.5 3 6 3 . 7 884,0 36 - 1 0 9 . 0 7 3 . 6 2 7 . 1 
24 246.6 513.6 696.7 1 4 1 . 3 •ibb.l 870.9 37 - 1 1 1 . 2 - 3 0 . 0 22.7 
25 200.8 444 .8 612.3 1 3 0 , 7 339.3 844.9 38 - 1 1 3 . 2 - 33.2 18.5 
26 1 7 3 . 3 403.1 560.9 1 0 7 . 4 3 0 4 . 0 789.9 39 - 1 1 5 . 3 - 3 6 . 6 14,4 
27 386.2 707,2 927.9 2 5 7 . 5 5 1 2 . 0 1083.6 40 - 1 1 5 . 4 - 38.2 1 2 . 1 
28 328.4 618.4 818.5 169.4 409.2 9 2 3 .7 41 - 1 1 8 . 7 - 4 3 . 0 5 . 9 
29 275.6 538.6 7 1 8 . 2 187.2 4 0 6 , 7 9 1 7 . 4 42 - 1 2 1 . 6 - 4 7 . 8 - 0 . 1 
30 2 2 7 . 8 4 6 6 . 7 6 3 1 . 5 1 6 3 . 0 369.3 8 6 0 . 0 43 - 1 2 4 . 5 - 5 2 . 6 - 6.3 
31 185.0 6 0 2 . 1 5 5 1 . 9 138.8 3 3 2 . 4 802.7 44 -127.-1 - 57.0 - 1 1 . 5 
32 1 7 7 . 5 390.5 537.6 1 1 4 . 7 2 9 5 . 8 745.3 45 - 1 3 0 . 3 - 6 1 . 6 - 1 7 . 2 
33 139.8 332.9 4 6 7 , 2 9 0 . 5 2 5 9 . 3 688,0 
34 105.6 281.8 ^03.5 66.2 222.6 630.7 
35 7 4 . 7 235.3 3 4 6 .4 66.2 222.6 630,7 
36 46.8 1 9 3 . 3 294.7 40.8 184.8 572.6 
( 1 ) R»Tenu« - O r o » » R«Tenu« - T o t a l P r o d u o t i o n C o o t - E x p o r t T R i « e ( R e s « a r « h CeB« p l u a S o h o d u l o I E x p o r t T a x ) , 
APPENDU 8.19A SMALLHOLDIKG: TOTAL COST 
(1) (2) (3) 
CROSS RETURHS A.KD HZT RITURNS FOR PRS-WAR SEEDLIKGS 





Fe r t i l i z e r 
Tapping i 
Co l l ec t i ng 
Equipoent 










At 40 Cents Per Pound At 60 Cents Per Pound At 80 Cents Per Pound 
Gross 











20 12.20 1.5 6 3 8.8 36 67.5 256.1 188,6 413.8 346.3 547.6 480,1 
21 12.20 4 6 3 8.8 34,2 68.2 243.4 175,2 393.1 324.9 520.2 452.0 
22 12.2 1.5 6 3 8.8 32.5 64.0 2 3 1 . 1 167,1 373.5 3 0 9 . 5 434.2 430.2 
23 12,20 1.5 6 3 8.8 30,8 62.3 2 1 9 . 6 157.3 354.7 292.4 469.4 407.1 
24 12,20 1.5 6 3 8.8 29.3 60.8 208.g 147,8 33-7.1 276,3 445.9 385.1 
25 12.20 1.5 6 3 8.8 27.9 59.3 198.2 1 3 7 . 7 3 2 0 . 4 261,1 423.9 364,6 
12.20 4 3 8.3 26.5 60.5 1 8 8 . 2 1 2 7 . 7 304.1 243.6 402.4 341.9 
27 12.20 1.5 6 3 8.8 25.13 56,6 178.8 122.2 2S8.9 232,3 382.3 3 2 5 . 7 
28 12.20 1.5 (, 3 8.8 23.9 55.4 169.9 114.5 274.4 219,0 363.0 3 0 7 . 6 
29 12.20 1,5 (, 3 8.8 22.7 54.2 161.4 107.2 260.6 206.-! 344.9 2 9 0 . 7 
30 12.20 1,5 6 3 8.8 21.5 53.0 153.3 IOC .3 247.6 194.6 327.6 2 7 4 . 6 
31 12.20 1.5 6 3 8,8 20.9 52.4 148.7 9 6 . 3 240.2 187.8 317.9 2 6 3 . 5 
32 12.20 1.5 6 3 8,8 20,3 51.8 144.2 92.4 2 3 2 , 9 181.1 308.3 2 5 6 . 5 
33 12.20 1.5 6 3 3.8 19.9 51.4 141.3 a-;.9 228.3 176.9 3 0 2 . 1 2 5 0 . 7 
34 12.20 1.5 6 3 8.8 19.5 51.0 138.5 37.5 223.7 127.7 2 9 6 . 0 245.0 
35 12,20 1,5 6 3 8.8 19.1 5 0 ^ 135.7 85.1 219.3 1 6 8 . 7 2 9 0 . 1 239.5 
36 12.20 1.5 6 3 8,8 18,7 50.2 133.0 82.8 214.9 164.7 284.4 2 3 4 , 2 
37 12.20 1.5 6 3 8,8 18.3 49.8 130.4 80.6 210.7 1 6 0 . 9 278.7 228.9 
38 12.20 1.5 6 . 3 8.8 18.0 49.5 127.7 76.2 207.0 157.5 273.4 223.9 
39 12.20 1.5 6 3 8 . 8 17.6 49.1 125.2 76,1 202.3 153.2 267,7 218.6 
40 12,20 1.5 6 3 8.8 17.3 48.8 122.7 73.9 198.2 149.4 2 6 2 , 4 213.6 
41 12.20 1.5 6 3 8.8 16.7 48.2 119.0 7 0 . 8 192.3 144.1 254.5 206.3 
42 12.20 1.5 6 3 8.8 16.2 47.7 115.5 6 7 . 8 186,6 138.9 246.9 199.2 
43 12,20 1.5 6 3 8.8 15.7 47.2 112,0 64.8 181.0 133.8 239.4 192.2 
44 12,20 1.5 6 3 8.8 15.3 46.8 108,6 6 1 . 8 175.6 128,8 232.3 185.5 
45 12,20 1.5 6 3 8 . 8 14.8 •6 ,3 105.4 59.1 170.2 1 2 3 . 9 225,3 179.0 
(1) Total m t e r i a l and hired coats . These d i f f e r f roo one estate case In that the labour oomponeat provided by f a a i l y labour is o a i t t e d . 
A miBber of i t e t s , v ie . Baaageaeiit, not app l i cab le to the saa l l ho l d i ag l i t u a t i o a have a lso been l e f t oa t . 
(2) Gross Returns - ( l a t e s outpat x RSS 3 price) + (acrap output i price of i o rap ) . 
(3) Gross Returns Minus t o t a l cos ts . 
(4) Cost of ha l f pound of coapound f e r t i l i s e r per tree froo year 20 to 45 ia assuned. 
(5) One round of chenioal spraying at $4.00 and $2,00 worth of pes t i c ides . 
(6) Tvo rounds of s t i nu lan ts at an arera^e of 3 cents per t ree . 
(7) Assume cost of cheaical is 5 cents per pcuod. 
-fc. 
OJ 
A P P E N O n 8 . 19B SMALLHOLDING: TOTAL COSTS, GROSS RETDRIIS MID NJT RETURNS FOR PB 86 AT 
































( 1 ) 
s rt i l l zer 
Tapping t 
C o l l e c t i n g 
Equipment 
Pesticide 
and , , 























2 4 . 2 0 10 10 8 . 8 13 . 2 6 6 . 2 8 9 . 8 2 3 . 4 1 4 5 . 7 7 9 . 3 1 9 2 . 7 1 2 6 , 3 
2 4 . 2 0 1 . 5 10 8 . 8 2 1 . 8 6 6 . 3 1 4 8 . 2 8 1 . 9 2 4 0 . 2 1 7 3 . 9 3 1 7 . 9 2 5 1 . 5 
2 4 , 2 0 1 . 5 • 10 8 . 8 3 3 . 3 7 7 . 8 2 2 6 , 6 1 4 8 . 8 3 6 7 . 2 2 8 9 . 4 4 3 5 , 8 4 0 8 , 0 
2 4 . 2 0 1 , 5 10 8 . 8 4 3 . 3 8 7 . 8 2 9 4 . 5 206,7 4 7 7 . 3 2 8 9 . 5 6 3 1 . 3 543.5 
2 4 , 2 0 1 . 5 10 8 . 8 5 1 . 4 9 5 . 9 3 4 9 . 9 2 5 4 . 0 5 6 7 . 2 471.3 7 5 0 . 3 654.4 
2 4 . 2 0 4 10 8 . 8 5 2 . 1 9 9 . 1 3 5 4 . 6 2 5 5 . 5 5 7 4 . 7 475.6 7 6 0 . 2 6 6 1 , 1 
2 4 . 2 0 1 . 5 10 8 . 8 5 3 . 5 9 8 . 0 3 6 4 . 0 266.0 5 9 0 . 2 492.2 7 8 0 . 2 6 8 2 , 7 
2 4 . 2 0 1 . 5 10 8 . 8 5 6 . 9 1 0 1 . 4 3 8 7 . 2 2 8 5 , 8 627.6 526.2 8 3 0 , 2 7 2 8 , 8 
2 4 . 2 0 1 . 5 10 8 . 8 5 8 . 2 1 0 2 . 7 3 9 5 . 9 2 9 3 . 2 6 4 1 . 7 5 3 9 . 0 8 4 8 , 8 7 4 6 , 1 
2 4 . 2 0 1 . 5 10 8 . 8 5 9 . 0 1 0 3 . 5 4 0 1 . 6 2 9 3 . 1 6 5 1 . 0 5 4 7 . 5 861 ,2 7 5 7 . 7 
2 4 , 2 0 4 10 8 . 8 5 3 . 7 1 0 5 . 7 3 9 8 . 7 2 9 3 . 0 6 4 6 . 4 5 4 0 . 7 8 5 5 . 0 7 4 9 . 5 
2 4 . 2 0 10 8 . 8 5 6 . 3 1 0 0 , 8 3 8 4 . 3 2 8 3 . 5 622.9 5 2 2 , 1 8 2 4 . 0 7 2 3 . 2 
7 4 . ^ • 1 . 5 10 3 e . 8 5 6 . 1 i o : . 6 3 8 ! , 4 2 9 7 . 3 6 1 8 . 3 ; i 4 , 7 31'7,3 7 1 3 . 7 
2 4 . 2 0 1 . 5 10 3 8 . 8 5 1 . 4 9 8 , 9 3 4 9 . 6 250,7 566.7 4 6 7 . 8 749.6 650.7 
2 4 . 2 0 1 . 5 10 3 8 . 8 5 1 . 0 9 8 , 5 3 4 6 , 7 2 4 8 , 2 562.0 4 6 3 . 5 743.5 645.0 
1 2 , 2 0 4 10 3 8 . 8 5 0 . 6 8 8 . 6 3 4 3 . 9 2 5 5 . 3 5 5 7 . 4 468.8 7 3 7 . 3 6 4 8 . 7 
1 2 . 2 0 1 . 5 6 3 8 . 8 5 7 . 8 8 9 . 3 3 9 3 . 0 3 0 3 . 7 637 . 1 5 4 7 . 8 3 4 2 . 6 7 5 3 . 3 
1 2 . 2 0 1 . 5 6 3 8 . 8 5 6 . 9 8 8 , 4 3 8 7 , 2 2 9 8 . 8 627,6 5 3 9 . 2 8 3 0 , 2 7 4 1 , 8 
1 2 . 2 0 1 . 5 6 3 8 . 8 5 5 . 3 8 6 , 8 3 7 5 . 6 2 8 8 . 8 6 0 8 , 9 5 2 2 , 1 8 0 5 , 5 7 1 8 , 7 
1 2 . 2 0 1 . 5 6 3 8 . 8 5 1 . 6 8 3 . 1 5 3 2 , 3 4 4 9 , 2 865.5 7 8 2 , 4 1 1 4 4 , 5 1061 .4 
1 2 . 2 0 4 6 3 8 . 8 6 8 . 0 1 0 2 . 0 4 8 4 , 1 3 8 2 , 1 7 8 2 , 1 6 8 0 . 1 1 0 3 4 , 8 932.8 
1 2 , 2 0 1 . 5 6 3 8 . 8 5 8 . 0 8 9 . 5 4 1 2 , 7 3 2 3 . 2 6 6 6 , 7 5 7 7 . 2 8 8 2 , 2 792.7 
1 2 . 2 0 1 . 5 6 3 8 . 8 5 7 . 6 8 9 . 1 4 0 9 , 8 3 2 0 , 7 662.0 5 7 2 , 9 8 7 6 . 1 7 3 7 . 0 
1 2 . 2 0 1 . 5 6 3 8 . 8 5 4 . 0 8 5 . 5 3 8 4 . 3 298,8 620,7 5 3 5 . 2 8 2 1 , 3 7 3 5 . 8 
1 2 . 2 0 1 . 5 6 3 8 . 8 5 0 . 4 8 1 . 9 3 5 8 . 6 2 7 6 . 7 5 7 9 . 4 4 9 7 . 5 7 6 6 , 6 6 8 4 . 7 
1 2 . 2 0 4 6 3 8 . 8 4 6 . 8 8 0 . 8 3 3 3 . 0 2 5 2 , 2 5 3 8 . 0 4 5 7 . 2 7 1 1 . 8 6 3 1 . 0 
1 2 . 2 0 1 . 5 6 3 8 . 8 4 3 . 2 7 4 . 7 3 0 7 . 3 232,6 496.6 4 2 1 . 9 657 . 1 5 8 2 , 4 
1 2 . 2 0 1 . 5 6 3 8 . 8 3 9 . 6 7 1 . 1 2 8 1 . 8 2 1 0 . 7 4 5 5 . 2 3 8 4 . 1 602,3 5 3 1 . 2 
1 2 . 2 0 1 . 5 6 3 8 . 8 3 9 . 6 7 1 . 1 2 8 1 . 8 2 1 Q . 7 4 5 5 . 2 3 8 4 . 1 602,3 5 3 1 . 2 
1 2 . 2 0 1 . 5 6 3 8 . 8 3 6 . 0 6 7 . 5 2 5 6 , 1 1 8 8 . 6 4 1 3 . 3 3 4 6 . 3 547,6 4 8 0 , 1 
( 1 ) Coat of a pound of coapound f e r t i l i z e r per tree froa year 1 to Thereafter half pound ia assuHed , 
( 2 ) From year 1 to year 2 rouads of cheaical spraying at $ 4 , 0 0 for chenioal and $ 2 . 0 0 for p e s t i c i d e s , 
ProB year 17| only 1 round of chemical spraying and half the amount of pesticides are used . In both 
cases faaily labour is assused^ 
U> 
See a lso Appendix for other assoiaptlons. 
APPSHDII 8.1?C .-SMALLBOLBING: TOTAL COSTS, GROSS RETTOHS A»D BET RSTHHSS fOH RRIH 600 AT 
7ARI00S RSS 3 PHICIS (3/ACHS) 
ks> 
r e r t l l i i e r ' ^ ^ 





At 40 Cents 1 Per Pound At 60 Cents Per Pound At 80 Cents Per Pound 
of Colleoticg 
(2) Weedicide ' 
StiE.ilant 4 Eduea- Gross Gross Gross Gross Gross Gross 
Trees Equlpisent tioo Tal Returns Returns Returns Returns Returns Returns 
7 24.20 10 10 8.8 25.6 78.6 182 .4 103.8 294.7 216. 1 390.0 3 1 1 .4 
8 24.20 1 . 5 10 8.8 43.2 87.7 307.3 219.6 496.6 408.9 657.1 569 .4 
9 24.20 1 . 5 10 8.8 59.1 105.6 409.3 305.7 662.6 559 876.6 773. 
10 24.20 1 . 5 10 8.8 71 .2 1 15 .7 479.9 364.2 778.5 662.8 1029.7 914 
1 1 24.20 1 . 5 10 8.8 89.7 134.2 599.1 464.9 972.3 838.1 2493.9 1 1 5 1 . 9 
12 24.20 4 10 8.8 89.1 136,1 600.8 464.7 974.4 838.3 1289.0 1152,9 
13 24.20 1 . 5 10 8.8 94.4 138.9 631.3 492.4 1024.7 835.8 1355.3 1216.4 
14 24.20 1 . 5 10 8.8 99.8 144.3 661.9 517.6 1074.8 930.5 1421.5 1277.2 
15 24,20 1 . 5 10 8.8 1 1 6 . 1 160.6 757.0 596.4 1230,9 1070.3 1627.8 1467.3 
16 24.20 1 . 5 10 8.8 122.7 167.2 800.2 633 1301.0 1 133 .8 1720.5 1553.3 
17 24,20 4 10 8.8 99.4 146.4 647.6 501.2 1053.0 906.6 392.5 246.1 
18 24.20 1 . 5 10 8.8 97.6 142.1 633.9 491.8 1033.9 891.8 1367.3 1225.2 
19 24.20 1 . 5 10 3 8.8 108.5 156 214.7 581.7 1195.7 1039.7 1581 .2 1425.7 
20 24.20 1 . 5 10 3 8.8 127.6 175.1 867.9 692.8 1406.5 1231 .4 1860.5 1685.4 
21 24.20 1 . 5 10 3 8.8 108.5 156 737.7 5S1.7 1195.7 io3r.7 1591.7 1425.7 
22 12.20 4 6 3 8.8 87,1 125 . 1 592.3 467.2 960.1 835 1395.2 1 145.0 
23 12.20 1 . 5 6 3 8.8 78,4 109.9 533.1 423.2 86-1.1 754.2 1253.0 1033.2 
24 12.20 1 . 5 6 3 8.8 73. 1 95.8 494.8 399 802.4 706.6 1061.0 964.2 
25 12.20 1 . 5 6 3 8.8 55.8 873 1233.6 360.6 1 5 1 1 . 6 638.6 1746 873.0 
26 12.20 1 . 5 6 3 8.8 61.6 931 1256,9 325.9 1 5 17 . 1 586.1 1736.2 805.2 
27 12.20 4 6 3 8.8 87.0 121 619.0 498 1001 , 1 880.1 1323.1 1202.1 
28 12.20 1 . 5 6 3 8.8 78.3 109.8 557.3 447.5 1012.9 913 . 1 1 1 9 1 . 3 1081,5 
29 12.20 1 . 5 6 3 8.8 70.5 102 501.7 399.7 810,6 708.6 1072.6 970.6 
30 12.20 1 . 5 6 3 8.8 63.5 95 451.6 356.6 729.2 634.7 1051.0 956 
31 12.20 1 . 5 6 3 8.8 57.2 88.7 406.6 317.9 657.0 568.3 869.4 780,7 
32 12.20 1 . 5 6 3 8.8 56,0 90 398,4 308.4 643.7 553.7 851.8 761,8 
33 12.20 1 . 5 6 3 8.8 50.4 819 1095.7 276.7 13 16 .5 497.5 1503.5 684 .5 
34 12.20 1 . 5 6 3 8.8 45,4 76.9 322.7 245,3 521.4 444.5 689.8 612.9 
35 12.20 1 . 5 6 3 8.8 40.8 72.3 290.5 218.2 469.5 397.2 621.2 548.9 




APPENDIX 8 .20A KSTATKs'.AMORTIZED NET RETUOTS FOR RKPIACSMEIiT CLONE RRIM 600 (S/ACRE) 
Assume ( l ) RSS 1 « 40 cents per pound 
(2) Discount rate © 7 per cent 








Interest Accumulated jAdjunted ! 1 Present 
1 { 
Present 1 Present 
of 
Returns 
on Unpaid Net ] Ket Value of \ Value of Value of 
Trees Balance Returns j Returns 
! 
Adjusted | 





0 - 2 1 5 . 3 -215.3 ; 
1 ' 
: - 2 1 5 . 3 j 
! 1 
i - 2 1 5 . 3 5 - 2 1 5 . 3 
1 - 3 6 1 . 4 - 1 5 . 1 -591.8 i 
- 9 0 8 . 7 
; -376.5 -351.9 j - 5 6 7 . 2 
2 - 2 7 5 . 5 - 4 1 . 4 -316,9 — 2 7 6 , 8 s - 3 4 - 4 , 0 -466«8 
3 - 2 3 7 . 8 - 6 3 . 6 - 1 2 1 0 . 1 -301.4 - 2 4 6 , 0 I - 1 0 9 0 . 0 - 4 1 5 , 3 
4 - 2 0 9 . 6 - 8 4 . 7 - 1 5 0 4 . 4 - 2 9 4 . 3 - 2 2 4 . 5 i - 1 3 1 4 . 5 ! - 3 8 8 , 1 
5 - 1 9 2 . 5 - 1 0 5 . 3 - 1 8 0 2 . 2 1 -297.8 - 2 1 2 . 6 ^ -1527.1 i - 3 7 2 . 5 
6 - 2 0 8 . 9 - 1 2 6 . 2 - 2 1 3 7 . 3 i I - 3 3 5 . 1 - 2 2 3 . 3 1 -1750 .4 1 - 3 6 7 . 2 
7 - 7 8 . 9 1 i - 1 4 9 . 6 - 2 3 6 5 . 8 1 ; - 2 2 8 . 5 - 1 4 2 . 3 ; - 1 8 9 2 . 7 j - 3 5 1 . 2 
8 4 1 . 8 i -165.6 - 2 4 8 9 . 6 i ! -123.8 - 7 2 . 1 1 -1964.8 I ' - 3 2 9 . 0 
1 4 2 . 2 : 1 - 1 7 4 . 3 - 2 5 2 1 . 7 - 3 2 . 1 - 1 7 , 5 1 - 1 9 8 2 , 3 ' 1 - 3 0 4 , 2 
1 0 2 1 3 . 3 1 - 1 7 6 . 5 - 2 4 8 4 . 9 3 6 . 7 1 8 . 7 1 -1963.6 1 1 - 2 7 9 . 6 
1 1 3 3 1 . 0 - 1 7 3 . 9 -2327.8 1 5 7 . 1 7 4 . 6 1 - 1 8 8 8 . 9 i - 2 5 1 . 9 
1 2 3 3 3 . 5 -162.9 j 1 - 2 1 5 7 . 2 170.6 7 5 . 7 i - 1 8 1 3 . 2 1 i - 2 2 8 . 3 
1 3 3 6 4 . 3 -151.0 i - 1 9 4 3 . 7 2 1 3 . 5 8 8 . 6 J -1724.6 ! 1 - 2 0 6 , 4 
1 4 3 9 6 . 5 -136,1 1 - 1 6 8 3 , 2 260.4 101.0 : -1623.6 1 - 1 8 5 . 6 
1 5 4 9 1 . 7 - 1 1 7 . 8 i 1 - 1 3 0 9 . 3 3 7 3 . 9 135.5 ! - 1 4 8 8 . 1 1 ' - 1 6 3 . 4 
1 6 5 3 5 . 0 - 9 1 . 7 i - 8 6 6 . 0 4 4 3 . 3 150.1 1 - 1 3 3 8 . 0 1 - 1 4 1 . 6 ; 
1 7 3 7 5 . 5 - 60.6 ' 1 - 5 5 1 . 1 314.9 99.7 ; - 1 2 3 8 . 3 i 1 -126.8 ; 
1 8 3 6 4 . 9 - 3 8 . 6 : - 2 2 4 . 8 3 2 6 , 3 9 6 , 5 j ; - 1 1 4 1 , 8 1  -113.5 ; 
1 9 4 6 0 O 6 - 15.7 2 2 0 . 1 4 4 4 . 9 i 1 2 3 . 0 ; - 1 0 1 8 . 8 ^ i ! - 9 8 , 6 
2 0 5 7 4 . 5 i 5 7 4 , 5 1 4 8 . 5 ; - 8 7 0 , 3 - 8 2 . 2 
2 1 4 6 0 . 3 4 6 0 , 3 1 1 1 , 2 j ; - 7 5 9 . 1 i - 7 0 . 1 




3 3 8 . 8 7 6 . 5 - 6 8 2 . 6 1 - 61.7 
2 3 2 8 2 . 7 
] 
2 8 2 , 7 5 9 . 6 - 6 2 2 . 9 1 - 5 5 . 3 
2 4 2 4 6 . 6 2 4 6 . 6 4 8 , 6 - 5 7 4 , 3 • - 5 0 . 1 
2 5 2 0 0 . 8 2 0 0 , 8 3 7 . 0 
- 5 3 7 , 4 ; - 4 6 . 1 
2 6 1 7 3 . 3 1 7 3 . 3 2 9 . 9 
s -507.6 ? - 4 2 . 9 • 
2 7 3 8 6 . 2 
3 8 6 . 2 62,1 1 - 4 4 5 . 5 i - 3 7 . 2 
2 8 3 2 8 . 4 3 2 8 . 4 4 9 . 4 i - 3 9 6 . 2 j - 32.6 
2 9 2 7 5 . 6 2 7 6 . 5 3 8 . 7 1 - 3 5 7 . 5 \ - 29.1 
3 0 2 2 7 . 8 • 2 2 7 , 8 
1 
2 9 , 9 i - 3 2 7 . 6 
i 
1 - 2 8 . 1 
^ i 
>'37 
A P P E N D I X 8 . 2 0 . B K S T A T E : A H O n T K E D N E T R E T U R N S F O R F t E P U C E m ' T C L O N K R R I M 6 0 0 ( V A C R E ) 
Afisumo (l) RSS 1 @ 40 cents per pound 
(2) Discount rate 0 10 per ocnt 
(3) No roplanti.nK f;rant 
I lAccumulatod Araortizod 
A g e 
n e t 
Interest Accumulated iAdju.Ttod 
'r, 
Preoent j PreBont Present 
of 
Retiirno 
on Unpaid Net i 
1 
i Net : Value of 
i 
j Value of 1 Value of 
T r e e a nulance Hoturns Roturns Adjusted ; Adjusted t Adjusted 
Hot Returns Not Returns \ Net Retruna 
0 - 2 1 5 . 3 
i 
- 2 1 5 . 3 
( 
! 
• - 2 1 5 . 3 
i 
1 - 2 1 5 . 3 
1 
! 
- 2 1 5 . 3 
f — — 
i 
i - 2 1 5 . 3 
1 - 3 6 1 . 4 - 2 1 . 5 - 5 9 8 . 2 - 3 3 2 . 9 i - 3 4 0 . 1 - 5 6 3 . 4 1 
2 - 2 7 5 . 5 - 5 9 . 3 - 9 3 3 . 5 - 3 3 5 . 3 i - 2 7 7 . 1 - 8 4 0 . 5 ; - 4 8 4 . 1 
3 - 2 3 7 . 8 - 9 3 . 1 - 1 2 6 4 . 7 - 3 3 1 . 2 1 - 2 4 8 . 8 j - 1 0 8 9 . 3 i - 4 3 8 . 0 
- 2 0 9 . 6 - 1 2 6 . 5 - 1 6 0 0 . 8 - 3 3 6 . 1 i - 2 2 9 . 6 - 1 3 1 8 . 9 ; i W 4 1 6 ; 0 
5 - 1 9 2 . 5 - 1 6 0 . 1 - 1 9 5 3 . 4 - 3 5 2 . 6 1 - 2 1 8 . 9 - 1 5 3 7 . 8 i 1 - 4 0 5 . 7 
6 - 2 0 8 . 9 - 1 9 5 . 3 - 2 3 5 7 . 6 - 4 0 4 . 2 - 2 2 8 . 2 - 1 7 6 6 , 0 ! - ^ . 0 5 . 5 
7 - 7 8 . 9 - 2 3 5 . 8 - 2 6 7 2 . 3 - 3 1 4 . 7 - 1 6 1 . 4 - 1 9 2 7 . 4 ' - 3 9 5 . 9 
8 4 1 . 8 - 2 6 7 . 2 i - 2 8 9 7 . 7 - 2 2 5 . 4 - 1 0 5 . 1 - 2 0 3 2 . 5 - 3 8 1 . 0 
9 1 4 2 . 2 - 2 8 9 . 8 1 - 3 0 4 5 . 2 - 1 4 7 . 6 - 6 2 , 6 - 2 0 9 5 - 0 - 3 6 3 . 8 
1 0 2 1 3 . 3 - 3 0 4 . 5 1 - 3 1 3 6 . 4 ; - 9 1 . 2 - 3 5 . 2 - 2 1 3 0 . 2 - 3 4 6 6 
1 1 3 3 1 . 0 - 3 1 3 . 6 - 3 1 1 9 . 0 + 1 7 . 3 • f 6 . 1 i - 2 1 2 4 . 1 - 3 2 7 . 0 
1 2 3 3 3 . 5 - 3 1 1 . 9 - 3 0 9 7 . 4 2 1 . 6 + 6 . 9 - 2 1 1 7 , 2 - 3 1 0 . 6 
1 3 3 6 4 . 5 - 3 0 9 . 7 - 3 0 4 2 . 6 5 4 . 0 1 5 . 9 - 2 1 0 1 , 3 - 2 9 5 . 8 
1 4 3 9 6 . 5 - 3 0 4 . 3 - 2 9 5 0 . 4 9 2 . 2 2 4 . 2 - 2 0 7 6 . 8 - 2 8 1 . 8 
1 ! ) 4 9 1 . 7 - 2 9 5 . 0 - 2 7 5 3 . 7 \ 1 9 6 . 7 4 7 . 1 - 2 0 2 9 . 7 ; 1 - 2 6 6 . 9 
1 6 5 3 5 . 0 1 - 2 7 5 . 4 - 2 4 9 4 . 0 1 2 5 9 . 6 5 6 . 5 - 1 9 7 3 . 2 ; 1 - 2 5 2 . 2 
1 7 3 7 5 . 5 - 2 4 9 . 4 - 2 3 6 7 . 9 i 1 2 6 . 1 2 4 . 9 - 1 9 4 0 . 2 i ; - 2 4 2 . 9 
1 8 3 6 4 . 9 - 2 3 6 , 8 - 2 2 3 9 . 8 1 2 8 . 1 2 3 . 0 - 1 9 2 5 . 1 - 2 3 4 . 7 
1 9 4 6 0 . 6 - 2 2 3 . 9 - 2 0 0 3 . 2 2 3 6 . 6 3 0 . 7 1 - 1 8 8 6 . 4 j j - 2 2 5 . 6 
2 0 5 7 t . 5 - 2 0 0 . 3 1 - 1 6 2 9 . 0 3 7 4 . 2 5 5 . 6 j - 1 8 3 0 . 8 i - 2 1 5 . 0 
2 1 4 6 0 , 3 - 1 6 3 . 0 - 1 3 3 1 . 6 2 9 7 . 4 4 0 . 2 - 1 7 9 0 . 6 - 2 0 6 . 9 
2 2 3 3 8 . 8 - 1 3 3 . 2 - 1 1 2 6 . 0 2 0 5 . 6 2 5 . 2 ' - 1 7 6 5 . 4 1 1 - 2 0 1 . 3 
2 3 2 8 2 . 7 - 1 1 2 . 6 - 9 5 5 . 9 1 7 0 . 1 1 8 . 9 - 1 7 4 6 . 4 j 1 - 1 9 6 . 6 
2 4 2 4 6 . 6 - 9 5 . 6 - 8 0 4 . 9 1 5 1 . 0 1 5 . 3 - 1 7 3 1 . 1 ; - 1 9 2 . 7 
2 5 2 0 0 . 0 - 0 0 . 5 - 6 8 4 . 6 1 2 8 . 3 1 1 . 8 - 1 7 1 9 . 3 - 1 0 9 . 4 
2 6 1 7 3 . 3 - 6 8 , 5 - 5 7 9 . 8 1 0 4 . 8 8 . 8 - 1 7 0 8 . 5 - 1 8 6 . 5 
2 7 - 5 8 . 0 - 2 5 1 . 6 3 2 8 . 2 2 5 . 0 - 1 6 8 3 . 5 - 1 8 2 . 2 
2 8 3 2 8 . 4 - 2 5 . 2 4 5 1 , 6 3 0 3 « 2 2 1 , 0 - 1 6 6 2 . 4 - 1 7 8 . 6 
2 9 2 7 5 . 6 1 1 7 . 6 - 1 6 4 4 . 8 - 1 7 5 . 5 
3 0 2 2 7 . 0 i 2 2 7 . 8 
i 
1 3 . 1 1 - 1 6 3 1 . 7 
i 
U ; 
- 1 7 3 . 1 
1 
k-'.p, 
APPENDIX 8.20C ESTATE: AMORTKED MET RETURNS FOR REPLACEMENT CLONE RRIH 600 (SVACRE) 
Asaume (l) RSS 1 60 cents per pouad 
(2) DiBCount rate 9 7 pcr cent 
(3) No replanting f^ rant 
1 ! 
i 
f i i Accumulated Amortized 
Age 
Net Interest Accumulated AdiUS ted j Present j Present Present i of 






Returna Reti-irns j 
I 
Adjusted j 





i 0 - 2 1 5 . 3 j ! ! - 2 1 5 . 3 
- - -j 
- 2 1 5 . 3 I 
( 
- 2 1 5 . 3 I - 2 1 5 . 3 
! 
- 2 1 5 . 3 
1 - 3 6 1 . 4 - 1 5 . 1 - 5 9 1 . 8 - 3 7 6 . 5 1 - 3 5 1 . 9 ; - 5 6 7 . 2 - 6 0 6,9 
2 - 2 7 5 . 5 - 4 1 . 4 • - 9 0 8 . 7 - 3 1 6 . 9 ; - 2 7 6 , 8 i - 8 4 4 . 0 - 4 6 6 . 8 
3 - 2 3 7 . 8 - 6 3 . 6 1 - 1 2 1 0 . 1 - 3 0 1 . 4 - 2 4 6 ^ 0 1 - 1 0 9 0 . 0 - 4 1 5 . 3 
4 - 2 0 9 . 6 - 8 4 . 7 - 1 5 0 4 . 4 - 2 9 4 . 3 - 2 2 4 , 5 j - 1 3 1 4 . 5 1 - 3 8 8 . 1 
5 - 1 9 2 . 5 - 1 0 5 . 3 1 - 1 8 0 2 . 2 - 2 9 7 . 8 - 2 1 2 . 6 1 - 1 5 2 7 . 1 1 - 3 7 2 . 5 
6 - 2 0 8 . 9 - 1 2 6 . 2 1 - 2 1 3 7 . 2 - 3 3 5 . 1 - 2 2 3 . 3 1 - 1 7 5 0 . 4 ! - 3 6 7 . 2 
7 - 1 4 9 . 6 - 2 0 2 2 . 5 - 1 1 4 . 7 - 7 1 . 4 - 1 8 2 1 . 8 1 - 3 3 7 . 9 
8 2 1 6 . 2 - 1 4 1 , 5 i - 1 9 4 7 . 9 + 7 4 . 6 + 4 1 . 5 - 1 7 3 0 . 2 - 2 9 8 , 0 
9 366.8 - 1 3 6 . 4 1 - 1 7 1 7 . 5 2 3 0 . 4 + 1 2 5 . 3 1 - 1 6 5 4 . 9 - 2 5 4 . 0 
1 0 4 7 3 . 1 1 1 - 1 2 0 . 2 ; - 1 3 6 4 . 6 3 5 2 , 9 + 1 7 9 . 4 1 - 1 4 7 5 . 5 - 2 1 0 . 1 
1 1 649.5 ' - 9 5 . 5 i - 8 1 0 „ 6 5 5 3 . 9 + 2 6 3 . 1 1 - 1 2 1 2 . 4 - 1 6 1 . 7 
1 2 . 6 5 2 . 3 - 5 6 . 7 i - 2 1 5 . 0 5 9 5 . 6 2 6 4 . 4 1 - 9 4 8 . 0 - 1 1 9 . ' ^ 
1 3 6 9 9 . 3 1 5 . 0 + 4 6 9 . 2 6 8 4 . 2 2 8 3 . 9 ! - 6 6 4 , 1 - 7 9 . 4 
1 4 7 4 6 . 0 i 7 4 6 . 0 2 8 9 . 3 i - 3 7 4 . 8 - 4 2 . 8 
1 5 8 8 8 . 8 8 8 8 . 8 3 2 2 . 2 : - 5 2 . 6 - 5 . 8 
1 6 9 5 2 . 8 9 5 2 . 8 3 2 2 . 7 1 + 2 7 0 . 1 + 2 8 . 6 
1 7 7 1 9 . 0 7 1 9 . 0 227-6 1 4 9 7 . 7 5 0 . 9 
1 8 1 7 0 2 . 6 7 0 2 . 6 i 2 1 2 . 7 i i 7 1 0 . 4 7 0 . 6 
1 5 8 4 6 . 1 8 4 6 . 1 233.9 i ! 9 4 4 . 3 9 1 . 3 
2 0 1 0 3 4 . 3 1 0 3 4 . 3 2 6 7 . 3 1 , 1 2 1 1 . 6 1 1 1 4 „ 4 
2 1 0 4 5 . 7 S 4 5 . 7 2 0 4 . 2 1 1 4 1 5 . 8 . 1 3 0 . 7 
2 2 1 6 5 3 . 2 6 5 3 . 2 1 4 7 . 4 1 5 6 3 . 2 1 4 1 , 3 
2 3 t 5 7 8 . 7 5 7 8 . 7 1 2 2 . 0 1 6 8 5 . 2 1 4 9 . 5 
?A 1 5 1 3 . 6 5 1 3 . 6 1 0 1 . 2 1 7 8 6 . 4 1 1 5 5 , 8 
2 5 j 4 4 4 . 8 ! 4 4 4 . 8 8 1 . 9 1 8 6 8 . 4 1 1 6 0 , 3 i 
2 6 ! 4 0 3 . 1 4 0 3 . 1 6 9 . 3 1 9 3 7 . 7 1 1 6 3 . 9 
2 7 i 7 0 7 . 2 7 0 7 . 2 1 1 3 . 2 2 0 5 0 . 9 1 7 3 . 4 
2 8 6 1 8 . 4 j 6 1 8 . 4 9 3 . 0 2 1 4 3 . 9 1 1 7 6 . 6 
2 9 ! 5 3 8 . 6 1 5 3 8 . 6 7 5 . 7 2 2 1 9 . 6 i 1 8 0 , 8 
3 0 i 4 6 6 . 7 
1 
! ! 4 6 6 . 7 5 8 . 7 i 1 
2 2 7 8 . 3 1 8 3 . 6 
'+39 
APPENDIX 8,20D ESTATE: AMORTIZED HET RETl'RNS FOR RKPUCEMENT CLONE RRIM 600 (VACRE) 
A S S U H O (l) RSS 1 0 60 cents per pound 
(2) Discount rate @ 10 per cent 





























0 - 2 1 5 . 3 i 
i 
- 2 1 5 . 3 - 2 1 5 . 3 -215.3 1 -215.3 - 2 1 5 . 3 
1 1 - 3 6 1 . 4 j - 2 1 . 5 1 - 5 9 8 . 2 - 3 8 2 . 9 - 3 4 8 . 1 1 - 5 6 3 . 4 i -619.7 
2 - 2 7 5 . 7 i - 5 9 . 8 j - 9 3 3 . 5 - 3 3 5 . 3 -277.1 1 - 8 4 0 . 5 1 - 4 . 8 4 . 1 
3 1 - 2 3 7 . 8 i - 9 3 . - 1 i - 1 2 6 4 . 7 - 3 3 1 . 2 i - 2 4 8 . 8 j - 1 0 8 9 . 3 - 4 3 8 . 0 
4 ! 
1 
-209.6 i - 1 2 6 . 5 1 -1600.8 - 3 3 6 . 1 1 - 2 2 9 . 6 1 - 1 3 1 8 . 9 - 4 1 6 , 0 
5 -192.5 1 -160.1 i - 1 9 5 3 .4 -352.6 ! - 2 1 8 . 9 ; - 1 5 3 7 . 8 - 4 0 5 . 7 
6 - 2 0 8 . 9 1 - 1 9 5 . 3 -2357.6 ; - 4 0 4 . 2 1 - 2 2 8 , 2 ' -1766.0 - 4 0 5 . 5 
7 3 ' * . 9 1 -235.8 - 2 5 5 8 . 4 i - 2 0 0 . 9 - 1 0 3 . 1 -I869.I - 3 8 3 . 9 
8 216.2 i - 2 5 5 . 0 -2598.0 ' - 3 9 . 6 - 1 8 . 5 - 1 8 8 7 . 5 - 3 5 3 . 7 
9 366.0 i -259.8 -2491.1 +106.9 + 4 5 , 3 - 1 0 4 2 . 2 - 3 1 9 . 8 
1 0 ^ 7 3 . 1 - 2 4 9 . 1 -2267.1 - V 2 2 4 . 0 8 6 . 3 - 1 7 5 5 . 8 i - 2 8 5 . 7 
1 1 6 4 9 . 5 -226.7 - 1 8 4 4 . 3 + 4 2 2 . 8 1 4 8 . 2 -1607.6 I - 2 4 7 . 5 
1 2 652.3 - 1 8 4 . 4 i -1376.4 + 4 6 7 . 9 1 4 9 . 1 j - 1 4 5 8 . 5 j -213.9 
1 3 6 9 9 . 3 1 - 1 3 7 . 6 - 8 1 4 . 7 1 + 5 6 1 . 7 1 6 2 . 7 1 -1295.8 ; - 1 8 2 . 4 
1 4 746.0 1 - 8 1 . 5 - 1 5 0 . 1 j +664.5 1 7 4 , 9 I - 1 1 2 0 . 8 i - 1 5 2 . 1 
1 5 8 8 3 . 8 1 - 1 5 - 0 i + 7 2 3 - 7 1 + 8 7 3 . 8 2 0 9 . 1 - 9 1 1 i ^  - 1 1 9 . 9 
1 6 9 5 2 o 8 j 
1 j 
9 5 2 . 8 2 0 7 . 3 - 7 0 4 . 2 ; i - 9 0 . 0 
1 7 1 719.0 ! 7 1 9 . 0 i 1 4 2 . 2 - 5 6 1 . 9 ' - 7 0 . 0 
1 8 1 7 0 2 . 6 ; 7 0 2 . 6 1 1 2 6 . 4 - 4 3 5 . 5 , 1 - 5 3 . 1 
1 9 i 8 4 6 . 1 8 4 6 . 1 1 1 3 8 . 3 - 2 9 7 . 2 - 3 5 . 5 
2 0 1 0 3 4 . 3 1 
1 
1 0 3 4 . 3 ! 1 5 3 . 7 1 
- 1 4 3 . 5 - 16.9 
2 1 8 4 5 . 7 ; 8 4 5 . 7 
> 1 1 4 . 2 i - 29.3 - 3 . 4 
2 2 6 5 3 . 2 ] ! 1 6 5 3 . 2 i 8 0 . 2 + 5 0 , 9 + 5 . 8 
2 3 5 7 8 . 7 
1 
1 5 7 8 . 7 6 4 . 6 1 1 5 . 5 1 3 . 0 
2 4 513.6 513.6 5 2 , 1 167.6 1 8 . 7 
2 5 4 4 4 . 8 I 4 1 4 . 8 4 1 . 1 2 0 8 . 7 2 3 < , 0 
26 4 0 3 . 1 4 0 3 . 1 3 3 . 8 2 4 2 , 5 26.4 
2 7 1 7 0 7 . 2 i 7 0 7 . 2 5 3 . 9 2 9 6 . 4 32.1 
2 8 6 1 8 . 4 
i j 6 1 8 . 4 4 2 . 7 1 3 3 9 . 1 36.4 
2 9 5 3 0 . 6 
1 
5 3 0 . 6 3 3 . 9 1 3 7 3 . 0 3 9 . 8 
3 0 466,7 
i 
i 4 6 6 . 7 j 26.6 j 3 9 9 . 6 
1 
1 4 2 . 4 
4 
kko 
A P P E K D I X 8 . 2 0 E E S T A T E : A I ' O n T I Z E D M E T R B ; r u n N S F O R R B P L A C E M K N T C L O N E R R I M 6 0 0 ( S / A C R E ) 
A s s u m e ( 1 ) R S S 1 « 3 0 c o n t a p e r p o u n d 
( ? ) D i s c o u n t r a t e © 7 p e r c e n t 
( 3 ) N o r e p l a n t i n g r r r a n t 
1 ! 1 j A c c u a u l a t e d 1 A m o r t i z e d j 
A g e 
N e t 
I n t e r e s t 
1 
A c c u m u l a t e d • A d j u s t e d : P r e s e n t P r e s e n t [ P r e s e n t 
o f 
R e t u r n s 
o n U n p a i d N e t i N e t j V a l u e o f j V a l u e o f V a l u e o f 
T r e e s B a l a n c e R e t u r n s i R e t u r n s 
( 
A d j u s t e d ! A d j u s t e d A d j u s t e d 
1 
1 
1 M e t R e t u r n s j N e t R e t u r n s N e t R e t u r n s 
0 - 2 1 5 . 3 
» 
- 2 1 5 . 3 j 
1 
- 2 1 5 . 3 - 2 1 5 . 3 - 2 1 5 . 3 
1 
- 2 1 5 . 3 
1 - 3 6 1 . 4 - 1 5 . 1 - 5 9 1 . 8 i - 3 7 6 . 5 - 3 5 1 . 9 - 5 6 7 . 2 - 6 0 6 . 9 
? - 2 7 5 . 5 - 4 1 . 4 - 9 0 8 . 7 j - 3 1 6 . 9 - 2 7 6 . 8 i - 8 4 4 . 0 - 4 6 6 . 8 
3 - 2 3 7 . 8 - 6 3 . 6 - 1 2 1 0 . 1 j - 3 0 1 . 4 - 2 4 6 . 0 1 1 - 1 0 9 0 . 0 - 4 1 5 . 3 1 
4 - 2 0 9 . 6 - 8 4 . 7 - 1 5 0 4 . 4 j - 2 9 4 . 3 - 2 2 4 . 5 1 - 1 3 1 4 . 5 - 3 8 0 . 1 
- 1 9 2 . 5 - 1 0 5 . 3 - 1 8 0 2 . 2 1 - 2 9 7 . 0 - 2 1 2 . 6 i - 1 5 2 7 . 1 - 3 7 2 . 5 
6 - 2 0 8 . 9 - 1 2 6 . 2 - 2 1 3 7 . 2 i - 3 3 5 . 1 - 2 2 3 . 3 : - 1 7 5 0 . 4 - 3 6 7 . 2 
7 1 1 3 . 8 - 1 4 9 . 6 - 2 1 7 3 . 0 ! - 3 5 . 8 - 2 2 . 3 ; - 1 7 7 2 . 7 - 3 2 8 . 8 
8 3 3 6 . 8 - 1 5 2 . 1 - 1 9 8 8 . 3 1 8 4 . 7 + 1 0 7 . 5 - 1 6 6 5 . 2 - 2 7 8 . 9 
9 5 2 2 . 3 - 1 3 9 . 1 ! - 1 6 0 5 . 2 3 8 3 . 1 2 0 8 . 4 1 - 1 4 5 6 . 8 - 2 2 3 . 7 
1 0 6 5 1 . 4 - 1 1 2 . 4 1 ; - 1 0 6 6 . 2 j 5 3 9 . 0 2 7 3 . 8 ' - 1 1 8 2 . 9 - 1 6 8 . 4 
1 1 8 6 7 . 4 - 7 4 . 6 i - 2 7 3 . 4 7 9 2 . 8 3 7 6 . 6 ; - 8 0 6 . 3 - 1 0 7 . 5 
1 2 8 7 0 . 8 - 1 9 . 1 : + 5 7 0 . 3 8 5 1 . 7 ! 3 7 8 . 2 ; - 4 2 8 . 1 - 5 3 . 9 
1 3 9 2 7 . 9 i 9 2 7 . 9 ! 1 3 8 4 . 9 ] - 4 3 . 2 - 5 . 2 
1 4 9 8 4 . 8 
1 1 
9 8 4 . 0 3 8 1 . 9 1 3 3 0 . 7 3 8 . 7 
1 5 1 1 5 9 . 4 
s 
1 1 5 9 . 4 4 2 0 . 1 ; ; 7 5 0 . 9 8 3 . 2 
1 6 1 2 3 7 . 8 
i 
I 1 2 3 7 . 0 4 1 9 . 2 i i 1 1 7 3 . 1 1 1 2 4 . 7 
1 7 9 5 2 . 9 9 5 2 . 9 1 3 0 1 . 7 ; 1 1 4 7 9 . 8 j 1 5 1 . 5 
1 8 9 3 2 . 6 9 3 2 , 6 1 2 7 5 . 9 1 1 1 7 5 5 . 7 1 1 7 4 , 5 
1 1 9 1 1 1 0 . 3 1 
1 1 1 0 . 3 3 0 7 . 0 ; 1 2 0 6 2 . 7 1 1 9 9 . 5 
2 0 1 3 4 2 , 3 1 3 4 ^ . 3 3 4 6 . 3 
I 2 4 0 9 . 0 2 2 7 . 4 } 
2 1 1 1 0 9 . 9 
! ; 1 1 0 9 . 9 ! 2 6 8 . 0 j 1 2 6 7 7 . 0 2 4 7 . 1 
2V 8 0 6 . 3 8 i ; 6 . 3 1 2 0 0 . 0 ; 2 8 7 7 . 0 i 1 2 6 0 , 0 
2 3 7 6 4 . 1 7 6 4 . 1 1 1 6 1 . 0 ; 3 0 3 8 . 1 ! 1 2 6 9 . 5 
2 4 6 9 6 . 7 6 9 4 . 7 1 3 6 . 9 j 3 1 7 4 . 9 ; 
2 7 6 . 2 
2 5 6 1 2 . 3 6 1 2 . 3 1 1 2 . 7 3 2 8 7 . 6 
2 8 2 . 1 j 
2 6 5 6 0 . 9 5 6 0 . 9 ; 9 6 . 5 3 3 8 4 . 1 
2 8 6 , 2 • 1 
2 7 9 2 7 . 9 » 9 2 7 . 9 1 4 9 . 3 3 5 3 > . 4 1 2 9 3 . 3 
2 8 8 1 8 . 5 \ 8 1 8 . 5 1 2 2 . 8 3 6 5 6 . 2 i 3 0 1 . 2 
2 9 7 1 8 . 2 7 5 0 . 2 i 1 0 0 . 9 j V 5 7 . 1 1 3 0 6 . 0 
3 0 6 3 1 . 5 
1 
! 
1 6 3 1 . 5 
1 
0 0 r , 
j 3 ' - ' 4 0 . 1 
j 
3 0 9 . 5 
1 
APPKNDIX 9,20F ESTATE: AM0RTI7.SD NST RETURNS FOR REPLACEMENT CLONE RRIK 600 (5/ACRE) 
Assume (l) RSS 1 @ 80 cents per pound 
(2) Discount rate © 10 per cent 






Interest { Accumulated • Adjusted 
on Unpaid I Net Net 





Accumulated | Aaortized 
Present | Present 
Value of I Value of 
Adjusted Ad;justed 

































- 3 6 1 . 4 
-275.5 
- 2 3 7 . 8 
- 2 0 9 . 6 
- 1 9 2 . 5 
-208.9 
1 1 3 . 8 
336.8 
5 2 2 . 3 
6 5 1 . 4 
867.4 
870.8 ^ 










7 6 4 . 1 
696.7 
6 1 2 . 3 









- 1 6 0 . 1 
-195.3 
- 2 3 5 . 8 
-247.9 
- 2 3 9 . 0 
-210.7 
- 1 6 6 . 7 
- 96.6 
- 1 9 . 2 









- 2 1 0 7 . 5 
- 1 6 6 6 . 8 
-966.1 
-191.9 
+ 7 1 6 . 8 























7 6 4 . 1 
696.7 
6 1 2 . 3 
560.9 




























7 0 . 7 
47.1 
7 0 . 8 
56.5 
4 5 . 2 




- 1 3 1 8 . 9 
- 1 5 3 7 . 8 
- 1 7 6 6 . 0 
-1828.6 
-1787.1 
- 1 6 6 7 . 0 
-1497.1 






























-243 . 6 




- 2 6 , 9 















APPENDIX 8.20G ESTATE: AMORTT^^ED NET RET'JRNS FOR REPLACEMKIIT CLONE RP.IM 600 (S/ACRE) 
Assume (1) RSS 1 ® 40 centc per pound 
{9.) Discount rate 7 per cent 
(3) Replanting grant 3450.00 per acre 
i j jAccunulated 1 Amortized 
Age 
Net Interest Accumulated Adjusted Present 1 Present I Present | of 





1 Net Returns 
0 - 65.3 - 65.3 - 65.3 - 65.3 
t 
- 65.3 
1 ' ' ' 
1 
1 - 65.3 
1 -301.4 - 4.6 -371.3 - 3 0 6 . 0 i -285.9 -351.3 -375.8 
2 -215.5 - 26.0 -612.8 -241.5 i -210.9 - 5 6 2 . 2 - 3 1 0 . 9 
3 -177.8 - 42.9 -833.5 -220.7 j -100.1 - 7 4 2 . 3 -282.9 
4 -165.'I - 58.3 -1057.2 i 1 -223.7 -170.7 -913.0 -269.3 
5 -150.5 - 74.0 -1281,7 -224.5 - 1 6 0 , 0 -1073.0 -261.7. 
6 -172.9 - 89.7 -1544.3 -?62.6 -175.0 -1248.0 - 2 6 1 . 7 
7 - 78.9 -108.1 -1731.3 -187.0 -116.5 -1364.5 -253.1 
8 41.8 -121.2 -1810,7 - 79.4 - 46,2 1 -1410.7 1 -235.6 
9 142.2 -126.7 - 1 7 9 5 . 2 + 1 5 . 5 + 8.4 j 1 -1402.3 : - 2 1 5 . 2 
10 213.3 -125.7 - 1 7 0 7 . 6 ' ' 87.6 44.5 -1357.8 : - 1 9 3 . 3 
11 331.0 -119.5 - 1 4 9 6 . 1 211.5 100.5 - 1 2 5 7 . 3 : 1 - 1 6 7 . 7 
12 333.5 -104.7 - 1 2 6 7 . 3 228.7 101.5 - 1 1 5 5 . 8 1 ! -145.5 
13 364.5 - 08.7 -991.5 275.8 114.2 I -1041.6 i -124.6 
14 396.5 - 69.4 - 6 6 4 . 4 327.1 1 2 6 , 8 -914.7 1 -104.6 
15 491.7 - 46.5 - 2 1 9 . 2 445.2 161.3 -753.4 ! i - 82.7 I 
16 535.0 - 15.3 + 3 0 0 . 5 519.7 176.1 1 1 -577.2 - 61.1 i 
17 375.5 375.5 118.6 1 -458.5 - 46.9 
18 364.9 i 3 6 4 . 9 107.6 1 -350.9 - 34.7 
19 460.6 4 6 0 . 6 1 127.1 i 1 - 2 2 3 , 8 - 21.6 ; 
20 57t.5 574.5 1 148.2 - 75.6 - 7.1 i 
21 460,3 4 6 0 . 3 i 111.2 + 35.6 + 3.2 
22 338.8 338.8 76.5 i 112.1 10.1 
23 282.7 282.7 59.6 171.7 15.2 
24 246.6 246.6 48.6 220.3 1 9 . 2 
25 200.8 200.8 37.0 257.3 22.1 
j [ 173.3 1 173.3 29.9 287.2 24.1 • 
27 3B6.2 1 386.2 62.1 349.3 29.1 
28 328.4 328.4 49.4 398.7 32.8 
29 275.8 275.8 38.7 437.4 35.4 
30 185.0 185.0 29.9 467.3 37.4 
kk3 
A P P E N D I X 8 . 2 0 H E S T A T K : A M O R T I Z E D N E T R E T U R N S F O R R E P L A C E H r J I l T C L O N E R R I H 6 0 0 ( f / A C R E ) 
Assume (.1) RSS 1 <s> 40 cents per pound 
( ? ) Discount r a t e if 10 per cunt 
( 3 ) Replantinf^ f^rant $;450,00 per acre 
1 ! I A c c u n u l a t e d j A m o r t i z e d 
A g e j 
N u t 
I n t e r e s t A c c u m u l a t e d A d j u s t e d | P r e s e n t P r e s e n t j P r e s e n t 
o f 
R e t u r n s 
o n U n p a i d N o t N e t 1 V a l u e o f V a l u e o f } 
i 
V a l u e o f 
T r e e s D a l a n c o ( 
1 
R e t u r n s j 
i 
R e t u r n s A d j u s t e d 
N o t R e t u r n s 
A d j u s t e d i 
M e t R e t u r n s 
A . d j u s t e d 
N o t R e t u r n s 
- 6 5 . 3 - 6 5 . 3 1 - 6 5 . 3 - 6 5 . 3 - 6 5 . 3 1 - 6 5 . 3 
! 1 - 3 0 1 . 4 - 6 . 5 - 3 7 3 . 2 I - 3 0 7 - 9 1 - 2 7 9 . 9 - 3 4 5 . 2 - 3 7 9 . 7 
2 - 2 1 5 . 5 - 3 7 . 3 - 6 2 6 . O - 2 5 2 . 8 - 2 0 8 . 8 - 5 5 4 . 0 i - 3 1 9 . 1 
3 - 1 7 7 . 8 - 6 2 . 6 - 8 6 6 . 4 i - 2 4 0 . 4 - 1 8 0 . 6 - 7 3 4 . 6 1 - 2 9 5 . 3 
4 - 1 6 5 . 4 - 8 6 , 6 - 1 1 1 8 . 4 1 - 2 5 2 . 0 - 1 7 2 . 1 - 9 0 6 . 7 i - 2 8 5 . 6 
5 - 1 5 0 . 5 - 1 1 1 . 8 - 1 3 8 0 . 7 1 - 2 6 2 . 3 - 1 6 2 . 8 - 1 0 6 9 . 6 i - 2 8 2 . 2 
6 - 1 7 2 . 9 - 1 3 8 . 1 - 1 6 9 1 . 7 1 - 3 1 0 . 9 - 1 7 5 . 3 1 - 1 2 4 4 . 9 } - 2 8 5 . 8 
7 - 7 8 . 9 - 1 6 9 . 2 - 1 9 3 9 . 8 1 - 2 4 8 . 1 1 - 1 2 7 . 3 - 1 3 7 2 . 2 - 2 8 1 . 3 
8 4 1 . 8 - 1 9 3 . 9 - 2 0 9 2 . 0 j - 1 5 2 . 2 ; - 7 1 . 0 - 1 4 4 3 . 2 1 - 2 7 0 . 5 
9 1 4 2 . 2 - 2 0 9 . 2 - 2 1 5 8 . 9 i - 6 6 . 9 ^ - 2 8 . 4 - 1 4 7 1 . 6 1 - 2 5 5 . 5 
1 0 2 1 3 . 3 - 2 1 5 . 9 - 2 1 5 6 . 3 - 2 . 6 - 1 . 0 : - 1 4 7 2 . 6 1 - 2 3 9 . 6 
1 1 3 3 1 . 0 - 2 1 5 . 6 - 2 0 4 0 . 9 1 1 5 . 4 1 4 0 . 4 
1 j 
i - 1 4 3 2 . 2 1 ; j - 2 2 0 . 4 
1 2 3 3 3 . 5 - 2 0 4 . 1 - 1 9 1 1 . 5 1 2 9 . 4 4 1 . 1 1 - 1 3 9 1 . 1 i : - 2 0 3 . 1 
1 3 3 6 4 . 5 - 1 9 1 . 1 - 1 7 3 8 . 1 1 7 3 . 4 i 5 0 . 2 • - 1 3 4 0 . 9 - 1 8 8 . 8 
1 4 3 9 6 . 5 - 1 7 3 . 3 1 - 1 5 1 5 . 4 2 2 2 . 7 5 1 ^ . 6 1 - 1 2 8 2 . 2 - 1 7 4 . 0 
1 5 4 9 1 . 7 - 1 5 1 . 5 1 - 1 1 7 5 . 2 3 4 0 . 2 8 1 . 4 I - 1 2 0 0 . 8 i 
1 1 
i - 1 5 7 . 9 
1 6 5 3 5 . 0 - 1 1 7 . 5 1 - 7 5 7 . 7 4 1 7 . 5 ( 9 0 . 6 
1 
! - 1 1 0 9 . 9 
1 
1 - 1 4 1 . 8 
1 7 3 7 5 . 5 - 7 5 . 8 1 - 4 5 8 . 0 2 9 9 . 7 5 9 . 3 1-1050.6 1 - 1 3 0 . 9 
1 8 3 6 4 . 9 - 4 5 . 8 - 1 3 8 . 9 3 1 9 . 1 j 5 7 . 1 I - 9 9 3 . 5 1 - 1 2 1 . 1 
1 9 4 6 0 . 6 - 1 3 . 9 1 + 3 0 7 . 8 4 4 6 . 7 I 7 3 . 0 ! 1 - 9 2 0 . 5 ' - 1 1 2 . 2 ( 
2 0 5 7 4 . 5 
i 
1 1 5 7 4 . 5 8 5 . 3 I - 8 3 5 . 2 • - 9 8 . 1 
2 1 4 6 0 . 3 4 6 0 . 3 6 2 . 1 - 7 7 3 . 1 ! - 8 9 . 4 
2 2 3 J 8 . 8 3 3 8 . 8 4 1 . 3 - 7 3 1 . 8 1 - 5 3 . 4 
2 3 2 8 2 . 7 2 8 2 . 7 3 1 . 4 j - 7 0 0 . 4 1 - 7 8 . 8 
2 4 2 4 6 . 6 2 4 6 . 6 2 5 . 0 - 6 7 5 . 4 1 - 7 5 . 2 
2 5 2 0 0 . 8 2 0 0 . 8 1 8 . 5 j - 6 5 6 . 9 - 7 2 . 4 
2 6 1 7 3 . 3 1 7 3 . 3 1 4 . 5 
! - 6 4 2 . 4 - 7 0 . 1 
2 7 3 8 6 . 2 3 8 6 . 2 2 9 . 5 1 - 6 1 2 . 9 - 6 6 , 4 
2 8 3 2 8 . 4 3 2 0 . 4 j 2 2 . 7 1 - 5 9 0 . 2 ! -
2 9 2 7 5 . 8 2 7 5 . 8 1 1 7 . 4 -512,Q 1 - 6 1 , 1 
3 0 1 8 5 . 0 1 1 8 5 . 0 
i 
i 
! 1 0 . 5 
1 
J 
- 5 6 2 , 3 
t 
i - 5 9 . 6 
! 
! 
APPI'MDIX 8.201 ESTATE: /VMORTIZED NET IffiTURNS FOR R»;PLACEI-!E!1T CLONE RRIM 600 (f/ACRE) 
Assurao (1) RSS 1 @ 60 cents per pound 
(2) Discount rate @ 7 per cents 









on Unpaid i 
Balance 
1 




















' Net Returns 
0 - 65.3 - 65.3 1 
i 
- 65.3 - 65.3 ; - 65.3 - 65.3 
1 -301.4 - 4.6 -371.3 1 -306.0 -285.9 ! -351.3 -375.8 
2 -215.5 - 26.0 -612.8 j -241.5 -210.9 -562.2 -310.9 
3 -177.8 - 42.9 -833.5 i -220.7 1 -180.1 -742.3 -282.9 
4 -165.4 - 58.3 -1057.2 i -223.7 -170.7 -913.0 -269.3 
5 -150.5 - 74.0 -1281.7 -224.5 -160.0 -1073.0 -261.7 
6 -172.9 - 89.7 -1544.3 -262.6 -175.0 -1248.0 i -261.7 
7 3A.9 i ; -108.1 -1617.5 - 73.2 - 45.6 -1293.5 -239.9 
8 216.2 : -113.2 -1514.5 +103.0 4 59.9 -1233.5 i -206.0 
9 ; 1 366.8 j -106.0 -1253.7 260.8 141.8 -1091.7 ; 1 -167.5 
1 10 
i 1 
1 473.1 ! - 87.8 -868.4 385.3 195.7 -396.0 i i -127.5 
1 11 ! j 649.5 : - 60.8 -279.7 588.7 279.6 -616.7 ' ' - 82.0 
12 1 652.3 1 - 19.6 +353.0 632.7 280.9 ! ; -335.8 : - 42.3 
13 1 699.3 > » 699.3 290.1 - 45.6 , , - 5.5 
1 
14 1 746.0 i 1 746.0 289.3 +243.7 i 1 + 27.8 
15 088.8 1 808. 8 321.7 565.4 i j 62.1 
16 952.8 i 952.8 322.7 838.1 94.0 
17 ! 719.Q 1 719.0 : 1 227.6 1 1115.7 114.2 
18 702.6 j 702.6 1 207.8 1323.5 131.6 
1 19 j 846.1 846.1 233.9 : 1557.4 150.6 
20 1 1034.3 i i 1034.3 266.8 1824.2 171.5 
21 1 845.7 345.7 204.2 2028.4 187.2 
22 ) 653.2 i 653.2 147.4 2175.8 195.8 
23 578.7 578.7 121.5 2297.3 i 203.8 
24 513.6 t f 513.6 j 101.2 2398.5 208.6 
25 444.8 
i j 444.8 1 81.8 2480.3 j 212.8 
26 403.1 i 403.1 ; 69.3 2549.6 215.4 • 
27 707.2 
J, 707.2 i 113.8 2663.4 221.1 
28 618.4 1 618.4 93.0 2756,4 ! 227.1 











APPENDIX 8.20J ESTATE: AMORTi:^ED NKT HKTURNS FOR REPUCEt'ENT CLONE RHIK 600 (S/ACRE) 
Aanutno (l) RSS 1 ® 80 cents per pound 
(2) Discount rato @ 7 per cont 
(3) Replanting f^rnnt ilA^O.OO per acre 
Ace 
! i 1 Aocumulated Anortizod 
Not Interent Accumulated 1 Adjusted Present Present Present of 





! Net Returns 
0 - 6 ^ . 3 - 6 5 . 3 i - 6 5 . 3 - 6 5 . 3 - 6 5 . 3 
I 
- 6 5 . 3 
1 - 3 0 1 . 4 - 4 . 6 - 3 7 1 . 3 1 - 3 0 6 . 0 - 2 0 5 . 9 - 3 5 1 . 3 1 - 3 7 5 . 8 
2 - 2 1 5 . 5 - 2 6 , 0 - 6 1 2 . 8 i - 2 4 1 . 5 - 2 1 0 . 9 - 5 6 2 . 2 1 - 3 1 0 . 9 
3 - 1 7 7 . 8 - 4 2 . 9 - 8 3 3 „ 5 j - 2 2 0 , 7 - 1 0 0 . 1 - 7 4 2 . 3 1 - 2 3 2 . 9 
4 - 1 6 5 . 4 - 5 0 . 3 - 1 0 5 7 . 2 - r n . i ! - 1 7 0 . 7 - 9 1 3 . 0 ! - 2 6 9 . 3 
5 - 1 5 0 . 5 - 7 4 . 0 - 1 2 8 1 , 7 - 2 2 4 . 5 - 1 6 0 . 0 - 1 0 7 3 . 0 1 - 2 6 1 . 7 
6 - 1 7 2 . 9 - 8 9 . 7 - 1 5 4 4 . 3 i - 2 6 2 . 6 - 1 7 5 . 0 - 1 2 4 0 . 0 j - 2 6 1 . 7 
7 1 1 3 . B - 1 0 0 . 1 - 1 5 3 8 . 6 + 5 . 7 3 . 5 i - 1 2 4 4 . 4 i - 2 3 0 . 2 
8 3 3 < 5 . 8 - 1 0 7 . 7 - 1 3 0 9 - 5 2 2 9 , 0 1 3 3 . 2 - 1 1 1 1 . 1 • - 1 8 5 . 6 
9 5 2 : . 3 - 9 1 . 6 - 8 7 0 . 9 4 3 0 . 6 2 3 4 . 2 - 8 7 6 . 9 i - 1 3 4 . 2 
1 0 6 5 1 . 1 - 6 1 . 5 - 2 3 9 . 0 5 8 9 . 9 2 9 9 . 7 - 5 7 7 . 2 0 2 . 0 
1 1 0 6 7 . 4 - 2 0 , 2 + 5 5 8 . 0 4 0 2 . 4 - 1 7 4 . 0 2 3 . 3 
1 2 8 7 0 . 8 ! 0 7 0 . 0 3 0 6 . 6 + 2 1 1 . 8 2 6 . 7 
1 3 9 2 7 . 9 9 2 7 . 9 i 3 : ; 4 . 9 5 9 6 , 7 7 1 . 4 
1 4 9 8 4 . 8 9 8 4 . 8 3 0 1 . 9 j 9 7 8 . 6 1 1 1 1 . 6 
1 5 1 1 5 9 . 1 1 1 5 9 . 4 4 2 0 . 1 1 
1 i 
1 1 3 9 0 . 7 1 5 3 . 6 
1 6 1 2 3 7 . 0 1 2 3 7 . 8 4 1 9 . 2 1 0 1 7 . 9 1 9 2 . 4 
1 7 9 5 2 . 9 1 I 9 5 2 . 9 3 0 1 . 7 2 1 1 9 . 6 2 1 7 . 0 
1 8 9 3 2 . 6 9 3 2 . 6 2 7 5 . 9 2 3 9 5 . 5 2 3 0 . 1 
1 9 1 1 1 0 . 3 1 1 1 0 . 3 3 0 7 . 0 2 7 0 2 . 5 2 6 1 . 3 1 
2 0 1 3 4 3 . 3 1 ' 1 3 4 3 . 3 i 3 4 6 . 3 3 0 4 0 . 8 2 8 7 . 8 i 
2 1 1 1 0 9 . 9 
1 
1 1 0 9 . 9 i i 2 6 0 . 0 3 3 1 6 . 8 3 0 6 . 1 
2 2 8 8 6 . 3 8 0 6 . 3 2 0 0 3 5 1 6 . 0 3 1 6 « 5 
2 3 7 6 4 , 1 i ! 7 6 4 . 1 1 6 1 3 6 7 7 . 8 3 2 6 . 2 1 
2 4 6 9 6 . 7 1 I 6 9 6 . 7 1 3 6 . 9 3 C 1 4 . 7 3 3 1 . 9 
2 5 6 1 2 . 3 
i 
1 I 6 1 2 . 3 1 1 2 . 7 3 9 2 7 . 4 3 3 7 . 0 
2 6 5 6 0 . 9 5 6 0 . 9 9 6 . 5 4 0 2 3 . 9 3 4 0 . 3 
2 7 9 2 7 . 9 1 9 2 7 . 9 1 4 9 . 3 4 1 7 3 . 2 3 4 0 . 0 
2 8 n i 8 . 5 8 1 0 . 5 1 2 2 . 8 4 2 9 6 . 0 3 5 3 . 9 
2 9 7 1 8 . 2 7 1 0 . 2 1 0 0 , 9 4 3 9 6 . 9 3 5 8 . 1 
3 0 6 3 1 . 5 6 3 1 . 5 
i 1 
1 0 2 . 9 
i 
4 4 7 9 . 8 3 6 1 , 0 
kk6 
APPENDIX 8.?0K ESTATi'.: AMORTIZED NCT RETURMS FOR HEPUCKMENT CLONE RRIM 600 (S/ACRE) 
Assume ( l ) RSS 1 » 80 cento per pound 
(2) Discount rate 9 10 per cent 



















- • • • ! t 
Accumulated 
Present i Present 
i 
Value of ! Value of 
i 
Adjusted | Adjusted 






0 - 65.3 -65.3 ; - 65.3 1 
1 
i 
- 65.3 1 
1 
- 65.3 - 65.3 
1 -301,4 - 6.5 -373.2 i -307.9 1 -279.9 i -345.2 1 -379.7 
2 -215.5 - 37.3 -626.0 1 -252.8 1 -208.8 1 -554.0 i -319.1 
3 - 1 7 7 . 8 - 62.6 -866.4 i -240,4 i -180,6 1 -734.6 -295.3 
4 -165.1 - 86,6 -1118.4 -252,0 -172.1 j -906.7 -285.6 
5 -150.5 -111,8 -1300.7 -262.3 -162.8 i -1069.6 -282.2 
6 -172.9 -130.1 -1691.7 -310.9 - 1 7 5 . 3 i -1244.9 -285.8 
7 113.8 -169.2 -1747.1 - 55.4 - 28.4 -1273.3 -261.0 
B 336.8 -174.7 -1585.0 + i 6 2 a + 75.6 -1197.7 -224.0 
9 522.3 -1585 -1221.2 363,8 154.3 -1043.4 -181,1 
10 651.4 -122.1 -691.9 +529,3 204.0 -839,4 -136.6 
11 
I 
867.4 - 69.2 +106.3 798,2 279.4 -559.8 - 86.2 
12 870 .8 1 t 870,8 277 .4 -282.4 - 41.4 
13 927.9 927.9 268.1 - 14.2 - 2.0 
14 984.8 ! 
' 
984.8 259.0 +244.8 33.2 




j 1237.8 1 269.4 791.7 101.1 
17 952.9 952.9 188.5 980.2 122.1 
18 932.6 932.6 167.7 1147,9 139.9 
19 1110.3 
i j 1110.3 181.5 1329.4 158.9 
20 1343.3 1343.3 198.7 1528.1 179.5 
21 1109.9 1109.9 149.8 1677.9 194.0 
22 886.3 
1 I 1 886.3 108.8 1786.7 203.7 
23 764.1 
1 
764.1 85.3 1072 210,7 
24 696.7 1 696.7 70.7 1942.7 216*2 
25 612.3 1 612.3 56.5 1999.2 220.1 
26 560,9 j 560.9 47.1 2046.3 223.0 
27 927.9 ! 927,9 70.8 2117.1 229.2 
20 818.5 1 818.5 56,5 2173.6 232.6 
29 718.2 { 710.2 45.2 2210,8 236.7 
30 631.5 1 631.5 36,0 2254.8 
t 
239.0 
APPENDIX 8.20L ESTATE: AMORTIZED MET RETURNS FOR REPLACEMENT CLOIIE RRIH 600 {t/XCPl) 
Assume (l) RSS 1 9 40 cents per pound 
(2) Discount rate ® 7 per cent 
(3-) Replanting grant SlOOO.OO per acre 







Interest Accumulated ^  1 Adjusted Present Present Present 
of on Unpaid Net Net Value of Value of Value of 
Trees Balance Returns Returns Adjusted 
Net Returns 
Adjusted 
1 Net Returns 
Adjusted 
Net Retuma 




1 1 1 8 
1 - 2 2 8 . 1 - 1 1 0 . 1 - 2 2 8 . 1 - 2 1 3 . 2 i - 9 5 . 2 j - 1 0 . 2 j 
2 - 1 4 2 . 2 - 7 . 7 - 2 6 0 . 0 - 1 4 9 . 9 1 - 1 3 0 . 8 ; - 2 2 6 . 1 - 1 2 5 . 0 
3 - 1 0 4 . 4 - 1 8 . 2 - 3 8 2 . 6 - 1 2 2 . 6 ; - 1 0 0 . 0 1 - 3 2 6 . 2 - 1 2 4 . 3 
4 - 1 1 6 . 3 - 2 6 . 8 - 5 2 5 . 7 - 1 4 3 . 1 1 - 1 0 9 . 2 ; - 4 3 5 . 4 - 1 2 8 . 4 
5 - 9 9 . 1 - 3 6 . 8 - 6 6 1 . 6 - 1 3 5 . 9 1 - 9 6 . 9 1 - 5 3 2 . 3 1 - 1 2 9 . 3 
6 t l 2 8 . 9 - 4 6 . 3 - 6 2 5 . 3 + 8 2 . 6 1 + 5 5 . 0 ! - 4 7 7 . 3 - 1 0 0 . 1 
7 - 7 8 . 9 1 - 4 3 . 3 - 7 4 7 . 9 - 1 2 2 , 7 - 7 6 . 3 - 5 5 3 . 6 - 1 0 2 . 7 
8 4 1 . 8 - 5 2 . 4 - 7 5 8 . 5 - 1 0 . 6 - 6 . 2 - 5 5 9 . 8 - 9 3 . 5 
9 1 4 2 . 2 - 5 3 . 1 - 6 6 9 . 4 4 - 8 9 . 1 + 4 8 . 5 1 - 5 1 1 . 3 - 7 8 . 2 
1 0 2 1 3 . 3 - 4 6 . 9 - 5 0 3 . 0 1 6 6 . 4 + 8 4 . 5 i - 4 2 6 . 8 - 6 0 . 6 
1 1 3 3 1 . 0 - 3 5 . 2 - 2 0 7 . 2 2 9 5 . 8 1 4 0 . 5 1 - 2 8 6 . 2 - 3 8 . 2 
1 2 3 3 3 . 5 - 1 4 . 5 + 1 1 1 . 8 3 1 8 . 9 1 4 1 . 6 1 - 1 4 4 . 6 - 1 3 . 2 
1 3 3 6 4 . 5 3 6 ^ - . 5 1 5 0 . 9 + 6 . 3 0 . 7 
1 4 3 9 6 . 5 3 9 6 . 5 1 5 3 . 3 1 6 0 . 1 1 8 . 2 
1 5 4 9 1 . 7 1 4 9 1 . 7 1 7 8 . 2 3 3 8 . 3 3 7 . 1 
1 6 5 3 5 . 0 5 3 5 . 0 1 8 1 . 2 - 5 1 9 . 5 5 5 . 0 
1 7 3 7 5 . 5 3 7 5 . 1 1 8 . 6 6 3 8 . 1 6 5 . 1 
1 0 3 6 4 . 9 
i 
I 3 6 4 . 9 1 0 7 . 6 7 4 5 . 7 7 3 . 8 
1 9 4 6 0 . 6 4 6 0 . 6 1 2 7 . 1 8 7 2 . 8 8 4 . 4 
2 0 5 7 4 . 5 
i 
5 7 4 . 5 1 4 8 . 2 1 0 2 1 . 0 9 6 . 0 
2 1 4 6 0 . 3 i 4 6 0 . 3 1 1 1 . 2 1 1 3 2 . 2 1 0 4 . 6 
2 2 3 3 8 . 8 i 1 3 3 8 . 8 1 7 6 . 5 1 2 0 8 . 7 1 0 9 . 3 
2 3 2 8 2 . 7 
1 
1 1 2 8 2 . 7 5 9 . 6 1 2 6 8 . 3 1 1 2 . 5 I 
2 4 2 4 6 . 6 2 4 6 . 6 4 8 . 6 1 3 1 6 . 9 
1 1 4 . 5 
2 0 0 . 8 1 2 0 0 . 8 3 7 . 0 1 3 5 3 . 9 1 1 6 . 2 
2 6 1 7 3 . 3 i 1 7 3 . 2 1 2 9 . 9 1 3 8 3 . 8 1 1 7 . 0 
2 7 i 3 3 6 . 2 1 3 8 6 . 2 1 6 2 . 1 1 4 4 5 - 9 1 2 0 . 0 
2 8 j 3 2 8 . 4 ! 3 2 8 . 4 
; 4 9 . 4 1 4 9 5 . 3 1 2 3 . 2 
2 9 2 7 5 . 8 2 7 5 . 8 3 3 . 7 
1 5 3 4 . 0 1 2 4 . 9 
3 0 1 8 5 
i 
1 8 5 . 0 1 2 9 . 9 j 1 5 6 3 . 9 1 2 6 . 0 
APPENDIX 8.2CW ESTATli: AMORTIZED NET RETURNS FOH RhPUCEKENT CLONE RRIM 600 (S /ACKE) 
Assume (1 ) RSS 1 @ 40 cents per pound 
( 2 ) Discount rate @ 10 per cent 






Intore G t Accumulated 
I 
Adjusted i Present Present 1 Present 
of 
Returns 
on Unpaid Net i 
1 
i Net value of Value of Value of 
Trees Balance Returns Returns 
1 
Adjusted 





0 l i s 118 
j 
118 118 118 118 
1 - 2 2 8 . 1 -110 . 1 -228 . 1 -207 . 3 - 8 9 . 3 8 . 2 
2 - 1 4 2 . 2 - 1 1 . 0 -263 . 3 -153 . 3 -126 . 5 ; - 2 1 5 . 8 - 1 2 4 . 3 
3 -104 . 4 - 2 6 . 3 - 3 9 4 . 0 -130 . 7 - 9 3 . 2 -314 . 0 1 1 -126 . 2 
4 - 1 1 6 . 3 - 3 9 . 4 -549 . 7 -155 . 7 : -106.3 i -420 . 3 - 1 3 2 . 4 
5 - 9 9 . 1 - 5 4 . 9 - 7 0 3 . 8 
: - 1 5 " . 1 1 ! - 9 5 . 5 1 1 - 5 1 5 . 8 -1361 
6 + 1 2 8 . 9 - 7 0 . 4 -645.3 i ^ + 5 8 . 5 ; 
i - 5 3 . 0 1 
- 4 8 2 . 8 - 1 1 0 . 6 
7 - 7 8 . 9 - 6 4 . 5 -738 . 7 : : - 1 4 3 . 3 i 1 - 7 3 . 5 1 1 -556 . 3 - 1 1 4 . 0 
8 4 1 . 8 - 7 3 . 8 -825 . 7 i 1 - 3 7 . 0 1 1 - 17 . 3 1 1 - 5 2 3 . 6 -107 . 3 
9 1 4 2 . 2 - 8 2 . 6 -766.1 1 + 5 9 . 6 2 5 . 3 I I - 5 4 3 . 3 i - 9 4 . 9 
10 2 1 3 . 3 - 5 3 . 6 -606.4 1 5 9 . 7 6 1 . 6 ] 1 -536 . 7 8 6 . 9 
11 3 3 1 . 0 - 6 0 . 6 -336.0 2 7 0 . 4 9 4 . 3 1 -4-41.9 6 7 . 6 
12 3 3 3 . 5 - 3 3 . 6 - 36*1 2 9 9 . 9 9 5 . 5 - 3 4 6 . 0 - 50.5 
13 3 6 4 . 5 - 3 . 6 + 3 2 4 . 8 360.9 1 0 4 . 5 -241 . 5 - 3 3 . 8 
14 3 9 6 . 5 1 ! 3 9 6 . 5 1 0 4 . 3 -137 . 2 - 1 8 . 5 
15 1 9 1 . 7 j i 4 9 1 . 7 1 1 7 . 7 - 1 9 . 5 I - 2 . 6 
16 5 3 5 . 0 5 3 5 . 0 1 1 6 . 4 9 6 . 9 + 1 2 . 3 
17 3 7 5 . 5 3 7 5 . 5 7 3 . 9 1 7 0 . 8 2 1 . 2 
18 3 6 4 . 9 i i 65.6 2 3 6 . 4 2 8 . ^ 
19 4 6 0 . 6 1 460.6 7 5 . 3 3 11 . 7 3 7 . 1 
20 5 7 1 . 5 1 5 7 4 . 5 8 5 . 3 3 9 7 . 0 4 6 . 4 1 
21 4 6 0 . 3 1 4 6 0 . 3 6 2 . 1 
1 4 1 . 3 
4 5 9 . 1 1 5 2 . 8 
22 3 3 8 . 8 3 3 0 . 3 5 0 0 . 4 ; 5 7 . 0 
23 2 8 2 . 7 2 8 2 . 7 3 1 . 4 531.8 5 9 . 6 
24 2 4 6 . 6 2 4 6 . 6 25.0 5 5 6 . 3 6 2 . 9 
25 2 0 0 . 8 i 2 0 0 . 8 1 1 3 . 5 5 7 5 . 3 6 3 . 3 
26 1 7 3 . 3 1 7 3 . 3 ! 1 4 . 5 5 3 9 . 8 64.2 
27 3 8 6 . 2 1 3 0 6 . 2 1 29.5 619.3 6 6 . 9 
2 8 3 2 0 . 4 i 3 2 8 . 4 I 2 2 . 7 6 4 2 . 0 68.7 
29 2 7 5 . 8 




! 1 8 5 . 0 
1 
1 




APW^NDIX 8 ,20N ESTATES: AMOHTIZED NET RETURNS FOR REPLACEMENT CLONE RRIM 600 ( V A C R E ) 
Assume ( l ) RSS 1 & 60 cents per pound 
(2 ) Discount rate & 7 per cent 
































0 1 1 8 
i 
1 1 8 
I 
! 
1 1 8 i 1 1 0 1 1 8 1 1 8 
1 - 2 2 6 . 1 - 1 1 0 . 1 - 2 2 8 . 1 1 -213o2 - 9 5 . 2 - 1 0 . 2 
2 - 1 4 2 . 2 - 7 . 7 - 2 6 0 . 0 - 1 4 9 . 9 1 - 1 3 0 . 8 - 2 2 6 . 1 - 1 2 5 . 0 
3 ~104»4 - 1 8 . 2 - 3 8 2 . 6 - 1 2 2 . 6 1 { - 1 0 0 . 0 - 3 2 6 . 2 - 1 2 4 . 3 
4 - 1 1 6 . 3 - 2 6 . 8 - 5 2 5 . 7 - 1 4 3 . 1 j -109 . 2 -435 . 4 -128 . 4 
5 - 9 9 . 1 - 3 6 . 8 - 6 6 1 . 6 - 1 3 5 . 9 - 9 6 . 9 -532 . 3 - 1 2 9 . 8 
6 + 1 2 8 , 9 - 4 6 . 3 - 6 2 5 . 3 + 8 2 . 6 ! + 5 5 . 0 -477 . 3 - 1 0 0 . 1 
7 3 4 . 9 - 4 3 . 8 -634 . 2 - 8 . 9 1 - 5 . 5 - 4 8 2 . 8 - 8 9 . 6 
8 2 1 6 . 2 - 4 4 . 4 -462 . 4 1 7 1 . 8 9 9 . 9 ! - 3 0 2 . 8 - 6 3 . 9 
9 3 6 6 . 8 - 3 2 . 4 - 1 2 7 . 9 3 3 4 . 4 1 8 1 . 9 - 2 0 0 . 9 - 3 0 . 8 
10 4 7 3 . 1 - 8 . 9 + 3 3 6 . 2 4 6 4 . 1 2 3 5 . 8 ! + 3 4 . 9 + 5 . 0 
11 6 4 9 . 5 6 4 9 . 5 3 0 0 . 5 3 4 3 . 4 4 5 . 8 
12 j 6 5 2 . 3 6 5 2 . 3 2 8 9 . 6 j 6 3 3 . 0 7 9 . 7 
13 6 9 9 . 3 6 9 9 . 3 2 9 0 . 1 9 2 3 . 1 1 1 0 . 4 
14 7 4 6 . 0 1 7 4 6 . 0 2 0 9 . 3 1 2 1 2 . 4 1 3 3 . 6 
15 8 8 8 . 8 8 8 0 . 8 3 2 1 . 7 1 5 3 4 . 1 1 6 8 , 4 
16 9 5 2 . 8 9 5 2 . 8 J2-.1 1 8 5 6 . 8 1 9 6 . 4 
17 7 1 9 . 0 7 1 9 . 0 271.G 2 0 8 4 . 4 2 1 3 . 5 
10 7 0 2 . 6 1 7 0 2 . 6 2 0 7 . 8 1 i 2 2 9 2 . 2 ! 1 2 2 6 , 9 I 
19 8 4 6 . 1 i 0 4 6 . 1 2 3 3 . 9 1 2 5 2 6 . 1 1 2 4 4 . 3 
2 0 1 0 3 4 . 3 1 1 1 0 3 4 . 3 2 6 6 , 8 1 2 7 9 2 . 9 
2 6 3 . 6 
21 8 4 5 . 7 1 8 4 5 . 7 
1 
! 2 0 4 . 2 2 9 9 7 . 1 2 7 6 . 6 
22 6 5 3 . 2 1 6 5 3 . 2 
1 
1 4 7 . 4 3 1 4 4 . 2 : 2 8 2 , 9 
23 5 7 8 . 7 5 7 0 . 7 1 2 1 . 5 3 2 6 5 . 7 289 *7 
2 4 5 1 3 . 6 5 1 3 . 6 101 . 2 3 3 6 6 . 9 2 9 2 . 9 
25 4 4 4 . 8 
4 4 4 . 8 8 1 . 8 3 4 4 8 . 7 2 9 5 . 9 
26 4 0 3 . 1 4 0 3 . 1 6 9 . 3 
3 5 1 8 . 0 2 9 7 . 5 1 
27 7 0 7 . 2 
7 0 7 . 2 1 1 3 . 8 3 6 3 1 . 8 1 3 0 1 . 4 
23 6 1 8 . 4 610 . 4 9 3 . 0 3 7 2 4 . 0 3 0 6 . 9 
29 5 3 8 . 6 
5 3 0 . 6 7 5 . 7 3 8 0 0 . 5 3 0 7 . 8 
30 4 6 6 . 7 
1 
4 6 6 , 7 6 1 . 1 t 
! 
3 0 6 1 . 6 3 1 1 . 2 
APPENDIX 8.200 KSTATK: AHOnTI'ZED NHT IffiTUKI^ 'S FOR HKPLACEtffiNT CLONE RRIH COO ($/ACRE) 
Assume (l) RSS 1 >9 60 cents per pound 
(2) Discount rate 10 per cent 
(3) Replanting grant SlOOO.OO per acre 




Interest Accumulated j Adjusted Present Present Present 
of on Unpaid 
! 











0 1 1 8 1 1 8 1 1 8 i I 1 1 8 1 1 1 8 1 1 8 
1 - 2 2 8 . 1 - 1 1 0 . 1 ! - 2 2 8 . 1 } - 2 0 7 . 3 ^ - 8 9 . 3 - 9 8 . 2 
2 - 1 4 2 . 2 - 1 1 . 0 - 2 6 3 . 3 ! - 1 5 3 . 2 1 - 1 2 6 . 5 ! - 2 1 5 , 8 - 1 2 4 . 3 
3 - 1 0 4 . 4 - 2 6 . 3 - 3 9 4 . 0 j - 1 3 0 . 7 I - 9 8 . 2 1 - 3 1 4 . 0 - 1 2 6 . 3 
4 - 1 1 6 . 3 - 3 9 . 4 - 5 4 9 . 7 j - 1 5 5 . 7 - 1 0 6 . 3 ; - 4 2 0 . 3 - 1 3 2 . 4 
5 - 9 9 . 1 - 5 4 . 9 - 7 0 3 . 8 1 - 1 5 4 . 1 1 - 9 5 . 5 - 5 1 5 . 8 - 1 3 6 . 1 
6 + 1 2 8 . 9 - 7 0 . 4 - 6 4 5 . 3 I + 5 0 . 5 + 3 3 . 0 1 - 4 0 2 . 8 - 1 1 0 . 6 
n / 3 - 1 . 9 - 6 4 . 5 - 6 7 4 . 9 i - 2 9 . 6 1 1 - 1 5 . 2 - 4 9 0 . 0 - 1 0 0 . 1 
8 2 1 6 . 2 - 6 7 . 5 - 5 2 6 . 2 1 4 8 . 7 6 9 . 4 - 4 2 8 . 6 - 8 0 . 1 
3 6 6 . 8 - 5 2 . 6 - 2 1 2 . 0 3 1 4 . 2 1 3 3 . 2 - 2 9 5 . 4 - 5 1 . 3 
1 0 4 7 3 . 1 - 2 1 . 2 + 2 3 9 . 9 4 5 1 . 9 1 7 4 . 2 - 1 2 1 . 2 - 1 9 . 7 
1 1 ' 6 4 9 . 5 6 4 9 . 5 2 2 8 . 3 + 1 0 7 . 1 + 1 6 . 3 
1 2 6 5 2 . 3 6 5 2 . 3 2 0 7 . 4 3 1 4 . 5 4 5 . 9 
1 3 6 9 9 . 3 1 6 9 9 . 3 2 0 2 . 1 5 1 6 . 6 7 2 . 3 
1 4 7 4 6 . 0 7 4 6 . 0 1 9 6 . 2 7 1 2 . 8 9 6 . 2 
1 5 8 8 8 . 8 8 8 8 . 8 2 1 2 . 4 } 9 2 5 . 2 1 2 1 . 2 
1 6 9 5 2 a 8 t 9 5 2 , 8 2 0 6 . 0 1 1 3 2 . 0 1 4 3 . 7 
1 7 7 1 9 . 0 1 1 7 1 9 . 0 j 1 4 2 . 2 1 2 7 4 . 2 1 5 8 . 0 
1 8 7 0 2 . 6 
1 7 0 2 . 6 ; 1 2 6 . 3 1 4 0 0 . 5 1 6 9 . 4 
1 9 8 4 6 . 1 j 8 4 6 . 1 1 3 8 . 3 1 5 3 8 . 8 j 1 8 3 . 1 
2 0 1 0 3 4 . 3 
1 
1 0 3 4 . 3 1 5 3 . 7 1 6 9 2 . 5 1 9 8 . 8 
2 1 8 4 5 . 7 3 4 5 . 7 1 1 4 . 2 1 8 0 6 . 7 1 2 0 7 . B 
2 2 6 5 3 . 2 6 5 3 . 2 0 0 . 2 1 1 8 6 . 9 j 2 1 5 . 2 
2 3 5 7 8 . 7 t 5 7 0 . 7 6 4 . 6 1 9 5 1 . 5 1 2 1 8 . 6 
2 4 5 1 3 . 6 5 1 3 . 6 5 2 . 1 2 0 0 3 . 6 2 2 3 . 0 
2 5 4 4 4 . 8 1 4 4 4 . 8 4 0 . 9 1 2 0 4 4 . 5 2 3 7 . 2 
2 6 4 0 3 . 1 j 4 0 3 . 1 ; 3 3 . 8 ! 2 4 4 7 . 5 2 4 0 . 7 
? 7 7 0 7 . 2 t 7 0 7 . 2 i 5 3 . 7 1 3 1 5 4 . 8 2 4 3 . 7 
2 8 6 1 8 . 4 6 I 8 . 4 1 4 2 . 7 3 7 7 3 . 2 2 5 7 . 7 
2 9 5 3 0 . 6 i 5 3 8 . 6 ! 3 3 . 9 4 3 1 1 . 8 2 8 6 . 5 
3 0 4 6 6 . 7 
1 4 6 6 . 7 
1 
2 6 . 6 4 7 7 8 . 5 2 9 1 . 6 1 
! ! 
APPENDIX 8,20P ESTATE: AMORTIZED MET RETURNS FOR REP LICE Iffil.'T CLONE RRIM 600 (S/ACRE) 
Assume ( l ) RSS 1 0 80 cents per pound 
(2) Discount rate 0 7 per cent 


































118 1 118 118 1 
. ...._ - .. , 
1 
i 
118 1 118 
1 -228.1 • - 1 1 0 . 1 1 -228.1 -213.2 1 - 95 .2 - 10 .2 
2 -142.2 - 7 . 7 -260 .0 1 -149.9 1 - 1 3 0 . 8 1 - 2 2 6 . 1 I -125.0 
3 -104.4 - 18.2 -382.6 1 -122.6 -100.0 i - 3 2 6 . 2 -124.3 
4 -116.3 - 2 6 . 8 -525.7 -143.1 -109.2 - 4 3 5 . 4 ! -128.4 
5 - 99 . 1 - 3 6 . 8 - 6 6 1 . 6 i -135.9 - 96 .9 - 5 3 2 . 3 ; - 1 2 9 . 8 
6 +128 .9 - 46 .3 -625,3 + 8 2 . 6 + 55 .0 - 4 7 7 . 3 ; -100.1 
7 113 .8 - 4 3 . 8 -555.3 + 70 . 0 + 4 3 . 6 ; - 4 3 3 . 7 1 - 80 .5 
8 336 .8 - 30 .9 j -257.4 +297 .9 173 . " 1 - 2 6 0 . 3 1 - 43 . 5 
9 522.3 - 18 .0 i +246.9 +504.3 274 .3 j + 1 3 . 9 I + 2 . 1 
10 651.1 
1 
6 5 1 . 4 330.9 3 4 4 . 8 48 .9 
1 1 867.4 j ! 8 6 7 . 4 412 .0 7 5 6 . 0 100 .9 
12 870 .8 
1 
870 .8 386 . 6 1 1 4 3 . 4 143.9 
13 927 .9 
1 
1 927 .9 304 .9 ; 1 5 3 0 103.1 
14 984 .8 
1 
984 . 8 301 .9 1 9 1 1 . 9 218 .0 
15 1159.4 1159.4 420.1 2 3 3 2 255 .8 
16 1237 .8 1237 .8 419.2 2 7 5 1 . 2 291 .1 
17 952 .9 952 .9 301.7 3 0 5 2 . 9 312 .6 
18 932 .6 932.6 275 .9 3328 ,8 1 330 .9 
19 m o . 3 1110.3 307.0 3635 .8 351 .6 
20 1342.3 1 3 4 2 . 3 1 346 .3 3982.1 375 .9 
21 1109.9 j 1 1 0 9 . 9 2 6 8 . 0 4 2 5 0 . 1 392.2 
1 
22 886.3 886.3 200 4 4 5 0 . 1 402.3 1 
23 764 .1 j 7 6 4 . 1 161 4 6 1 1 . 1 409 .0 
24 j 696.7 
i 
1 6 9 6 . 7 136 .9 4 7 4 3 . 0 413 .0 
25 612.3 
1 
1 612.3 112.7 4860.7 417 .0 
26 560 .9 
( 
1 5 6 0 . 9 96 .5 4957.2 419.2 
27 1 927 .9 
1 
1 927.9 M 9 . 3 5106.5 426 .0 
28 1 818.5 818.5 122 .8 5229.3 430 .9 
29 718.2 
1 
1 718.2 100 .9 5330.2 434.1 




631.5 82 .9 
i 
5413.1 436 .2 
'02 
APPENDIX 8.20Q ESTATE: AM0riTI7,f;D NET RETUIWS FOH l^iiPLACEffiHT CLONE RHIH 600 (5t/ACRE) 
Assume (l) RSS 1 @ 80 cents per pound 
(2) Discount rate ® 10 per cent 
(3) Roplanting grant SlOOO.OO per acre 




Interest Accumulated Adjusted Present Present 
t { 
Present 1 
of on Unpaid Net Net Value of Value of Value of 







; Net Returns 
0 1 1 8 1 1 8 1 1 8 1 1 8 1 1 1 8 
• " 
1 1 8 
1 - 2 2 8 . 1 - 1 1 0 . 1 - 2 2 8 . 1 - 2 0 7 . 3 - 8 9 . 3 ) - 9 8 . 2 
2 - 1 4 2 . 2 - 1 1 . 0 - 2 6 3 . 3 - 1 5 3 . 2 1 - 1 2 6 . 5 - 2 1 5 . 8 - 1 2 4 . 3 
3 - 1 0 4 . 4 - 2 6 . 3 - 3 9 4 . 0 - 1 3 0 . 7 i 1 - 9 8 . 2 - 3 1 4 . ; - 1 2 6 . 2 
4 - 1 1 6 . 3 - 3 9 . 4 - 5 4 9 . 7 - 1 5 5 . 7 1 - 1 0 6 . 3 - 4 2 0 . 1 - 1 3 2 . 4 
- 9 9 . 1 - 5 4 . 9 - 7 0 3 . 8 - 1 5 4 . 1 - 9 5 . 5 - 5 1 5 . 8 i I - 1 3 6 . 1 
6 + 1 2 8 , 9 - 7 0 . 4 - 6 4 ^ , . 3 + 5 8 . 5 + 3 3 . 0 - 4 8 2 . 8 i I - 1 1 0 . 6 
7 1 1 3 . 8 - 6 4 . 5 - 5 9 6 0 4 9 . 3 + 2 5 . 3 - 4 5 7 . 5 - 9 3 . 8 
8 3 3 6 . 8 - 5 9 . 6 - 3 1 8 . 8 2 7 7 . 2 1 2 9 . 3 - 3 2 0 . 2 - 6 1 . 4 
5 2 2 . 3 - 3 1 . 9 + 1 7 1 . 6 4 < ; 0 . 4 2 0 7 . 9 - 1 2 0 . 3 ! : - 2 0 . 8 
1 0 6 5 1 . 4 6 5 1 . 4 2 5 1 . 1 + 1 3 0 . 8 j + 2 1 . 3 
1 1 8 6 7 . 4 8 6 7 . 4 3 0 4 . 0 4 3 4 . 8 1 I + 6 6 . 5 
1 2 8 7 0 . 8 8 7 0 . 8 2 9 7 . 3 7 3 2 . 1 ; 1 1 0 6 . 9 
1 3 9 2 7 . 9 i 9 2 7 . 9 2 6 . 8 1 0 0 0 . 9 1 4 0 . 9 
1 4 9 8 4 . 8 9 8 4 . 8 2 5 9 . 3 1 2 6 0 . 2 1 7 0 . 1 
1 5 1 1 5 9 . 4 1 1 1 5 9 . 4 2 7 7 . 1 1 5 3 7 . 3 2 0 2 . 1 
1 6 1 2 3 7 . 8 1 2 3 7 . 0 ! 1 2 6 9 . 4 1 8 0 6 . 7 2 2 9 . 5 
1 7 9 5 2 . 9 9 5 2 . 9 ! 1 1 8 8 . 5 1 9 9 5 . 2 2 4 7 . 4 
1 8 9 3 2 . 6 9 3 2 . 6 i 1 6 7 . 7 2 1 6 2 . 9 2 6 1 . 7 
1 9 1 1 1 0 . 3 I 1 1 1 0 . 3 i 1 1 8 1 . 5 2 3 4 4 . 4 2 7 8 . 9 
2 0 1 3 4 2 . 3 1 3 4 2 . 3 1 1 9 8 . 7 2 5 4 3 . 1 2 9 7 . 5 
2 1 1 1 0 9 . 9 1 1 0 9 . 9 1 1 4 9 . 8 2 6 9 2 . 9 2 0 9 . 7 
2 2 3 0 6 . 3 8 8 6 . 3 1 0 8 . 8 2 8 0 1 . 7 3 1 9 . 4 
2 3 7 6 4 . 1 7 6 4 . 1 8 5 . 3 2 8 8 7 . 0 3 2 3 . 3 
2 4 5 6 9 6 . 7 7 0 . 7 2 9 5 7 . 7 1 3 2 9 . 2 
2 5 6 1 2 . 3 1 6 1 2 . 3 5 6 . 5 3 0 1 4 . 2 ! ! 3 2 2 . 1 
2 6 5 6 0 . 9 i 5 6 0 . 9 4 7 . 1 3 0 1 1 . 3 3 3 3 . 7 • 
2 7 9 2 7 . 9 9 2 7 . 9 7 0 . 8 3 1 3 2 . 1 3 3 9 . 1 
2 8 B I B . 5 8 1 8 . 5 5 6 . 5 3 1 8 8 . 6 3 4 1 . 2 
2 9 7 1 8 . 2 1 7 1 8 . 2 4 5 . 2 3 2 3 3 . 8 3 4 2 . 8 
3 0 6 3 1 . 5 1 6 3 1 . 5 
1 
3 6 . 0 3 2 6 9 . 8 3 4 6 . 6 
t 
A P P K N D I X 8 . 2 0 R E S T A T K : A H O H T I Z E D N E T R S T L ' R H S F O R R S P L A C E M K N T C L O N E R R I M 6 0 0 ( S / A C R E ) 
A a s u m o ( 1 ) R S S 1 # 4 0 c e n t s p e r p o u n d 
( 2 ) D i s c o u n t r a t e © 7 p e r c e n t 
( 3 ) R e p l a n t i n c ^ r a n t J i l ^ O O . O O p e r a c r e 
A g e 
o f 
T r e e s 
N e t 
R e t u r n s 
I n t e r e s t 
o n U n p a i d 
B a l a n c e 
A c c u m u l a t e d 
N e t 




A d j u s t e d 
N e t 
R e t u r n s 
1 
I 
j P r e s e n t 
V a l u e o f 
A d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t u r n a 
A c c a n u l a t e d 
P r e s e n t 
V a l u e o f 
A d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t u r n s 
A m o r t i z e d 
P r e s e n t 
V a l u e o f 
A d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t u r n s 
0 2 8 4 . 7 2 8 4 . 7 
i 
! 2 8 4 . 7 j 2 8 4 . 7 
i 
2 8 4 . 7 2 8 4 . 7 
1 - 1 6 1 . 4 1 2 3 . 3 - 1 6 1 . 4 ! - 1 5 0 . 8 1 1 3 3 . 9 ! 1 4 3 . 2 
2 - 7 5 . 5 4 7 . 8 - 7 5 . 5 1 - 6 5 . 9 6 7 . 9 1 3 7 . 6 
3 - 3 7 . 8 1 0 . 8 - 3 7 . 8 - 3 0 . 8 i 
1 ; 
1 4 , 1 
4 - 6 9 , 6 - 5 9 . 6 - 6 9 . 6 - 5 3 . 1 - 1 6 . 0 
1 
; - 4 . 7 
- 5 2 . 5 - 4 . 2 - 1 1 6 . 3 - 5 6 . 7 - 4 0 . 4 - 5 6 . 4 i - 1 3 . 7 
6 - 8 8 . 9 - 8 . 1 - 2 1 3 . 3 - 9 7 . 0 - 6 4 . 6 - 1 2 1 . 0 1 ' - 2 5 . 4 
7 - 7 0 . 9 - 1 4 . 9 i - 3 0 7 . 1 - 9 3 . 8 - 5 8 . 3 1 7 9 . 3 i - 3 3 . 2 
8 4 1 . 8 - 2 1 . 5 - 2 8 6 . 8 + 2 0 . 3 + 1 1 . 8 - 1 6 7 . 5 - 2 7 . 9 
9 1 4 2 . 2 - 2 0 , 1 - 1 6 4 . 7 1 2 2 . 1 6 6 . ^ - - 1 0 1 . 1 i - 1 5 . 5 
1 0 2 1 3 . 3 - 1 1 . 5 + 3 7 . 1 2 0 1 . 8 1 0 2 . 5 1 . 4 1 + 0 . 2 
1 1 3 3 1 . 0 3 3 1 . 0 1 5 7 . 2 1 5 8 . 6 i + 2 1 . 1 
1 2 3 3 3 . 5 3 3 3 . 5 i 1 4 8 . 1 3 0 6 . 7 i + 3 8 . 6 
1 3 3 6 4 . 5 3 6 4 . 5 1 1 5 0 . 9 1 4 5 7 . 6 + 5 4 . 8 
1 4 3 9 6 . 5 3 ' ; 6 . 5 i 1 1 5 3 . 8 6 1 1 . 4 + 6 9 . 7 
1 5 4 9 1 . 7 j 4 9 1 . 7 
1 7 3 . 2 7 8 9 . 6 + 8 6 . 7 
16 5 3 5 . 0 1 5 3 5 . 0 1 3 1 . 2 i 9 7 0 . 8 1 0 2 . 8 
1 7 3 7 5 . 5 
» 
3 7 5 . 5 1 1 8 . 6 1 0 8 9 . 4 1 1 1 . 1 
1 8 3 6 4 . 9 
f 
3 6 4 . 9 1 0 7 . 6 1 1 9 7 . 0 1 1 8 . 9 
19 I 4 6 0 . 6 
1 j 1 
1 
I 4 6 0 . 6 1 2 7 . 1 1 1 3 2 4 . 1 j 1 2 3 . 0 
20 ! 5 7 1 . 5 
1 
1 
5 7 4 . 5 1 1 4 0 . 2 j 1 4 7 2 . 2 1 3 8 . 9 




1 4 6 0 . 3 1 1 1 . 2 1 1 5 8 3 . 4 1 4 6 . 1 
2 2 3 3 3 . 8 1 3 3 8 . 8 7 6 . 5 1 6 5 9 . 9 1 5 0 . 0 
2 3 2 3 2 . 7 j 2 8 2 . 7 5 9 . 6 1 7 2 0 1 5 2 . 2 
2 4 2 4 6 . 6 ! 2 4 6 . 6 4 8 . 6 1 7 6 8 . 1 1 5 3 . 8 
2 5 2 0 0 . 8 j 2 0 0 . 8 3 7 . 0 j 1 8 0 5 . 1 1 5 4 . 8 
2 6 1 7 3 . 3 1 1 7 3 . 3 2 9 . 9 1 1 8 3 5 1 5 5 , 2 
2 7 3 0 6 . 2 3 3 6 . 2 6 2 . 1 i S 1 8 9 7 . 1 1 5 7 . 5 
2 8 3 2 8 . 4 3 2 8 . 4 4 9 . 4 1 9 4 6 . 5 1 6 0 . 4 
2 9 2 7 5 . 6 
1 
i 2 7 5 . 6 3 8 . 7 1 9 8 5 o 2 1 6 1 . 7 
j 2 2 7 . 8 
I 
i 2 2 7 . 8 2 9 . 9 ! 
! j 
i 2 0 1 5 o l 
1 
1 6 2 , 4 
APPENDIX 8,20S ESTATE: AMORTIZED NET RETURNS FOR REPLACEMENT CLONE RRIM 600 ($/ACRE) 
Assume (l) RSS 1 0 '10 cents per pound 
(2) Discount ratu @ 10 per cent 








Interest Accumulated ! Adjusted Present Present Present ' 




Balance Returns Returns Adjusted | 








2 8 4 . 7 2 8 4 . 7 2 8 4 , 7 
i 
2 8 4 . 7 j 
i 
2 8 4 , 7 
1 
2 8 4 . 7 
1 - 1 6 1 . 4 ! 1 2 3 . 3 1 - 1 6 1 . 4 1 - 1 4 6 . 7 1 3 8 . 0 1 5 1 . 7 
2 - 7 5 . 5 4 7 . 8 - 7 5 . 5 1 - 6 2 . 4 7 5 . 6 4 3 . 6 
3 - 3 7 . 8 i 1 0 . 0 - 3 7 . 8 1 - 2 8 . 4 4 7 . 2 1 8 . 9 
4 - 6 9 . 6 - 5 9 . 6 1 - 6 9 . 6 i - 4 7 . 5 - 0 . 3 - 0 . 1 
5 - 5 2 , 5 - 6 . 0 - 1 1 8 . 1 1 - 5 8 . 5 ! - 3 6 . 3 - 3 6 . 6 - 9 . 6 
6 - 8 8 . 9 - 1 1 . 8 - 2 1 8 . 8 i - 1 0 0 . 7 j - 5 6 . 8 - 9 3 . 4 - 2 1 . 4 
7 - 7 8 . 9 - 2 1 . 9 ! - 3 1 9 . 6 1 - 1 0 0 . 8 1 - 5 1 . 7 - 1 4 5 . 0 - 2 9 . 8 
8 4 1 . 8 - 3 2 . 0 1 - 3 0 9 . 8 j + 9 . 8 + 4 . 6 - 1 4 0 . 4 - 2 6 i 3 
9 1 4 2 . 2 - 3 1 . 0 i - 1 9 8 . 6 ! 1 1 1 . 2 1 4 7 . 1 - 9 3 . 3 - 1 6 . 2 
1 0 2 1 3 . 3 - 1 9 . 9 s - 5 . 2 i 1 9 3 . 4 i 7 4 . 6 - 1 8 . 7 - 3 . 0 
1 1 3 3 1 . 0 - 0 . 5 + 3 2 5 . 3 ! 3 3 0 . 5 1 1 5 . 6 + 9 6 . 9 + 1 4 . 9 
1 2 3 3 3 . 5 3 3 3 . 5 I 1 0 6 . 0 2 0 2 . 9 + 2 9 . 8 
1 3 3 6 4 . 5 3 6 4 . 5 1 1 0 5 . 6 3 0 8 . 5 4 3 . 4 
1 4 3 9 6 . 5 3 9 6 . 5 1 0 4 . 3 ' 4 1 2 . 3 5 6 . 0 
1 5 4 9 1 . 7 4 9 1 . 7 1 1 7 . 7 1 5 3 0 . 5 6 9 . 7 
16 5 3 5 . 0 1 5 3 5 - 0 1 1 6 . 4 6 4 6 . 9 8 2 . 2 
1 7 3 7 5 . 5 3 7 5 . 5 7 3 . 9 7 2 0 . 8 8 9 . 4 
1 0 3 6 4 . 9 3 6 4 . 9 6 5 . 6 7 8 6 . 4 ' 9 5 . 9 
1 9 4 6 0 . 6 4 6 0 . 6 1 7 5 . 3 8 6 1 . 7 i 1 0 3 . 0 
2 0 5 7 4 . 5 5 7 4 . 5 8 5 . 3 9 4 7 , 0 1 1 1 , 2 
2 1 4 6 0 . 3 3 6 0 . 3 6 2 . 1 1 0 0 9 , 1 1 1 6 . 7 
2 2 3 3 8 . 8 I 3 3 8 . 8 4 1 . 3 
1 0 5 0 . 4 1 1 9 . 7 
2 3 2 8 2 . 7 j 2 8 2 . 7 3 1 . 4 1 0 8 1 . 8 1 2 1 . 7 , 
2 4 2 4 6 . 6 2 4 6 . 6 2 5 . 0 1 1 0 6 . 8 1 2 3 . 2 
2 5 2 0 0 . 8 2 0 0 . 8 1 3 . 5 1 1 2 5 . 3 1 2 3 . 9 
2 6 1 7 3 . 3 1 7 3 . 3 1 4 . 5 1 1 3 9 . 8 
1 2 4 . 4 
2 7 3 8 6 . 2 3 8 6 . 2 2 9 . 5 1 1 6 9 . 3 
1 2 6 . 6 
2 8 3 2 8 . 4 3 2 8 . 4 2 2 , 7 1 1 9 2 . 0 
1 2 8 . 1 
2 9 2 7 5 . 6 2 7 5 . 6 1 7 . 4 1 1 2 0 9 . 4 
1 2 9 . 0 
3 0 2 2 7 . 8 2 2 7 . 8 1 0 . 5 
i 
i 2 1 1 9 . 9 
i 
1 1 2 9 . 3 
1 
APPENDIX 8,?0T K^TATE: A M O H n Z E D HKT RKTUiiUS fOU REPLACEHKiT CLONE RHIM 600 (Sl/ACiffi) 
Assume (l) RSS 1 @ 60 cents per pound 
(2) Discount rate 9 7 per cent 
(3) Replanting grant ;|1500.00 per acre 
I ! ! 1 Accumulated Amortized 
Age 
Met 
Interest Accumulated Adjusted i Present Present Present 
of on Unpaid Net Hot 1 Value of Value of Value of 
Returns I 
Trees Balance Returns 
1 i 








0 2 8 4 . 7 
! 
i 




2 8 4 . 7 2 8 4 . 7 2 8 4 . 7 2 8 4 . 7 
1 - 1 6 1 . 4 1 2 3 . 3 - 1 6 1 . 4 - 1 5 0 . 8 1 3 3 . 9 1 4 3 . 2 
2 - 7 5 . 5 4 7 . 8 - 7 5 . 5 - 6 5 . 9 6 7 . 9 3 7 . 6 
3 - 3 7 . 8 1 0 . 0 - 3 7 . 8 - 3 0 . 8 3 7 . 1 1 4 . 1 
4 - 6 9 . 6 
< - 5 9 . 6 - 6 9 . 6 - 5 3 . 1 
- 1 6 . 0 - 4 . 7 
5 - 5 2 . 5 - 4 . 2 - 1 1 6 . 3 1 - 5 6 . 7 - 4 0 . 4 - 5 6 . 4 - 1 3 . 7 
6 - 8 8 . 9 - 8 . 1 - 2 1 3 . 3 - 9 7 . 0 - 6 4 . 6 - 1 2 1 . 0 1 - 2 5 . 4 
7 3 4 . 9 - 1 4 . 9 - 1 9 3 . 3 + 2 0 . 0 + 1 2 . 4 - 1 0 8 . 5 i - 2 0 . 1 
0 2 1 6 , 2 - 1 3 . 5 1 + 9 . 4 j 2 0 2 . 7 + 1 1 7 . 9 + 9 . 5 i 
+ 1 . 6 
9 3 6 6 . 8 
; \ 
i 3 6 6 . 8 1 9 9 . 1 2 0 8 . 7 1 3 1 . 9 
1 0 ' 1 7 3 . 1 
1 
] i 4 7 3 - 1 2 4 0 . 3 4 4 9 . 0 6 3 . 3 
1 1 6 4 9 . 5 i 1 1 6 4 9 . 5 3 0 8 . 5 7 5 7 . 5 1 0 0 . 9 
1 2 6 5 2 . 3 
i i
6 5 2 . 3 2 0 9 . 6 1 0 4 7 . 1 1 3 1 . 8 
1 3 6 9 9 . 3 6 9 9 . 3 1 1 2 9 0 . 1 1 3 3 7 . 2 1 5 9 . 1 
1 4 7 4 6 . 0 7 4 6 . 0 : 2 8 9 . 3 1 6 2 6 . 5 j 1 8 5 . 4 
1 5 8 8 8 . 8 8 8 8 . 8 3 2 1 . 7 
1 9 4 8 . 2 1 2 1 3 . 9 
1 6 9 5 2 . 8 9 5 2 . 8 3 2 2 . 7 1 2 2 7 0 . 9 1 2 4 0 , 4 
1 7 7 1 9 . 0 7 1 9 . 0 2 2 7 . 6 j 2 4 9 3 . 5 2 5 5 . 8 
1 8 7 0 2 . 6 7 0 2 . 6 2 0 7 . 8 1 2 7 0 6 . 3 2 6 7 . 9 
1 9 8 4 6 . 1 8 4 6 , 1 2 3 3 . 9 
1 2 9 4 0 , 2 2 8 4 . 3 
2 0 1 0 3 - 1 . 3 1 0 3 4 . 3 2 6 6 . 8 { 3 2 0 7 . 0 3 0 1 . 1 
2 1 8 4 5 . 7 0 4 5 . 7 2 0 4 . 2 j 3 4 1 1 . 2 3 1 3 . 8 
2 2 6 5 3 . 2 6 5 3 . 2 1 4 7 . 4 j 3 5 5 8 . 6 3 2 1 . 7 
2 3 5 7 0 . 7 ! 1 
5 7 3 . 7 1 2 1 . 5 3 6 8 0 . 1 3 2 6 . 4 
2 4 5 1 3 . 6 i 5 1 3 . 6 1 0 1 . 2 3 7 8 1 . 3 3 2 8 . 9 
4 4 4 . 8 1 4 4 4 . 8 8 1 . 8 3 8 6 3 . 1 1 3 3 1 . 5 
2 6 4 0 3 . 1 j 4 0 3 . 1 6 9 . 3 1 3 9 3 2 . 4 j 3 3 2 . 5 • 
2 7 7 0 7 . 2 7 0 7 , 2 
! 1 1 3 . 8 j 4 0 4 6 . 2 i 3 3 5 . 9 
1 2 8 6 1 0 . 4 6 1 8 . 4 1 9 3 . 0 i 4 1 3 9 . 2 
3 4 1 . 0 
j 2 9 5 3 8 . 6 5 3 0 . 6 j 7 5 . 7 4 2 1 4 . 9 3 4 1 . 4 
1 3 0 
1 
4 6 6 . 7 
t 
1 
i 1 4 6 6 . 7 
1 
1 6 1 . 1 
i 
! 4 2 7 6 . 0 3 4 4 . 6 
A P P E N D I X 8 . 2 0 U E S T A T E : A M O R T I Z E D N E T R E T U R N S F O R R E P L A C E M E N T C L O N E R R I M 600 ( S / A C R E ) 
A s a u m e ( l ) R S S 1 ® 6 0 c e n t a p e r p o u n d 
( ? ) D i s c o u n t r a t e ® 1 0 p e r c e n t 
( 3 ) R e p l a n t i n g ; g r a n t S l 5 0 0 , 0 0 p e r a c r e 
A g e 
o f 
T r e e s 
N e t 
R e t u r n s 
I n t e r e s t 
O n U n p a i d 
B a l a n c e 
1 
A c c u m u l a t e d 
N e t 
R e t u r n s ; 
i 
! 
A d j u s t e d 1 
N e t 
R e t u r n a 
P r e s e n t 
V a l u e o f 
i 
A d j u s t e d i 
N e t R e t i i r n s ] 
A c c u m u l a t e d 
P r e s e n t 
V a l u e o f 
A d j u s t e d 
i N e t R e t u r n s 
A m o r t i z e d 
P r e s e n t 
V a l u e o f 
A d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t u r n s 
0 2 8 4 . 7 
1 
2 8 4 . 7 1 2 8 4 . 7 2 0 4 . 7 2 8 4 . 7 2 8 4 . 7 
- 1 6 1 . 4 1 2 3 . 3 - 1 6 1 , 4 I - 1 4 6 . 7 1 3 8 . 0 1 5 1 . 7 
2 - 7 5 . 5 4 7 . 8 - 7 5 . 5 I - 6 2 . 4 i 7 5 . 6 4 3 . 6 
3 - 3 7 . 8 1 0 . 0 1 - 3 7 . 8 i - 2 8 . 4 1 4 7 . 2 1 1 8 . 9 
4 - 6 9 . 6 - 5 9 . 6 1 - 6 9 . 6 j - 4 7 . 5 ^ - 0 . 3 1 : - 0 . 1 
5 - 5 2 . 5 - 6 . 0 - 1 1 8 . 1 - 5 3 . 5 j - 3 6 . 3 1 - 3 6 . 6 ; - 9 . 6 
6 - 8 8 . 9 - 1 1 . 8 - 2 1 8 . 8 - 1 0 0 . 7 - 5 6 . 8 j - 9 3 . 4 - 2 1 . 4 
7 3 4 . 9 - 2 1 . 9 - 2 0 5 . 8 + 1 3 . 0 + 6 . 7 j - 8 6 . 7 - 1 7 , 8 
8 1 2 1 6 . 2 - 2 0 . 6 - 1 0 . 2 + 1 9 5 . 6 9 1 . 2 1 + 4 . 5 + 0 . 9 
9 1 3 6 6 . 8 - 1 . 0 + 3 5 5 . 6 + 3 6 5 . 8 1 5 5 . 1 1 + 1 5 9 . 6 2 7 . 7 
1 0 ; 4 7 3 . 1 1 4 7 3 . 1 1 8 2 . 4 j 3 4 1 . 9 5 5 , 6 
1 1 6 4 9 . 5 1 1 6 4 9 . 5 2 2 8 . 3 j 5 7 0 , 2 8 7 . 7 
1 2 6 5 2 . 3 i j 6 5 2 . 3 2 0 7 . 4 ; 7 7 7 . 6 
1 1 4 . 1 
1 3 ! 6 9 9 . 3 
j f 6 9 9 . 3 2 0 2 . 1 1 9 7 9 . 7 1 3 7 . 9 
1 4 i 7 4 6 . 0 
! 
i 7 4 6 . 0 1 9 6 . 2 1 1 7 5 . 9 1 5 9 . 6 
1 3 8 8 8 . 8 i J 8 0 8 . 8 ! 1 2 1 2 . 4 1 3 8 8 . 3 1 8 2 , 5 
1 6 9 5 2 . 8 i j 9 5 2 . 8 2 0 6 . 8 1 5 9 5 . 1 2 0 3 . 9 
1 7 7 1 9 . 0 1 7 1 9 . 0 1 4 2 . 2 1 7 3 7 . 3 2 1 6 . 5 
1 8 7 0 2 . 6 t 7 0 2 . 6 1 2 6 . 3 I 8 6 3 . 6 1 2 2 7 . 2 
1 9 I 8 4 6 . 1 8 4 6 . 1 1 3 8 , 3 2 0 0 1 . 9 1 2 3 8 . 2 
2 0 1 1 0 3 4 . 3 1 0 3 4 . 3 1 5 3 . 7 2 1 5 5 . 6 2 5 3 . 2 
2 1 j 8 4 5 . 7 8 4 5 . 7 j 1 1 4 . 2 2 2 6 9 . 8 2 6 2 . 4 
2 2 ; 6 5 3 . ? 6 5 3 . 2 8 0 . 2 2 3 5 0 . 0 2 6 7 . 9 
2 3 1 5 7 8 . 7 5 7 8 . 7 6 4 . 6 2 4 1 4 . 6 2 7 1 . 8 
2 4 1 5 1 3 . 6 5 1 3 . 6 5 2 . 1 2 4 6 6 . 7 2 7 4 . 5 
2 5 1 4 4 4 . 8 
1 
4 4 4 . 8 } 4 0 . 9 2 5 0 7 . 6 2 7 6 , 3 
2 6 4 0 3 . 1 4 0 3 . 1 3 3 . 8 2 5 4 1 . 4 2 7 7 . 0 
2 7 { 7 0 7 . 2 1 7 0 7 . 2 5 3 . 7 2 5 9 5 . 1 2 8 0 . 3 
2 8 j 6 1 8 , 4 6 1 8 . 4 4 2 . 7 2 6 3 7 . 8 2 8 3 , 4 
2 9 5 3 8 . 6 i 5 3 8 . 6 3 3 . 9 2 6 7 1 . 7 2 8 5 . 1 
3 0 4 6 6 . 7 4 6 6 . 7 2 6 . 6 2 6 9 8 . 3 
2 3 6 . 0 
'+57 
A P P E N D I X 8 , 2 0 Y E S T A T E : A M O R T I Z E D N E T R E T U R N S F O R R E P U C E M E N T C L O N E R R I H 6 0 0 ( I / A C R E ) 
A 3 3 U I I I O , . . { 1 ) R S S 1 © 8 0 c e n t s p e r p o x m d 
( 2 ) D i s c o u n t r a t e 7 p e r c e n t 







j ] A c c u m u l a t e d A m o r t i z e d 
A g e 
N e t 
I n t e r e s t 
I 
A c c u m u l a t e d | 
i 




R e t u r n s 
o n U n p a i d ] N e t N e t V a l u e o f V a l u e o f V a l u e o f 
T r e e s B a l a n c e 
i 
R e t u r n s R e t u r n s A d j u s t e d ! 
N e t R e t r u n s 
A d j u s t e d 
N o t R e t u r n s 
A d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t u r n s 
0 2 8 4 . 7 
• t 
i ) 
2 8 4 , 7 2 8 4 , 7 2 8 4 . 7 2 8 4 . 7 i 2 8 4 , 7 
1 - 1 6 1 . 4 1 2 3 . 3 - 1 6 1 . 4 - 1 5 0 . 8 1 3 3 . 9 1 4 3 . 2 
2 - 7 5 . 5 4 7 , 8 ; - 7 5 o 5 - 6 5 . 9 6 7 . 9 3 7 . 6 
3 - 3 7 . 8 1 0 . 0 i - 3 7 . 8 - 3 0 . 8 3 7 . 1 1 4 , 1 
4 - 6 9 . 6 - 5 9 . 6 ; - 6 9 . 6 - 5 3 . 1 - 1 6 . 0 - 4 , 7 
5 - 5 2 . 5 - 4 . 2 - 1 1 6 . 3 ; - 5 6 . 7 - 4 0 . 4 - 5 6 . 4 - 1 3 . 7 
6 - 8 8 . 9 - 8 - 1 - 2 1 3 . 3 - 9 7 . 0 - 6 4 . 6 - 1 2 1 , 0 - 2 5 . 4 
7 1 1 3 . 8 - 1 4 . 9 1 - 1 1 4 , 4 ; + 9 8 . 9 + 6 1 . 6 - 5 9 . 4 - 1 1 , 0 
8 3 3 6 . 8 - 8 . 0 i + 2 1 4 . 4 j i 3 2 8 . 8 1 9 1 . 4 + 1 3 2 . 0 + 2 2 . 0 




i 5 2 2 . 3 2 8 4 . 1 4 1 6 , 1 i 6 3 , 7 
1 0 6 5 1 . 4 i 6 5 1 . 4 3 3 0 . 9 7 4 7 . 0 1 0 6 . 4 
1 1 QGJ.A 
t 
1 
! : 8 6 7 . 4 i 4 1 2 . 0 1 1 5 9 . 0 1 5 4 , 5 
1 2 8 7 0 . 8 i 8 7 0 . 8 3 8 6 . 6 1 5 4 5 . 6 1 9 4 . 6 
1 3 9 2 7 . 9 
i 
i 1 9 2 7 . 9 3 8 4 . 9 1 9 3 0 . 5 2 3 0 , 9 
1 4 9 8 4 . 8 i 9 8 4 . 8 3 8 1 . 9 2 3 1 2 . 4 2 6 4 . 5 
1 5 1 1 5 9 . 4 
! 
1 1 5 9 . 4 4 2 0 . 1 2 7 3 2 . 5 3 0 0 , 0 
1 6 1 2 3 7 . 8 1 2 3 7 . 8 4 1 9 . 2 3 1 5 1 . 7 3 3 3 . 6 
1 7 9 5 2 . 9 
i f 
9 5 2 . 9 3 0 1 . 7 3 4 5 3 . 4 3 5 3 . 6 
1 8 9 3 2 . 6 9 3 2 . 6 2 7 5 . 9 3 7 2 9 . 3 3 6 9 . 2 
1 9 1 1 1 0 , 3 1 1 1 0 . 3 3 0 7 . 0 4 0 3 6 . 3 3 9 0 . 5 
2 0 1 3 4 2 . 3 1 3 4 2 . 3 3 4 6 . 3 4 3 8 2 . 6 4 1 3 . 7 
2 1 1 1 0 9 . 9 1 1 0 9 . 9 2 6 8 . 0 4 6 5 0 , 6 
4 2 9 . 2 
2 2 8 8 6 . 3 8 8 6 . 3 2 0 0 4 8 5 0 . 6 4 3 6 . 5 
2 3 7 6 4 . 1 7 6 4 . 1 1 6 1 5 0 1 1 . 6 
4 4 4 . 5 
2 4 6 9 6 . 7 6 9 6 . 7 1 3 6 ^ 9 5 1 4 8 , 5 4 4 7 . 9 
2 5 6 1 2 . 3 6 1 2 . 3 1 1 2 . 7 
5 2 6 1 . 2 4 - 5 1 . 4 
2 6 5 6 0 . 9 5 6 0 . 9 9 6 . 5 5 3 5 7 . 7 
4 5 3 . 0 • 
2 7 9 2 7 . 9 9 2 7 . 9 1 4 9 . 3 
5 5 0 7 . 0 4 5 7 . 0 
2 8 8 1 8 . 5 8 1 8 . 5 1 2 2 . 8 
5 6 2 9 . 8 4 6 3 . 8 
2 9 7 1 8 . 2 7 1 8 . 2 1 0 0 . 9 5 7 3 0 . 7 
4 6 6 , 8 
3 0 6 3 1 . 5 6 3 1 . 5 
3 
8 2 . 9 5 8 1 3 . 6 4 6 8 , 5 
'458 
APPENDIX 0.20W ESTATE: AMORTIZED NET RETUHNS FOR RliPLACtlMENT CLONE RRIM 600 ( V A C R E ) 
Assume ( l ) R3S 1 ® 80 c e n t s per pound 
( 2 ) D i s c o u n t r a t e W 10 p e r c e n t 
( 3 ) Replantin,c^ g r a n t ^IpOO.OO p e r a c r e 
1 A c c u m u l a t e d A m o r t i z e d | 
Age 
Net 
I n t e r e s t A c c u m u l a t e d A d j u s t e d P r e s e n t P r e s e n t P r e s e n t 
o f 
R e t u r n s 
on U n p a i d Net j Met V a l u e o f V a l u e of V a l u e o f 
T r e e s B a l a n c e R e t u r n s i 1 R e t u r n s A d j u s t e d 
Net R e t u r n s 
A d j u s t e d 
Net R e t u r n s 
A d j u s t e d 
Net R e t u r n s 
0 2 8 4 . 7 
. j 
2 8 4 . 7 
• • - H 
2 3 4 . 7 2 8 4 , 7 2 8 4 . 7 2 8 4 . 7 
1 - 1 6 1 . 4 1 2 3 . 3 - 1 6 1 . 4 - 1 4 6 , 7 1 3 8 . 0 1 5 1 . 7 
2 - 7 5 . 5 4 7 . 8 - 7 5 . 5 - 6 2 . 4 7 5 . 6 4 3 . 6 
3 - 3 7 . 8 1 0 . 0 - 3 7 . 8 - 2 8 . 4 4 7 . 2 1 8 . 9 
4 - 6 9 . 6 - 5 9 . 6 ! ; - 6 9 . 6 - 4 7 . 5 - 0 . 3 - 0 . 1 
5 - 5 2 . 5 - 6 . 0 - 1 1 8 . 1 i ' - 5 " . 5 - 3 6 . 3 1 ! - 3 6 . 6 - 9 . 6 
6 - 8 8 . 9 - 1 1 . 8 - 2 1 8 . 8 - 1 0 0 . 7 - 5 6 . 8 1 - 9 3 . 4 - 2 1 . 4 
7 1 1 3 . 8 - 2 1 . 9 - 1 2 6 . 9 + 9 1 . 9 + 4 7 . 1 1 1 - 4 6 . 3 - 9 . 5 
8 3J(>.S - 1 2 . 7 + 1 9 7 ^ 2 •^324.1 1 5 1 . 1 1 0 4 . 8 1 9 . 6 
9 5 2 2 . 3 5 2 2 . 3 2 2 1 . 1 3 2 6 . 3 5 6 . 6 
10 6 5 1 . 4 6 5 1 . 4 2 5 1 . 1 5 7 7 . 4 9 3 . 9 
1 1 8 6 7 . 4 8 6 7 - 4 3 0 4 . 0 881 „4 1 3 5 . 7 
12 8 7 0 . 8 8 7 0 . 8 2 9 7 . 3 1 1 7 8 . 7 1 7 2 . 9 
1 3 9 2 7 . 9 1 9 2 7 . 9 2 6 . 8 1 4 4 7 . 5 2 0 3 . 8 
14 9 8 4 . 8 1 9 0 4 . 8 2 5 9 . 3 1 7 0 6 . 8 2 3 1 . 6 
15 1 1 5 9 . 4 2 7 7 . 1 1 9 0 3 . 9 2 6 0 . 8 
IC 1 2 3 7 . 8 1 2 3 7 . 0 2 6 9 . 4 2 2 5 3 . 3 2 8 7 . 9 
1 7 9 5 2 . 9 9 5 2 . 9 I B 8 . 5 2 4 4 1 . 8 3 0 4 . 2 
1 8 9 3 2 . 6 i 9 3 2 . 6 1 6 7 . 7 2 6 0 9 . 5 3 1 8 . 1 
19 1 1 1 0 . 3 1 1 1 0 . 3 1 8 1 . 5 2 7 9 1 . 0 3 3 3 . 7 
2 0 13<t2.3 1 3 1 2 . 3 1 9 8 . 7 2 9 8 9 . 7 3 5 1 . 2 
21 1 1 0 9 . 9 1 1 0 9 . 9 1 4 9 . 8 3 1 3 9 . 5 3 6 2 . 9 
22 mG.3 B 8 6 . 3 1 0 8 . 8 3 2 4 8 . 3 3 7 0 . 3 
23 7 6 4 . 1 7 6 4 . 1 8 5 . 3 3 3 3 3 . 6 3 7 5 . 3 
24 6 9 6 . 7 6 9 6 . 7 7 0 . 7 3 4 0 4 . 3 3 7 8 . 9 
25 6 1 2 . 3 6 1 2 . 3 5 6 . 5 3 4 6 0 . 8 3 8 1 . 2 
26 5 6 0 , 9 5 6 0 , 9 4 7 . 1 3 5 0 7 . 9 3 8 2 . 9 
27 9 2 7 . 9 9 2 7 . 9 7 0 . 8 3 5 7 8 . 7 3 8 7 . 4 
28 8 1 8 . 5 8 1 8 . 5 5 6 . 5 3 6 3 5 . 2 3 8 8 . 9 
2<; 7 1 B . 2 1 7 1 8 . 2 4 5 . 2 3 6 3 0 . 4 3 9 2 . 7 
30 6 3 1 . 5 
t 
6 3 1 . 5 
( 9 
3 6 . 0 3 7 1 6 . 4 3 9 4 . 2 
5^9 
APPENDIX 8.2U SMAU.HOLDIDG: AMORTIZED NF;T nETURNS FOR REPLACEMEHT CLONE RRIM 600 (S/ACRE) 
Assume (l) RSS 'i & AO cents per pound 
(2) Diaoouat rate @ 7 per cer.t 
(3) No replp.nting fprant 
1 j 1 Aooumulated Amortized 




Interest AccuBulated Adjusted Value of Value of Value of 
of oa Unpaid Net Net Adjusted 1 Adjusted Adjusted 
Trees Balance Returns Returns Net Returns Not Returns Net Returns 
0 -242.8 -242.8 
i 
-242.8 -242,8 -242,8 -242.8 
1 -201.8 - 16.9 -461.5 -218.7 ! -204,4 -447.2 -448.3 
2 -181,8 - 32.3 -675.6 -214.1 i -187 -634,2 -300.1 
3 -161,8 - 47.3 -88 ,^. 7 -209 -170,7 -804,9 -306.7 
4 -160.8 - 61.9 -1107.4 -222.7 -169.9 -974.8 -287,8 
5 -148,8 - 77.5 -1333.7 -226,3 -161.3 -1136.1 -277.1 
6 -140,8 - 93.4 -1567.9 -234.2 -156,1 -1292.2 -271.1 
7 103.8 -109.8 -1573.9 - 6.0 - .37 -1292.6 -239.8 
8 219,6 -110.2 -1464.5 109,4 + 63.7 -1228.9 -205.8 
305.7 -102.5 -1261.3 203,2 110.5 -1118.4 -171.7 
10 364,2 - 88.3 -958,4 275.9 140.3 -978 -139.2 
11 464,9 - 68.98 -589.5 395.9 188.1 -789,9 -105.3 
12 464,7 - 41.3 -166.1 423,4 188 -601.97 - 75.9 
13 492.4 - 11.6 314.7 400,8 ! 199.5 -402.5 - 48.2 
14 517.6 517.6 200.7 -201.8 - 23.1 
15 596,4 596.4 216.2 14,4 1.58 
16 633 633 214.4 228,8 24.2 
17 501.2 201.2 158.7 387.5 39.7 
18 491.8 491.8 145.5 533 52.98 
19 581.7 581.7 160.8 693.8 67.1 
20 692,8 692.8 179 872.8 82,4 
21 581,7 581.7 140.5 i i 1013.3 93.6 
22 467,2 467.2 105.5 1118.8 101.1 
1 23 423,2 423.2 89.3 1208.1 107.2 
24 399 399 78.7 1286.8 112.2 
25 360,6 360.6 66.4 1353.2 116.0 
26 325,9 325.9 56,1 1409.3 119.2 
27 498 498 i 80.1 1409.4 124.3 
28 447,5 447.5 67.3 1556.7 128.3 
29 399,7 399.7 56.2 1613 131.4 
30 356.6 356.6 46.8 1659.8 133.8 
31 317.9 317.9 39.0 1698.8 135.6 
32 308.4 3O8.4 35.4 1734.2 137.1 
33 276.7 276.7 29.7 1763.9 138.3 
34 245.8 245.8 24.6 1788.5 139.1 
35 210.2 218.2 21.1 1809,6 139.8 
36 193.2 
i 
1 j 193.2 16.9 1826.5 140.1 
i v s o 
APPENDLX 8,21B SMALLHOLDIIIG: AMORTIZED MKT RETURNS FOR REPLACEMKT CLONE RRIM 600 (S/ACRE) 
Assuno (l) RSS 3 ® 40 cents per pouad 
(2) Discount rate © 10 per cent 






































-242.8 -242.8 -242,8 -242,8 
1 -201.8 - 24.3 -468.9 i - 2 2 6 . 1 -205.54 -448.34 -493..17 
2 -181.8 - 46.9 -697.6 i -228.7 -189.0 -637.34 -3^7.23 
3 - 1 6 1 . 8 - 6 9 . 8 -929.2 1 -231.7 -174.01 -811.35 1 - 3 2 6 . 2 6 
A - 1 6 0 . 8 - 92.9 -1182.9 -253.7 -173.28 -984.63 -310.62 
5 -148.8 -118.3 -1450.0 -267.1 - 1 6 5 . 8 5 -1150.48 -303.49 
6 -140.8 -145.0 -1735.8 j - 2 8 5 . 8 - 1 6 1 . 3 2 -1311.8 -301,20 
7 103.8 -173.6 -1805.6 i - 69.8 - 35.31 i -1347.6 - 2 7 6 , 8 
8 219.6 -180,6 - 1 7 6 6 . 6 + 39 + 18.19 1 -1329.42 - 2 4 9 , 1 0 
9 305.7 -176.7 -1637,6 1 2 9 . 0 54.7 1 -274.72 - 2 2 1 , 3 4 
10 364.2 - 1 6 3 . 8 -1437.2 1 200.4 77.26 1 -1197.46 - 1 9 4 , 8 8 
11 464.9 -143.7 - 1 1 1 6 . 5 320.7 112.4 1 -1085,06 - 1 6 7 , 0 6 
12 464.7 -111.7 -763.5 353 112.48 - 9 7 2 . 6 -142,74 
13 492.4 - 76.4 -347.5 416 120.5 - 0 5 2 .08 j -119.95 1 
14 5 1 7 . 6 - 34.8 +135.3 4 82.8 127.1 -724,98 - 98.4 
15 596.4 i 1 596.4 142.77 
-582,21 - 76.54 
16 633.0 1 633.0 137.76 - 4 4 4 , 4 5 - 5 6 . 8 . 
17 5 0 1 . 2 501.2 99,16 -345.29 1 - 43.04 
18 4 9 1 . 8 491.8 80.45 -256,84 - 31.32 
19 581.7 581.7 i 95.1 ^ -161,74 - 19.34 
20 692.8 692.8 j 102.98 - 58.76 - 6.9 
21 581.7 581.7 78.6 19.84 + 2 . 2 9 
22 467.2 467.2 57.4 77.24 8.8 
23 423.2 423.2 47.3 1 124 .54 14,01 
24 399.0 399.0 1 40 . 5 j 1 165.04 18,37 
25 360.6 360.6 ! 33.28 1 198.32 21,85 • 
26 325.9 3 2 5 . 9 27.34 225.66 24,63 
27 498.0 498.0 37.99 263.65 28,54 
28 447.5 447.5 ! 31.03 1 
294.68 31.66 




i 356.6 20.43 3 4 0 , 3 1 36.01 
31 317.9 317.9 1 6 . 5 6 356.87 37.65 
32 308.4 308.4 14.6 371.47 38.99 
33 276.7 276.7 1 1 . 9 1 303.38 
40,06 
34 245.8 245.8 9.62 
393.0 40,9 
35 218.2 218.2 
7.76 400 .76 41.55 
36 193.2 193.2 6.2498 
407 42 .06 
i 
'+61 
APPENDIX 8 , 2 1 C SMALLHOLDING: AMORTIZED NST RKTURNS FOR REPUCEMENT CLONE RRIM 600 ( $ / A C R E ) 
Assume ( 1 ) RSS 3 @ 60 c e n t s p e r pound 
( 2 ) D i s c o u n t r a t e 0 7 p e r c e n t 
( 3 ) No r e p l a n t i n g g r a n t 
A c c u m u l a t e d A m o r t i z e d 
Age 
N e t 
I n t e r e s t A c c u m u l a t e d A d j u s t e d P r e s e n t P r e s e n t P r e s e n t 
of 
R e t u r n s 
on U n p a i d Not Net V a l u e o f I V a l u e of V a l u e o f 
T r e e s B a l a n c e R e t u r n s R e t u r n s i A d j u s t e d 
^ Net R e t u r n s 
T l d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t u r n s 
A d j u s t e d 
Net R e t u r n s , 
0 - 2 4 2 , 8 - 2 ^ 2 . 8 
. 
- 2 4 2 , 8 - 2 4 2 . 8 - 2 4 2 . 8 - 2 4 2 . 8 
1 - 2 0 1 . 8 - 17 - 4 6 0 . 8 - 2 1 8 - 2 0 3 . 7 - 4 4 6 . 5 - 4 4 7 . 8 
2 - 1 8 1 . 8 - 3 2 . 3 - 6 7 4 . 9 - 2 1 4 - 1 8 6 . 9 - 6 3 3 . 4 ^ - 3 5 0 . 3 
3 - 1 6 1 . 8 - 4 7 . ^ - 3 8 3 . 9 - 2 0 9 - 1 7 0 . 6 - 8 0 4 - 3 0 6 . 4 
4 - 1 6 0 . 8 - 6 1 . 9 - 1 1 0 6 . 6 - 2 2 0 . 7 - 1 5 3 . 1 - 9 5 7 . 1 - 2 8 2 . 6 
5 - 1 4 8 . 8 - 7 7 . 5 - 1 3 3 ^ . 9 - 2 2 c . 3 - 1 6 1 , 3 - 1 1 1 8 . 4 - 2 7 2 . 8 
6 - 1 4 0 . 8 - 9 3 . 3 - 1 5 6 7 - 2 3 4 - 5 5 . 9 - 1 2 7 4 . 3 - 2 6 7 . 3 
7 2 1 6 - 1 0 9 . 7 - 1 4 6 0 . 1 + 1 0 6 . 3 + 6 6 . 2 - 1 2 0 8 , 1 - 2 2 4 . 2 
8 4 0 8 . 9 - 1 0 2 . 2 - 1 1 5 3 . 4 3 0 6 . 7 1 7 8 . 5 - 1 0 2 9 . 6 - 1 7 2 . 4 
9 559 - 8 0 . 7 - 6 7 5 . 1 4 7 8 . 3 2 6 0 . 2 - 7 6 9 . 4 - 1 1 8 . 1 
10 6 6 2 . 8 - 4 7 . 3 - 5 9 . 6 6 1 5 . 5 31'-^.9 - 4 5 6 . 5 - 6 4 . 9 9 
1 1 8 3 8 . 1 - 4 , 1 7 + 7 7 4 . 3 8 3 3 . 9 3 9 6 . 2 - 6 0 . 3 - 8 . 0 4 
12 8 3 8 . 3 8 3 8 . 3 3 7 2 . 2 3 1 1 . 9 3 9 . 3 
1 3 8 8 5 . 8 8 8 5 . 8 3 6 7 . 6 6 7 9 . 5 8 1 . 3 
14 9 3 0 . 5 1 9 3 0 . 5 3 6 0 . 9 1 0 4 0 . 4 1 1 8 . 9 6 
1 5 1 0 7 0 . 3 1 0 7 0 . 3 3 3 7 . 9 1 4 2 8 . 3 1 5 6 . 3 
1 6 1 1 3 3 . 8 1 1 3 3 . 8 3 8 4 . 1 1 8 1 2 . 4 1 9 1 . 8 5 
1 7 9 0 6 , 6 9 0 6 , 6 2 8 7 . 0 2 0 9 9 . 4 2 1 5 
1 8 8 9 1 . 8 8 9 1 . 8 2 6 3 . 9 2 3 6 3 . 3 2 3 4 . 9 
19 1 0 3 9 . 7 1 0 3 9 . 7 2 8 7 . 5 2 6 5 0 . 8 2 5 6 . 5 
2 0 1 2 3 1 . 4 1 2 3 1 . 4 3 I 8 . 2 2969 2 8 0 . 2 
2 1 1 0 3 9 . 7 1 0 3 9 . 7 2 5 1 . 1 3 2 2 0 . 1 2 9 7 . 2 
22 3 3 5 .835 1 8 0 . 5 3 4 0 8 . 6 
3 O 8 . 2 
2 3 7 5 4 . 2 7 5 4 . 2 1 5 9 . 1 3 5 6 7 . 7 3 2 C 5 
24 7 0 6 . 6 7 0 6 . 6 1 3 9 . 3 3 7 0 7 3 2 3 . 2 
2 5 6 3 8 . 6 6 3 8 . 6 1 1 7 . 7 
3 8 2 4 . 7 3 2 8 . 2 
26 5 8 6 . 1 5 8 6 . 1 1 0 0 . 9 3 9 2 5 . 6 3 3 1 . 9 
2 7 8 8 0 . 1 8 8 0 . 1 1 4 1 . 6 4 0 6 7 . 2 3 3 9 . 3 
2 8 9 1 3 . 1 9 1 3 . 1 1 3 7 . 3 
4 2 0 4 . 5 3 4 6 . 4 
29 7 0 8 . 6 ( 7 0 8 . 6 9 9 . 6 4 3 0 4 . 1 3 5 0 . 6 
3 0 6 3 4 . 7 6 3 4 . 7 8 3 . 4 4 3 8 7 . 5 
3 5 3 . 6 
3 1 5 6 8 . 3 5 6 B . 3 6 9 . 7 
4 4 5 7 . 2 3 5 5 . 7 
32 5 5 3 . 7 5 5 3 . 7 6 3 . 5 
4 5 2 0 . 7 3 5 7 . 5 
3 3 4 9 7 . 5 4 9 7 . 5 5 3 . 3 
4 5 7 4 3 5 8 . 6 
34 4 4 4 , 5 4 4 4 . 5 4 4 . 5 5 » 
5 0 1 9 . 6 3 9 0 . 5 
3 5 3 9 7 . 2 3 9 7 . 2 
3 7 . 2 5 3 9 1 . 5 4 1 6 . 4 
3 6 3 5 4 . 3 3 5 4 . 3 3 1 . 0 
5 4 2 2 . 5 
i 
4 1 5 . 9 8 
'+62 
A P P E N D I X 8 . 2 1 D SM_,ML!IOL.nEItS: AMORTIZED flST RETURNS FOP. R E P U C E M E N T CLONE RUIM 6 0 0 ( V A C R E ) 
Assume ( l ) RSS 3 # 6 0 cents per pound 
( 2 ) D i s c o u n t rate 0 10 per cent 
( 3 ) No r e p l a n t i i v ; g rant 
Age 
of 
T r e e s 
N e t 
R e t u m a 
I n t e r e s t 
on U n p a i d 












[ P r e s e n t 
Value of 
A d j u s t e d 
Net R e t u r n s 
Accumulated 
P r e s e n t 
Value of 
A d j u s t e d 
Net Returns 
A m o r t i z e d 
P r e s e n t 
Value o f 
A d j u s t e d 
Net R e t u r n s 
0 - 2 4 2 . 8 - 2 4 2 . 8 1 - 2 4 2 , 8 - 2 4 2 , 8 - 2 4 2 , 8 - 2 4 2 . 8 
1 - 2 0 1 . 8 - 2 4 . 2 8 -468.9 1 -226.1 - 2 0 5 . 5 - 4 4 8 , 3 - 4 9 3 . 1 3 
2 - 1 8 1 . 8 - 4 6 . 8 9 - 6 9 7 . 6 ' - 2 2 8 . 7 j - 1 8 9 . 0 - 6 3 7 . 3 - 3 6 7 . 2 
3 -161.8 - 6 9 . 8 - 9 2 9 . 2 - 2 3 1 . 6 - 1 7 4 . 0 - 8 1 1 . 3 - 3 2 6 . 2 
4 -160,8 - 9 2 . 9 - 1 1 8 2 . 9 - 2 5 3 . 7 - 1 7 3 . 3 - 9 0 4 . 6 -310.6 
5 - 1 4 8 . 8 - 1 1 B . 3 - 1 4 5 0 - 2 6 7 . 1 -165.8 -1150.4 - 3 0 3 . 5 
6 - 1 4 0 . 8 - 1 4 5 . 0 - 1 7 3 5 . 3 -265.8 - 1 5 0 -1300.4 - 2 9 8 
7 2 1 6 - 1 7 3 . 6 - 1 6 9 3 . 4 ] + 4 2 , 4 2 1 . 8 -1278.6 -262.6 
8 4 0 8 . 9 - 1 6 9 . 3 - 1 4 5 3 . 8 2 3 9 . 6 1 1 1 . 8 -1166.8 - 2 1 8 . 7 
9 5 5 9 - 1 4 5 . 4 - 1 0 4 0 . 2 4 1 3 . 6 1 7 5 . 4 - 9 9 1 . 4 - 1 7 2 . 1 
1 0 662,8 - 1 0 4 . 0 - 4 8 1 , 4 5 5 8 . 0 2 1 5 . 4 -776 - 1 2 6 . 3 
11 8 3 3 . 1 - 4 8 . 1 + 3 0 8 . 6 790.0 2 7 6 . 9 - 4 9 9 . 1 - 7 6 . 8 
12 8 3 0 . 3 8 3 8 . 3 2 6 7 . 1 -232 - 3 4 . 0 
13 8 8 3 . 8 i 8 8 5 . 8 256.6 + 2 4 . 6 3 4 . 6 
1 4 9 3 0 . 5 930,5 2 4 5 . 0 269.6 36.6 
15 1 0 7 0 . 3 1070.3 2 5 6 . 0 5 2 5 . 6 0 . 1 
16 1 1 3 3 . 8 1133.8 2 4 ^ . 7 7 7 2 . 3 9 8 . 7 
17 906.6 906.6 1 7 9 . 4 9 5 1 . 7 1 1 8 . 6 
1 8 8 9 1 . 8 8 9 1 . 8 1 6 0 . 4 1 1 1 2 . 1 135.6 
1 9 1 0 3 9 . 7 1 0 3 9 . 7 1 6 9 . 9 9 9 
1 2 8 2 . 1 153.3 
2 0 1 2 3 1 . 4 1 2 3 1 . 4 1 8 3 . 0 1 4 6 5 . 1 172.0 
2 1 1 0 3 9 . 7 1 0 3 9 . 7 1 4 0 . 5 1605.6 1 8 5 . 6 
2 2 835 835 1 0 2 . 6 
I 7 O 8 . 2 1 9 4 . 7 
2 3 754.2 754.2 8 4 . 2 1 7 9 2 . 4 2 0 1 . 8 
24 706,6 706.6 7 1 . 7 1 8 6 4 . 1 2 0 7 . 5 
2 5 638.6 6 3 8 . 6 5 0 . 9 1 9 2 3 2 1 1 . 9 
2 6 506.1 5 8 6 . 1 49.2 1 9 7 2 . 2 2 1 5 . 3 
27 8 8 0 . 1 j 8 8 0 . 1 67.1 2 0 3 9 . 3 2 2 0 . 8 
2 8 9 1 3 . 1 5 913.1 63.3 2 1 0 2 . 6 2 2 5 . 9 
2 9 7 0 8 . 6 1 708.6 4 4 . 7 2 1 4 7 . 3 
2 2 9 . 2 
3 0 63-^.7 1 634.7 i 3 6 . 4 2 1 8 3 . 7 2 3 1 . 6 
31 5 6 8 . 3 560.3 2 9 . 6 2 2 1 3 . 3 2 3 3 . 5 
32 5 5 3 . 7 5 5 3 . 7 
26.2 2 2 3 9 . 5 2 3 5 . 1 
33 4 9 7 . 5 4 9 7 . 5 
2 1 , 4 2 2 6 0 . 9 2 3 6 . 3 
3t 444.5 j 4 4 4 . 5 1 7 . 4 2 2 7 8 . 3 2 3 7 . 1 
35 3 9 7 . 2 3 9 7 . 2 
1 4 . 1 2 2 9 2 . 4 2 3 7 . 7 
3 6 3 5 4 . 3 3 5 4 . 3 
1 1 , 4 6 2 3 0 3 . 9 2 3 8 . 1 
APPENDIX 8.21E SI'lALLHOLDING: AMORTIZED NET HKTURNS FOR REPLACEMENT CLONE HRIH 600 ($/ACRE) 
Assume: (l) RSS 3 ® 80 cents per pound 
(2) Discount rate ® 7 per cent 






























0 - 2 4 2 . 8 - 2 4 2 . 8 - 2 4 2 . 8 
1 
- 2 4 2 . 8 - 2 4 2 . 8 - 2 4 2 . 8 
1 - 2 0 1 . 8 - 1 6 . 9 9 6 - 4 6 0 . 8 - ; : i 8 1 - 2 0 3 . 7 - 4 4 6 . 5 - 4 7 7 . 8 
2 - 1 8 1 . 8 - 3 2 . 3 - 6 7 4 . 9 - 2 1 4 - 1 8 6 . 9 - 6 3 3 . 4 - 3 5 0 . 3 
3 - 1 6 1 . 8 - 4 7 . 2 - 8 8 3 . 9 - 2 0 9 - 1 7 0 . 6 - 0 0 4 - 3 0 6 . 4 
4 - 1 6 0 . 8 - 6 1 . 9 - 1 1 0 6 . 6 - 2 2 0 . 7 ^ - 1 5 3 . 1 - 9 5 7 . 1 - 2 3 2 . 6 
5 - 1 4 8 . 0 - 7 7 . 5 - 1 3 3 2 . 9 - 2 2 6 . 3 - 1 6 1 . 3 - 1 1 1 8 . 4 - 2 7 2 , 8 
6 - 1 4 0 . 8 - 9 3 . 3 - 1 5 6 7 - 2 3 4 - 1 5 5 . 9 - 1 2 7 4 . 3 - 2 6 7 . 3 
7 3 1 1 . 4 - 1 0 9 . 7 - 1 3 6 5 . 3 + 2 0 1 . 7 1 + 1 2 5 . 6 - 1 1 4 0 . 7 - 2 1 3 . 1 
8 5 6 9 . 4 - 9 5 . 6 - 8 9 1 . 5 4 7 3 . 8 2 2 7 5 . 8 - 0 9 0 . 9 - 1 4 9 . 2 
9 7 7 3 - 6 2 . 4 - 1 8 0 . 9 7 1 0 . 6 3 0 6 . 5 - 5 0 4 . 4 - 7 7 . 4 
1 0 9 1 4 - 1 2 . 7 + 7 2 0 . 4 9 0 1 . 3 4 5 0 . 2 - 4 6 . 2 - 6 . 6 
1 1 1 1 5 1 . 9 1 1 5 1 . 9 5 4 7 . 3 + 5 0 1 + 6 6 . 8 1 
1 2 1 1 5 2 . 9 1 1 5 2 . 9 5 1 1 . 9 1 0 1 2 . 9 + 1 2 7 . 5 
1 3 1 2 1 6 . 4 1 2 1 6 . 4 5 0 4 . 8 1 5 1 7 . 7 1 0 1 , 6 
1 4 1 2 7 7 . 2 1 2 7 7 . 2 4 9 5 . 3 2 0 1 . 3 2 3 0 . 2 
1 5 1 4 6 7 . 3 1 4 6 7 . 3 5 3 1 . 8 2 5 4 4 . 0 2 7 9 . 4 
1 6 1 5 5 3 . 3 1 5 5 3 . 3 5 2 6 . 2 3 0 7 1 3 2 5 . 1 
1 7 1 2 4 6 . 1 1 2 4 6 . 1 3 9 4 . 5 3 4 6 5 . 5 3 5 4 . 9 5 
1 8 1 2 2 5 . 2 1 2 2 5 . 2 3 6 2 . 5 3 8 2 8 3 8 0 . 5 
1 9 1 4 2 5 . 7 
1 
1 4 2 5 . 7 3 9 4 . 2 1 4 2 2 2 . 1 4 0 8 . 6 
2 0 1 6 8 5 . 4 1 1 6 8 5 . 4 4 3 5 . 5 4 6 5 7 . 7 4 3 9 . 6 
2 1 1 4 2 5 . 7 1 4 2 5 . 7 3 4 4 . 3 2 5 0 0 2 . 0 3 4 6 1 . 6 
2 2 1 1 4 5 1 1 4 5 2 5 8 . 4 5 2 6 0 . 4 3 4 7 5 . 6 
2 3 1 0 3 3 . 2 1 0 3 3 . 2 2 1 7 . 9 5 4 7 8 . 3 4 8 5 . 9 9 
2 4 9 6 5 . 2 9 6 5 . 2 1 9 0 . 3 5 6 6 8 . 6 4 9 4 . 2 
2 5 6 7 3 8 7 3 1 6 . 0 5 8 2 9 . 4 5 0 0 , 2 
2 6 8 0 . 5 8 0 . 5 1 3 8 . 6 1 5 9 6 0 5 0 4 . 6 6 . 
2 7 1 2 0 2 1 2 0 2 1 9 3 . 4 6 1 6 1 . 4 5 1 4 . 0 
2 8 t 1 0 0 1 . 5 1 0 8 1 , 5 1 6 2 . 7 6 3 2 4 . 1 5 2 1 . 0 
2 9 9 7 0 . 6 j 9 7 0 . 6 1 3 6 . 4 6 4 6 0 . 5 5 2 6 . 2 
3 0 9 5 6 9 5 6 1 2 5 . 6 6 5 0 6 . 1 ! , 5 3 0 . 7 
3 1 7 8 0 . 7 7 Q 0 . 7 9 5 . 8 5 6 6 0 1 . 9 5 3 3 . 2 
3 2 7 6 1 . 8 7 6 1 . 8 0 7 . 4 6 7 6 9 . 4 5 3 5 . 3 
3 3 6 8 4 . 5 6 0 4 . 5 7 3 . 4 6 0 4 2 . 8 5 3 6 . 5 
3 4 6 1 2 . 9 6 1 2 . 9 6 1 . 4 6 9 0 4 . 2 5 3 7 . 1 
3 5 5 4 0 . 4 ! 5 4 0 . 4 5 1 . 3 6 9 5 5 . 4 9 5 3 7 . 2 
3 6 4 9 0 . 0 1 4 9 0 . 0 
i 
4 3 . 0 6 9 9 8 . 5 5 3 6 . 9 
k6ii 
APPENDIX 8.21F SMALLHOLDING: AhiORTIZED MET RETURNS FOR liEFLACEMlCMT CLONE RRIH 600 (VACRE) 
Assume (l) RSS 3 @ 80 cents per pound 
(2) Discount rate @ 10 per cent 
(3) No replantin^'j grant 
1 1 Accumulated Amortized 
Age 
Net Interest Accumulated Adjusted Present j Present Present 
of 
Returns 
on. Unpaid Net Net 1 Value of Value of Value of 
Trees Balance Returns Returns ! Adjusted 
Net Returns 
Adjusted 








-242.8 -242.8 -242.8 
1 -201.8 - 24.28 -468.9 -226.08 -205.5 j -448.3 1 -493.13 
2 -181.8 - 46.89 -697.59 -228.7 -189.0 1 -637.3 -367.2 
3 -161.8 - 69.8 -929.2 -231.6 -174.0 1 -811.3 -326,2 
4 -160.8 - 92.9 -1182.9 -253.7 -173.3 j -984.6 -310.6 
5 -148.8 -118.3 -1450.0 i -267.1 -165.8 i -1150.4 -303.5 
6 -140.8 -145.0 -1735.8 -265.8 -150,0 : -1300,4 -298.6 
7 311.4 -173.6 -1873.6 -137.8 - 70.7 1 -1371.1 -281.9 
8 569.4 -187.4 -1491.6 +382 + 78.2 1 -1192.9 -223.6 
9 773 -149.2 -867.8 623.8 264.6 1 -928.3 -161.2 
10 914 - 86.8 - 40.6 827 «2 318.9 -609.4 - 99.2 
11 1151.9 - 4.1 +1107.2 1147.8 402.3 -207.1 - 31.9 
12 1152.9 1152.9 367.3 1 160.2 23.5 
13 1216.4 i 1216,4 352.3 ! 512.5 72.1 
14 1277.2 1277.2 ; 336.3 1 848.3 115.2 
15 1467.3 1467.3 351,3 1 1200,1 157.8 
16 1553.3 1 1 1553.3 338.0 I 1538.1 196.6 
17 1246.1 1 1246.1 246.5 1 1784.6 222.5 
18 1225.2 1225.2 220.4 1 2005.0 244.5 
19 1425.7 1425.7 233.1 2238.1 267.6 
20 1685.4 1685.4 250.5 2488.6 292.3 
21 1 1425.7 1425.7 192.7 2681.3 310.0 
22 } 1145.0 1 1145.0 140.7 2822 321.7 
23 1033.2 i 1033.2 115.4 2937.4 330,7 
24 965.2 965.2 ! 97.99 3035.4 337.8 
25 S 873.0 I 1 873.0 I 80.57 3115.96 343.3 • j 26 ! 805.2 805.2 1 67.56 3183.5 347,5 
27 1202,1 1 1202,1 91.7 3275.2 354.6 
28 1081.5 ; 1081.5 74.99 3351.2 360,0 
29 970.6 j 970.6 61.2 3412.4 364.2 
30 956 956 54.8 3467.2 367.8 
1 31 780.7 780.7 40.7 3507.9 370.0 
I 32 761.8 761.8 j 36.1 3544.0 372.0 
i 33 684.5 i 684.5 29.5 3573.5 373.4 
34 i 612.9 i j 612.9 23.99 3597.5 374.4 








3632.9 375.4 ] 
A P P E N D I X 8 , 2 1 G S M A L L H O L D I N G : A M O R T I Z E D N E T R E T U R N S FOR R E P L A C E M E N T C L O N E R R I M 6 0 0 ( $ / A C R E ) 
A s s u m e ( I ) R S S 3 ® 4 0 c e n t s p e r p o u n d 
( 2 ) D i s c o u n t r a t e @ 7 p c r c e n t 
( 3 ) R e p l a n t i n c G r a n t S 7 5 O . O O p e r a c r e 
A c c u n u l a t e d A m o r t i z e d 
A f ^ 
N e t 
R e t u r n s 
I n t e r e s t A c c u m u l a t e d A d j u s t e d P r e s e n t P r e s e n t P r e s e n t 
o f o n U n p a i d N e t 1 N e t V a l u e o f V a l u e o f V a l u e o f 
T r e e s B a l a n c e R e t u r n s i 
1 
1 
R e t u r n s A d j u s t e d 
r i o t R e t u r n s 
A d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t u r n s 
A d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t u r n s 
0 + 7 . 2 
i 
+ 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 
1 - 1 0 1 . 8 - 9 4 . 6 - 1 0 1 . 8 - 9 5 . 1 - 8 7 . 9 - 9 4 . 0 5 
2 - 8 1 . 8 - 6 . 6 - 1 6 9 . 7 - 8 0 . 4 - 7 7 . 7 - 1 6 5 . 6 - 9 1 . 5 9 
3 - 6 1 . 8 - 1 1 . 8 7 - 2 4 3 . 3 7 - 7 3 . 6 7 - 6 0 . 1 1 - 2 2 5 . 7 1 j - 8 6 . 0 0 
4 - 9 0 . 8 - 1 7 . 0 3 - 3 5 1 . 2 0 - 1 0 7 . 8 3 - 8 2 . 1 6 - 3 0 7 . 8 7 . - 9 0 . 8 9 
5 - 7 3 . 8 - 2 4 . 5 8 - 4 5 4 . 5 8 - 1 0 3 . 3 8 - 7 3 . 6 0 - 3 8 1 . 4 7 - 9 3 . 0 4 
6 - 8 0 . 8 - 3 1 . 8 2 - 5 6 7 . 2 0 1 - 1 1 2 . 6 2 - 7 5 . 0 0 - 4 5 6 . 4 7 - 9 5 . 7 7 
7 1 0 3 . 8 - 3 9 . 7 0 - 5 0 3 . 1 0 6 4 . 1 0 3 9 . 8 7 - 4 1 6 . 6 0 - 7 7 . 3 0 
8 2 1 9 . 6 - 3 5 . 2 1 - 3 1 8 . 7 1 1 8 4 . 3 9 1 0 - 7 . 3 - 3 0 9 . 3 0 - 5 1 . 8 0 
9 3 0 5 . 7 - 2 2 . 3 - 3 5 . 3 2 2 8 3 . 4 0 1 5 3 . 8 8 - 1 5 5 . 4 2 - 2 3 . 8 5 
1 0 3 6 4 . 2 - 2 . 4 7 + 3 2 6 . 4 0 3 6 1 . 7 3 1 8 3 . 7 5 2 8 . 3 3 4 . 0 3 
1 1 4 6 4 . 9 4 6 4 . 9 2 2 0 . 8 2 2 4 9 . 1 5 3 3 . 2 3 
1 2 4 6 4 . 7 4 6 4 . 7 1 2 0 6 . 3 2 4 5 5 . 4 7 5 7 . 3 4 
1 3 4 9 2 . 4 4 9 2 , 4 j 2 0 3 . 0 5 6 5 9 . 3 2 7 8 . 8 9 
1 4 5 1 7 . 6 5 1 7 . 6 2 0 0 . 3 1 8 5 9 . 6 3 9 8 . 2 9 
1 5 5 9 6 . " . , 5 9 6 . 4 2 1 5 . 8 9 1 0 7 5 . 5 2 1 1 8 . 0 9 
1 6 6 3 3 . 0 6 3 3 . 0 2 1 3 . 9 5 1 2 8 9 . 4 7 1 3 6 . 5 0 
1 7 5 0 1 . 2 5 0 1 . 2 1 5 0 . 3 7 1 4 4 7 . 8 4 1 4 8 . 3 0 
1 8 4 9 1 . 8 4 9 1 . 8 1 4 5 . 0 8 1 5 9 2 . 9 2 1 5 8 . 3 6 
1 9 5 8 1 . 7 5 8 1 . 7 1 6 0 . 5 4 1 7 5 3 . 4 6 1 6 9 . 6 5 
2 0 6 9 2 . 8 6 9 2 . 8 1 7 8 . 7 4 1 9 3 2 . 2 1 8 2 . 3 8 
2 1 5 8 1 . 7 5 8 1 . 7 1 4 0 . 1 8 2 0 7 2 . 3 8 1 9 1 . 2 6 
2 2 4 6 7 . 2 4 6 7 . 2 1 0 5 . 1 2 2 1 7 7 . 5 1 9 6 . 8 6 
2 3 4 2 3 . 2 4 2 3 . 2 0 8 . 8 7 2 2 6 6 . 3 7 2 0 1 . 0 6 
2 4 3 9 9 . 0 3 9 9 . 0 7 0 . 6 0 2 3 4 4 . 9 7 2 0 4 , 4 6 
? 5 3 6 0 . 6 3 6 0 . 6 6 5 . 6 2 4 1 0 . 5 9 2 0 6 . 8 5 • 
26 3 2 5 . 9 3 2 5 . 9 5 6 . 0 5 2 4 6 6 , 6 4 2 0 8 . 6 1 
2 7 4 9 8 . 0 4 9 8 . 0 7 9 . 6 8 2 5 4 6 . 3 2 2 1 2 , 4 3 
2 8 4 4 7 . 5 4 4 7 . 5 6 7 . 1 2 2 6 1 3 . 4 4 2 1 5 . 3 2 
2 9 3 9 9 . 7 3 9 9 . 7 5 5 . 9 5 2 6 6 9 . 3 9 2 1 7 . 4 2 
3 0 3 5 6 . 6 3 5 6 . 6 4 6 . 7 1 2 7 1 6 . 1 2 1 8 . 8 8 
3 1 3 1 7 . 9 3 1 7 . 9 3 8 . 7 8 2 7 5 4 . 8 8 2 1 9 . 0 3 
3 2 3 0 8 . 4 3 0 8 , 4 3 5 . 1 5 2 7 9 0 . 0 3 2 2 0 , 6 1 
3 3 2 7 6 . 7 2 7 6 . 7 2 9 . 6 0 2 8 1 9 . 6 3 2 2 1 . 0 8 
3 4 2 4 5 . 8 2 4 5 . 8 2 4 . 5 8 2 8 4 4 . 2 1 2 2 1 . 2 7 
3!> 2 1 8 . 2 2 1 8 . 2 2 0 . 2 9 2 8 6 4 . 5 1 2 1 9 , 8 4 
3 6 1 9 3 . 2 1 9 3 . 2 1 6 . 8 0 2 8 0 1 . 3 2 2 1 , 0 4 
APPENDIX 8 . 2 1 H SMALLHOLDING: AMORTi::^KD NKT RETURNS FOR REPLACEMENT CLONE RRIM 600 ( V A C R E ) 
Asaume: ( l ) RSS 3 & 40 cents per pound 
( 2 ) Discount rate @ 10 per cent 
( 3 ) R e n l a n t i n g Grant 5^750.00 per acre 






I n t e r e s t Accumulated Adjusted Present Present Present 
of on Unpaid Net Met Value of Value of Value of 






0 + 7 . 2 
j 
+ 7 . 2 ! 
f 
+ 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 
1 
+ 7 . 2 
1 - 1 0 1 . 8 - 9 4 . 6 - 1 0 1 . 8 - 9 2 . 5 - 8 5 . 3 - 9 3 . 8 3 
2 - 8 1 . 8 - 9 . 4 6 - 1 8 5 . 8 6 - 9 1 . 2 6 - 7 5 . 3 8 - 1 6 0 . 6 8 - 9 2 . 5 8 
3 - 6 l , 8 - 1 8 . 5 8 - 2 6 6 . 2 4 - 8 0 . 3 8 1 - 6 0 . 0 3 - 2 2 0 , 7 1 - 8 8 . 7 5 
4 - 9 0 . 8 - 2 6 . 6 2 - 3 8 3 . 6 6 - 1 1 7 . 4 2 - 8 0 . 1 9 - 3 0 0 . 9 - 9 4 . 9 2 
5 - 7 8 . 8 - 3 8 . 3 6 - 5 0 0 . 8 2 - 1 1 7 . 1 6 - 7 2 . 6 3 - 3 7 3 . 5 3 - 9 8 . 5 4 
6 - 8 0 . 8 - 5 0 . 0 8 - 6 3 1 . 7 0 - 1 3 0 . 8 8 - 7 3 . 8 1 - 4 4 7 . 3 4 - 1 0 2 . 7 1 
7 1 0 3 . 8 - 6 3 . 1 7 - 5 9 1 . 0 7 + 4 0 . 6 3 + 2 0 . 8 4 - 4 2 6 . 5 - 8 7 . 6 1 I 
! 8 2 1 9 . 6 - 5 9 . 1 0 - 4 3 0 . 5 7 1 6 0 . 5 0 7 4 . 7 9 3 5 1 . 7 1 6 5 . 9 3 1 
9 3 0 5 . 7 - 4 3 . 0 5 - 1 6 7 . 9 2 2 6 2 . 6 5 1 1 1 . 3 6 2 4 0 . 3 5 4 1 . 7 3 
10 3 6 4 . 2 - 1 6 . 7 9 + 1 7 9 . 4 9 3 4 7 . 4 1 3 3 . 7 4 1 0 6 . 6 1 1 7 . 3 5 
11 4 6 4 . 9 4 6 4 . 9 1 6 2 . 7 1 5 6 . 1 8 . 6 4 
12 4 6 4 . 7 1 4 6 4 . 7 1 4 7 . 7 7 2 0 3 . 8 7 2 9 . 9 2 
13 492. '? 1 4 9 2 . 4 1 4 2 . 3 3 4 6 . 1 7 4 8 . 7 3 
14 5 1 7 . 6 5 1 7 . 6 1 3 6 . 1 2 4 8 2 . 2 9 6 5 . 4 7 




5 9 6 . 4 1 4 2 . 5 3 6 2 4 . 8 2 8 2 . 1 5 
16 6 3 3 . 0 
1 
6 3 3 . 0 1 3 7 . 3 6 7 6 2 . 1 8 9 7 . 4 2 
17 5 0 1 . 2 5 0 1 , 2 9 8 . 7 3 8 6 0 . 9 1 1 0 7 . 3 2 
1 8 4 9 1 . 8 4 9 1 . 8 ! 8 8 . 0 3 9 4 8 . 9 4 1 1 5 . 7 0 
19 5 8 1 . 7 5 8 1 . 7 9 4 . 8 1 1 0 4 3 . 7 5 1 2 4 . 7 8 
2 0 6 9 2 . 8 6 9 2 . 8 1 0 2 . 5 3 1 1 4 6 . 2 8 1 3 4 . 6 4 
21 5 8 1 . 7 5 8 1 . 7 7 8 . 5 2 1 2 2 4 . 8 1 4 1 . 6 2 
22 4 6 7 . 2 • 4 6 7 . 2 5 6 . 9 9 1 2 8 1 . 7 9 1 4 6 . 1 3 
2 3 4 2 3 . 2 4 2 3 . 2 4 6 . 9 7 1 3 2 8 . 7 6 1 4 9 . 5 8 
24 3 9 9 . 0 3 9 9 . 0 4 0 . 2 9 1 3 6 9 . 0 5 1 5 2 . 3 7 
2 5 3 6 0 . 6 3 6 0 . 6 3 3 . 1 7 1 4 0 2 . 2 2 1 5 4 . 4 8 
2 6 3 2 5 . 9 3 2 5 . 9 2 7 . 0 4 1 4 2 9 . 2 6 1 5 6 . 0 2 
27 4 9 8 . 0 4 9 8 . 0 3 7 . 8 4 1-167.10 1 5 8 . 8 2 
2 8 4 4 7 . 5 4 4 7 . 5 1 3 0 . 8 7 1 4 9 7 . 9 7 1 6 0 . 9 6 
2 9 3 9 9 . 7 3 9 9 . 7 2 5 . 1 8 1 5 2 3 . 1 5 1 6 2 . 5 6 
3 0 3 5 6 . 6 3 5 6 . 6 2 0 . 3 2 1 5 4 3 . 4 7 1 6 3 . 7 3 
3 1 3 1 7 . 9 3 1 7 . 9 1 6 . 5 3 1 5 6 0 . 0 1 6 4 . 5 7 
32 3 0 8 . 4 3 0 8 . 4 1 3 . 2 6 1 1 5 7 3 . 2 6 1 6 5 . 1 5 
33 2 7 6 . 7 2 7 6 . 7 1 0 . 7 9 1 5 8 4 . 0 5 1 6 1 . 7 7 
34 2 4 5 . 8 2 4 5 . 8 8 . 6 0 1 5 9 2 . 6 5 1 6 5 . 7 5 
35 2 1 8 . 2 2 1 8 . 2 7 . 6 3 
l 6 0 0 , 2 8 1 6 5 . 9 3 
36 1 9 3 . 2 1 9 3 . 2 6 . 1 8 1 6 0 6 . 4 6 
1 6 6 . 0 2 
k67 
APPEt lDLX 8 , 2 1 1 StWLLHOLDING: AMORTIZED NST RKTURHS FOR REPLACEMENT CLONE R R I H 600 ( $ / A C R E ) 
A s s u m e ( l ) R S C 3 @ 6 0 c e n t s p e r p o u n d 
( 2 ) D i s c o u n t r a t e ® 7 p s r c e n t 
( 3 ) R e p l a n t i n g f p ^ n t 3 7 5 0 , 0 0 p e r a c r e 
A g e 
o f 
T r e e s 
N e t 
R e t u r n a 
I n t e r e s t 
o n U n p a i d 
B a l a n c e 
A c c u i a u l a t e d 
N e t 
R e t u r n s 
A d j u s t e d 
N e t 




; P r e s e n t 
1 
V a l u e o f 
A d j u s t e d 
H e t R e t u r n s 
j A c c u m u l a t e d 
P r e s e n t 
V a l u e o f 
A d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t u r n s 
A m o r t i z e d 
i P r e s e n t 
V a l u e o f 
A d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t u r n a 
0 + 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 1 + 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 
j • ' 
+ 7 . 2 
1 - 1 0 1 . 8 - 9 4 . 6 ! - 1 0 1 . 8 : - 9 5 . 2 - 8 8 . 0 - 9 4 . 2 
2 - 8 1 . 8 - 6 . 6 - 1 8 3 . 0 i - 8 8 . 4 ; - 7 7 . 2 - 1 6 5 . 2 - 9 1 . 4 
3 - 6 1 . 8 - 1 2 . 8 - 2 5 7 . 6 i - 7 4 . 6 1 - 6 0 . 9 - 2 2 6 . 1 - 8 6 . 1 
4 - 9 0 . 8 - 1 8 . 0 - 3 6 6 . 4 i - 1 0 8 . 8 I - 8 3 . 0 - 3 0 9 . 1 - 9 1 . 2 
5 - 7 8 . 8 - 2 5 . 6 - 4 7 0 . 8 ! - 1 0 4 . 4 i - 7 4 . 4 - 3 8 3 . 5 - 9 3 06 
6 - 8 0 . 8 - 3 3 . 0 - 5 8 4 . 6 1 ^  - 1 1 3 . 8 - 7 5 . 8 1 - 4 5 9 . 3 - 9 6 . 5 
7 2 1 6 . 1 - 4 0 . 9 - 4 0 9 . 4 1 + 1 7 5 . 2 + 1 0 9 . 1 - 3 5 0 . 2 - 6 5 . 1 
8 4 0 8 . 9 - 2 8 . 7 - 2 9 . 2 3 8 0 . 2 2 2 1 . 3 - 1 2 8 . 9 - 2 1 . 5 
9 5 5 9 . 0 - 2 . 0 + 5 2 7 . 8 ! 5 5 7 . 0 3 0 3 . 0 + 1 7 4 . 1 + 2 6 . 6 
1 0 6 6 2 , 8 6 6 2 . 8 3 3 6 . 7 5 1 0 . 8 7 2 . 5 
1 1 8 3 8 . 1 ; 8 3 8 . 1 3 9 8 . 1 9 0 8 . 9 1 2 0 . 9 
1 2 8 3 8 . 3 j 8 3 8 . 3 3 7 2 . 2 1 2 8 1 . 1 1 6 1 . 4 
1 3 8 8 5 . 8 8 8 5 . 8 3 6 7 . 6 1 6 4 8 . 7 1 9 7 . 8 
1 4 9 3 0 . 5 9 3 0 . 5 3 6 1 . 0 2 0 0 9 . 7 2 2 9 . 1 
1 5 1 0 7 0 . 3 1 0 7 0 . 3 3 8 7 . 4 2 3 9 7 . 1 2 6 3 . 7 
1 6 1 1 3 3 . 8 1 1 3 3 . 8 3 8 4 . 4 2 7 8 I . 5 2 9 4 . 8 
1 7 9 0 6 . 6 9 0 6 . 6 2 8 7 . 4 3 0 6 8 . 9 3 1 3 . 0 
1 8 8 9 1 . 8 8 9 1 . 8 2 6 4 . 0 3 3 3 2 . 9 3 3 0 . 0 
1 9 1 0 3 9 . 7 1 0 3 9 . 7 2 8 8 . 0 3 6 2 0 . 9 3 5 1 . 2 
2 0 1 2 3 1 . 4 1 2 3 1 . 4 3 1 7 . 7 3 9 3 8 . 6 3 7 0 . 2 
2 1 1 0 3 9 . 7 1 0 3 9 . 7 2 5 1 . 6 
4 1 9 0 . 2 3 8 5 . 5 
2 2 8 3 5 8 3 5 1 8 8 . 7 4 3 7 8 . 9 
3 9 4 . 1 
2 3 7 5 4 . 2 7 5 4 . 2 1 5 9 . 1 
4 5 3 8 . 0 4 0 3 . 9 
2 4 7 0 6 . 6 7 0 6 . 6 1 3 9 . 2 4 6 7 7 . 2 4 0 6 . 9 
2 5 6 3 8 . 6 
6 3 8 . 6 1 1 7 . 5 4 7 9 4 . 7 4 1 2 . 3 
2 6 5 8 6 . 1 5 8 6 . 1 1 0 0 . 8 4 8 9 5 . 5 
4 1 6 . 1 
2 7 8 8 0 . 1 8 8 0 . 1 
1 4 1 . 7 5 0 3 7 . 2 4 1 8 . 1 
2 8 9 1 3 . 1 9 1 3 . 1 1 3 7 . 0 
5 1 7 4 . 2 4 2 4 . 3 
2 9 7 0 8 . 6 
7 0 8 . 6 9 9 . 9 5 2 7 4 . 1 
4 2 7 . 2 
3 0 6 3 4 . 7 6 3 4 . 7 3 3 . 1 5 3 5 7 . 2 
4 3 3 . 9 
3 1 5 6 8 . 3 5 6 8 . 3 6 9 . 9 
5 4 2 7 . 1 4 3 4 . 2 
3 2 5 5 3 . 7 5 5 3 . 7 6 3 . 7 
5 4 9 0 . 8 4 3 3 . 8 
3 3 4 9 7 . 5 4 9 7 . 5 
5 3 . 2 5 5 4 4 . 0 
4 3 2 . 4 
3 4 4 4 4 . 5 4 4 4 . 5 4 4 . 5 5 5 8 8 . 5 4 3 5 . 9 
3 5 3 9 7 . 2 
3 9 7 . 2 3 7 . 3 5 6 2 5 . 8 
4 3 3 . 2 
3 5 4 . 3 3 5 4 . 3 
I 
1 
3 1 . 2 
1 
1 
5 6 5 7 . 0 4 3 5 . 6 
! 
'+68 
APPKNDIX SMALUIOLDiNG: AMORTIZKO RETURNS FOR REPUCEMENT CLONE RRIM 600 (S/ACRE) 
Assume (1 ) RS3 3 ® 60 oenta per pound 
(2 ) Discount rate © 10 per cent 




I Accumulated Amortized 
Age 
Net 
Interest Accumulated Adjusted Present Present Present 
of 
Returns 
on Unpaid Net Net Value of Value of Value of 






0 + 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 
1 - i o i . 8 - 9 4 . 6 -101 .8 - 92 . 5 - 05 .3 - 9 3 . 8 
2 - 8 1 , 8 - 9 . 4 6 -185 .8 1 - 91 .3 - 75 . 4 I I -160.7 - 93 . 2 
3 - 6 1 . 8 - 1 8 . 5 8 -266.2 - 80 .4 - 60 .4 -221 .1 - 88 .4 
4 - 9 0 . 8 - 26 . 62 -383.7 -117.4 - 80 .2 -301.3 - 96 . 4 
5 - 7 8 . 8 - 3 8 . 3 6 -500 .8 -117.2 - 7 2 . 8 -374.1 - 9 7 . 3 
6 - 8 0 . 8 - 50 . 1 -631.7 1 -130 .8 - 7 3 . 8 -447.9 -103 .0 
7 216 , 1 - 63 . 2 -591.1 1 + 4 0 . 6 + 2 0 . 8 -427 .1 - 89 .7 
8 4 0 8 . 9 - 5 9 . 1 -430 .6 160 . 5 7 5 . 0 -352.1 - 66 . 9 
9 559 - 4 3 . 1 -167.9 262 . 6 113.3 -238 .8 - 4 0 . 6 
10 6 6 2 . 8 - 1 6 . 8 +478 .1 347 .4 134 .1 -104.7 - 1 6 . 8 
11 838 .1 838 .1 293 .3 +188 .6 28 .3 
12 838 .3 838 .3 267.4 1 4^,6.0 68 .4 
13 8 8 5 . 8 885 . 8 236 .9 712 . 9 9 9 . 8 
14 930 . 5 930 . 5 244 .7 9 57 . 6 
134 . 0 
15 1070 .3 1070 .3 255 . 3 1213 .4 157 .7 
16 1 133 . 8 1133 . 8 247 .2 1460 .6 189 .9 
17 906 . 6 906 . 6 179 .5 
1640 . 1 1 96 . 8 
18 891 . 8 S ' ; i .8 1800 . 6 216 . 0 
15 1039 .7 1039 .7 170 .5 1971 . 1 236 . 5 
20 1231 .4 1231 .4 183 .5 2154 . 6 
258 . 6 
21 1039 .7 1039 .7 
140 .4 2295 . 0 275 .4 
22 835 035 102 ,7 2397 .7 263 .7 
23 754 . 2 
75^ . 2 84 .5 2482 .2 2 73 . 0 
24 7 0 6 . 6 7 06 . 6 72 . 1 2554 .3 
281 .0 
25 638 . 6 
638 . 6 58 . 8 2613 . 1 287 .4 
26 586 .1 586 .1 49 .2 2662 .3 
292 .9 
27 880 ,1 880 .1 66 . 9 
2729 .2 300.2 
28 913 .1 9 I J . I 
63 . 0 2792 .2 307 .1 
29 7 0 8 . 6 
7O8 .6 44 .6 2836 . 8 312 . 0 
30 634 .7 634 .7 
36 .2 2873 . 0 316 . 0 
31 568 .3 568.3 
29 .6 2902 .6 319 .3 
32 553 .7 553 .7 
26 . 0 2928 .6 322 . 1 
33 497 .5 497 . 5 
21 .4 2950 .0 2 95 . 0 
34 444 . 5 444 .5 17 .3 
2967 .3 296 .7 
3 )^ 397 .2 
297 .2 14.3 2981 .6 298 .1 
36 354 .3 
351 .3 1 11 .3 2 992 . 9 299 .3 
'+69 
APPENDIX 8.21K SMALLHOLDING: AMORTIZED NET RETURNS FOR Rt;PLACKro:NT CLONE RRIM 600 (VACRE) 
Assume (l) RS3 J & QO cents per pound 
(2) Discount rate 9 7 per cent 
(3) Replanting grant S750.00 per acre 
1 
j 






Accumulated Adjusted j Present Present Present 
of bn Unpaid Not Net Value of j j Value of Value of 
Trees Balance Returns j 
! I 






0 + 7.2 I 
1 
i 
+ 7.2 1 + 7.2 
I i 
+ 7.2 + 7.2 + 7.2 
1 - 1 0 1 . 8 - 9 4 . 6 i - 1 0 1 . 8 - 95.14 - 87.94 - 94.10 
2 - 8 1 . 8 - 6 . 6 - 1 6 9 . 7 j - 88.4 - 77.21 -165.15 - 91.34 
3 - 6 1 . 8 - 11.87 - 2 4 3 . 4 I - 73.7 - 6 0 . 1 6 -225.31 - 85.85 
4 - 9 0 . 8 - 1 7 . 0 - 3 5 1 . 2 1 - 1 0 7 . 8 - 82.24 -307.55 - 90.80 
5 - 78.8 - 24.6 - 4 5 4 . 6 i -103.4 - 73.72 j -381.27 - 92.99 
6 - 8 0 . 8 - 31.8 - 5 6 7 . 2 -112.6 - 75.03 -456.3 - 95.73 
7 311.1 - 39.7 - 2 9 5 . 5 +271.7 + 1 6 9 . 2 -287.1 - 53.27 
8 569.4 - 2 0 . 9 + 2 5 3 . 0 +548.5 319.23 + 32.13 5.33 
9 773 773 420.46 452.59 6 9 . 4 7 
10 914 914 464.63 917.22 1 3 0 . 5 9 
11 1151.9 1 1 5 1 . 9 547.26 1464.48 195.30 
12 1 1 5 2 . 9 1 1 5 2 . 9 511.9 1976.38 248.83 
13 1 2 1 6 . 4 1 2 1 6 . 4 504.76 2481.14 296.87 
14 1 2 7 7 . 2 1 2 7 7 . 2 495.32 2976.46 340.34 
15 1467.3 1 1 4 6 7 . 3 531.82 3508.28 385.19 
16 1553.3 ! 1 j 1 5 5 3 . 3 5 2 6 . 1 6 4034.44 4 2 7 . 0 7 
17 1246.1 1 1246,1 394.48 4428.92 4 5 3 . 6 3 
18 1225.2 1 1225.2 362.49 4791.41 4 7 6 . 3 2 
19 1425.7 1 1 1425.7 394.22 5135.95 5 9 1 . 7 6 
20 1685.4 i 1635.4 435.54 5621.49 5 3 0 . 6 2 
21 1425.7 1425.7 344.33 5965.82 550.58 
22 1145.0 j 1 1 4 5 . 0 2 5 n . 4 4 62"4.26 1 5 6 2 . 7 0 
23 1633.2 1 0 3 3 . 2 2 1 7 . 9 4 6442.2 5 7 1 . 5 1 
24 9 6 5 . 2 9 6 5 . 2 1 9 0 . 2 5 6632.45 578.28 
25 873.0 873.0 1 1 6 0 . 8 5 6793.3 582.93 . 
26 8 0 5 . 2 8 0 5 . 2 1 1 3 8 . 6 5 6931.95 586.17 
27 1202.1 j 1202.1 1 9 3 . 4 5 7125.4 594.43 
28 1081.5 1081.5 1 6 2 . 6 6 7 2 8 8 . 0 6 6 0 0 . 4 7 
29 9 7 0 . 6 970.6 1 3 6 . 4 3 7424.49 6 0 4 . 7 1 
30 9 5 6 . 0 i 956.0 1 2 5 . 5 9 7550.08 608.43 
31 780.7 j 780.7 95.85 7 6 4 5 . 9 5 610.12 
32 7 6 1 . 8 7 6 1 . 8 87.41 7 7 3 3 . 3 4 611,49 
33 684.5 684,5 73.40 7 8 0 6 . 7 4 612.11 
34 6 1 2 . 9 6 1 2 . 9 61.42 7 8 6 8 . 1 6 612.11 
35 548.9 548.9 51.41 7 9 1 9 . 5 7 611.65 
36 4 9 0 . 8 1 
t 
4 9 0 . 8 
1 
42.96 7962.53 610.85 
1 -
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APPENDIX 0 . 2 1 L SMALLHOLDING: AMORTIZED NET RKTUIWS FOR RKPLACEKENT CLONK RRIM 600 (S/ACRE) 
Assume ( l ) RSS 3 & 80 cents per pound 
(2) Discount rate @ 10 per cent 
(3) Replanting ci'ar^t $750.00 per acre 




I n t e r e s t Accunulated Adjusted Present Present Present 
of on Unpaid Net Not Value of Value of Value of 
Trees Balance 
1 






+ 7 . 2 
! 
! + 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 + 7 . 2 
1 - 1 0 1 . 8 
1 
\ - 94.6 1 - 1 0 1 . 8 - 92 .5 - 85.3 - 93.8 
2 - 8 1 . 8 - 9.46 - 1 8 5 , 8 ; - 9 1 . 3 - 75.4 - 1 6 0 . 7 - 93.2 
3 - 6 1 . 8 - 1 8 . 5 - 2 0 6 . 2 i - 80,3 ! - 60.3 j - 2 2 1 . 0 - 88.4 
4 - 90.8 - 26.6 - 3 8 3 . 6 ! - 1 1 7 . 4 1 - 80.2 - 3 0 1 . 2 - 96.4 
5 - 78.8 - 38.3 - 5 0 0 . 8 - 1 1 7 . 1 1 - 7 2 . 7 - 3 7 3 . 9 - 97.2 
6 - 80.8 - 50.0 - 6 3 1 . 7 - 1 3 0 . 8 1 - 7 3 . 8 i - 4 4 7 . 7 - 1 0 3 . 0 
7 3 1 1 . 4 - 6 3 . 1 - 3 8 3 . 4 +248.3 1 2 7 . 4 - 3 2 0 . 3 - ^ 7 . 3 
8 569.4 - 38.3 +147.7 5 3 1 . 1 248.0 - 7 2 . 3 - 1 3 . 7 
9 773 773 327.8 +255.5 + 43.4 
10 914 914 352.8 ! 608.3 97.3 
1 1 1 1 5 1 . 9 1 1 1 5 1 . 9 403.2 1 0 1 1 . 5 1 5 1 . 7 
12 1 1 5 2 . 9 1 1 5 2 . 9 367.8 1379.3 206,9 
13 1 2 1 6 . 4 1 2 1 6 . 4 352.8 1 7 3 2 . 1 242.5 
14 1 2 7 7 . 2 1 2 7 7 . 2 335.9 2068.0 289.5 
15 1467.3 1467.3 350.7 2418.7 314.4 
16 1553 .3 1 5 5 3 . 3 338.6 2757.3 358.4 
i 
1 2 4 6 . 1 1 2 4 6 . 1 246.7 3004.0 390.5 
18 1 2 2 5 . 2 1 2 2 5 . 2 220.5 3224.5 386.9 
19 1 4 2 5 . 7 1 4 2 5 . 7 233.8 3458.3 4 1 5 . 0 
20 1605.4 1685.4 2 5 1 . 1 3709.4 4 4 5 . 1 
2 1 1 4 2 5 . 7 1 4 2 5 . 7 1 9 2 . 5 3901.9 468.2 
22 1 1 4 5 . 0 1 1 4 5 . 0 140.8 4042.7 444.7 
23 1033.2 1033.2 1 1 5 . 7 4158.4 457.4 
24 965.2 i 965.2 98.5 4256.9 468.3 
25 873.0 1 873.0 80.3 4337.2 4 7 3 . 1 
26 805.2 i 805.2 67.6 4404.8 484.5 
27 1 2 0 2 . 1 i 1 1 2 0 2 . 1 91 .4 4496.2 494.6 
28 1 0 8 1 . 5 
1 
t 1081 .5 74.6 4570.8 502.8 
29 970.6 970.6 61 . ] 4631.9 509.5 
30 956 956 54.5 4686.4 5 1 5 . 5 
3 1 780.7 980.7 5 1 . 0 4737.4 5 2 1 . 1 
32 7 6 1 . 8 7 6 1 . 8 3 5 . 8 4773.2 5 2 5 . 1 
33 684.5 684.5 29.4 4802.6 
480.2 
34 6 1 2 . 9 i 612 .9 23 .9 1 4826.5 
482.6 
35 548.9 548.9 1 9 . 8 4846.3 
484.6 
36 490.8 1 1 490.8 1 5 . 7 
4 862.0 486.2 
i 
A P P E N D I X 8 . 2 1 K S M A L L H O L D I N G : A M O R T I Z E D M E T I f f l T U R N S F O R R E P L A C E M E N T C L O N E R R I M 6 0 0 ( 8 / A C R S ) 
A s s u m e ( l ) R S S 3 3 4 0 c e n t s p e r p o u n d 
( 2 ) D i s c o u n t r a t e © 7 p e r c e n t 
( 3 ) R e p l a n t i n / ^ g r a n t $ 1 0 0 0 . 0 0 p e r a c r e 
1 
I I f t I 1 A c o u m u l a t o d A m o r t i z e d 
A g e 
N e t i 
I n t e r e s t j A c c u m u l a t e d j A d j u s t e d j P r e s e n t i P r e s e n t P r e s e n t 
o f 
R e t u r n s 
o n U n p a i d N e t 1 K e t 1 V a l u e o f V a l u e o f V a l u e o f 
T r e e s B a l a n c e R e t u r n s j R e t u r n s A d j u s t e d j A d j u s t e d A d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t u r n s i N e t R e t u r n s N e t R e t u r n s 





+ 9 0 . 5 3 i + 9 0 . 5 3 
r 
i 
+ 9 0 . 5 3 + 9 0 . 5 3 + 9 0 . 5 3 
1 - 6 8 . 4 7 
1 
! - 2 2 . 0 6 - 6 8 . 4 7 - 6 3 . 9 9 + 2 6 . 5 4 + 2 8 . 4 
2 - 4 8 . 4 7 - 2 6 . 4 1 - 4 8 . 4 7 - 4 2 . 3 3 - 1 5 . 7 9 - 8 . 7 
3 - 2 8 . 4 6 - 1 . 8 - 5 6 . 6 7 1 - 3 0 . 2 6 - 2 4 . 7 - 4 0 . 4 9 - 1 5 . 4 
4 - 6 7 . 4 7 - 3 . 9 7 - 1 2 8 . 1 i - 7 1 . 4 4 - 5 4 . 5 - 9 4 . 9 9 - 2 8 . 
5 - 5 5 . 4 6 - 8 . 9 7 - 1 9 2 . 5 - 6 4 . 4 3 - 4 5 . 9 - 1 4 0 . 8 9 - 3 4 . 4 
6 - 6 0 . 8 - 1 3 . 5 - 2 6 6 . 8 - 7 4 . 3 - 4 9 . 5 - 1 9 0 . 3 9 - 4 0 . 0 
7 1 0 3 . 8 - 1 8 . 7 - 1 8 1 . 7 8 5 . 1 5 2 . 9 9 - 1 3 7 . 4 - 2 5 . 6 
8 2 1 9 . 6 - 1 2 . 7 + 2 5 . 1 8 2 0 6 . 9 1 2 0 . 4 - 2 5 . 8 - 4 . 3 
9 3 0 5 . 7 3 0 5 . 7 1 6 6 . 3 + 1 4 0 . 5 + 2 1 . 5 
1 0 3 6 4 . 2 
i 
3 6 4 . 2 1 8 5 . 1 3 2 5 . 6 4 6 . 2 
1 1 4 6 4 . 9 4 6 4 . 9 j 2 2 0 . 9 5 4 6 . 5 7 2 . 7 
1 2 4 6 4 . 7 4 6 4 . 7 1 2 0 6 . 3 7 5 2 . 8 9 4 . 9 
1 3 4 9 2 . 4 4 9 2 . 4 2 0 4 . 3 9 5 7 . 1 1 1 4 . 9 
1 4 5 1 7 . 6 1 5 1 7 . 6 2 0 0 . 7 1 1 5 7 . 8 1 3 2 . 0 
1 5 5 9 6 . 4 5 9 6 . 4 2 1 6 . 2 1 3 7 4 . 0 1 5 1 . 1 : 
1 6 6 3 3 6 3 3 2 1 4 . 4 1 5 8 8 . 5 1 6 8 . 4 
1 7 5 0 1 . 2 1 5 0 1 . 2 1 5 8 . 7 1 7 4 7 . 2 
1 7 8 . 2 
1 8 4 9 1 . 8 
1 1 
4 9 1 . 8 1 4 5 . 5 1 8 9 2 . 7 1 8 7 . 4 ! 
1 9 5 8 1 . 7 5 8 1 . 7 1 1 6 0 . 8 2 0 5 3 . 5 1 9 9 . 2 i 
2 0 6 9 2 . 8 6 9 2 . 8 1 1 7 9 . 0 2 2 3 2 . 5 2 0 9 . 9 i 
2 1 5 8 1 . 7 5 8 1 . 7 1 4 0 . 5 ! 2 3 7 3 . 0 2 1 8 . 3 i 
2 2 4 6 7 . 2 4 6 7 . 2 1 0 5 . 5 i 2 4 7 8 . 5 2 2 3 . 1 1 
2 3 4 2 3 . 2 4 2 3 . 2 8 9 . 3 2 5 6 7 . 8 2 2 8 . 5 
2 4 3 9 9 3 9 9 7 8 . 6 7 2 6 4 6 . 5 
2 3 0 . 2 
2 5 3 6 0 . 6 3 6 0 . 6 6 6 , 4 4 2 7 1 2 . 9 2 3 3 . 3 
2 6 3 2 5 . 9 3 2 5 . 9 5 6 . 1 2 7 6 9 . 0 2 3 5 . 4 
2 ? 4 9 8 4 9 8 8 0 . 1 2 8 4 9 . 1 2 3 6 . 5 
2 8 4 4 7 . 5 I 4 4 7 . 5 6 7 . 3 
2 9 1 6 . 4 2 3 9 . 1 
2 9 3 9 9 . 7 3 9 9 . 7 
5 6 . 2 2 9 7 2 . 6 2 4 0 . 8 
3 0 3 5 6 . 6 3 5 6 . 6 
4 6 . 8 3 0 1 9 . 4 2 4 4 . 6 
3 1 3 1 7 . 9 3 1 7 . 9 
3 9 . 0 3 0 5 8 . 4 2 4 4 . 7 
3 2 3 0 8 . 4 3 0 8 . 4 3 5 . 4 
3 0 9 3 . 8 2 4 4 . 4 
3 3 2 7 6 . 7 2 7 6 . 7 
2 9 . 7 3 1 2 3 . 5 2 4 3 . 6 
3 4 2 4 5 . 8 
2 4 5 . 8 1 2 4 . 6 3 1 4 8 . 1 2 4 5 . 6 
1 
3 5 2 1 8 . 2 
2 1 8 . 2 2 0 . 4 3 1 6 8 . 5 2 4 4 . 0 
3 6 1 9 3 . 2 
1 9 3 . 2 1 6 . 9 
( 
3 1 8 5 . 4 2 4 5 . 3 
'+72 
APPENDIX 8.21N Sfl/VLLHOLDIIIG: AMOHTIVED MflT Hl^ TO'SKi FOR REPLACEMENT CLONE RRIM 600 (S/ACRE) 
Assume (l) F!SS 3 & AO cents per pound 
(2) Discount rate 0 10 per cent 
(3) Repl.'i.nt :.ns gr int ^1000,00 per acre 
1 
i 



























0 + 90.53 + 90.53 + 90.53 + 90.53 + 90.53 + 90.53 
1 - 68.47 + 22.06 - 68.5 - 62.3 + 28.2 + 31.0 
2 - 48.47 - 26.4 - 48.5 - 40.1 - 11.9 - 6.9 
3 - 28.46 - 2.6 - 57.46 - 31.1 - 23.4 - 25.3 - 10.2 
4 ~ 67.47 - 5.7 -130.6 - 73.2 - 50.0 - 85.3 - 26.9 
5 - 55.^6 - 13.0 -199.1 - 68.5 - 42.5 -127.8 - 33.7 
6 - 60.8 - 19.9 -279.8 - 80.7 - 45.5 i -173.3 - 39.9 
7 103.8 - 27.9 -203.9 + 75o9 + 38.9 1 -134.4 - 27.6 
8 219.6 - 20.3 - 4.6 +199.3 93.1 ' - 41.3 - 7.7 
9 305.7 - 0.5 +300.6 +305.2 129.4 + 88.1 + 15.3 
10 364.2 i 364.2 140.6 228.7 37.3 
11 464.9 464.9 162.7 391.4 60.3 
12 464.7 464.7 1 140.2 539.6 79.3 
13 492.4 492.4 i 142.8 682.4 96.2 
14 517.6 517.6 136.1 818.5 111.3 
15 596.4 
i 
596.4 142.5 ! 961.0 125.9 
16 633 633 138.0 1099.0 140.7 
17 501.2 501.2 99.2 1198.2 149.8 
18 491.8 1 491.8 88.5 1286.7 157.0 
19 581.7 
i 1 
581.7 95.4 1382.1 165.9 
20 692.8 692.8 103.2 1485.3 173.8 
21 581.7 581.7 78.5 1563.8 181.4 
22 467.2 467.2 57.5 1621.3 184.8 
23 423.2 423.2 47.4 1668.7 188.6 
24 399 399 40.7 1709.4 189.7 
25 360.6 360,6 33.2 17-^2.6 191.7 
26 325.9 3^5.9 27.4 1770.0 192.9 • 
27 496.0 498.0 37.8 1807.8 195.2 
28 447.5 447.5 30.9 1838.7 196.7 
29 399.7 399.7 25.2 1863.9 199.4 
30 356.6 356.6 20.3 1884.2 199.7 
31 317.9 317.9 16.5 1900.7 199.6 
32 308.4 308.4 14.5 1915.2 201.1 
33 276.7 276.7 11.9 1927.1 200.4 
34 245,8 245. 9.6 1936.7 201.4 
35 218.2 1 :'lf!.2 7.9 1944.6 202.2 




^ + 7 3 
0 
APPEUDIX 8 . 2 1 ^ M A L L ! ! O L D I K ' G : A M O R T I Z E D N K T R E T I U W S F O R R E P L A C E M E N T C L O N E R R I H 6 0 0 ( $ / A C R E ) 
Assump ( l ) RSC 3 @ 60 c e n t s p e r pound 
( 2 ) D i s c o u n t r a t e @ 7 p e r c e n t 
( 3 ) R e p l a n t i n g g r a n t $ 1 0 0 0 . 0 0 p e r a c r e 
A c c u m u l a t e d A m o r t i z e d 
A g e 
N e t 
R e t u r n s 
I n t e r e s t A c c u m u l a t e d A d j u s t e d 1 P r e s e n t P r e s e n t P r e s e n t 
o f o n U n p a i d N e t N e t V a l u e o f V a l u e o f V a l u e o f 
T r e e s ^ l a l a n c e R e t u r n s R e t u r n s A d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t x i r n s 
A d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t u r n s 
A d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t u r n s 
0 + 9 0 . 5 3 + 9 0 . 5 3 + 9 0 . 5 3 + 9 0 . 5 3 + 9 0 . 5 3 + 9 0 . 5 3 
1 - 6 8 . 4 7 + 2 2 . 0 6 - 6 8 . 4 7 - 6 3 . 9 9 + 2 6 . 5 4 + 2 8 . 4 
2 - 4 8 . 4 7 - 2 6 . 4 1 - 4 8 . 4 7 - 4 2 . 3 - 1 5 . 7 6 - 8 . 7 
3 - 2 8 , 4 6 - 1 . 8 5 - 5 6 . 7 2 - 3 0 . 3 1 1 - 2 4 . 7 - 4 0 . 4 6 - 1 5 . 4 
4 - 6 7 . 4 7 - 3 . 9 7 - 1 2 8 . 1 6 - 7 1 . 4 4 - 5 4 . 5 - 9 4 . 9 6 - 2 8 . 0 
5 - 5 5 . 4 6 - 8 . 9 7 - 1 9 2 . 5 9 - 6 4 . 4 3 - 4 5 . 9 3 - 1 4 0 . 8 9 - 3 4 . 4 
6 - 6 0 . 8 - 1 3 . 4 8 - 2 6 6 . 8 7 - 7 4 . 2 8 - 4 9 . 4 9 - 1 9 0 . 3 8 - 4 0 . 0 
7 2 1 6 . 1 - 1 8 . 6 8 - 6 9 . 4 5 + 1 9 7 . 4 + 1 2 2 . 9 - 6 7 . 4 8 - 1 2 . 6 
8 4 0 8 . 9 - 4 . 8 6 + 3 2 9 . 7 3 + 4 0 4 . 0 4 2 3 5 . 1 5 + 1 6 7 . 6 7 + 2 8 . 0 
9 5 5 9 5 5 9 3 0 4 . 0 6 4 7 1 . 7 3 + 7 2 . 0 
1 0 6 6 2 . 8 6 6 2 . 8 3 3 6 . 9 3 8 0 8 . 6 6 1 1 4 . 8 
1 1 8 3 8 . 1 8 3 8 . 1 3 9 8 . 1 7 1 2 0 6 . 8 3 1 6 0 . 5 
1 2 8 3 8 . 3 8 3 8 . 3 3 7 2 . 2 1 5 7 9 . 0 3 1 9 9 . 0 
1 3 8 8 3 . 0 8 8 5 . 8 3 6 7 . 5 1 9 4 6 , 5 3 2 3 3 . 6 
1 4 9 3 0 . 5 9 3 0 . 5 3 6 0 . 8 6 2 3 0 7 . 3 9 2 6 3 . 0 
1 5 1 0 7 0 . 3 1 0 7 0 . 3 3 8 7 . 9 2 2 6 9 5 . 3 1 2 9 6 . 5 
1 6 1 1 3 3 . 8 1 1 3 3 . 8 3 8 4 , 0 5 3 0 7 9 . 3 6 3 2 6 . 4 
1 7 9 0 6 . 6 9 0 6 . 6 2 8 7 . 0 3 3 6 6 . 3 6 3 4 3 . 4 
1 8 8 9 1 . 8 8 9 1 . 8 2 6 3 . 8 5 3 6 3 0 . 2 1 3 5 9 . 4 
1 9 1 0 3 9 . 7 1 0 3 9 . 7 2 8 7 , 4 8 3 9 1 7 . 6 9 
3 8 0 . 0 
2 0 1 2 3 1 . 4 
! 
1 2 3 1 . 4 3 1 9 . 7 6 4 2 3 7 . 4 5 3 9 8 . 3 
2 1 1 0 3 9 . 7 1 0 3 9 . 7 2 5 1 . 1 4 4 8 8 . 5 5 4 1 2 . 9 
2 2 8 3 5 8 3 5 1 8 8 . 5 4 6 7 7 . 0 5 4 2 0 . 9 
2 3 7 5 4 . 2 7 5 4 . 2 1 5 9 . 1 4 0 3 6 . 1 5 
4 3 0 . 4 
2 4 7 0 6 . 6 7 0 6 . 6 1 3 9 . 3 4 9 7 5 . 4 5 4 3 2 . 9 
2 5 6 3 8 . 6 6 3 8 . 6 1 1 7 . 6 7 
5 0 9 3 . 1 2 4 3 8 . 0 
2 6 5 8 6 . 1 5 8 6 . 1 1 0 0 . 9 2 
5 1 9 4 . 0 4 4 4 1 , 5 
2 7 8 8 0 . 1 8 8 0 . 1 1 4 1 , 6 3 
5 3 3 5 . 6 8 4 4 2 . 9 
2 8 9 1 3 . 1 9 1 3 . 1 1 3 7 . 3 3 
5 4 7 3 . 0 1 4 4 8 . 8 
2 9 7 0 8 . 6 7 0 0 . 6 9 9 . 6 
5 5 7 2 . 6 1 4 5 1 . 4 
3 0 6 3 4 . 7 6 3 4 . 7 8 3 . 3 8 5 6 5 5 . 9 9 
4 5 8 . 1 
3 1 5 6 8 . 3 ! 5 6 0 . 3 6 9 . 8 5 7 2 5 . 7 9 4 5 8 . 1 
3 2 5 5 3 . 7 
1 1 5 5 3 . 7 6 3 . 5 5 7 8 9 . 2 9 4 5 7 . 4 
3 3 4 9 7 . 5 4 9 7 . 5 4 9 . 7 
5 8 3 8 . 9 9 4 5 5 . 4 
3 4 4 4 4 . 5 
4 4 4 , 5 4 4 . 5 5 8 8 3 . 4 9 4 5 8 . 9 
3 5 3 9 7 . 2 
i 3 9 7 . 2 3 7 . 2 5 9 2 0 . 6 9 4 5 5 . 9 
3 6 3 5 4 . 3 
j 




3 1 . 0 
i 
+ — 
5 9 5 1 . 6 9 4 5 8 . 3 
APPENDIX 8.21P SKALUIOLDIMG: AMORTIZED NET RETURNS FOR REPLACEMENT CLOUE RRIH 600 (S/ACRE) 
Assume (l) RSS 3 9 60 cents per pound 
(2) Discount rate © 10 per cent 






























0 + 90.5 + 90.5 
i 
+ 90.5 + 90.5 + 90.5 + 90.5 
1 - 6 8 . 5 + 2 2 . 0 6 i - 6 8 . 5 - 6 2 . 3 + 2 8 , 2 + 31.0 
2 - 48.5 - 26.4 - 43.5 - 40.1 - 11.9 - 6.9 
3 - 28.5 - 2 . 6 - 57.46 - 31.1 - 23.4 - 25.3 - 10.2 
4 - 67.5 - 5.7 - 1 3 0 . 6 - 73.2 - 50.0 - 85.3 - 26.9 
5 - 55.5 - 1 3 . 0 -199.1 - 6 8 . 5 - 42.5 - 1 2 7 . 8 - 33.7 
6 - 60.8 - 19.9 - 2 7 9 . 8 1 - 80.7 - 45.5 -173.3 - 39.9 
7 +216.1 - 2 7 . 9 - 91.6 • +180.2 + 96.5 j - 76.8 - 15.7 
8 408.9 - 9.2 +308.1 399.7 186.7 +109.9 + 2 0 . 7 
9 559.0 559.0 2 3 7 . 0 346.9 + 6 0 . 4 
10 662.8 662.0 2 5 5 . 8 6 0 2 . 7 98.2 
11 838.1 838.1 2 9 3 . 3 8 9 6 . 0 138.0 
12 83B.3 838.3 2 6 7 . 4 1 1 6 3 , 4 171.0 
13 885.8 885.8 2 5 6 . 8 1420.2 200.2 
14 930.5 1 
1 
' j 930.5 244.7 1 6 6 4 . 9 226.4 
15 1 0 7 0 . 3 1 1070.3 255.8 1920.7 251.6 
16 1 1 3 3 . 8 ; 1 1 3 3 . 8 247.2 2167.9 277.5 
17 9 0 6 . 6 9 0 6 . 6 179.5 2347.4 293.4 
18 891.8 891.8 160.5 2507.9 306.0 
19 1039.7 ; 1 0 3 9 . 7 170.5 2 6 7 8 . 4 321.4 
20 1231.4 1 2 3 1 . 4 182.2 2860.6 334.7 
21 1039.7 1 0 3 9 . 7 140.4 3001,0 348.1 
22 835 835 102.7 3103.7 353.8 
23 754.2 7 5 4 . 2 84.5 3 I 8 O . 2 360.3 
24 7 0 6 . 6 7 0 6 . 6 72.1 3260.3 3 6 1 . 9 
25 636.6 638.6 58.8 3319.1 365.1 
26 586.1 586.1 49.2 i 3368.3 367.1 ' 
27 880.1 i 880.1 66.9 3435.2 371.0 
28 913.1 
1 
9 1 3 . 1 63.00 3498.2 374.3 
29 7 0 8 . 6 7 0 8 . 6 j 44.6 3542.8 379,1 
30 634.7 6 3 4 . 7 36.2 3579.0 379.4 
31 5 6 8 . 3 
i 
j i 5 6 0 . 3 29.6 3 6 0 8 . 6 378.9 
32 553.7 1 ] 
i [ 
! 553.7 2 6 . 0 3634.6 381.6 
33 497.5 j 497,5 21.4 3 6 5 6 . 0 380.2 
34 4 4 4 , 5 
i 
444.5 17.3 3673.3 382.0 









APPENDIX 0 . 2 I Q S U M . L H O L D I N G : AMORTIZED NET H^TUfmS FOR Rj'.PLACEMENT CLONE RRIH 6 0 0 ( S / A C R E j 
Assuine ( 1 ) R S J 3 & 00 oenta per pound 
( 2 ) D i s c o u n t rate 0 7 per cent 
( 3 ) Replantinjr grant v l O O O . O O per a c r e a 
Age 
of 
T r e e s 
Net 
Returns 
I n t e r e s t 
on Unpaid 













Value of 1 






A d j u s t e d 
Net R e t u m a 
A m o r t i z e d 
P r e s e n t 
Value o f 
A d j u s t e d 
Net Returns 
0 + 9 0 . 5 3 
' t 
+ 9 0 . 5 3 i + 9 0 . 5 3 j 
• ' ' i 
+ 9 0 . 5 3 
i 
+ 9 0 . 5 3 + 9 0 . 5 3 
1 - 6 8 . 4 7 + 2 2 , 0 6 i - 6 0 , 4 7 1 - 6 4 . 0 + 2 6 . 5 3 + 2 8 , 4 
2 - 4 8 , 4 7 - 2 6 . 4 1 1 - 4 0 . 4 7 - 4 2 . 3 - 1 5 . 8 - 8 . 7 
3 - 2 8 . 4 6 - l . S - 5 6 . 6 7 1 - 3 0 . 2 6 - 2 4 . 7 - 4 0 . 5 - 1 5 . 4 
4 - 6 7 . 4 7 - 3 . 9 7 - 1 2 8 . 1 ! - 7 1 . 4 4 - 5 4 . 5 - 9 5 . 0 - 2 8 . 0 
5 - 5 5 . ^ 6 - 8 . 9 7 - 1 9 2 . 5 1 - 6 4 . 4 3 - 4 5 . 9 - 1 4 0 . 9 - 3 4 . 4 
6 - 6 0 . 8 - 1 3 . 5 - 2 6 6 . 8 1 - 7 4 . 3 - 4 9 . 5 - 1 9 0 . 4 - 4 0 . 0 
7 3 1 1 . 4 - 1 8 , 7 + 2 5 . 9 j + 2 9 2 . 7 + 1 8 2 . 4 - 8 . 0 - 1 . 5 
8 5 6 9 . 4 5 6 9 . 4 3 3 1 . 4 + 3 2 3 . 4 + 5 4 . 0 
9 7 7 3 
J 
1 7 7 3 4 2 0 . 5 7 4 3 . 9 
1 1 3 . 8 
1 0 9 1 4 9 1 4 4 6 4 . 3 1 2 0 8 . 2 1 7 1 . 6 
1 1 1 1 5 1 . 9 1 1 5 1 . 9 5 - 1 7 . 1 1 7 5 5 . 3 2 3 3 . 5 
1 2 1 1 5 2 . 9 1 1 5 2 . 9 5 1 1 . 9 2 2 6 7 . 2 2 8 5 . 7 
1 3 1 2 1 6 . 4 1 2 1 6 . 4 5 0 4 . 8 2 7 7 2 . 0 3 3 2 . 6 
1 4 1 2 7 7 . 2 1 2 7 7 . 2 4 9 5 . 6 3 2 6 7 . 6 3 7 2 . 5 
1 5 1 4 6 7 . 3 1 4 6 7 . 3 5 3 1 . 2 3 7 9 8 , 8 4 1 7 . 9 
1 6 1 5 5 3 . 3 1 5 5 3 . 3 5 2 6 . 6 4 3 2 5 , 4 4 5 8 . 5 
1 7 1 2 4 6 . 1 1 2 4 6 , 1 3 9 5 . 0 4 7 2 0 . 4 4 8 1 . 5 
1 8 1 2 2 5 . 2 1 2 2 5 . 2 3 6 2 , 7 5 0 0 3 . 1 5 0 3 . 2 
1 ' ; 1 4 2 5 . 7 1 4 2 5 . 7 3 9 4 . 9 5 4 7 8 , 0 5 3 1 . 4 
2 0 1 6 8 5 . 4 1 6 8 5 . 4 4 3 4 , 8 5 9 1 2 . 8 5 5 5 . 8 
2 1 1 4 2 5 . 7 1 4 2 5 . 7 3 4 5 . 0 6 2 5 7 . 8 5 7 5 . 7 
2 2 1 1 4 5 . 0 1 1 4 5 . 0 2 5 8 , 8 6 5 1 6 . 6 5 8 6 . 5 
2 3 1 0 3 3 . 2 1 0 3 3 . 2 2 1 0 . 0 j 6 7 3 4 . 6 5 9 9 . 4 
2 4 9 6 5 . 2 9 6 5 . 2 1 9 0 . 1 6 9 2 4 . 7 
6 0 2 . 4 
8 7 3 . 0 8 7 3 . 0 1 6 0 . 6 7 0 8 5 . 3 6 0 9 . 3 
2 6 8 0 5 . 2 8 0 5 , 2 1 3 8 . 5 7 2 : ' 3 . a 
6 1 . 4 0 
2 7 1 2 0 2 . 1 1 2 0 2 . 1 1 9 3 . 5 7 4 1 7 . 3 
6 1 5 . 6 
2 8 1 0 0 1 . 5 1 0 8 1 , 5 1 6 2 . 2 7 5 7 9 . 5 
6 2 1 . 5 
2 9 9 7 0 . 6 9 7 0 . 6 1 3 6 . 9 
7 7 1 6 . 4 6 2 5 . 0 
3 0 9 5 6 . 0 9 5 6 . 0 
1 2 5 , 2 7 8 4 1 , 6 6 3 5 . 2 
3 1 7 8 0 . 7 7 8 0 . 7 
9 6 . 6 7 9 3 7 . 6 6 3 5 . 0 
3 2 7 6 1 . 8 7 6 1 . 8 8 7 . 6 
0 0 2 5 . 2 6 3 4 . 0 
3 3 6 8 4 . 5 
6 8 4 . 5 7 3 . 2 8 0 9 0 . 4 6 3 1 . 7 
3 1 6 1 2 . 9 6 1 2 . 9 
6 1 . 3 8 1 5 9 . 7 6 3 6 . 5 
3 5 5 4 8 . 9 5 1 8 . 9 
5 1 . 6 8 2 1 1 . 3 6 3 2 . 3 
3 6 4 9 0 . 0 
i 
1 
4 9 0 . 8 
1 
4 3 . 2 8 2 5 4 . 5 6 3 5 . 6 
k76 
A P P E N D I X 8 . 2 1 R S M A L I J I O L D I K G : - A M O O T I Z E D N E T ffiTUliiJS F O . i P L A C E M E N T C L O N E R R I M 6 0 0 ( $ / A C R E ) 
A s s u m e ( l ) R S 3 3 © 8 0 c c n t a p e r p o u n d 
( 2 ) D i s c o u n t r a t e ® 1 0 p e r c e n t 
( 3 ) R e p l a n t i n g g r a n t $ 1 0 0 0 . 0 0 p e r a c r e 
A c c u a u l a t e d A m o r t i z e d 
A g e 
N e t 
I n t e r e o t A c c u m u l a t e d A d j u s t e d P r e s e n t P r e s e n t P r e s e n t 
o f 
R e t u r n s 
o n U n p a i d N e t N e t V a l u e o f V a l u e o f V a l u e o f 
T r e e s B a l a n c e R e t u r n s R e t u r n s A d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t u r n s 
A d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t u r n s 
A d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t u r n s 
0 + 9 0 . 5 + 9 0 . 5 + 9 0 . 5 + 9 0 . 5 + 9 0 . 5 + 9 0 . 5 
1 - 6 8 . 5 + 2 2 . 0 6 - 6 8 . 5 - 6 2 . 3 + 2 8 . 2 + 3 1 . 0 
2 - 4 8 . 5 - 2 6 . 4 - 4 8 . 5 - 4 0 . 1 - 1 1 . 9 - 6 . 9 
3 - 2 8 . 5 - 2 . 6 - 5 7 . 4 6 - 3 1 . 1 - 2 3 . 4 - 2 5 . 3 - 1 0 . 2 
4 - 6 7 . 5 - 5 . 7 - 1 3 0 . 6 - 7 3 . 2 - 5 0 . 0 - 8 5 . 3 - 2 6 . 9 
5 - 5 5 . 5 - 1 3 . 0 - 1 9 9 . 1 - 6 8 . 5 - 4 2 . 5 - 1 2 7 . 8 - 3 3 . 7 
6 - 6 0 . 8 - 1 9 . 9 - 2 7 9 . 8 - 8 0 . 7 - 4 5 . 5 - 1 7 3 . 3 - 3 9 . 9 
7 3 1 1 . 4 - 2 8 . 0 + 3 . 6 + 2 8 3 . 4 + 1 4 5 . 4 - 2 7 . 9 - 5 . 7 
8 5 6 9 . 4 5 6 9 . 4 2 6 5 . 9 + 2 3 8 . 0 + 4 4 . 5 
9 7 7 3 7 7 3 3 2 7 . 8 5 6 5 . 8 9 8 . 4 
1 0 9 1 4 9 1 4 3 5 2 . 8 9 1 8 . 6 1 4 9 . 7 
1 1 1 1 5 1 . 9 1 1 1 5 1 . 9 4 0 3 . 2 1 3 2 1 . 0 2 0 3 . 6 
1 2 1 1 5 2 . 9 
! 
! 1 1 5 2 . 9 3 6 7 v 8 1 6 0 9 . 6 2 4 8 . 4 
1 3 1 2 1 6 . 4 1 2 1 6 . 4 3 5 2 . 8 2 0 4 2 . 4 2 8 8 , 0 
1 4 1 2 7 7 . 2 1 2 7 7 . 2 3 3 5 . 9 2 3 7 8 . 3 3 2 3 . 4 
1 5 1 4 6 7 . 3 ( 1 4 6 7 . 3 3 5 0 . 7 2 7 2 9 . 0 3 5 7 . 5 
1 6 1 5 5 3 . 3 
i 
i 1 5 5 3 . 3 3 3 8 . 6 3 0 6 7 . 6 3 9 2 . 7 
1 7 1 2 4 6 . 1 1 2 1 6 . 1 2 4 6 . 7 3 3 1 4 . 3 4 1 4 . 3 
1 8 1 2 2 5 . 2 1 2 2 5 . 2 2 2 0 . 5 3 5 3 4 . 8 4 3 1 . 2 
1 9 1 4 2 5 . 7 1 4 2 5 . 7 2 3 3 . 0 5 7 6 8 . 6 4 5 2 . 2 
2 0 1 6 8 5 . 4 i 
1 6 8 5 . 4 , I 2 5 1 . 1 4 0 1 9 . 7 4 7 0 . 2 
2 1 1 4 2 5 . 7 
1 
( j 1 4 2 5 . 7 ' i 1 9 2 . 5 4 2 1 2 . 2 4 8 8 . 6 
2 2 1 1 4 5 . 0 j 1 1 4 5 . 0 1 1 4 0 . 8 4 3 5 3 . 0 4 9 6 . 2 
2 3 1 0 3 3 . 2 1 0 3 3 . 2 , 1 1 5 . 7 4 4 6 . 7 5 0 5 . 0 
1 2 4 9 6 5 . 2 9 6 5 . 2 9 8 . 5 4 5 6 7 . 2 5 0 7 . 0 
2 5 8 7 3 . 0 8 7 3 . 0 8 0 . 3 4 6 4 7 . 5 5 1 1 . 2 
2 6 8 0 5 . 2 8 0 5 . 2 6 7 . 6 4 7 1 5 . 1 5 1 3 . 9 • 
2 7 1 2 0 2 . 1 1 2 0 2 . 1 9 1 . 4 4 0 0 6 . 5 5 1 9 . 1 
2 0 1 0 0 1 . 5 1 0 8 1 . 5 7 4 . 6 4 8 8 1 . 1 5 2 2 . 3 
2 9 9 7 0 . 6 9 7 0 . 6 6 1 . 1 4 9 4 2 . 2 5 2 0 . 8 
3 0 9 5 6 9 5 6 5 4 . 5 4 9 9 6 . 7 5 2 9 . 7 
3 1 7 8 0 . 7 7 8 0 . 7 4 0 . 6 5 0 3 7 . 3 5 2 8 . 9 
3 2 7 6 1 . 8 j 
7 6 1 . 0 j 3 5 . 8 5 0 7 3 . 1 5 3 2 . 7 
3 3 6 0 4 . 5 
1 
1 6 8 4 . 5 1 2 9 . 4 5 1 0 2 . 5 5 3 0 . 7 
1 
3 4 6 1 2 . 9 6 1 2 . 9 2 3 . 9 5 1 2 6 . 4 5 3 3 . 1 
3 5 5 4 8 . 9 5 4 8 . 9 1 9 . 8 
5 1 4 6 . 2 5 3 5 . 2 
3 6 t 9 0 . 8 
t 
J 
4 9 0 . 0 1 5 . 7 5 1 6 1 . 9 5 3 1 . 7 
APPENDIX 8 .21S SM\LLHO!,')Tl'a; A!!O..TJZKn 3STU!31S FOR R^PLACEMl':'T CLONE RRIH 600 ( V A C R E ) 
Assume (1 ) RSS 3 'J 40 sorts per pound 
(?) Discount rate Q 7 per cent 





Interest Accumulated Adjusted Present Present Present 
of 
Returns 
on Unpaid Net Net Value of Value of 7alue of 
Trees Balance Returns Returns Adjusted Adjusted Adjusted 
Net Returns Net Returns 'let Returns 
0 + 2 5 7 . 2 + 2 5 7 . 2 +257 . 2 + 2 5 7 . 2 + 2 5 7 . 2 
i 
+ 2 5 7 . 2 
1 - 1 . 8 4 5 j +255 . 4 - 1 . 8 4 5 - 1 . 7 1 + 2 5 5 . 5 2 7 3 . 4 
2 + 1 8 . 1 5 5 + 2 7 3 . 6 + I B . 1 5 5 + 1 5 . 9 + 2 7 1 . 4 1 5 0 . 1 
3 + 3 8 . 1 5 5 1 +311 . 7 + 3 8 . 1 5 5 + 3 1 . 1 3 0 2 . 5 1 1 5 . 3 
4 - 2 0 . 8 5 + 2 9 0 . 9 - 2 0 . 8 5 - 1 5 . 9 2 8 6 . 6 8 4 . 5 
5 - 8 . 8 4 5 + 2 8 2 . 1 - 8 . 8 4 5 - 6 . 3 2 8 0 . 3 6 8 . 4 
6 - 2 0 . 8 +261 . 3 - 2 0 . 8 - 1 3 . 9 2 6 6 . 4 5 5 . 9 
r» 
/ 1 0 3 . 3 + 1 0 3 . 8 + 6 4 . 7 3 3 1 . 1 6 1 . 6 
8 2 1 9 . 6 2 1 9 . 6 1 2 7 . 8 4 5 8 . 9 
9 3 0 5 . 7 3 05 . 7 1 6 6 . 3 6 2 5 . 2 9 5 . 7 
10 3 6 4 . 2 3 6 4 . 2 1 8 5 . 0 8 1 0 . 2 1 1 5 . 0 
11 4 6 4 . 9 i 4 6 4 . 9 2 2 0 . 8 1 0 3 1 . 0 1 3 7 . 1 
12 4 6 4 . 7 4 6 4 . 7 2 0 6 . 3 1 2 3 7 . 3 1 5 5 . 9 
13 4 9 2 . 4 4 9 2 . 4 2 0 4 . 3 1441 . 6 1 7 3 . 0 
14 5 1 7 . 6 1 5 1 7 . 6 2 0 0 , 8 
1 6 4 2 . 4 1 1 8 7 . 2 
15 596 . 4 
) 
5 9 6 . 4 2 1 5 . 9 1 858 . 3 2 0 4 . 4 
16 633 633 2 1 4 . 6 2 0 7 2 . 9 2 1 9 . 7 
17 5 0 1 . 2 501 . 2 1 5 8 . 9 2 2 3 1 . 8 2 2 7 . 6 
18 4 9 1 . 8 4 9 1 . 8 1 4 5 . 6 2 3 7 7 . 4 2 3 5 . 4 
19 5 8 1 . 7 
1 
1 1 5 ^1 . 7 
1 6 1 , 1 2 5 3 8 . 5 2 4 6 . 2 
20 6 9 2 . 8 
1 
6 9 2 . 8 1 7 8 . 7 2 7 1 7 . 2 2 5 5 . 4 
21 5 0 1 . 7 581 . 7 1 4 0 . 8 2 8 5 8 . 0 2 6 2 . 9 
22 4 6 7 . 2 467 . 2 1 0 5 , 6 2 9 6 3 . 6 2 6 6 . 7 
23 4 2 3 . 2 4 2 3 . 2 8 9 . 3 3 0 5 2 . 9 2 7 1 . 7 
24 399 399 7 8 . 6 3 1 3 1 . 5 2 7 2 . 4 
25 3 6 0 . 6 3 6 0 . 6 6 6 . 4 3 1 9 7 . 9 2 7 5 . 0 
26 3 2 5 . 9 3 2 5 . 9 5 6 . 1 3 2 5 4 . 0 276.6-
27 498 498 80 . 2 3 3 3 4 . 2 2 7 6 . 7 
28 4 4 7 . 5 4 4 7 , 5 6 7 . 1 3 4 0 1 . 3 2 7 8 . 9 
29 3 9 9 . 7 
i 
399 . 7 5 6 . 4 3 4 5 7 . 7 2 8 0 . 0 
30 3 5 6 . 6 3 5 6 . 6 4 6 . 7 3 5 0 4 . 4 2 8 3 . 9 
31 3 1 7 . 9 3 1 7 . 9 3 9 . 1 3 5 4 3 . 5 2 8 3 . 5 
32 308 . 4 1 300 . 4 3 5 . 5 3 5 7 9 . 0 
2 8 2 . 7 
33 2 7 6 . 7 2 76 . 7 
2 9 . 6 3 6O8 . 6 2 8 1 . 5 
34 2 4 5 . 8 2 4 5 . 8 2 4 . 6 3 6 3 3 . 2 
2 8 3 . 4 
35 2 1 8 , 2 
2 1 8 . 2 2 0 . 5 3 6 5 3 . 7 2 8 1 . 3 
36 1 9 3 . 2 
1 
193 .2 1 7 . 0 3 6 7 0 . 7 2 8 2 . 6 
k7S 
APPENDIX 8 .21T sr .f iLLHOLDiNG: AMO :TT/:.;r) II::T R.;T'j:i]!S ycl ; :{..:r'LAcr:i';;:NT CLOUii RR IH 600 (S/ACRE) 
Anaumo ( l ) 3 /".O cenU; per pound 
(^0 Discoui.t rite u) 10 per cent 
( 3 ) Replant in- ^r-nt 0 i.il^OO.OO per acre 
j ] 
1 '\ccui7iulatod Amortized 
A CO 
Net 
I n t e r e s t .'.ccumulated Adjusted Present Present i Present 
of 
Returns 
on Unpriid !Jet Ilet Value of Value of Value of 
Trees Balance Returns Returns Adjusted Adjusted Adjusted 
!Iot Returns Net Returns j Net Returns 
0 + 2 5 7 . 2 
i 
+ 2 5 7 . 2 + 2 5 7 . 2 + 2 5 7 . 2 
f ' -- • —• 
+ 2 5 7 . 3 
1 
+ 2 5 7 . 3 
1 - 1 . 8 4 5 + 2 5 5 . 4 - 1 . 8 4 5 - 1 . 7 + 2 5 5 . 5 ! + 2 8 1 . 1 ! 
2 + 1 8 . 1 5 5 + 2 7 3 . 6 + 1 8 . 1 5 5 + 1 5 . 0 + 2 7 0 . 5 1 5 5 . 8 
3 + 3 3 . 1 5 5 + 3 1 1 . 8 •1 3 8 . 1 5 5 + 2 8 , 7 + 2 9 9 . 2 1 2 0 . 3 
4 - 2 0 . 8 5 + 2 9 1 . 0 i - 2 0 . 3 5 - 1 4 . 2 + 2 8 5 . 0 9 0 . 1 
5 - 8 . 8 4 5 + 2 8 2 . 2 - 8 . 8 4 5 - 5 . 5 2 7 ' . 5 7 3 . 8 
6 - 2 0 . S + 2 6 1 , 4 - 2 0 . 8 - 1 1 . 8 2 6 7 . 7 6 1 . 6 
7 1 0 3 . 8 + 1 0 3 . 8 + 5 3 . 2 3 2 0 . 9 6 5 . 8 
8 2 1 9 . 6 1 0 2 . 6 4 2 3 . 5 7 9 . 2 
9 3 0 5 . 7 1 2 9 . 6 5 5 3 . 1 9 6 . 2 
1 0 3 6 4 . 2 3 6 4 . 2 1 4 0 . 6 693..7 1 1 3 . 1 
11 464 . 9 4 6 4 . 9 1 6 3 . 2 8 5 6 , 9 1 3 1 . 9 6 
12 4 6 4 . 7 4''-4,7 14 0.'/ 1 0 0 5 . 1 14 ' / . 7 
13 4 9 2 . 4 4 9 2 . 4 2 3 0 . 9 1 2 3 6 . 0 1 7 4 . 3 
14 5 1 7 . 6 5 1 7 . 6 2 2 0 . 8 1 4 6 4 . 8 1 9 9 . 2 
5 9 6 . 4 5 9 6 . 4 2 4 8 . 7 1 7 1 3 . 5 2 2 6 . 2 
16 633 r/J3 2 4 9 . 4 1 9 6 : ^ ' ; 2 5 1 . 3 1 
17 5 0 1 . 2 j 5 0 1 . 2 9 9 . 2 2 0 6 2 . 1 2 5 7 . 8 1 
18 4 0 1 . 8 491.8 3?!. 5 2 1 5 0 . 6 2 6 2 . 4 1 
19 5 0 1 . 7 5 ' ' a . 7 9 5 . 4 2 2 4 6 . 0 2 6 9 . 5 
2 0 6 9 2 . 8 6 9 2 . 3 1 0 3 . 2 2 3 4 9 . 2 2 7 7 . 2 
21 5 " '1 .7 5 3 1 . 7 7 8 . 5 2 4 2 7 . 7 2 8 1 . 6 
22 4 6 7 . 2 4 6 7 . 2 5 7 . 5 2 4 8 5 . 2 2 8 3 . 3 
23 4 2 3 . 2 4 2 3 . 2 4 7 . 4 2 5 3 2 . 6 2 0 6 . 2 
24 399 399 4 0 . 7 2 5 7 3 . 3 2 8 5 . 6 
2 5 3 6 0 . 6 3 6 0 . 6 3 3 . 2 2 6 0 6 . 5 2 8 6 . 7 
2 6 3 2 5 . 9 3 2 5 . 9 2 7 . 4 2 6 3 3 . 9 2 8 7 . 1 • 
27 498 498 3 7 . 8 2 6 7 1 . 7 2 8 8 . 5 
2 8 4 4 7 . 5 4 4 7 . 5 3 0 . 9 2 7 0 2 . 6 2 8 9 . 2 
2 9 3 9 9 . 7 3 9 9 . 7 2 5 . 2 2 7 2 7 . 8 2 9 1 . 9 
30 3 5 6 . 6 3 5 6 . 6 2 0 . 3 2 7 4 0 . 1 2 9 1 . 3 
31 3 1 7 . 9 3 1 7 . 9 1 6 . 5 2 7 6 4 . 6 2 9 3 . 0 
32 3 0 8 . 4 3 0 8 . 4 1 4 . 5 2 7 7 9 . 1 2 9 1 . 8 
3 3 2 7 6 . 7 2 7 6 . 7 1 1 . 9 2 7 9 1 . 0 2 9 3 . 1 
34 2 4 5 . 8 2 4 5 . 8 9 . 6 2 8 0 0 . 6 2 9 1 . 3 
35 2 1 0 , 2 2 1 8 . 2 : 7 . 9 2 8 0 8 . 5 2 9 2 . 1 
36 1 9 3 . 2 1 9 3 . 2 
i 
1 6 . 2 2 8 1 4 . 7 2 8 9 . 9 
479 
APPEMDIX 8.21U SMALLHOLDINQ: AMORTIZED NET RETURNS FOR REPUCEMliNT CLONE RRIM 600 (VACRI:) 
Assume ( l ) RSS 3 60 cents per pound 
{?•) Discount rate @ 7 per cent 





























0 +257.2 +257.2 +257.2 +257.2 +257.2 +257.2 
1 - 1.85 +255.4 - 1.65 - 1.7 +255.5 273.4 
2 + 18.16 +273.6 + 18.16 + 15.9 +271.4 150.1 
3 + 30.16 +311.7 + 38.16 I + 31.1 302.5 115.3 
4 - 20.85 +290.9 - 20.85 i 1 - 15.9 286.6 B4.5 
5 - 8.85 +282.1 ~ 8.85 - 6.3 280.3 68,4 
6 - 20.8 +261.3 - 20.8 - 13-9 266.4 55.9 
7 216.1 216.1 +134.6 401.0 74.6 
8 408.9 408.9 230.0 639.0 106.7 
9 559 559 304.1 943.1 144.3 
10 ; 662.8 662.8 336.7 1279.8 181.7 
11 838.1 1 038.1 398.1 1677.9 223.2 
12 ' 838.3 ! 838.3 372.2 2050.1 258.3 
13 j 885.8 885.8 367.6 2417.7 290.1 
14 930.5 930.5 361.0 2778.7 316.8 
15 1070.3 1070.3 387.4 3166.1 348.3 
16 1133.8 1 1133.8 384.4 3550.5 376,4 
17 ' 906.6 906.6 287.4 3037.9 391.5 
18 891.8 891.8 264.0 4101.9 406.1 
19 1039.7 1039.7 288.0 4309.9 425,8 
20 I 1231.4 1231.4 317.7 4707.6 442.5 
21 1039.7 i 1039.7 251.6 4959,2 456.2 
22 835 1 i 835 1 188.7 5147.9 463,3 
23 754.2 ! 754.2 I 159.1 5307.0 472.3 
24 706.6 1 706.6 139.2 5446.2 473.8 
25 63'3.6 638.6 117.5 5563.7 470.5 
26 586.1 586.1 100,0 5664.5 481,5 
27 880.1 1 880,1 141.7 5806.2 481,9 
28 913.1 913.1 137.0 5943.2 487,3 
29 708.6 700.6 99.9 6043,1 489.5 
30 634.7 1 631.7 83.1 6126.2 496.2 
31 568.3 ( i 568.3 69.9 6196.1 495.7 
553.7 553.7 63.7 6259.8 494.5 
31 497.5 i 497.5 53.2 6313.0 492,4 
34 ; 444.5 444.5 44.5 6357.5 495.9 
3$ 397.2 






354.2 31.2 6426.0 494.8 
8^0 
A P P K H D I X 8 . 2 1 V S M / i L L I I O L D I N G : A M O ! i T I Z E D N K T R K T U ' ^ N S F O R R - i P L A C E M E M T C L O r i t ; R l i l H 6 0 0 ( S / A C R E ) 
A s s u m e ( l ) R S S 3 © 6 0 c e n t s p e r p o u n d 
( 2 ) D i s c o u n t r a t e & 1 0 p e r c e n t 
1 , . ,. „ 
( 3 ) R e p l a n t i n g g r a n t , . 1 5 0 0 . 0 0 p e r a c r e 
A g e 
1 
A c c u m u l a t e d A m o r t i z e d 
N e t 
I n t e r e s t A c c u m u l a t e d ] A d j u s t e d P r e s e n t P r e s e n t P r e s e n t 
o f 
R e t u r n s 
o n U n p a i d N o t I N e t V a l u e o f V a l u e o f V a l u e o f 
T r e e s B a l a n c c R e t u r n s R e t u r n s 
1 
1 
A d j u s t e d 
1 R e t R e t u r n s 
A d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t u r n s 
A d j u s t e d 
N e t R e t u r n s 
0 + 2 5 7 . 2 + 2 5 7 . 2 + ? 5 7 . 2 
I— —: 
+ 2 5 7 . 2 + 2 5 7 . 2 + 2 5 7 . 2 
1 - 1 . 8 5 + 2 5 5 . 4 - 1 . 8 5 - 1 . 7 + 2 5 5 . 5 2 8 1 . 1 
2 + 1 8 . 1 6 + 2 7 3 . 6 + 1 8 . 1 6 + 1 5 . 0 + 2 7 0 . 5 1 5 5 . 8 5 
3 + 3 0 . 1 6 + 3 1 1 . 7 + 3 8 . 1 6 + 2 8 . 7 + 2 9 9 . 2 1 2 0 . 3 
4 - 2 0 . 8 b + 2 9 0 . 9 - 2 0 . 8 5 - 1 4 . 2 + 2 8 5 8 9 . 9 
5 - 8 . 3 5 + 2 0 ; ' , 1 - 8 . 8 5 - 5 . 5 + 2 7 9 . 5 7 3 . 7 
6 - 2 0 . 8 + 2 6 1 . 3 - 2 0 . 8 - 1 1 . 8 ! + 2 6 7 . 7 6 5 . 5 
7 2 1 6 . 1 2 1 6 . 1 + 1 1 0 . 9 3 7 8 . 6 7 7 . 8 
0 4 0 8 . 9 4 0 8 . 9 1 9 1 . 0 5 6 9 . 6 1 0 6 . 8 
9 5 5 9 5 5 9 2 3 7 . 0 3 0 6 . 6 1 4 0 
1 0 6 6 2 . 8 6 6 2 . 8 2 5 5 . 8 1 0 6 2 . 4 1 7 2 . 9 
1 1 8 3 0 . 1 8 3 8 . 1 2 9 4 . 2 1 3 5 6 . 6 2 0 8 . 9 
1 2 8 3 8 . 3 8 3 0 . 3 2 6 7 . 4 1 6 2 4 2 3 8 . 3 
1 3 8 8 5 . 8 8 8 5 . 0 2 5 6 . 9 1 0 G 0 . 9 2 6 4 . 8 
1 4 9 3 0 . 5 9 3 0 . 5 2 4 4 . 7 2 1 2 5 . 6 2 8 8 . 5 
1 5 1 0 7 0 . 3 ! 1 0 7 0 . 3 2 5 > . 8 2 3 8 1 . 4 3 1 3 
1 6 1 1 3 3 . 8 ! 1 1 3 3 . 8 2 4 7 . 2 2 6 2 8 . 6 3 3 5 . 9 7 
1 7 9 0 6 . 6 1 9 0 6 . 6 1 7 9 . 5 2 8 0 8 . 1 3 5 0 , 0 
1 8 8 9 1 . 8 8 9 1 . 8 1 6 0 . 5 2 9 6 8 . 6 3 6 1 . 9 6 
1 9 1 0 3 9 . 7 i 1 0 3 9 . 7 1 7 0 . 5 3 1 3 9 . 1 3 7 5 . 
2 0 1 2 3 1 . 4 1 2 3 1 . 4 1 8 3 . 5 3 3 2 2 . 6 3 9 0 . 3 
2 1 1 0 3 9 . 7 
1 
1 1 0 3 9 . 7 1 4 0 . 4 3 4 6 3 . 4 0 0 , 4 
2 2 8 3 5 8 3 5 1 0 2 . 7 3 5 6 5 . 7 4 0 6 . 5 
2 3 7 5 4 . 2 7 5 4 . 2 8 4 . 5 3 6 5 0 . 2 4 1 0 . 9 
2 4 7 0 6 . 6 7 0 6 . 6 1 7 2 . 1 3 7 2 2 . 3 4 1 4 . 3 
2 5 6 3 8 , 6 
i 
6 3 8 . 6 5 8 . 8 3 7 8 1 . 1 4 1 6 . 5 5 
2 6 5 8 6 . 1 5 8 6 , 1 4 9 . 2 3 8 3 0 . 3 4 1 8 
2 7 8 8 0 . 1 8 8 0 . 1 6 6 . 9 3 8 9 7 . 2 4 2 1 . 8 9 
2 8 9 1 3 . 1 
( 
9 1 3 . 1 6 3 . 0 3 9 6 0 . 2 4 2 5 . 5 
2 9 7 0 8 . 6 7 0 8 . 6 4 4 . 6 4 0 0 4 . 8 4 2 7 . 4 
3 0 6 3 4 . 7 6 3 4 . 7 3 6 . 2 4 0 4 1 4 2 8 . 7 
3 1 5 6 8 . 3 5 6 8 . 3 2 9 . 6 4 0 7 0 . 6 4 2 9 . 4 
3 2 5 5 3 . 7 
( 
i 
5 5 3 . 7 2 6 . 0 4 0 9 6 . 6 4 3 0 
3 3 4 9 7 . 5 i 4 9 7 . 5 2 1 . 4 4 1 1 8 4 3 0 . 3 
3 4 4 4 4 . 5 i 
4 4 4 . 5 1 7 . 3 4 1 3 5 . 3 4 3 0 . 3 7 
3 5 3 9 7 . 2 3 9 7 . 2 1 4 . 3 4 1 4 9 . 6 4 3 0 . 7 7 
3 6 3 5 4 . 3 3 5 4 . 3 1 1 . 3 4 1 6 0 . 9 4 2 9 . 9 9 
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A s a u m e ( l ) R S S 3 « 8 0 c e n t s p e r p o u n d 
( 2 ) D i s c o u n t r a t e @ 7 p e i " c e n t 
( 3 ) R e p l a n t i n g f p ~ a n t $ 1 5 0 0 , 0 0 p e r a c r e 
! A c c u m u l a t e d A m o r t i z e d 
A g e 
N e t 
I n t e r e s t A c c u m u l a t e d A d j u s t e d j P r e s e n t P r e s e n t P r e s e n t 
o f 
R e t u r n s 
o n U n p a i d N e t N e t V a l u e o f V a l u e o f V a l u e o f 
T r e e s B a l a n c e R e t u r n s R e t u r n s A d j u s t e d 
i N e t R e t t t r n s 
A d j u s t e d 
• ' e t R e t u r n s 
A d j u s t e d 
N e t H e t u m a 




j + 2 5 7 . 2 + 2 5 7 . 2 + 2 5 7 . 2 + 2 5 7 . 2 + 2 5 7 . 2 
1 - 1 . 8 5 + 2 5 5 . 4 - 1 . 8 5 - 1 . 7 + 2 5 5 . 5 2 7 3 . 4 
2 + 1 8 . 1 6 + 2 7 3 . 6 + 1 8 . 1 6 + 1 5 . 9 2 7 1 . 4 1 5 0 . 1 
3 + 3 8 . 1 6 + 3 1 1 . 7 + 3 0 . 1 6 + 3 1 . 1 3 0 2 . 5 1 1 5 . 3 
4 - 2 0 . 8 5 + 2 9 0 . 9 - 2 0 . 8 5 1 - 1 5 . 9 2 8 6 . 6 8 4 . 5 
5 - 8 . 8 5 + 2 8 2 . 1 - 8 . 8 5 ' - 6 . 3 2 8 0 . 3 6 8 . 4 
6 - 2 0 . 8 + 2 6 1 . 3 - 2 0 . 8 1 - 1 3 . 9 2 6 6 . 4 5 5 . 9 
7 3 1 1 . 4 
i 3 1 1 . 4 
+ 1 9 4 . 0 4 6 0 . 4 8 5 . 6 
0 5 6 9 . 4 5 6 9 . 4 3 3 1 . 4 7 9 1 . 8 1 3 2 . 2 
9 7 7 3 . 0 i 7 7 3 . 0 4 2 0 . 5 1 2 1 2 . 3 1 8 5 . 5 
1 0 9 1 4 . 0 9 1 4 . 0 4 6 4 . 3 1 6 7 6 . 6 2 3 8 . 1 
1 1 5 1 . 9 
1 
1 1 5 1 . 9 5 4 7 . 2 2 2 2 3 . 8 2 9 5 . 8 ' 
1 2 1 1 5 2 . 9 
f 
1 1 5 2 . 9 5 5 1 . 9 2 7 3 5 . 7 3 4 4 . 7 
1 3 1 2 1 6 . 4 1 2 1 6 . 4 5 0 4 . 8 3 2 4 0 . 5 3 8 8 . 9 
1 4 1 2 7 7 . 2 1 2 7 7 . 2 4 9 5 . 6 3 7 3 6 . 1 4 2 5 . 9 
lb 1 4 6 7 . 3 1 4 6 7 . 3 5 3 1 . 2 4 2 6 7 . 3 4 6 9 . 4 
16 1 5 5 3 . 3 I 1 5 5 3 . 3 5 2 6 6 4 7 9 3 . 9 5 0 8 . 2 
1 7 1 2 4 6 . 1 1 2 4 6 . 1 3 9 5 . 0 5 1 8 8 . 9 5 2 9 . 3 
1 8 1 2 2 5 . 2 1 2 2 5 . 2 3 6 2 . 7 5 5 5 1 . 6 5 4 9 . 6 
1 9 1 4 2 5 . 7 1 4 2 5 . 7 3 9 4 . 9 5 9 4 6 . 5 5 7 6 . 8 
2 0 1 6 5 5 » 4 i 1 6 8 5 . 4 4 3 4 . 8 6 3 8 1 . 5 5 9 9 . 8 
2 1 1 4 2 5 . 7 1 4 2 5 . 7 { j 3 4 5 . 0 6 7 2 6 . 3 6 1 8 . 8 
2 2 1 1 4 5 . 0 1 1 4 5 . 0 2 5 8 . 8 6 9 8 5 . 1 6 2 8 . 7 
2 3 1 0 3 3 . 2 1 0 3 3 . 2 2 1 8 . 0 7 2 0 3 . 1 6 4 1 . 1 
2 4 9 6 5 . 2 9 6 5 . 2 1 9 0 . 1 7 3 9 3 . 2 6 4 3 . 2 
2 5 8 7 3 . 0 8 7 3 . 0 1 6 0 . 6 7 5 5 3 . 8 6 4 9 . 6 
2 6 8 0 5 . 2 
1 8 0 5 . 2 1 3 8 , 5 7 6 9 2 . 3 6 5 3 . 8 • 
2 7 1 2 0 2 . 1 1 2 0 2 . 1 1 9 3 . 5 2 8 8 5 . 8 6 5 4 . 5 
2 8 1 0 0 1 . 5 1 0 0 1 . 5 1 6 2 . 2 8 0 4 8 . 0 6 5 9 . 9 
2 9 9 7 0 . 6 9 7 0 . 6 1 3 6 . 9 8 1 8 4 . 9 6 6 3 . 0 
3 0 9 5 ^ . 0 9 5 6 . 0 1 2 5 . 2 8 3 1 0 . 1 6 7 3 . 1 
3 1 7 8 0 . 7 7 B 0 . 7 9 6 . 0 0 4 0 6 . 1 6 7 2 . 5 
3 2 7 6 1 . 8 7 6 1 . 8 8 7 . 6 8 4 9 3 . 7 6 7 1 . 0 
3 3 6 8 4 . 5 6 8 4 . 5 7 3 . 2 3 5 6 6 . 9 6 6 8 . 2 
3 4 6 1 2 . 9 6 1 2 . 9 6 1 . 3 6 8 2 8 . 2 6 7 3 . 0 
3 5 5 4 8 . 9 5 4 8 . 9 5 1 . 6 8 6 7 9 . 8 
668,3 
3 6 4 9 0 . 8 4 9 0 . 8 4 3 . 2 8 7 2 3 . 0 6 6 3 , 0 
APPfflDIX 8 .2LX StULLIIOLDIMG: AMORTIZED NET RfiTORDS FOR RKPLACEKEN'T CLONE RRIH 600 ( V A C R E ) 
Assumo ( l ) RSS 3 "i 80 cents per pound 
( 2 ) Discount rate @ 10 per cent 






I n t e r e s t 
( 
Accumulated ( Ad justed Pre sent Present Present 
of on Unpaid Net Net Value of Value of Value of 








0 > 2 5 7 . 2 + 2 5 7 . 2 ! + 2 5 7 . 2 + 2 5 7 . 2 + 2 5 7 . 2 + 2 5 7 . 2 
1 - 1 . 8 4 5 + 2 5 5 . 4 : - 1 . 3 4 5 - 1 . 6 7 7 2 2 5 5 . 5 2 8 1 . 1 
2 + 1 8 . 1 5 5 + 2 7 3 . 6 + 1 8 . 1 5 5 + 1 5 . 0 0 4 2 7 0 . 5 1 5 5 . 9 
3 + 3 8 , 1 5 5 + 3 1 1 . 7 + 3 8 . 1 5 5 + 2 8 , 6 6 7 2 9 9 . 1 7 1 2 0 . 3 
4 - 2 0 , 8 5 + 2 9 0 . 9 1 - 2 0 . 8 5 - 1 4 . 2 4 2 8 4 . 9 3 3 9 . 9 
5 - 8 , 8 4 ; ; + 2 8 2 . 1 : - 8 . 8 4 5 - 5 . 4 9 2 7 9 . 4 4 7 3 . 7 
6 - 2 0 . 8 + 2 6 1 . 3 i - 2 0 . 8 - 1 1 . 7 4 2 6 7 . 7 6 1 . 5 
7 3 1 1 . 4 3 1 1 . 4 1 5 9 . 7 9 4 2 7 . 5 8 7 . 8 
8 5 6 9 . 4 5 6 9 . 4 2 ^ . 6 6 9 3 . 1 1 2 9 . 9 
9 7 7 3 . 0 7 7 3 3 2 7 . 0 1 0 2 0 . 9 1 7 7 . 3 
1 0 9 1 4 . 0 9 1 4 . 3 5 2 . 4 1 3 7 3 . 3 2 2 3 . 5 
1 1 1 1 5 1 . 9 1 1 5 1 . 9 4 0 3 . 7 1 7 7 7 2 7 3 . 6 
1 2 1 1 5 2 . 9 1 1 5 2 . 9 3 6 7 . 3 2 1 4 4 , 3 3 1 4 . 7 
1 3 1 2 1 6 . 4 
1 2 1 6 . 4 3 5 2 2 4 9 6 . 3 3 5 1 . 4 
1 2 7 7 . 2 1 2 7 7 . 2 3 3 6 . 3 2 8 3 2 . 6 3 8 4 . 5 
1 5 1 4 6 7 . 3 1 4 6 7 . 3 3 5 1 . 3 3 1 8 3 . 9 4 2 8 . 9 
1 6 1 5 5 3 . 3 1 5 5 3 . 3 j 3 3 8 3 5 2 1 . 9 4 5 0 
1 7 1 2 4 6 . 1 1 2 4 6 . 1 2 4 6 . 5 3 7 6 8 . 4 
4 6 9 . 8 
1 8 1 2 2 5 . 2 1 2 2 5 . 2 2 2 0 . 4 3 9 8 3 . 8 4 8 6 . 4 
1 9 1 4 2 5 . 7 1 4 2 5 . 7 2 3 3 . 0 4 2 2 1 . 8 5 0 4 . 7 
2 0 1 6 8 5 . 4 1 6 8 5 . 4 2 5 0 . 5 4 4 7 2 . 3 5 2 5 . 3 
2 1 1 4 2 5 . 7 1 4 2 5 . 7 1 9 2 . 6 5 4 6 6 4 . 9 5 5 3 9 . 4 
2 2 1 1 4 5 . 0 1 1 4 5 1 4 0 . 7 4 8 0 5 . 6 5 5 4 7 . 9 
2 3 1 0 3 3 . 2 1 0 3 3 . 2 1 1 5 . 4 4 9 2 1 . 0 5 5 5 3 . 9 7 
2 1 9 6 5 . 2 9 6 5 . 2 9 7 . 9 9 5 0 1 9 . 0 4 5 5 8 . 6 
2 5 8 7 3 . 0 8 7 3 . 0 8 0 . 5 7 5 0 9 9 . 6 
5 6 1 . 8 
2 6 8 0 5 . 2 8 0 5 . 2 6 7 . 5 6 5 1 6 7 . 2 5 6 4 
2 7 1 2 0 2 . 1 j 1 2 0 2 . 1 9 1 . 6 9 
5 2 5 8 . 6 5 6 9 . 3 
2 8 1 0 8 1 . 5 1 0 8 1 . 5 7 4 . 9 9 5 3 3 3 . 8 5 5 7 3 
2 9 9 7 0 . 6 9 7 0 . 6 
6 1 . 1 4 5 3 9 4 . 9 9 5 7 5 . 8 
3 0 9 5 6 9 5 6 5 4 . 8 
5 4 4 9 . 7 5 7 8 
3 1 7 8 0 . 7 7 e o . 7 4 0 , 7 
5 4 9 0 . 4 9 5 7 9 . 2 
y? 7 6 1 . 0 7 6 1 . 8 3 6 . 0 8 5 5 2 6 . 5 3 5 8 0 
3 3 6 8 4 , 5 6 8 4 . 5 2 9 . 5 5 5 5 6 . 0 3 
5 8 0 . 6 
3 " 6 1 2 . 9 6 1 2 . 9 2 3 . 9 8 
5 5 8 0 5 0 0 . 7 
3 5 1 5 4 8 . 9 5 4 8 . 9 1 9 . 5 3 
5 5 9 9 . 5 5 8 0 . 6 
3 6 1 4 9 0 . 8 
i 
4 9 0 , 8 1 5 . 8 7 5 6 1 5 . 4 5 B 0 . 3 
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